Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2478 Filed 09/14/22 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`Case No. 2:22-md-03034-TGB
`
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`Case No. 2:22-cv-11403-TGB
`
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Case No. 2:22-cv-11405-TGB
`
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`IN RE NEO WIRELESS, LLC
`PATENT LITIG.
`
`NEO WIRELESS, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.,
`INC. AND HONDA DEVELOPMENT
`& MANUFACTURING OF
`AMERICA, LLC,
`
`Defendants.
`
`NEO WIRELESS, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`NISSAN NORTH AMERICA INC.
`AND NISSAN MOTOR
`ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
`a/k/a NISSAN MOTOR
`ACCEPTANCE COMPANY LLC,
`Defendants.
`
`DEFENDANTS HONDA AND NISSAN’S REPLY BRIEF IN
`SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
`CLAIMS OF WILLFUL AND INDUCED PATENT
`INFRINGEMENT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`I.
`II.
`
`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2479 Filed 09/14/22 Page 2 of 14
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 1
`A. Neo’s Willful Infringement Claims Should Be Dismissed. .................. 1
`1.
`Neo’s allegations of pre-suit notice are deficient. ...................... 1
`2.
`Neo does not allege any “subsequent actions”
`suggesting willful infringement. ................................................. 4
`Neo’s Induced Infringement Claims Should Be Dismissed. ................ 6
`B.
`III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 7
`
`
`
`
`i
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2480 Filed 09/14/22 Page 3 of 14
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,
`24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 3
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................. 5
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................. 5
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,
`No. 17-CV-00072-BLF, 2017 WL 2462423 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) ............ 2, 3
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc.,
`No. 07-CV-710-BBC, 2009 WL 3047616 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 18, 2009) .............. 3
`Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
`563 U.S. 754 (2011) .............................................................................................. 3
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`579 U.S. 93 (2016) ................................................................................................ 4
`Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,
`No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 1455336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) ........... 2, 3
`IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc.
`No. 18-452-WCB, 2019 WL 330515 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2019) .............................. 6
`JDS Techs., Inc. v. Avigilon USA Corp.,
`No. 15-10385, 2015 WL 3603525 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2015) ............................. 7
`Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,
`917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .............................................................................. 7
`Michigan Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`472 F. Supp. 3d 377 (E.D. Mich. 2020) ............................................................... 6
`No. 13-10534, 2013 WL 5701063, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2013) ..................... 7
`Semiconductor Energy Lab’y Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp.,
`531 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ................................................................ 4
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2481 Filed 09/14/22 Page 4 of 14
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
`
`Page(s)
`Service Solutions U.S., LLC v. Autel U.S. Inc............................................................ 7
`SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. CIV. 10-389-LPS, 2012 WL 3061027 (D. Del. July 26, 2012) .................... 4
`State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
`751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................ 5
`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.,
`990 F. Supp. 2d 882 (W.D. Wis. 2013) ................................................................ 3
`ZitoVault, LLC v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`No. 3:16-CV-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971131 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018) ............... 4
`
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`iii
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2482 Filed 09/14/22 Page 5 of 14
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Neo’s willfulness and inducement claims are implausible and should be
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`dismissed for two reasons. First, Neo’s alleged notice letter does not support a
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`plausible inference of willfulness or the specific intent required for indirect
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`infringement, because it only generally disclosed the existence of a large portfolio
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`with no detail on any purported infringement.1 Second, Neo’s allegations only
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`describe Honda and Nissan’s conduct before being notified of the patents-in-suit;
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`Neo does not identify any post-knowledge conduct by Honda and Nissan that
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`could suggest willfulness or specific intent.
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`A. Neo’s Willful Infringement Claims Should Be Dismissed.
`Neo’s allegations of pre-suit notice are deficient.
`1.
`Neo’s allegations do not support a reasonable inference that Honda or
`
`Nissan acted willfully with respect to the asserted patents. First, Neo’s alleged
`
`letters do not contain sufficient detail to plausibly support an inference of
`
`
`1 Moreover, Neo’s purported letter to “Honda” (if sent at all)—which Neo’s
`counsel first provided to Honda’s counsel on August 10, 2022—was incorrectly
`addressed to 115 Gaither Dr, Mt. Laurel Township, New Jersey 08054. This is a
`parts facility for defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“HMC”), and not
`defendant HMC’s headquarters in Torrance, California. In its complaint filed in
`Ohio (and amended Complaint filed in this Court), Neo correctly averred that
`HMC is a California corporation located in Torrance, California. As to defendant
`Honda Development & Manufacturing of America, LLC (“HDMA”), Neo never
`relies on any allegations that it sent any letter to HDMA, but it correctly averred
`that HDMA is an Ohio corporation located in Ohio.
`
`
`

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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2483 Filed 09/14/22 Page 6 of 14
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`willfulness regarding the asserted patents. The letters do nothing more than state
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`that a large patent portfolio exists, and fail to identify any accused products or
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`asserted claims. See Exs. A-B; Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 17-CV-00072-
`
`BLF, 2017 WL 2462423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) (“Knowledge of a patent
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`portfolio generally is not the same thing as knowledge of a specific patent.”).
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`Without providing Honda and Nissan an identification of which products allegedly
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`infringe which patents, Neo attempts to place the burden on Honda and Nissan to
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`seek out patents and claims that they may infringe—or else commit willful
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`infringement. That is not the law. Even assuming arguendo that Neo’s letters
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`could be deemed to give Honda and Nissan actual knowledge, it is still “too far a
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`stretch to convert the [letters] into a basis for willful infringement.” Hypermedia
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`Navigation LLC v. Google LLC, No. 18-CV-06137-HSG, 2019 WL 1455336, at *4
`
`(N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019). Neo’s letters, devoid of necessary details, do not support
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`a plausible inference of willfulness with respect to the specific asserted patents—
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`especially as Neo’s letter to defendant American Honda was sent to the wrong
`
`address, a New Jersey parts location rather than defendant American Honda’s
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`California headquarters. Courts need not accept “unwarranted deductions of fact[]
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`or unreasonable inferences.” Id. at *1.
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`Notably, both actual notice under § 287(a) and active inducement under
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`§ 271(b) require more than a simplistic disclosure of a patent portfolio and an
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`2
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`

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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2484 Filed 09/14/22 Page 7 of 14
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`
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`assertion of patent essentiality. Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,
`
`24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc., No. 07-CV-710-
`
`BBC, 2009 WL 3047616, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 18, 2009); Toshiba Corp. v.
`
`Imation Corp., 990 F. Supp. 2d 882, 900 (W.D. Wis. 2013); Global-Tech
`
`Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763–64, (2011).2 It makes no sense
`
`that these doctrines would require knowledge of the infringement, while
`
`willfulness—which requires even more, egregiousness—can be met by nothing
`
`more than an alleged vague awareness that a large patent portfolio exists. Finjan,
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`2017 WL 2462423, at *5; Hypermedia, 2019 WL 1455336, at *3-4.
`
`Further, Neo’s complaints, in fact, do not state who allegedly sent and
`
`received the letters. The Honda Amended Complaint simply states that “Neo sent
`
`a letter to HMC,” Honda Am. Compl. ¶ 69, and the Nissan Amended Complaint
`
`states an essentially verbatim allegation, Nissan Am. Compl. ¶ 71. However, this
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`omits details necessary for the plausibility of a willfulness allegation, especially
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`where the letter is addressed to the wrong location. See Ex. A.
`
`Finally, at a minimum, Neo’s allegations fail with respect to HDMA,3
`
`located in Ohio. Neo does not allege it sent HDMA any notice letter, nor does it
`
`
`2 Under the willful blindness standard, Neo must plead “active efforts . . . to avoid
`knowing” about the alleged infringement, Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 766, 770, but
`Neo merely alleges receipt of its facially inadequate letters. Compl. ¶ 69. Neo’s
`allegations on this point are insufficient.
`3 Honda Development & Manufacturing of America, LLC.
`3
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`

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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2485 Filed 09/14/22 Page 8 of 14
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`make any of the allegations necessary to impute notice to HDMA. See, e.g.,
`
`Semiconductor Energy Lab’y Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp.
`
`2d 1084, 1114-15 (N.D. Cal. 2007); SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc., No. CIV. 10-389-
`
`LPS, 2012 WL 3061027, at *6-7 (D. Del. July 26, 2012); ZitoVault, LLC v. Int’l
`
`Bus. Machines Corp., No. 3:16-CV-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971131, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
`
`Mar. 29, 2018). Neo’s allegations fail with respect to NMAC4 for the same
`
`reasons, given that Neo resorts to conclusory allegations based on NMAC
`
`allegedly “shar[ing] the same address as Nissan NA.” Nissan Am. Compl. ¶ 71.
`
`2.
`
`Neo does not allege any “subsequent actions” suggesting
`willful infringement.
`Neo also contends that so-called “subsequent actions” support a plausible
`
`inference of willfulness. But Neo points to none. “[C]ulpability is generally
`
`measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged
`
`conduct.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 105 (2016). Here,
`
`Neo points only to Honda and Nissan’s conduct prior to becoming aware of Neo’s
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`infringement allegations—not conduct after gaining knowledge of the patents.
`
`Neo first alleges that Honda and Nissan “refused” to engage in licensing
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`discussions. Resp. at 12. But given the inadequate detail in the letters (and
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`incorrect addressing of Neo’s letter to Honda), see supra, Neo’s allegations do not
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`4 Nissan Motor Acceptance Company LLC.
`4
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2486 Filed 09/14/22 Page 9 of 14
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`plausibly support any improper refusal. Further, Neo’s laundry list of allegations,
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`Resp. at 4-6, does not include any post-knowledge conduct by Honda or Nissan
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`that could suggest willfulness, as opposed to business as usual before gaining
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`awareness of Neo’s infringement allegations. For example, the Honda Amended
`
`Complaint points to a purported advertisement titled in part, “How to Use the
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`Built-In 4G LTE Wi-Fi,” Honda Am. Compl. ¶ 65 n.6, but that video shows it was
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`created in August 2017—years before Neo filed this case or sent its alleged letter.
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`Similarly, the Nissan Amended Complaint references a specific URL on Nissan’s
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`website which contains a purported advertisement titled in part, “NissanConnect
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`with Wi-Fi Hotspot,” Nissan Am. Compl. ¶ 66 n.3, but on information and belief
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`this specific URL containing the purported advertisement existed at least as early
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`as January 2020. This alleged conduct—like the rest of Neo’s relied-upon
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`conduct—says nothing about Honda and Nissan’s supposed willfulness with
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`respect to the asserted patents. Neo’s inability to identify any post-knowledge
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`conduct suggesting willfulness reduces Neo’s willfulness allegations to a bare legal
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`assertion devoid of required facts. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d
`
`1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]illful infringement . . . requires knowledge of the
`
`patent.” (emphasis omitted)); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
`
`(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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`5
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`

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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2487 Filed 09/14/22 Page 10 of 14
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`Neo also relies heavily on IOENGINE, LLC v. PayPal Holdings, Inc. No.
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`18-452-WCB, 2019 WL 330515 (D. Del. Jan. 25, 2019), to argue that notice based
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`on the filing of a complaint is sufficient. First, that case is distinguishable: Neo
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`fails to explain how the “software development kits” in that case, id. at *2, are
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`comparable to the vehicles here that take years to design and build. Moreover, that
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`case is not binding but rather is expressly limited to the District of Delaware. Id. at
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`*7 (holding is based on decisions of “this district”). The IOENGINE court pointed
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`to no Federal Circuit or Supreme Court case to support the notion that a bare
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`allegation of post-suit knowledge is sufficient to survive dismissal. See id.
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`Moreover, Neo’s argument that post-suit knowledge and past conduct suffice runs
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`directly contrary to the decisions of this court and other courts—including the
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`Supreme Court, which held that willfulness requires a defendant to have
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`knowledge “at the time of the challenged conduct.” Michigan Motor Techs. LLC
`
`v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F. Supp. 3d 377, 384 (E.D. Mich. 2020)
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`(quoting Halo, 579 U.S. at 105). Absent any allegation of conduct undertaken with
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`knowledge of the patents—much less egregious conduct as required for enhanced
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`damages—Neo’s willfulness is a bare legal conclusion and should be dismissed.
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`B. Neo’s Induced Infringement Claims Should Be Dismissed.
`Neo’s inducement claims should be dismissed for the same reasons. Neo
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`does not plausibly plead the “specific intent” required for active inducement under
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`6
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`

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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2488 Filed 09/14/22 Page 11 of 14
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`§ 271(b) by relying on post-suit knowledge and Honda and Nissan’s pre-suit
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`conduct. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553
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`(Fed. Cir. 1990) (inducement requires “specific intent . . . and not merely that the
`
`defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement”). Neo’s
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`cited case, JDS Techs., Inc. v. Avigilon USA Corp., No. 15-10385, 2015 WL
`
`3603525 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2015), illustrates this point. There, the complaint
`
`alleged that the defendant had pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents when it
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`began production—permitting an inference of an intent to cause infringement—
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`based inter alia on its repeated observation of the plaintiff’s display of products
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`and patent numbers at trade shows. JDS, 2015 WL 3603525, at *1-2. Not so here,
`
`as Neo does not allege any new, post-knowledge conduct undertaken by Honda or
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`Nissan that suggests an intent to cause infringement. Service Solutions U.S., LLC
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`v. Autel U.S. Inc. does not change the analysis: There, a complaint survived
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`dismissal for showing “activity undertaken by Defendants to encourage infringing
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`product use since [the filing of the complaint] . . . with knowledge of the patents.”
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`No. 13-10534, 2013 WL 5701063, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2013). Neo’s
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`allegations of pre-notice conduct say nothing about Honda and Nissan’s “specific
`
`intent” to cause others to infringe.
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`III. CONCLUSION
`Neo’s willfulness and active inducement claims should be dismissed.
`
`7
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2489 Filed 09/14/22 Page 12 of 14
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`Dated: September 14, 2022
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP
`
`Of Counsel:
`John T. Johnson
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`7 Times Square, 20th Floor
`New York, NY 10036
`Telephone: (212) 765-5070
`Facsimile: (212) 258-2291
`Email: jjohnson@fr.com
`Ruffin B. Cordell
`Benjamin J. Christoff
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
`1000 Maine Avenue, S.W.
`Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20024
`Telephone: (202) 783-5070
`Facsimile: (202) 783-2331
`Email: Cordell@fr.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Thomas P. Branigan
`Thomas P. Branigan (P41774)
`Bowman and Brooke LLP
`41000 Woodard Avenue, Suite 200 East
`Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
`Telephone: (248) 205-3300
`Facsimile: (248) 205-3399
`tomas.branigan@bowmanandbrooke.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.
`AND HONDA DEVELOPMENT &
`MANUFACTURING OF AMERICA,
`LLC
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`8
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2490 Filed 09/14/22 Page 13 of 14
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`/s/ Peter J. Brennan
`Reginald J. Hill (IL Bar #6225173)
`Peter J. Brennan (IL Bar #6190873)
`JENNER & BLOCK LLP
`353 N. Clark Street
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Telephone: (312) 222-9350
`rhill@jenner.com
`pbrennan@jenner.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`NISSAN NORTH AMERICA INC. AND
`NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE
`CORPORATION a/k/a NISSAN MOTOR
`ACCEPTANCE COMPANY LLC
`
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`9
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`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 79, PageID.2491 Filed 09/14/22 Page 14 of 14
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above
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`and foregoing document has been served upon all counsel of record, via the
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`Court’s CM/ECF electronic notification system on September 14, 2022.
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`/s/ Thomas P. Branigan
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`10
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