CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 1 of 15
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
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`Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB)
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`
`MEMORANDUM
`OPINION AND ORDER
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`Alexander Farrell, Esq., and Russell M. Spence, Jr., Esq., Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC,
`counsel for Plaintiff Neil Leonard Haddley.
`
`Bruce H. Little, Esq., and Sarah Pruett, Esq., Lindquist & Vennum LLP, counsel for
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`Neil Leonard Haddley,
`
`
`
`v.
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`Next Chapter Technology, Inc., a corporation;
`Vaughn Mulcrone, an individual;
`dataBridge, LLC, a limited liability company;
`County of Kittson, Minnesota;
`County of Mahnomen, Minnesota;
`County of Marshall, Minnesota;
`County of Norman, Minnesota;
`County of Polk, Minnesota;
`County of Red Lake, Minnesota;
`County of Roseau, Minnesota;
`County of Kandiyohi, Minnesota;
`County of Rice, Minnesota;
`County of Scott, Minnesota;
`County of Stearns, Minnesota;
`County of Washington, Minnesota;
`County of Becker, Minnesota;
`County of Clay, Minnesota;
`County of Dodge, Minnesota;
`County of Isanti, Minnesota;
`County of Otter Tail, Minnesota;
`County of Mower, Minnesota;
`County of Steele, Minnesota; and
`County of Waseca, Minnesota;
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`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
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`
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`Defendants.
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 2 of 15
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`INTRODUCTION
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`
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`This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
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`Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim (Doc. No. 44); and Plaintiff’s
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`Motion to Consolidate (Doc. No. 51). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in
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`part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate.
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`I.
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`Factual Background
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Neil Haddley filed suit against Defendants alleging various acts of
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`copyright infringement stemming from their use and then replacement of a software
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`program called Scanning Enabler. In 2007, Plaintiff developed Scanning Enabler as a
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`program to scan documents into Microsoft SharePoint and which also allowed the user to
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`view and index paper documents without leaving SharePoint. (Doc. No. 18 (“Am.
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`Compl.”) ¶ 36.) Haddley first published Scanning Enabler in Australia while he was
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`living there. At the time, Haddley was operating as the sole shareholder of Blue Duck
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`Pty., Ltd, an Australian entity that Haddley formed in 2006. Blue Duck Pty. had no
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`formal employees. Instead, Haddley used Blue Duck Pty. as a vehicle to market and sell
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`Scanning Enabler. (Defs.’ MTD Memo. at 4.)1
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`1
`The Court will cite Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to
`Dismiss as “Defs.’ MTD Memo.” (Doc. No. 46); Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition
`as “Pl.’s MTD Opp.” (Doc. No. 48); and Defendants’ Reply Brief as “Defs.’ MTD
`Reply” (Doc. No. 49). The Court will cite Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of his
`Motion to Consolidate as “Pl.’s Consolidation Memo.” (Doc. No. 54); and Defendants’
`Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Consolidate as “Defs.’ Consolidation Opp.”
`(Doc. No. 58).
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`(Footnote Continued on Next Page)
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`2
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 3 of 15
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`In 2009, Haddley entered into a resale agreement for Scanning Enabler with
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`Defendant Next Chapter Technology (“NCT”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) Haddley also
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`licensed to NCT two versions of Scanning Enabler, which NCT then incorporated into its
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`document-management program ScottWorks. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) NCT helped develop
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`ScottWorks for Scott County, Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 51.) Based on the success of
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`ScottWorks, NCT began marketing the product as CaseWorks to other county
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`governments in Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.) A number of Minnesota counties purchased
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`licenses for CaseWorks, which used Scanning Enabler as part of its functionality. These
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`counties are defendants in this action (generally, the “County Defendants”).2
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`In 2012, Haddley began working for NCT. While Haddley worked there, NCT
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`licensed Scanning Enabler to Clay County and Steele County, Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 60, 98.)
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`To download and access Scanning Enabler, a purchaser was required to enter a unique
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`license key. (See id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Clay and Steele Counties
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`exceeded the licenses by downloading too many copies of Scanning Enabler. (Id. ¶¶ 67,
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`103.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that six of the County Defendants3 accessed Steele
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`and Clay counties’ servers to copy Scanning Enabler without paying for additional
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`
`(Footnote Continued From Previous Page)
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` 2
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`The County Defendants are the Minnesota counties of Kittson, Mahnomen,
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`Marshall, Norman, Polk, Red Lake, Roseau, Kandiyohi, Rice, Scott, Stearns,
`Washington, Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele, and Waseca.
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`
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`The six counties are Becker, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, and Waseca.
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`3
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` 3
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 4 of 15
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`licenses. Plaintiff also alleges that NCT was actively involved in enabling this system of
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`shared licenses. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 84.)
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`Near the end of 2012, Haddley apparently learned that some of the County
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`Defendants were allegedly using unlicensed versions of Scanning Enabler. (Id. ¶ 131.)
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`Haddley raised the issue with NCT. Haddley and NCT attempted to resolve the issue, but
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`could not reach an agreement to remedy Haddley’s concerns. With the issues unresolved,
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`NCT fired Haddley without cause. (Id. at ¶ 139.) NCT then hired Defendant dataBridge
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`to create a replacement product for Scanning Enabler. The replacement product was
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`distributed to the County Defendants. (Id. ¶ 166-67.)
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`II.
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`Procedural History
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`On August 24, 2015, Haddley filed a pro se complaint against eight of the County
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`Defendants4 (the “Isanti Matter”).5 In that complaint, Haddley brought claims related to
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`the Isanti Defendants’ use of Scanning Enabler. On September 16, 2015, NCT moved to
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`intervene pursuant to its contractual duty to defend the Isanti Defendants. (Isanti, Doc.
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`No. 26.) Plaintiff, still pro se, opposed the motion. (Isanti, Doc. No. 36.) On
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`November 18, 2015, the magistrate judge denied the motion. (Isanti, Doc. No. 49.) In
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`the Isanti Matter, Haddley has obtained counsel, discovery has closed, and the parties
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`have cross-moved for summary judgment.
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`4
`The eight defendants are Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele,
`and Waseca (generally, the “Isanti Defendants”).
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` 5
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`Haddley v. Isanti et al., Civ. No. 15-2106 (D. Minn). The Court will cite to
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`documents in the Isanti Matter as “Isanti, Doc. No. __.”
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`4
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 5 of 15
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`After hiring counsel, Haddley filed a new complaint here, which was later
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`amended. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings three claims: (1) a claim against
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`NCT and its sole shareholder, Vaughn Mulcrone, for copyright infringement for
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`providing copies of Scanning Enabler to the Isanti Defendants; (2) a claim against all
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`defendants for copyright infringement stemming from the creation and use of the
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`replacement product for Scanning Enabler; and (3) a claim against NCT, Mulcrone, and
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`the Isanti Defendants alleging that they undertook efforts to circumvent Scanning
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`Enabler’s license-key system.
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`DISCUSSION
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`Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc.
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`No. 44.) Plaintiff has moved to consolidate this case with the Isanti Matter. (Doc. No.
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`51.) Defendants also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim for Count 2 as to the
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`County Defendants and for Count 3 as to the Isanti Defendants.
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`I.
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`Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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`A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court’s subject matter
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`jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the party
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`asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving jurisdiction. V S Ltd. P’ship v. Dep’t of
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`Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). “Subject-matter jurisdiction
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`is a threshold requirement which must be assured in every federal case.” Kronholm v.
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`Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990).
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`A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may challenge a plaintiff’s complaint either on its face or
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`on the factual truthfulness of its averments. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 6 of 15
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`n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). When a defendant brings a facial challenge—that is, even if the
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`allegations were true, they lack an essential element for jurisdiction—a court reviews the
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`pleadings alone and assumes the allegations are true. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593
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`(8th Cir. 1993); accord Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. In a factual challenge to
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`jurisdiction, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings and weigh the accuracy
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`of the allegations. Titus, 4 F.3d at 593; accord Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6.
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`Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff’s copyright registration
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`certificate is materially inaccurate. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
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`registration certificate incorrectly identifies Haddley as the author of Scanning Enabler,
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`instead of Blue Duck Pty.—the Australian entity that Plaintiff used to market and sell the
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`program. Before a plaintiff may file a lawsuit for copyright infringement, the plaintiff
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`must register his copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 411.6 If a registration certificate is inaccurate, a
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`plaintiff may still proceed with a civil action unless the inaccurate information was
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`provided with knowledge of the inaccuracy and the inaccuracy of the information would
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`have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse to issue the registration certificate. 17
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`6
`The holder of a foreign copyright does not need to register before filing suit,
`unless he is seeking statutory damages or attorney fees. 17 U.S.C. § 412; see also The
`Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162
`(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Section 412 has no exception excusing foreign works from its
`mandate: it requires registration to obtain statutory damages for both domestic and
`foreign works.”).
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`6
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 7 of 15
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`U.S.C. § 411(b). The misrepresentation must be inaccurate and material. See, e.g.,
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`DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2013).7
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`When a copyright is registered within five years of the material’s first publication,
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`there is a presumption that the copyright is valid and the information contained in the
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`registration certificate is accurate. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). This presumption shifts the
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`burden to the defendant to prove invalidity. Progressive Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home
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`Centers, Inc., 549 F. App’x 913, 918 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, however, Haddley received
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`his registration certificate in 2014, more than five years after he first published Scanning
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`Enabler in 2007. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38, Ex. A.) As a result, Haddley bears the burden of
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`showing that the copyright is valid and that the information contained in the certificate is
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`accurate.
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`Defendants argue that Haddley’s registration certificate incorrectly identifies
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`himself as the author of Scanning Enabler. Defendants’ argument is premised on the
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`7
`The Court notes that 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) provides a specific procedure for
`situations when a party claims that a registration certificate is invalid (a procedure the
`parties have failed to discuss and seemingly ignored). Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b), “In any
`case in which inaccurate information [in the registration certificate] is alleged, the court
`shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the inaccurate
`information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse
`registration.” The purpose of the provision is to prevent courts from invalidating
`copyrights without receiving input from the Register—the very thing that Defendants
`invited the Court to do here. Despite the mandatory provision, courts can still determine
`the timing of when it will contact the Register. DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v.
`Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts can demand that the party
`seeking invalidation first establish that the other preconditions to invalidity are satisfied
`before obtaining the Register’s advice on materiality.”). Here, the Court will wait to
`contact the Register until there is a showing that ownership information was inaccurate
`and that Haddley provided the information with knowledge of the inaccuracy.
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 8 of 15
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`Work-for-Hire doctrine, which provides that generally an employer owns the copyrights
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`for the materials that its employees create. See generally Melville B. Nimmer & David
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`Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 5.03 (2016). In response, Haddley argues that even if
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`he were an employee of Blue Duck Pty.—an entity that he solely owned—Blue Duck
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`Pty. and he could have agreed that he would be the owner of the copyright.
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`In addressing whether Haddley owns the copyright for Scanning Enabler, the
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`Court must first determine whether Australian or U.S. law applies. As a general matter,
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`the law governing the substantive rights of the copyright holder is drawn from the
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`country where the infringement took place. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
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`Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1998). The law governing ownership, however, is
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`drawn from the country with the most significant relationship. Id. at 91; see also
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`Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Initial ownership
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`of a copyrighted work is determined by the laws in the work’s country of origin.”). Here,
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`because the work was first published in Australia to a person then domiciled in Australia,
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`Australia “is the appropriate source of law to determine the issues of ownership.” See
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`Itar-Tass Russian News Agency, 153 F.3d at 90 (“Since the works at issue were created
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`by Russian nationals and first published in Russia, Russian law is the appropriate source
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`of law to determine issues of ownership of rights.”).
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`
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`The parties provided only limited briefing on Australia’s copyright-ownership law,
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`but Defendants cite to the Australian Copyright Council as authoritative. (Defs.’ MTD
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`Memo. at 13.) According to the Australian Copyright Council, an employer will own the
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`copyright for the software developed by an employee during the course of the employee’s
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 9 of 15
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`usual duties. Australian Copyright Council, Software & Apps, G050v12 (Dec. 2014), at
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`3. Parties, however, can designate by agreement who owns the copyright. Australian
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`Copyright Council, Ownership of Copyright, G058v08 (Nov. 2014), at 1-2; see also
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`Australian Copyright Council, Software & Apps, G050v12 (Dec. 2014), at 3 (“In most
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`cases there will be an agreement . . . setting out who owns copyright in the material.”);
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`Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Short Guide to Copyright, at 7
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`(“All copyright ownership rules (except those that relate to moral rights) may be varied
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`by agreement.”). Thus, Haddley and the Australian entity that he solely owned could
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`have agreed that Haddley would retain the copyright for Scanning Enabler. See Jules
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`Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Can. Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding
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`that the owner of a “one-man shop” could decide whether he or the entity owned the
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`copyright). Because Haddley could have retained ownership in the copyright, the Court
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`concludes that Plaintiff has adequately plead standing to bring his claims for copyright
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`infringement.8 Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
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`Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
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`8
`Plaintiff still has the burden of demonstrating that an agreement existed between
`Haddley and Blue Duck Pty., Ltd regarding the copyright ownership of Scanning
`Enabler. If Plaintiff fails to demonstrate such an agreement existed, the Court will
`reexamine whether Haddley’s registration certificate is invalid because of a material
`misstatement. See Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1156 (noting that the district court allowed
`the case to proceed despite questions of fact regarding the registration certificate, but left
`open the opportunity to revisit the issue if the plaintiff failed to “perfect standing prior to
`the close” of the plaintiffs’ case in chief).
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 10 of 15
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`II. Motion to Consolidate
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`Plaintiff moves to consolidate this case with the Isanti Matter. Under Federal Rule
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`of Civil Procedure 42(a), courts have broad discretion to consolidate pending actions that
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`involve a common question of fact or law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a); see also Doe YZ v.
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`Shattuck–St. Mary’s Sch., Civ. No. 15-1151, 2016 WL 6594077, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 4,
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`2016). The party seeking consolidation bears the burden of showing that consolidation
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`promotes judicial convenience and economy. Shattuck–St. Mary’s Sch., 2016 WL
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`6594077, at *1. But even if consolidation would promote judicial economy,
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`consolidation is inappropriate when it unfairly prejudices a party. Id.
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`Here, Plaintiff argues that common issues of fact and law exist between the two
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`cases. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the Isanti Defendants are in a different
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`factual and legal position than the Defendants in this case. In addition, Defendants argue
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`that the Isanti Defendants will be prejudiced because the parties have completed
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`discovery in the Isanti Matter and that case is ripe for summary judgment.
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`
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`The Court concludes that common issues of fact and law exist between this case
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`and the Isanti Matter. The underlying facts of this case focus on NCT’s use and
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`replacement of Scanning Enabler in its CaseWorks product. The exact same facts
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`underlie Haddley’s claims in the Isanti Matter, where Haddley alleges that the Isanti
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`Defendants exceeded the contracted-for number of licenses of Scanning Enabler.
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`Moreover, both matters focus on whether the defendants infringed Haddley’s copyrights.
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`The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that the two cases are legally or
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`factually distinct. Indeed, Defendants have moved to dismiss a claim in this case on the
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 11 of 15
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`basis that Haddley is bringing the exact same claim in the Isanti Matter. (See Defs.’
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`MTD Memo. at 25 (“Plaintiff includes the County of Isanti Defendants as defendants in
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`Count 3 . . . even though he has already made the same claims against them in the first
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`lawsuit.”).)
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`Having concluded that the two cases involve common issues of fact and law, the
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`Court also finds that judicial economy would be furthered by consolidating the two cases.
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`Plaintiff has brought similar claims against overlapping defendants in two separate
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`matters. Litigating the matters separately would waste limited judicial resources. As a
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`result, the Court concludes that judicial economy would be promoted by consolidating
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`the two matters.
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`Despite finding that judicial economy will be promoted, the Court must also
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`examine whether a party will be prejudiced by the consolidation. Defendants argue that
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`consolidation will cause prejudice because the Isanti Matter has completed discovery
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`while this case has only started. But Defendants cannot avoid consolidation simply
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`because discovery is concluded, especially when much of the discovery will be
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`overlapping. See 9A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
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`Federal Practice & Procedure § 2382 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2017) (“Actions pending at
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`different stages of discovery may be consolidated, although any savings of time and
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`expense well may be diminished.”); see also Doc. No. 62, Tr. at 39 ([Plaintiff’s Counsel]:
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`“We won’t have to do any more discovery with the [Isanti] Defendants, so they can just
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`sit and wait for the rest of the discovery to complete as to the rest of the case.”). In
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`addition, the Isanti Defendants are defendants in both actions, and the parties are
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`represented by the same respective counsel in both actions. See Shattuck–St. Mary’s
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`Sch., 2016 WL 6594077, at *2 (noting that consolidation was appropriate in part because
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`counsel for both matters were the same). The Court therefore concludes that Defendants
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`will not be unfairly prejudiced by consolidating the matters.
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`Thus, consolidating the Isanti Matter and this case is appropriate. Accordingly,
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`Plaintiff is instructed to file a consolidated complaint not inconsistent with this order
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`within thirty days of this order.
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`III. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
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`In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in
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`the complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the
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`light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th
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`Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true wholly conclusory
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`allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th
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`Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v.
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`City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). A court deciding a motion to
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`dismiss may consider the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced
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`by the complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall
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`Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
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`To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
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`claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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`570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must
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`contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
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`level.” Id. at 555. As the Supreme Court reiterated, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
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`of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster
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`under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`at 555). In sum, this standard “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation
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`that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
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`
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`Defendants move to dismiss Count 2 for the County Defendants. Count 2 is a
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`claim based on the creation and use of a replacement product for Scanning Enabler.
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`Specific to the County Defendants, Plaintiff’s claim is premised on the County
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`Defendants’ downloading and use of the replacement product. “Plaintiffs must satisfy
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`two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must
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`show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that
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`the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders
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`under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th
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`Cir. 2001); accord Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2004).
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`Here, Plaintiff alleges that NCT, Mulcrone, and dataBridge infringed on Haddley’s
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`copyright by creating a replacement product for Scanning Enabler. (Am. Compl.
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`¶ 161-65.) One of the rights of a copyright owner is the right to create derivative
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`products. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2); see also Mulcahy, 386 F.3d at 852 (“One who violates the
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`copyright owner’s right to create derivative works is an infringer.”). Haddley goes on to
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`allege that the County Defendants infringed Plaintiff’s copyright by using the
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`replacement product. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 167-68.) But merely buying an infringing product
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`is not actionable. Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir.
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`1952). Because Plaintiff’s claim in Count 2 against the County Defendants is premised
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`merely on purchasing an infringing product, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Thus, the
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`Court dismisses Count 2 against the County Defendants.
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`Defendants also move to dismiss Count 3 for the Isanti Defendants on the basis
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`that Haddley has already brought the same claim against them in the Isanti Matter.
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`Because the Court has ordered Plaintiff to file a consolidated complaint, the Court
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`determines that Defendants’ motion on this issue is moot. The Court therefore denies
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`Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 3 for the Isanti Defendants.
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`CONCLUSION
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`
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`Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately plead
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`standing to pursue his copyright infringement claims, but the Court will revisit the issue
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`if Plaintiff fails to prove that he is the owner of the copyright. The Court grants
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2 for the County Defendants, and the Court denies
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 3 for the Isanti Defendants. The Court grants
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`Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate.
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`ORDER
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`Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
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`1.
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. [44]) is GRANTED IN PART
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`and DENIED IN PART consistent with the memorandum above.
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`2.
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`Count 2 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. No. [18]) is DISMISSED
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`WITH PREJUDICE as to the County Defendants—the Minnesota counties of Kittson,
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`14
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`CASE 0:16-cv-01960-DWF-LIB Document 63 Filed 04/25/17 Page 15 of 15
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`Mahnomen, Marshall, Norman, Polk, Red Lake, Roseau, Kandiyohi, Rice, Scott, Stearns,
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`Washington, Becker, Clay, Dodge, Isanti, Otter Tail, Mower, Steele, and Waseca.
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`3.
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`4.
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`Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate (Doc. No. [51]) is GRANTED.
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`This matter and Haddley v. Isanti et al., Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB) are
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`consolidated for all purposes under case number: Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB).
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`5.
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`Plaintiff shall file a consolidated complaint for the two matters consistent
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`with this order within thirty days of this order.
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`6.
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`7.
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`The caption for Civil No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB) will remain the same.
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`Upon the filing of the consolidated amended complaint in Civil
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`No. 16-1960 (DWF/LIB), the parties shall file a dismissal document in Civil No. 15-2106
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`(DWF/LIB).
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`8.
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`All pending matters, including discovery, in Civil No. 15-2106 (DWF/LIB)
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`are STAYED unless the parties jointly stipulate to the matters continuing.
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`Dated: April 25, 2017
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`s/Donovan W. Frank
`DONOVAN W. FRANK
`United States District Judge
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`15
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