Case 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-SDJ Document 371 04/25/24 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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`CIVIL ACTION
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`22-CV-211-SDD-SDJ
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`RULING
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`PRESS ROBINSON, ET AL.
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`VERSUS
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`KYLE ARDOIN
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`This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss1 filed by Intervenor-
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`Defendant, the State of Louisiana (the “State”), and Nancy Landry, in her official capacity
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`as Louisiana Secretary of State (collectively, the “Defendants”). The Robinson and
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`Galmon Plaintiffs (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed Oppositions,2 to which Defendants filed
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`a Reply.3 For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion will be granted.
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`I.
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`FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`In March 2022, Plaintiffs brought suit against the Secretary of State challenging
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`House Bill 1 (“H.B. 1”), which established district boundaries for Louisiana’s 2022
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`congressional map.4 The State of Louisiana, through the Attorney General, intervened in
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`the suit.5 The Plaintiffs claimed that that the 2022 congressional map provided less
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`opportunity for Black Louisianans to participate in the political process and elect the
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`candidates of their choice to Congress. The Plaintiffs claimed that the 2022 congressional
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`map diluted the Black vote in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (the “VRA”).6
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`They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that this Court (1) declare that
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`1 Rec. Doc. 352.
`2 Rec. Docs. 357 and 358.
`3 Rec. Doc. 360.
`4 Rec. Doc. 1.
`5 Rec. Doc. 64.
`6 Rec. Doc. 1, p. 1.
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`the 2022 congressional map violates Section 2 of the VRA, (2) issue a preliminary and
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`permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants from enforcing the boundaries of the
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`congressional districts as adopted in the 2022 congressional map, and (3) order the
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`adoption of a valid congressional redistricting plan for Louisiana that includes two districts
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`in which Black voters have an opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice.7 In June
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`2022, this Court found that Plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of
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`their claims and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendants from
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`conducting elections under the H.B. 1 map.8 However, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
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`preliminary injunction and remanded proceedings to this Court. The Fifth Circuit instructed
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`that the Legislature have an opportunity to adopt a new districting plan, and if a new plan
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`became effective, this plan could be subject to new challenges.9 But if the Legislature
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`failed to adopt a new plan, this Court was instructed to conduct a merits trial to decide the
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`validity of H.B. 1 and “if necessary to adopt a different districting plan for the 2024
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`elections.”10 On November 27, 2023, the parties held a status conference before this
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`Court. At the conference, Plaintiffs moved to convert the remedial hearing on the
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`preliminary injunction set to begin February 5, 2024, to a trial on the merits.11 Pursuant to
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`the Fifth Circuit’s instruction, the Court ordered that if the Defendants failed to produce a
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`new enacted map on or before January 30, 2024, this matter would proceed to a trial on
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`the merits on February 5th, but if a new enacted map was produced, a trial would
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`7 Id at pp. 51–53.
`8 Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 853 and 856 (M.D. La.), cert. granted before judgment, 142 S.
`Ct. 2892 (2022), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 143 S. Ct. 2654 (2023), and vacated and
`remanded, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023).
`9 Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574, 601 (5th Cir. 2023).
`10 Id at 601–602.
`11 Rec. Doc. 315.
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`commence on March 25th.12 On January 22, 2024, Senate Bill 8 (“S.B. 8”), which
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`provides for the enactment of a new congressional map containing two majority-Black
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`districts, was enacted.13 The State asserted that the enactment of S.B. 8 makes this
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`matter moot. Thereafter, the Galmon and Robinson Plaintiffs informed the Court that they
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`did not oppose S.B. 8, but contended this case is not moot.14 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued
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`that the case is not moot primarily because of a pending case, Callais v. Landry, et al. in
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`the Western District of Louisiana, which presents a constitutional challenge to S.B. 8 .15
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`Defendants move to dismiss this case arguing that S.B. 8 renders this case moot. The
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`Plaintiffs filed Oppositions, and in turn Defendants filed a Reply.16
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`II.
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`LAW AND ANALYSIS
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`A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard
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`When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-
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`pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”17 The Court
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`may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the
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`complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”18 “To
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`survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state
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`a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”19
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`12 Id.
`13 Rec. Doc. 342.
`14 Rec. Docs. 346, p. 1 and 347, p. 2.
`15 Callais v. Landry, No. 3:24-cv-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS (W.D. La).
`16 Rec. Docs. 357, 358, and 360.
`17 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.
`v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
`18 Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).
`19 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
`570 (2007)).
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`In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary
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`for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked
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`by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
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`plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than
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`labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
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`not do.”20 A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of
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`‘further factual enhancement.’”21 However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
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`plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
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`the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”22 In order to satisfy the plausibility
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`standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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`unlawfully.”23 “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will
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`not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.’”24 On a motion to dismiss, courts
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`“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”25
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`B. Mootness
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`Article III restricts this Court’s jurisdiction to cases and controversies. The Court is
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`permitted “to adjudicate only live disputes.”26 If “the parties lack a legally cognizable
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`interest in the outcome,”27 the case is moot. Meaning, “‘[t]here must be a case or
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`controversy through all stages of a case’—not just when a suit comes into existence but
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`20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (internal citations and brackets omitted).
`21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and brackets omitted).
`22 Id.
`23 Id.
`24 Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting Southland Sec.
`Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
`25 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
`26 Hinkley v. Envoy Air, Inc., 968 F.3d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 2020).
`27 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted)
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`throughout its existence.”28 Thus, “any set of circumstances that eliminates actual
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`controversy after the commencement of a lawsuit renders that action moot.”29
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`There is an exception to mootness, however, that occurs when a defendant
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`voluntary ceases the challenged practice. “‘[A] defendant’s voluntary cessation of a
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`challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality
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`of the practice.’”30 “In general, a defendant’s voluntary conduct moots a case only if ‘it is
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`absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
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`recur.’”31 But, government entities bear a “‘a lighter burden’. . . in proving that the
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`challenged conduct will not recur once the suit is dismissed as moot.”32 The Court
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`presumes, that “state actors, as public representatives, act in good faith.”33 Consequently,
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`unless there is evidence to the contrary, the Court assumes “‘that formally announced
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`changes to official government policy are not mere litigation posturing.’”34 Moreover, the
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`government’s ability to “reimplement the statute or regulation at issue is insufficient to
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`prove the voluntary-cessation exception.”35
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`Defendants move to dismiss this case because S.B. 8 has superseded H.B. 1 and
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`Plaintiffs’ lack of opposition to S.B. 8 show that an actual controversy no longer exists.
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`Moreover, Defendants argue that the case should be dismissed because the Legislature
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`28 Yarls v. Bunton, 905 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added in original) (quoting K.P. v. LeBlanc,
`729 F.3d 427, 438 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)
`(explaining that jurisdiction must “subsist[ ] through all stages of federal judicial proceedings”).
`29 DeOtte v. Nevada, 20 F.4th 1055, 1064 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Center for Individual Freedom v.
`Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 2006)).
`30 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 833 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Friends of the
`Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).
`31 Id (quoting Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009), aff'd sub nom.
`Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011)).
`32 Id (quoting Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 2014)).
`33 Id (internal citations omitted).
`34 Id (quoting Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325).
`35 Id (internal citations omitted).
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`voluntarily discontinued the challenged practice and as government actors they should
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`be afforded a presumption of good faith when carrying out this voluntary cessation.36
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`Plaintiffs argue that regardless of S.B. 8’s enactment, the voluntary cessation
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`doctrine does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction because Defendants’ “words and
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`actions demonstrate that the likelihood of recurrence is high.”37 Plaintiffs argue these
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`actions defeat the presumption of good faith because (1) Defendants have not provided
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`a controlling statement of their future intentions, (2) the timing of S.B. 8’s enactment is
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`suspicious, and (3) Defendants continue to defend H.B. 1.38 Further, the Robinson
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`Plaintiffs rely on Perez v. Perry, in which the Western District of Texas considered these
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`similar factors and claim Perez is analogous.39
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`In Perez, a group of Texas voters sued the state claiming the state’s redistricting
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`plans violated the VRA. But, while the case was pending the Texas legislature voluntarily
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`enacted a new set of maps. Thereafter, the state of Texas filed a motion to dismiss the
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`case. The Western District of Texas held that the state’s voluntary cessation of allegedly
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`illegal conduct did not deprive the court from hearing the case because the defendants
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`had not carried its burden to show that it would not resume its unlawful conduct once the
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`case was dismissed.40 Plaintiffs argue, that as in Perez, Defendants here have also failed
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`36 Rec. Doc. 352-1, pp. 5–8.
`37 Rec. Doc. 357, p. 14; The Galmon Plaintiffs argue that the voluntary cessation of the challenged practice
`herein does not make the case moot because Defendants have refused to acknowledge “the obligations
`that the VRA imposes on Louisiana’s congressional map” and therefore their “rights remain vulnerable.”
`The Galmon Plaintiffs, however, did not address the presumption of good faith placed on state actors. Rec.
`Doc 358, p. 9.
`38 Plaintiffs cite Speech First, Inc v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020), in which “[t]he Fifth Circuit
`has recently held that the voluntary cessation doctrine applies, even for government actors, where there is
`(1) an absence of a controlling statement of future intention; (2) the timing of a mooting change is
`suspicious; and (3) where the Defendant continues its defense of the challenged policies.” Rec. Doc. 357,
`p. 16.
`39 Id at pp. 13–15.
`40 Perez v. Perry, 26 F. Supp. 3d 612, 622 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
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`to show they can satisfy this burden.41 Defendants have not asserted H.B. 1 is illegal and
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`the State likely enacted S.B. 8 in part to end this litigation; these are facts similar to the
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`state’s actions in Perez. But, there are also meaningful distinctions between the two
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`cases, leading the Court to find that the Defendants have met their burden to show the
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`State will not resume any unlawful conduct if this Court dismisses the case.
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` First, in Perez, the new redistricting plans incorporated “identical portions” from
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`the previous plans that were alleged to be illegal.42 Here, Defendants assert that S.B. 8
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`“utterly eradicates” the alleged defect with H.B. 1 by providing two additional majority-
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`Black districts to the congressional maps and there is no evidence suggesting S.B. 8 was
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`heavily derived from H.B. 1.43 Furthermore, the Plaintiffs in Perez complained that the
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`“Legislature engaged in similar vote dilution conduct” with regard to the new redistricting
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`plans.44 “Thus, there [was] evidence that the Legislature ha[d] already engaged in both
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`identical and substantially similar conduct.”45 Here, Plaintiffs argue that “not only have the
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`Defendants continued to defend the lawfulness of [H.B. 1]; [Defendants] have wholly
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`failed to defend [S.B. 8].”46 But, Defendants counter that their intention to defend S.B. 8
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`is made clear with the State Attorney General’s intervention in Callais so that the State
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`can defend the legality of S.B. 8.47
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`The Callais case has been tried and S.B. 8 was vigorously defended by the State
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`as Intervenor. The Court finds that the presumption of good faith applies here and
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`41 Rec. Doc. 357, p. 14.
`42 Perez, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
`43 Rec. Doc. 360, p. 3.
`44 Perez, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
`45 Id.
`46 Rec. Doc. 357, p. 17
`47 Rec. Doc. 360, pp. 3–4.
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`Defendants have satisfied their burden in showing that the alleged illegal conduct is
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`unlikely to recur.
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`C. Implication of Callais Litigation
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`The Robinson Plaintiffs also argue against a finding of mootness because even if
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`there is no risk of recurrence, the allegations set forth in Callais “[make] it far from clear
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`whether [S.B. 8] will ever be implemented” and therefore, Plaintiffs need “declaratory and
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`injunctive relief.”48
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`Addressing the need for injunctive relief first, the Fifth Circuit has explained that
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`the standard for seeking injunctive relief “requires plaintiffs to show that they suffer or will
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`suffer an injury-in-fact, and therefore would benefit from the [C]ourt’s granting of such
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`equitable relief. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they face a palpable present or future
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`harm, not harm that is ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’”49 “Past wrongs can be considered,
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`however, as evidence of an actual threat of repeated injury.”50
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`Plaintiffs’ argument
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`for
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`injunctive relief
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`is premised on
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`the hypothetical
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`circumstance that the Callais plaintiffs will prevail in their suit and the Western District of
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`Louisiana will hold S.B. 8 unconstitutional. However, with the state’s enactment of S.B. 8,
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`there is currently no injury-in-fact. The Court cannot presume the outcome of a case
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`outside of its jurisdiction to reach a particular conclusion for Plaintiffs.
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`With respect to Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief, Defendants argue that if the
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`Court were to provide an opinion on such relief, it would constitute an impermissible
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`48 Rec. Doc. 357, p. 19.
`49 King v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 249, 259–60 (M.D. La. 2020) (citing Perez v.
`Drs. Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., 624 F. App'x 180, 183 (5th Cir. 2015) and Armstrong v. Turner Indus.,
`Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 563 n. 23 (5th Cir. 1998)).
`50 Id at 260 (citing Henschen v. City of Houston, 959 F.2d 584, 588 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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`advisory opinion because “the alleged wrong” of the “absence of two majority-minority
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`districts” has been eliminated through S.B. 8.51 “The Declaratory Judgment Act provides
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`that, ‘in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction. . .any court of the United States.
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`. . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
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`declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.’”52 The Court must ask “(1)
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`‘whether an ‘actual controversy’ exists between the parties’ in the case; (2) whether it has
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`authority to grant declaratory relief; and (3) whether ‘to exercise its broad discretion to
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`decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment action.’”53 Moreover, a declaratory judgment
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`“cannot be used to seek an opinion advising what the law would be on a hypothetical set
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`of facts. . . .”54 “Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all
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`the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
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`adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
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`declaratory judgment.”55
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`In the Complaint, Plaintiffs request that the Court “[d]eclare [that] the 2022
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`congressional map, [also known as H.B. 1], violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”56
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`But, Defendants state that S.B. 8 has “repeal[ed] H.B. 1.”57 Consequently, given this
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`repeal, the Court finds that no substantial controversy remains to warrant a declaratory
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`judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ alleged need for injunctive and declaratory relief does
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`not prevent mootness.
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`51 Rec. Doc. 360, p. 6.
`52 Donelon v. Altman, 2021 WL 4205654, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 15, 2021) (citing Frye v. Anadarko Petroleum
`Corp., 953 F.3d 285, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2019)).
`53 Id (citing Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000)).
`54 Id (citing Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009)).
`55 Id (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)).
`56 Rec. Doc. 1, p. 52.
`57 Rec. Doc. 360, p. 4.
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`The Galmon Plaintiffs also argue against dismissal because the capable-of-
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`repetition doctrine applies to this case.58 The Supreme Court has held that this doctrine
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`applies in “exceptional situations” where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too
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`short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable
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`expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
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`again.”59 The Galmon Plaintiffs state, that “if the Callais plaintiffs succeed in enjoining
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`S.B. 8, the time before the 2024 elections will be too short for Plaintiffs to fully litigate their
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`Section 2 rights anew, which creates a reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs will be
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`subject to voting in unlawful districts again this year, just as they did in 2022.”60 The
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`argument fails on two grounds. First, Plaintiffs’ argument seems to suggest that the action
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`at issue is S.B. 8 and the Callais Plaintiffs’ challenge of it. But, H.B. 1, not S.B. 8, is the
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`challenged action before this Court. And in a separate ruling this Court declined to apply
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`the First-Filed Rule, which would have allowed the Court to consider the allegations
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`brought forth in Callais and decide the constitutionality of S.B. 8.61
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`Second, there is not a reasonable expectation that the Plaintiffs will be subject to
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`the congressional map set forth in H.B. 1 again. As noted earlier, Defendants have
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`intervened in Callais in order to defend S.B. 8’s enactment, have asserted H.B. 1 is
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`repealed, and there is no evidence suggesting the enjoinment of S.B. 8 would result in
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`H.B. 1’s reenactment.
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`58 Rec. Doc. 358, p. 9.
`59 Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481 (1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
`60 Rec. Doc. 358, p. 9.
`61 Rec. Doc. 370.
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`D. Public’s Interest in Litigation
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`Finally, the Robinson Plaintiffs argue against dismissal because of “the public’s
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`undeniable interest in voting under a congressional map that does not dilute the votes of
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`a significant portion of the State’s population.”62 Plaintiffs rely on United States v. W.T.
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`Grant Co., and quote the Supreme Court, stating “a public interest in having the legality
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`of the [challenged] practices settled…mitigates against a mootness conclusion.”63
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`However, this quote does not take into account the Supreme Court’s complete holding on
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`this issue. While the Supreme Court held that the public’s interest in having practices
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`settled militates against a mootness conclusion, the Supreme Court reached this
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`conclusion in the context of a voluntary cessation of the alleged illegal conduct at issue.
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`The Supreme Court explained that when there is a voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal
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`conduct, a case may not be moot because “[t]he defendant is free to return to his old
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`ways.”64 This freedom “together with” the public’s interest in resolving a matter is what
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`militates against a mootness conclusion.65 The Supreme Court then continues to state,
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`“[t]he case may nevertheless be moot if the defendant can demonstrate that ‘there is no
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`reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’”66 This Court has found that the
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`Defendants demonstrated that there is not a reasonable expectation for the alleged wrong
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`to be repeated. Accordingly, W.T. Grant Co. is applicable, but does not persuade the Court
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`against a finding of mootness.
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`62 Rec. Doc. 357, pp. 21–22.
`63 Id at pp. 20–21.
`64 United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (internal citation omitted).
`65 Id.
`66 Id at 633 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945)).
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`Plaintiffs also rely on Pierre v. Vazquez, stating “that [in this case] even though the
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`Texas Department of Public Safety made a post-appeal change of policy, the plaintiff[’s]
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`claims were not moot because ‘there remain[ed] a public interest in determining the
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`legality of Defendants’ practices.’”67 But, Pierre is distinguishable from this case. The
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`plaintiff brought procedural due process claims against the Department of Public Safety
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`(“DPS”) after the Sex Offender Registration Bureau, a division of DPS, notified him that
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`he was a “extrajurisdictional registrant” and thereby requiring him to register as a sex
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`offender under federal law.68 The plaintiff argued that this was a violation of both federal
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`and state law because he was not provided notice or an opportunity to dispute his sex-
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`offender determination. During the litigation, DPS ceased using the extrajurisdictional
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`registrant policy, and thereafter argued the policy change rendered plaintiff’s claims
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`moot.69
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`The Western District of Texas found the plaintiff’s request for injunctive and
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`declaratory relief for “the original extrajurisdictional-registrant” determination moot
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`because of the change in policy.70 But, the Court declined to find the plaintiff’s due process
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`claims moot because (1) the policy change did not address the plaintiff’s claims that the
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`defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with notice or an opportunity to be heard in
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`violation of his constitutional rights, (2) “th[e] type of alleged procedural-due-process
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`violation ha[d] recurred in multiple cases,” and (3) it was not “‘absolutely clear’ that [the]
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`[d]efendants [would] provide adequate due process to those similarly situated to [the
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`67 Rec. Doc. 357, p. 21.
`68 Pierre v. Vasquez, 2022 WL 3219421, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2022).
`69 Id at *2–3.
`70 Id at *4.
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`Case 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-SDJ Document 371 04/25/24 Page 13 of 14
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`plaintiff].”71 The Western District of Texas found that the defendants failed to point to “any
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`policy change that would ensure procedural due process and demonstrate adherence to
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`previous Fifth Circuit decisions. . . .”72 Therefore, the court declined to find the case moot
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`because of the procedure due process issues that remained in the defendants’ practices
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`even after the policy change.
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`The circumstances in Pierre are distinct from those in this case. First, this Court
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`has explained that this Court must presume as government actors, Defendants are acting
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`in good faith and Defendants are held to a more lenient standard than the “absolutely
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`clear” standard usually used to analyze voluntary cessations. Second, with the repeal of
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`H.B. 1 and the enactment of a new congressional map with two majority-Black districts,
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`the Court finds that no issues remain.
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`In conclusion, the Court finds that with the voluntary enactment of S.B. 8 a live
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`substantial controversy no longer exists and Defendants have sufficiently shown that the
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`challenged conduct will not recur following the dismissal of this action. In conclusion, the
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`Court will grant Defendants’ motion.73
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss74 is hereby
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`GRANTED. The Motion in Limine to Exclude the Proposed Expert Testimony of David A.
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`71 Id.
`72 Id.
`73 In their response in Opposition to Defendants’ motion, the Galmon Plaintiffs request that the Court stay
`proceedings in this matter pending the resolution of the motion to intervene and to transfer Callais to this
`Court in Callais, et al. v. Landry. Rec. Doc. 358, p. 13. At the time of the writing of this Ruling, the Robinson
`and Galmon Plaintiffs have successfully intervened in Callais, and the Robinson Plaintiffs withdrew their
`motion to transfer. Accordingly, the request to stay these proceedings are denied as moot.
`74 Rec. Doc. 352.
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`Case 3:22-cv-00211-SDD-SDJ Document 371 04/25/24 Page 14 of 14
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`Swanson, Ph.D.75 and the Motion in Limine to Exclude the Proposed Expert Testimony
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`the Proposed Expert Testimony of Dr. Douglas Johnson76 are DENIED AS MOOT.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this ____ Day, April, 2024.
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`75 Rec. Doc. 339.
`76 Rec. Doc. 340.
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`________________________________
`SHELLY D. DICK
`CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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`Page 14 of 14
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`25th
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`S
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