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Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2423 Filed 09/12/22 Page 1 of 21
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`IN RE NEO WIRELESS, LLC
`PATENT LITIG.
`
`Case No. 2:22-md-03034-TGB
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`NEO WIRELESS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 2:22-CV-11769-TGB
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`DEFENDANT MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
`
`Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (“MBUSA”), by its attorneys, moves
`
`to dismiss Neo Wireless, LLC’s (“Plaintiff” or “Neo”) Complaint Against
`
`Mercedes, Case No. 2:22-CV-11769-TGB, Dkt. 1 (E.D. Mich.) (“Complaint”) on
`
`the ground that Neo has failed to state claims for willful infringement and indirect
`
`(inducement) infringement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
`
`Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a), on September 9, the parties’ counsel met and
`
`conferred on this motion. During that conference, Mercedes’ counsel explained the
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2424 Filed 09/12/22 Page 2 of 21
`
`nature of the motion and its legal bases and requested but did not obtain
`
`concurrence in the relief sought.
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2425 Filed 09/12/22 Page 3 of 21
`
`Dated: September 12, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
` Respectfully submitted,
`/s/ Celine J. Crowson
`Celine J. Crowson (DC Bar No.
`0436549A)
`Hogan Lovells US LLP
`555 Thirteenth St, NW
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-5703
`Facsimile: (202) 637-5910
`Email:
`celine.crowson@hoganlovells.com
`
`Counsel for Defendant Mercedes-
`Benz USA, LLC
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2426 Filed 09/12/22 Page 4 of 21
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`IN RE NEO WIRELESS, LLC
`PATENT LITIG.
`
`
`Case No. 2:22-md-03034-TGB
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:22-CV-11769-TGB
`Hon. Terrence G. Berg
`
`
`
`
`NEO WIRELESS, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`DEFENDANT MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
`ITS MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2427 Filed 09/12/22 Page 5 of 21
`
`STATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`1. To state a claim for willful patent infringement, a complaint must plead facts
`plausibly suggesting that (i) the defendant had knowledge of the asserted
`patent; (ii) the defendant specifically intended to infringe the patent or
`willfully blinded itself to such infringement; and (iii) the defendant engaged
`in egregious behavior. Should Neo’s claims of willful infringement be
`dismissed, where Neo has failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting any—
`much less all—of these elements?
`
`Answer: Yes
`
`2. To state a claim for indirect (inducement) patent infringement, a complaint
`must plead facts plausibly suggesting that the defendant had knowledge and
`specific intent that actions it induced constituted patent infringement.
`Should Neo’s claims of indirect infringement be dismissed, where Neo has
`failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting any—much less all—of these
`elements?
`
`Answer: Yes
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2428 Filed 09/12/22 Page 6 of 21
`
`CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
`
`Issue 1 (willful infringement):
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 103 (2016)
`
`Michigan Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F. Supp. 3d
`377 (E.D. Mich. 2020)
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
`
`Issue 2 (indirect infringement):
`
`Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F. Supp. 3d 377
`(E.D. Mich. 2020) (Larson, J.)
`
`CAP Co., Ltd. v. McAfee, Inc., No. 14–cv–05068–JD, 2015 WL 3945875 (N.D.
`Cal. June 26, 2015)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2429 Filed 09/12/22 Page 7 of 21
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Pages
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`STATEMENT OF LAW ................................................................................. 2
`II.
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................... 2
`A. Willful Infringement.............................................................................. 2
`1.
` Neo Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show Pre-Suit Knowledge
` ..................................................................................................... 2
`2. Neo Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show MBUSA’s Intent to
`Willfully Infringe ........................................................................ 5
`3. Neo Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show Any Egregious
`Behavior of MBUSA to State an Enhanced Damages Claim ..... 7
`Failure to State a Claim Of Indirect Infringement ................................ 8
`B.
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2430 Filed 09/12/22 Page 8 of 21
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................. 5
`CAP Co., Ltd. v. McAfee, Inc.,
`2015 WL 3945875 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015) ...................................................... 9
`Dynamic Data Techs. v. Google LLC,
`2020 WL 1285852 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2020) ......................................................... 3
`Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc.,
`2017 WL 2462423 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) ........................................................ 4
`FluorDx LLC v. Quidel Corp.,
`2020 WL 4464475 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2020) .................................................... 6, 7
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) .......................................................................................... 3
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`579 U.S. 93 (2016) ................................................................................................ 7
`Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,
`2019 WL 1455336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) ........................................................ 6
`Malvern Panalytical Ltd v. Ta Instruments-Waters LLC,
`2021 WL 3856145 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2021) ......................................................... 6
`Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft,
`472 F. Supp. 3d 377 (E.D. Mich. 2020) ......................................................passim
`Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,
`843 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 8
`Serv. Sols. U.S., LLC v. Autel U.S. Inc.,
`2013 WL 5701063 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2013) ................................................... 4
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2431 Filed 09/12/22 Page 9 of 21
`
`Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Elekta AB,
`2016 WL 3748772 (D. Del. July 12, 2016) .......................................................... 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2432 Filed 09/12/22 Page 10 of 21
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff Neo Wireless, LLC’s (“Plaintiff” or “Neo”) intentional conduct-
`
`based claims, namely its claims for willful and indirect infringement, should be
`
`dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`
`12(b)(6) because Neo fails to plead facts that plausibly support such claims against
`
`Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”). First, to adequately plead
`
`willful infringement and entitlement to enhanced damages, Neo must allege facts
`
`plausibly suggesting that (i) MBUSA knew of the asserted patents; (ii) MBUSA
`
`intended to infringe the patents or was willfully blind to such infringement; and
`
`(iii) MBUSA’s behavior was “egregious.” Mich. Motor Techs. LLC v. Volkswagen
`
`Aktiengesellschaft, 472 F. Supp. 3d 377, 383–84 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Second, to
`
`adequately plead induced infringement,1 Neo must plead knowledge of the patents
`
`and “specific intent” to infringe. See e.g., Mich. Motor, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 385
`
`(dismissing induced infringement claims).
`
`Neo has not so plead and instead relies on vague, insufficient allegations of
`
`“actual notice” of entities other than MBUSA, coupled with conclusory allegations
`
`that mimic legal elements, without alleging specific facts that plausibly support
`
`willful or indirect infringement. Neo fails to plead sufficient facts to show (1)
`
`
`1 Neo recites that MBUSA has “indirectly infringed” the Asserted Patents, but does
`not allege and pleads no facts relating to contributory infringement. Thus, as Neo
`appears to allege only inducement, MBUSA addresses only the same.
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2433 Filed 09/12/22 Page 11 of 21
`
`
`
`MBUSA had any knowledge of the asserted patents before service of the
`
`Complaint; (2) MBUSA had any specific intent to infringe; and (3) MBUSA’s
`
`conduct was egregious in any way. Neo’s willfulness and indirect (induced)
`
`infringement allegations should therefore be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 12(b)(6).
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF LAW
`In compliance with this Court’s order to “coordinate to avoid duplicative
`
`briefing,” (Dkt. 27), MBUSA incorporates by reference co-defendants Honda and
`
`Nissan’s discussion of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, willful infringement, and
`
`induced infringement reflected in their Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 50 at 7-10.)
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`A. Willful Infringement
`Neo’s willful infringement claims should be dismissed because Neo fails to
`
`plead facts sufficient to show any of the required elements of willful infringement
`
`against MBUSA.
`
`1.
`
` Neo Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show Pre-Suit
`Knowledge
`Neo does not plead that MBUSA had any pre-suit knowledge of the asserted
`
`patents. Instead, Neo asserts it sent a notice letter to a different entity—
`
`“[MBUSA]’s [alleged] parent company”— on November 23, 2021, purportedly
`
`informing that entity of “[Neo’s] relevant patent portfolio,” which allegedly
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2434 Filed 09/12/22 Page 12 of 21
`
`
`
`includes the asserted patents among others. (Dkt. 1, Compl., ¶ 64.) This pleading
`
`fails to plausibly show MBUSA’s pre-suit knowledge for two separate reasons.
`
`First, it is black-letter law that willfulness relates to the state of mind of the
`
`defendant, and not any third party. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S.
`
`93,105-06 (2016). Allegations that a parent company had pre-suit knowledge of a
`
`patent do not plausibly suggest that the parent company’s subsidiaries had the
`
`requisite knowledge. Dynamic Data Techs. v. Google LLC, No. 19-1529, 2020
`
`WL 1285852, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2020); see also Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v.
`
`Elekta AB, No. 15-871, 2016 WL 3748772, at *5 (D. Del. July 12, 2016)
`
`(observing that “knowledge of a patent by a parent corporation is not necessarily
`
`imputed to its subsidiaries[]” and dismissing willfulness claim because notice letter
`
`had been sent to named defendant’s parent company) (collecting cases). Nor does
`
`a pleading “on information and belief” that MBUSA obtained knowledge based on
`
`Neo’s alleged transmission of a letter to an indirect affiliate of MBUSA suffice.
`
`(See Dkt. 1 ¶ 65.) Neo provides no factual support whatsoever that MBUSA itself
`
`received the letter or any information therein (indeed, Neo fails to even attach any
`
`such letter to its Complaint), and such conclusory assertions are insufficient to
`
`satisfy Neo’s pleading obligations.2
`
`
`2 Neo may allege that a threadbare pleading of service on an indirect affiliate suffices
`to show that MBUSA has knowledge. See Dkt. 68 (Neo Opp’n to VW Mot. to
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2435 Filed 09/12/22 Page 13 of 21
`
`
`
`Second, Neo’s Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to show that any
`
`entity (e.g., MBUSA or any affiliated company) had knowledge of the Asserted
`
`Patents. The Complaint pleads that the letter it sent “informed [MBUSA’s] parent
`
`company of [Neo’s] relevant patent portfolio” which purportedly implemented
`
`“certain 3GPP wireless standards” and included the Asserted Patents. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 64)
`
`But courts, including those in this District, have held that conclusory assertions
`
`that a letter was sent identifying a large patent portfolio, without more, are
`
`insufficient to establish knowledge of specific Asserted Patents in a Complaint.
`
`See, e.g., Mich. Motor, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 384; Finjan, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 2017
`
`WL 2462423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) (“[E]ven if the Court were to try to
`
`circumstantially infer that Cisco had knowledge of the Asserted Patents from its
`
`alleged awareness of Finjan’s ‘patent portfolio and patented technology,’ there are
`
`not enough factual allegations to make this plausible.”).
`
`A court in this District dismissed willful infringement claims on nearly
`
`identical facts to those present here. Mich. Motor, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 384. In that
`
`case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were made aware of the patents-in-
`
`suit “when [they were] provided notice of the patents via letter.” Id. The court
`
`
`Dismiss) at 15-17 (citing Serv. Sols. U.S., LLC v. Autel U.S. Inc., No. 13-10534,
`2013 WL 5701063, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2013)). Neo’s authority pre-dates
`and is distinguishable MBUSA’s cited Mich. Motor Techs. authority, however, and
`ignores that the purely conclusory nature of Neo’s allegations have been recently
`rejected by courts in this District. Mich. Motor, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 384.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2436 Filed 09/12/22 Page 14 of 21
`
`
`
`found the allegations conclusory, noting, “[t]he plaintiff did not attach a copy of
`
`the referenced letter, and did not identify who sent the letter, and did not identify to
`
`whom the letter actually was sent.” Id. The court found the pleadings insufficient
`
`to meet the Ashcroft v. Iqbal pleading standard, finding them “purely conclusory,
`
`and [noting] conclusory allegations are ‘not entitled to be assumed true.’” Id.
`
`(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). The court therefore
`
`declined to credit “this naked assertion[] . . . devoid of further factual
`
`enhancement.” Id. The same should apply here, as Neo’s allegations fail to
`
`sufficiently plead that it sent any entity (much less MBUSA) any notice of the
`
`Asserted Patents. No letter was attached. No information was provided as to who
`
`received the letter. No information identifying how the Asserted Patents were
`
`identified in the alleged letter was provided. Such vague and conclusory assertions
`
`are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
`
`2. Neo Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show MBUSA’s Intent
`to Willfully Infringe
` Neo pleads no facts in its Complaint suggesting that MBUSA had any
`
`subjective intent to willfully infringe the Asserted Patents. The only reference to
`
`intent is a conclusory pleading that MBUSA has “has deliberately and wantonly
`
`continued to infringe on Neo’s patent rights.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 66-67; see also id. ¶ 63
`
`(reciting similar conclusory allegations).) These unsupported assertions lack
`
`plausibility, particularly given MBUSA’s lack of knowledge of the Asserted
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2437 Filed 09/12/22 Page 15 of 21
`
`
`
`Patents. And courts routinely dismiss claims of willful infringement reciting
`
`similar threadbare, conclusory statements repeating the legal requirements for
`
`willful infringement without more. Hypermedia Navigation LLC v. Google LLC,
`
`2019 WL 1455336, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2019) (dismissing willful infringement
`
`where “[n]othing in the complaint provid[ed] specific factual allegations about
`
`[defendant’s] subjective intent or details about the nature of [defendant’s]
`
`conduct[.]”); see also Malvern Panalytical Ltd v. Ta Instruments-Waters LLC, No.
`
`19-cv-2157, 2021 WL 3856145, at *3–4 & n.3 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2021) (complaint
`
`“must do more than plead the standard” for willfulness).
`
`Here, as in Hypermedia, Neo pleads only that it sent a pre-suit letter to an
`
`indirect affiliate of MBUSA (not even MBUSA itself). Hypermedia, 2019 WL
`
`1455336, at *4. Like in Hypermedia, Neo makes no pleading of any facts relating
`
`to MBUSA’s subjective intent, and as Hypermedia held, the mere transmission of a
`
`notice letter and rejection of a license are insufficient to plead willful infringement.
`
`See id. That is because those facts are “equally consistent with a defendant who
`
`subjectively believes the plaintiff’s patent infringement action has no merit.”
`
`FluorDx LLC v. Quidel Corp., No. 19-CV-1998 JLS,2020 WL 4464475, *5 (S.D.
`
`Cal. Aug. 4, 2020).
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2438 Filed 09/12/22 Page 16 of 21
`
`
`
`3. Neo Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show Any Egregious
`Behavior of MBUSA to State an Enhanced Damages Claim
`Based on Alleged Willful Infringement
`As with subjective intent, Neo makes only a threadbare, conclusory pleading
`
`that “[MBUSA’s] infringement of the Asserted Patents has been willful and
`
`egregious.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 67.) This conclusory assertion fails to plead any actual
`
`egregious conduct on Mercedes’s part, which is required for enhanced damages
`
`based on willful infringement. Enhanced damages under § 284 are “reserved for
`
`egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.” Halo Elecs., 579 U.S. at 106.
`
`Without sufficient pleading of facts showing egregious conduct, claims for
`
`enhanced damages and, consequently, willful infringement should be dismissed.
`
`Mich. Motor, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 382.
`
`At most, Neo has pleaded that an indirect affiliate of MBUSA was provided
`
`a letter referencing a patent portfolio in November 2021—only months before its
`
`Complaint was filed, and that no license was taken between November 2021 and
`
`the filing of the Complaint.3 Such (alleged) notice is insufficient to show that
`
`MBUSA’s continued sales of allegedly infringing products was egregious conduct.
`
`“Refusing a license alone . . . does not show willfulness[.]” FluorDx, 2020 WL
`
`4464475, at *5 (dismissing willfulness claim for failure to plausibly allege
`
`
`3 Neo does not plead that such portfolio, nor the Asserted Patents themselves, made
`their way to Mercedes.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2439 Filed 09/12/22 Page 17 of 21
`
`
`
`egregiousness). And the timing set forth in Neo’s complaint also demonstrates
`
`there can be no reasonable inference that MBUSA has engaged in egregious
`
`behavior. Any allegedly infringing components on Mercedes vehicles would have
`
`been in the supply chain years prior to Neo’s service of its Complaint. Any
`
`accused products would have been designed well before Neo’s alleged letter
`
`providing notice, and thus Neo’s allegations fail to establish any egregious conduct
`
`on MBUSA’s part. Neo’s enhanced damages (and, consequently, willful
`
`infringement) claims should thus be dismissed.
`
`Failure to State a Claim Of Indirect Infringement
`B.
`To state a claim for indirect (induced) infringement,4 one must plead, among
`
`other things, that the defendant (1) undertook an affirmative act to encourage
`
`infringement, with (2) knowledge that its actions would cause infringement (i.e.,
`
`that the defendant had “specific intent” to cause infringement). Power
`
`Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315, 1332 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2016). Neo fails to plead facts sufficient to show knowledge or intent. First,
`
`as discussed above, Neo’s alleged but unquoted, unattached notice letters do not
`
`satisfy the requirement that MBUSA has the requisite knowledge of any
`
`infringement to support an inducement claim. See supra Section III.A.1. MBUSA
`
`
`4 As stated above, induced infringement is the only form of indirect infringement
`pleaded by Neo. Neo did not plead contributory infringement.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2440 Filed 09/12/22 Page 18 of 21
`
`
`
`thus lacked any knowledge of infringement before service of the Complaint, and
`
`Neo’s inducement claims must, at minimum, be dismissed to the extent they claim
`
`infringement prior to service of Neo’s Complaint.
`
`Second, even after service of the Complaint, Neo fails to plead facts
`
`identifying the requisite intent on MBUSA’s part to cause others to commit patent
`
`infringement. Neo makes generic, bare recitals of alleged showings of specific
`
`intent, including “implementing infringing features,” “instructing, dictating, or
`
`training its dealerships to use the infringing features,” providing “advertising,
`
`sales, design, development, or technical materials” instructing others on the
`
`infringing features, providing technical documentation to others, and providing
`
`materials on its website. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 57-62.) These threadbare allegations do not,
`
`however, recite how MBUSA, with specific intent, encouraged users to infringe
`
`any specific allegedly infringing features of the Asserted Patents, and do not allege
`
`how MBUSA instructs, dictates, or trains its dealers and customers to infringe the
`
`features, apart from boilerplate language to that effect. Courts, including those in
`
`this District have dismissed similar induced infringement claims for similar
`
`threadbare recitals. See Mich. Motor, 472 F.Supp.3d at 385 (holding allegations of
`
`“distributing the Accused Instrumentalities and providing materials and/or services
`
`related to the Accused Instrumentalities” are nothing more than “threadbare
`
`recitals . . . supported by mere conclusory statements, which do not suffice to
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2441 Filed 09/12/22 Page 19 of 21
`
`
`
`survive a motion to dismiss.”); see also CAP Co., Ltd. v. McAfee, Inc., , 2015 WL
`
`3945875, at *16 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015) (holding that mere reference to user
`
`manuals, guides, and articles, without discussion of what such material contained,
`
`was inadequate to show specific intent).
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons discussed above, the claims of willful infringement and
`
`enhanced damages, as well as indirect infringement against MBUSA should be
`
`dismissed.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2442 Filed 09/12/22 Page 20 of 21
`
`
`
`Dated: September 12, 2022
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`/s/ Celine J. Crowson
`Celine J. Crowson (DC Bar No. 0436549A)
`Hogan Lovells US LLP
`555 Thirteenth St, NW
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-5703
`Facsimile: (202) 637-5910
`Email: celine.crowson@hoganlovells.com
`
`Counsel for Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA,
`LLC
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-md-03034-TGB ECF No. 74, PageID.2443 Filed 09/12/22 Page 21 of 21
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I certify that on September 12, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with
`
`the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of
`
`such filing to all counsel of record.
`
`/s/ Celine J. Crowson
`Celine J. Crowson
`
`
`
`

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