Case 2:20-cv-01240-LMA-MBN Document 32 Filed 04/21/21 Page 1 of 17
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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`JACQUES GEORGE RODRIGUE, ET AL.
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`VERSUS
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`WENDY WOLFE RODRIGUE MAGNUS
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`CIVIL ACTION
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`No. 20-1240
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`SECTION I
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`ORDER & REASONS
`Before the Court is defendant Wendy Wolfe Rodrigue Magnus’s (“Wendy”)
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`motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of
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`subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.1
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`The plaintiffs, Jacques George Rodrigue (“Jacques”), André George Rodrigue
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`(“André”), and the Rodrigue Charitable Remainder Unitrust No. 1 (the “Unitrust”)
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`(collectively, the “plaintiffs”) filed a memorandum in opposition,2 to which Wendy
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`replied.3 The Court grants the motion because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
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`I.4
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`Artist George G. Rodrigue, Jr. (“George”) gained fame for his iconic “Blue Dog”
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`paintings.5 He died in 2013, survived by his second wife, Wendy (the defendant here),
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`with whom he was married for the last sixteen years of his life, and his two children
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`1 R. Doc. No. 10.
`2 R. Doc. No. 17.
`3 R. Doc. No. 23.
`4 The Court takes judicial notice herein of certain courts’ records and rulings (but not
`their factual findings), which is proper when deciding this Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See,
`e.g., Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 407 n.7 (5th Cir.
`2004).
`5 R. Doc. No. 9, at 3 ¶ 6 (first amended and supplemental declaratory complaint).
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`from his first marriage, Jacques and André (plaintiffs here).6 George disposed of his
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`property in a last will and testament, which left his interest in his copyrights to two
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`trusts: (1) the George Godfrey Rodrigue, Jr. Family Trust (the “Family Trust”), and
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`(2) the Rodrigue Charitable Remainder Unitrust No. 1 (the “Unitrust”).7
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`After George’s death, Jacques and André sued Wendy and her second husband,
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`Douglas Magnus (“Douglas”), in state court under a variety of theories, including a
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`copyright infringement claim against Douglas for his use of Blue Dog images in
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`jewelry he created.8 After Wendy removed that case to this Court—based on
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`exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Copyright Act9—the plaintiffs amended their
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`complaint to withdraw the infringement claim; this Court remanded the case to state
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`court.10
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`In state court again, Wendy moved to enjoin Jacques from selling physical
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`prints that she co-owned, as well as new prints made from the intellectual property
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`that she co-owned.11 The requested injunction was granted.12 Then, Jacques and
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`Wendy jointly moved to amend the injunction to cover only co-owned physical
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`6 Id. at 3 ¶ 7.
`7 Id. at 4–5 ¶¶ 12–14.
`8 See Rodrigue v. Magnus, No. 19-12036, R. Doc. No. 1, at 2 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2019)
`(notice of removal).
`9 Id.
`10 Rodrigue v. Magnus, No. 19-12036, R. Doc. No. 16 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019) (remand
`order).
`11 See generally R. Doc. No. 1-6 (state court motion for entry of preliminary
`injunction).
`12 See R. Doc. No. 10-2, at 6 (order granting amended preliminary injunction,
`referencing earlier injunction).
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`prints—not the intellectual property thereto.13 The state court granted the motion,
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`removing from the injunction the restraints on intellectual property.14
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`Following all of that, Jacques and André, joined by Jacques in his official
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`capacity as trustee for the Unitrust, brought this declaratory judgment action. They
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`ask this Court to declare the following as to the copyrights created during George’s
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`marriage with Wendy: (1) “[b]y operation of copyright law,” George “alone held all
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`exclusive copyrights to his created works;” (2) the “Family Trust and Unitrust are the
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`sole owners of all exclusive copyrights owned by” George upon his death; (3) the
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`“Unitrust holds all copyrights related to the physical prints that were donated to the
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`Unitrust” by George’s First Codicil and “the Family Trust holds the copyrights to the
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`remainder, as transferred by” George’s Last Will and Testament; (4) Wendy “does not
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`own copyrights to any of” George’s “works or prints that are owned by the Family
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`Trust and the Unitrust by operation of the Judgment of Possession;” (5) Wendy “has
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`only an arguable claim to a percentage of the economic benefit derived from” George’s
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`“copyright,” which “does not confer any controlling or exclusive rights to [Wendy,] the
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`non-author spouse, as decided in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue[, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir.
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`2000)];” (6) Wendy “owns none of the copyrights to artwork created by” George; and
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`(7) Wendy “does not own or co-own any copyrights to prints made from George’s
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`original artwork.”15
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`13 Id. at 2; see also R. Doc. No. 17, at 5 (stating the parties “reached a compromise
`regarding the injunction issue in an effort to allow Rodrigue Studios to continue to
`operate pending the litigation”).
`14 R. Doc. No. 10-2, at 4.
`15 R. Doc. No. 9, at 10–11 ¶ 40 (emphasis in original).
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`Wendy has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
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`12(b)(1), claiming that neither the plaintiff’s declaratory complaint, nor any
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`hypothetical claim that Wendy could raise, arises under federal law.16 The Court
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`agrees for the reasons that follow.
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`II.
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`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly
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`dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or
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`constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v.
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`City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers
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`Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Where “a Rule 12(b)(1)
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`motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider
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`the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.”
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`Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Hitt
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`v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).
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`“The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party
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`asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citing McDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp 305, 307
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`(E.D. Tex. 1995)). That party must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
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`evidence. New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir.
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`2008). In evaluating jurisdiction, courts must resolve disputed facts without giving
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`a presumption of truthfulness to the plaintiff's allegations. Williamson v. Tucker, 645
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`16 See R. Doc. No. 10. Alternatively, Wendy asks this Court to dismiss for failure to
`state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Court concludes it lacks jurisdiction,
`it cannot reach that merits-based argument. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
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`Case 2:20-cv-01240-LMA-MBN Document 32 Filed 04/21/21 Page 5 of 17
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`F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc.,
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`549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). A court may dismiss an action for lack of subject
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`matter jurisdiction “on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2)
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`the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
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`complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed
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`facts.” Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 565–66 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting St.
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`Tammany Parish, ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 661, 663 (5th
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`Cir. 2007)).
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`III.
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`Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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`Generally, a case “arises under” federal law “only if a federal question appears on the
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`face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.” Bernhard v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 523
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`F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2008). But the inquiry is slightly different when the plaintiff
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`sues for only a declaration. That is because a federal question is not necessarily
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`present every time a declaration is sought—“the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
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`‘extend’ the ‘jurisdiction’ of the federal courts.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam.
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`Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 197 (2014) (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
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`Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)). In other words, “in an action for declaratory judgment,
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`the inquiry is inverted: Since a declaratory judgment action is inherently
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`anticipatory, the federal issue must form part of the hypothetical well-pleaded
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`complaint that the declaratory judgment defendant would have filed but for the
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`anticipatory action.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir.
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`2015) (citing Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671) (emphasis added).
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`That rule is straightforward, but it is unclear whether it must be applied in all
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`declaratory judgment actions. For example, if the well-pleaded declaratory complaint
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`contains issues that necessarily arise under federal law, is that sufficient to confer
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`jurisdiction? Or must the Court reject that and look only to the declaratory
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`defendant’s hypothetical cause of action, per Skelly Oil? As explained below, the Fifth
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`Circuit has applied the former approach before, albeit implicitly. See generally
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`Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1987). Fortunately, this Court need not
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`decide which approach is correct—because jurisdiction is lacking under both. But
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`first, the Court will provide an overview of each version of the rule.
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`Start with the general rule for these cases: where a federal question is the
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`alleged jurisdictional basis for a declaratory judgment, courts “ask whether[,] ‘if the
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`declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that
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`suit would necessarily present a federal question.’” Barrois, 533 F.3d at 329 (quoting
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`Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Lab. Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 19
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`(1983)) (emphasis added). In such cases, the “plaintiff cannot evade the well-pleaded
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`complaint rule by using the declaratory judgment remedy to recast what are in
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`essence merely anticipated or potential federal defenses as affirmative claims for
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`relief under federal law.” Id. (citing TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 681
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`(5th Cir. 1999)).
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`The federal question that this case allegedly arises under is, unsurprisingly,
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`the Copyright Act. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any “civil action
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`arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
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`To determine whether an action so arises, the Fifth Circuit uses Judge Friendly’s test
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`from T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu:
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`[A]n action “arises under” the Copyright Act if and only if [(1)] the
`complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a suit for
`infringement or for the statutory royalties for record reproduction, . . .
`or [(2)] asserts a claim requiring constructing of the Act, . . . or, [(3)] at
`the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a
`distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the
`disposition of the claim. The general interest that copyrights, like all
`other forms of property, should be enjoyed by their true owner is not
`enough to meet this last test.
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`339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964); see Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1031 (adopting the T.B.
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`Harms test). “[M]ost disputes about ownership of a copyright do not arise under the
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`copyright laws for purposes of jurisdiction.” 13D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
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`Miller, & Richard D. Freer, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3582 (3d ed. 2021) (gathering
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`cases).
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`As alluded to above, this is where the jurisdictional analysis has gotten hazier.
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`The manner in which the Fifth Circuit applied Harms in Goodman is difficult to
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`square with the reverse-well-pleaded-complaint rule from Skelly Oil and Franchise
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`Tax Board, described above.17 That is, the court in Goodman looked only to the
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`plaintiff’s declaratory complaint—not a hypothetical coercive claim that the
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`17 Indeed, Goodman cited neither Skelly Oil nor Franchise Tax Board. See generally
`Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1030–32.
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`declaratory defendant could bring—to determine whether the declaratory action
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`arose under the Copyright Act. See Goodman, 815 F.2d at 1031–32. The court
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`concluded that the plaintiff’s claim—which asserted that she “was a co-author of the
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`copyrighted material and that it was a joint work under the definition contained in
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`17 U.S.C. § 101”—“involve[d] the validity of the copyright itself under the Copyright
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`Act.” Id. at 1032. Accordingly, the court found it had jurisdiction. Id.
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`It therefore appears that, at least under Goodman, where a declaratory
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`plaintiff’s affirmative claim arises under the Copyright Act (e.g., a claim to declare
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`the plaintiff a co-author), jurisdiction is satisfied. See also Bridgmon v. Array
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`Systems Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 575 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (hypothesizing that jurisdiction
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`is present if a “declaratory judgment claim . . . ar[o]se under the Copyright Act,” but
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`declining to “address this complicated jurisdictional issue”).
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`Ultimately, this Court need not decide whether it must look only to Wendy’s
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`coercive claim (as Skelly Oil and Franchise Tax Board dictate), or to the plaintiffs’
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`declaratory complaint (as in Goodman), because it concludes, as explained below, that
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`the result is the same either way. Neither Wendy nor the plaintiffs have a claim that
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`(1) seeks a remedy expressly granted by the Copyright Act, (2) requires construction
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`of the Act, or (3) is controlled by a distinctive policy of the Act.
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`A.
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`No Party Seeks a Remedy Under the Copyright Act
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`The plaintiffs do not seek a remedy under the Copyright Act. They concede
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`that their “declaratory action does not seek monetary damages for infringement.”18
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`18 R. Doc. No. 17, at 6.
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`Had they sought such a claim for infringement, that would be a “remedy” under the
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`Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 (providing legal and equitable “[r]emedies
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`for [i]nfringement”); 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §
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`12.01(A)(1)(a) (noting that a claim for infringement is a “prototypical case invoking
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`federal jurisdiction”); Asunto v. Shoup, 132 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (E.D. La. 2000)
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`(Duval, J.) (finding that because the plaintiff’s claim was “not one for copyright
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`infringement,” it did not seek a remedy under the Copyright Act). Instead, they seek
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`only a declaration “to settle the ownership of the copyrights.”19
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`But the plaintiffs do not identify a provision of the Copyright Act purporting to
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`confer such a remedy. The most they claim is that the “Copyright Act grants the
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`owner of copyrighted works the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, display and
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`prepare derivatives of the copyrighted works,” implying that this, somehow, creates
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`a remedy to “settle” ownership of copyrighted works.20
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`The plaintiffs’ argument clashes with the text of the Copyright Act—which
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`provides, in the context of copyright transfers at death, that “ownership of a copyright
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`may be . . . bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of
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`intestate succession.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).21 The drafters of the Copyright Act could
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`19 Id.
`20 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106).
`21 The statute’s next clause further provides:
`Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
`subdivision of any of the rights specified by [17 U.S.C.] § 106, may be
`transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner
`of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right,
`to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by
`this title.
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`have provided a remedy by which to adjudicate disputes involving the transfer of
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`copyrights upon death. But they opted instead to defer to the testator-author’s will
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`or, if there is no will, to the “applicable laws of intestate succession.” Id. A leading
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`commentator has observed that this “leaves no doubt that, at least in the case of
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`deceased authors, state law controls disposition of copyright ownership.” 1 Nimmer
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`& Nimmer § 6A.02(A)(1)).22 Accordingly, because the plaintiffs do not seek a remedy
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`under the Copyright Act, the first prong of T.B. Harms does not provide a basis for
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`jurisdiction.
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`Nor does Wendy’s coercive claim for relief—currently pending in state court—
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`seek a remedy under the Copyright Act. Her claim is based only on Louisiana
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`community property law—she argues that “any intellectual property that George
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`Rodrigue created [during George’s and Wendy’s marriage] was community property.
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`The intellectual property from this period is owned 50% by Wendy Rodrigue and 50%
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`by the marital trust.”23 Like the plaintiffs’ claim, this does not seek a remedy under
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`the Copyright Act—it seeks to settle only the ownership of the copyrights under state
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`law. Although Wendy previously sought to enjoin Jacques’s use of intellectual
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`property that she co-owns (i.e., “any re-print, re-creation, or item that utilizes
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`17 U.S.C. 201(d)(2).
`22 Although the Fifth Circuit has not had the occasion to so squarely hold, other
`circuits have. See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co., 339 F.2d at 827 (“The relevant statutes create
`no explicit right of action to enforce or rescind assignments of copyrights . . . [nor] to
`fix the locus of ownership.”); Dolch v. United Calif. Bank, 702 F.2d 178, 180–81 (9th
`Cir. 1983) (holding that the validity of a trustee’s assignments of heirs’ copyright
`renewal rights was a question of state law that did not confer federal jurisdiction).
`23 R. Doc. No. 9, at 7 ¶ 22 (quoting Wendy’s state-court complaint) (emphasis omitted).
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`intellectual property created by George” during the marriage),24 she no longer does
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`so.25 The parties jointly sought, and the state court granted, an amendment to the
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`preliminary injunction to that effect.26 Now, Wendy asserts only a state-law
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`ownership right to “any Rodrigue artwork created by George” during the marriage.27
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`Neither Wendy nor the plaintiffs seek a remedy under the Copyright Act. It
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`cannot, therefore, provide a basis for jurisdiction.
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`B.
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`This Case Does Not Require Construction of the Copyright Act
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`The plaintiffs’ claim does not require construction28 of the Copyright Act. They
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`point to a purported “conflict between the Copyright Act and Louisiana law” that was
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`not “fully resolve[d]” by the Fifth Circuit in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th
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`Cir. 2000), which they argue requires this Court to construe the Copyright Act.29
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`They are wrong. Still, a summary of Rodrigue will provide helpful context.
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`Rodrigue involved a dispute between George and his first wife, Veronica, from
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`whom he had divorced. Id. at 433. At issue was whether the Copyright Act effectively
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`vests all intellectual-property rights solely in the author-spouse (George) even
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`following divorce—notwithstanding Louisiana’s contrary community property
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`24 R. Doc. No. 1-6, at 10 (Wendy’s state-court petition for a preliminary injunction).
`25 R. Doc. No. 10-2, at 2 (the plaintiffs’ joint motion to amend preliminary injunction).
`26 Id. at 4.
`27 Id. at 2.
`28 “The act or process of interpreting or explaining the sense or intention of a writing
`. . . ; the ascertainment of a document’s meaning in accordance with judicial
`standards[.]” Construction, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); see also
`Westmorland v. Westmorland, No. 07-1435, 2007 WL 4358309, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
`10, 2007) (finding no federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff “asks the Court to apply
`the Copyright Act not interpret the Copyright Act” (emphasis in original)).
`29 R. Doc. No. 17, at 6.
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`rules—to the exclusion of the non-author former spouse (Veronica). Id. at 434.
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`Veronica’s counterclaim asserted that, as a former member of the community regime,
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`she would be entitled to half of all community property. Id. George sought a
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`declaration that he was the sole owner of all intellectual property—including the
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`economic benefits from that property—in all paintings created during their marriage;
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`he also sought to enjoin Veronica from seeking a contrary declaration, making image
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`transfers, and suing him for copyright infringement. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that
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`“an author-spouse in whom a copyright vests maintains exclusive managerial control
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`of the copyright but that the economic benefits of the copyright work belong to the
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`community while it exists and to the former spouses in indivision thereafter.” Id.30
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`Seizing on Rodrigue, the plaintiffs argue that “the Court has to further
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`interpret the intersection of Louisiana community property law and the Copyright
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`Act.”31 They explain that Rodrigue “holds that the community between the spouses
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`has only an interest in the ‘economic benefit’ of the copyrights. Defendant urges an
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`interpretation of Rodrigue that the copyrights themselves are community property.
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`If her interpretation is correct . . . the Court must resolve whether the five rights that
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`vest in the author-spouse . . . remain separate following the termination of the
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`community.”32
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`30 Jurisdiction was not at issue in Rodrigue. See Bridgmon, 325 F.3d at 575 n.4
`(observing the same).
`31 R. Doc. No. 17, at 6.
`32 Id. at 6–7 (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs further argue that “[n]o provision
`of the Copyright Act provides for the divesting of the management powers vested in
`the author spouse, and the Court would have to weigh how George’s death impacts
`that bundle of rights.” Id. The Court is puzzled by this argument. The Copyright
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`Wendy responds on two fronts: first, Wendy pushes back on the plaintiffs’
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`assertion that the Fifth Circuit failed to fully resolve the “conflict” between Louisiana
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`law and the Copyright Act. From Wendy’s view, the Fifth Circuit resolved the conflict
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`to the extent one existed33—by holding that the economic benefits of copyrighted
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`works created during the community’s existence belong to the community, while the
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`rights to manage the copyrighted works belong to the author-spouse during the
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`community and following divorce. That, Wendy argues, was not so much a conflict
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`resolution as it was an application of Louisiana’s community property law to the facts
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`of the case—in that, under Louisiana law, “a spouse retains exclusive management
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`of community-owned movables titled in his or her name following a divorce.”34
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`But the question here, Wendy notes, is quite different: how those rights
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`transfer upon death, not divorce. When death triggers the property transfer, Wendy
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`says, “state law is different. Exclusive management ceases, and the spouses . . . revert
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`to simple co-ownership.”35 Because that question—how property rights transfer upon
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`Act does envision divestment of such powers—“the Act explicitly allows for
`subsequent vesting in non-authors, either jointly with the author or subsequent to
`him by virtue of transfer of all or lesser portions of the copyright.” Rodrigue, 218 F.3d
`at 436. The claim that the Copyright Act does not ‘provide for’ such divestment is
`dead on arrival.
`33 The Fifth Circuit rebuffed George’s preemption arguments, which were based on a
`supposed conflict between the Copyright Act and Louisiana community property law.
`See id. at 435 (“We do disagree . . . with [George’s] expansive view of the scope of the
`conflict between copyright law and community property law, and thus with the extent
`of the preemptive effect of such conflict.”).
`34 R. Doc. No. 23, at 4 (citing Rodrigue, 218 F.3d at 435; La. Civ. Code arts. 2369.1 &
`2369.5) (emphasis in original).
`35 Id. (citing La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1, cmts. (a)–(b); In re Succession of Jenkins, 936
`So. 2d 268, 270 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2006); Junca v. Junca, 747 So. 2d 767, 769 (La.
`Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999)).
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`death—is answered solely by Louisiana law, she reasons, construction of the
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`Copyright Act is unnecessary.
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`Second, Wendy argues that the plaintiffs’ argument boils down to a preemption
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`defense to Wendy’s assertion of co-ownership under Louisiana law. Put another way:
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`the plaintiffs argue that the Copyright Act preempts her state-law right to own and
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`manage half of the community’s copyrights.36 Relying on the well-pleaded complaint
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`rule, Wendy argues that an anticipated federal defense is insufficient to support
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`federal-question jurisdiction.37
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`Wendy is right. As mentioned above, the Copyright Act’s text leaves the
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`question of copyright ownership following a death to state law. See 17 U.S.C. §
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`201(d)(1) (“[O]wnership of a copyright . . . may be bequeathed by will or pass as
`
`personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”). That means that
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`determining ownership does not require construction of the Copyright Act. Rodrigue
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`recognized as much: “State law governs such death-related transfers and the
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`resulting co-ownerships they produce[.]” 218 F.3d at 441.
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`The plaintiffs point to no case suggesting otherwise, and the Court has found
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`none. Indeed, where the issue of copyright ownership turns solely on questions of
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`state law, courts consistently hold that those questions do not require construction
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`of, and the case does not arise under, the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Asunto, 132 F.
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`Supp. 2d at 454 (finding claims that “revolve around, and depend upon, state law
`
`
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`36 Id. at 3–4.
`37 Id. at 3 n.4.
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`Case 2:20-cv-01240-LMA-MBN Document 32 Filed 04/21/21 Page 15 of 17
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`issues of contract, fiduciary duty and mandate” did not require construction of the
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`Copyright Act); Dorsey v. Money Mack Music, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 (E.D. La.
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`2003) (Duval, J.) (similar); Westmorland, 2007 WL 4358309, at *2 (finding no federal
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`jurisdiction because the plaintiff “asks the Court to apply the Copyright Act not
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`interpret the Copyright Act” (emphasis in original)).
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`It is true that, where the question of ownership turns on a provision of the
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`Copyright Act, such as whether the plaintiff is an “author” of the copyrighted work,
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`the claim to ownership requires construction of the Copyright Act. Goodman, 815
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`F.2d at 1031–32. Here, however, Louisiana law alone will resolve the matter. It
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`would be one thing if the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they are co-authors of
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`copyrighted works. See id. But they seek only a declaration as to co-ownership, a
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`declaration that requires no construction of the Copyright Act. The same is true for
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`Wendy’s claim for coercive relief—which would be that, according to Louisiana
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`community property law, she owns an undivided one-half interest in the copyrights
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`(not just the economic benefits of the copyrights, as is the case now). The answer to
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`that question turns only on whether Louisiana community property law requires it;
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`it does not require construction of the Copyright Act. Accordingly, this does not
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`provide a basis for jurisdiction either.
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`C.
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`This Case Does Not Implicate a Distinctive Policy of the
` Copyright Act Necessitating Federal Intervention
`
`Finally, neither the plaintiffs’ declaratory claim nor Wendy’s coercive claim
`
`
`
`implicates a distinctive policy of the Copyright Act. T.B. Harms recognized that this
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`third basis for copyright jurisdiction is “perhaps more doubtful[]” than the other two.
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`Case 2:20-cv-01240-LMA-MBN Document 32 Filed 04/21/21 Page 16 of 17
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`339 F.2d at 828. And it made clear that “[t]he general interest that copyrights, like
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`all other forms of property, should be enjoyed by their true owner is not enough to
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`meet this . . . test.” Id. At bottom, that is the only interest the plaintiffs claim here.
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`The plaintiffs argue that Wendy should not be able to exercise co-ownership
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`over George’s copyrights because principles underlying the Copyright Act counsel
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`against it. They argue that “unilateral control encourages authorship, because an
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`author can be confident that whatever the author creates, the author and her
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`designees will fully control.”38 They similarly assert that “the efficiency of the
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`copyright market” is “increase[d]” when “management control remains in the hands
`
`of a single individual or entity.”39 They offer no legal support for either assertion.40
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`It would indeed be hard for them to do so, because the Copyright Act expressly allows
`
`for transfer of copyrights by testamentary or intestate disposition, which may result
`
`in the very co-ownership that the plaintiffs protest. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1). In fact,
`
`Rodrigue acknowledged that such transfers are “likely to produce co-ownership of
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`undivided interests in the copyright among the author’s heirs or legatees.” 218 F.3d
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`at 441. But the court had no problem with that. Id. (“State law governs such death-
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`related transfers and the resulting co-ownerships they produce, and does so routinely
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`without impairing federal interests.” (emphasis added)).
`
`
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`Rodrigue’s preemption analysis is persuasive; this Court concludes the same—
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`this case implicates no distinctive policy of the Copyright Act. Id. at 439–40. Even
`
`
`
`38 R. Doc. No. 17, at 8.
`39 Id.
`40 See id.
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`16
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`Case 2:20-cv-01240-LMA-MBN Document 32 Filed 04/21/21 Page 17 of 17
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`under Louisiana’s community property regime following Rodrigue, George could
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`enjoy all that he was entitled to—exclusive management of the copyrighted works,
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`and an undivided one-half interest in the works’ economic benefits. Nothing in the
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`Copyright Act—policy or otherwise—demands that his exclusive managerial right
`
`vest in only one heir following his death, as the plaintiffs suggest. Accordingly, this
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`cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction either.
`
`
`
`Nor does Wendy’s coercive claim implicate federal copyright principles. She
`
`asks simply for an application of community property law—to determine how certain
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`property (copyrights) created during a community regime is distributed following the
`
`death of a community member. That does not implicate any policy of the Copyright
`
`Act. Therefore, this cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction either.
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`Accordingly,
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`IV.
`
`IT IS ORDERED that Wendy’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The
`
`
`
`
`
`plaintiffs’ complaint is hereby DISMISSED because the Court lacks subject matter
`
`jurisdiction over it.41
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`New Orleans, Louisiana, April 21, 2021.
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`
`
`
`LANCE M. AFRICK
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` UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`
`
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`
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`41 Because the Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it will not reach
`Wendy’s alternative argument for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ramming, 281
`F.3d at 161.
`
`
`
`17
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`