`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN CRAFTING MACHINES AND
`COMPONENTS THEREOF
`
`
`ORDER NO. 9:
`
`INV. NO. 337-TA-1426
`
`DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO EFFECT PERSONAL
`SERVICE THROUGH ALTERNATIVE MEANS
`
`UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`
`Washington, D.C.
`
`
`
`
`(February 12, 2025)
`
`On January 24, 2025, complainant Cricut, Inc. (“Cricut”) moved pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
`
`§§ 210.7(a)(1) and 210.11(b) for leave to effect personal service of the complaint and notice of
`
`investigation through alternate means on the following unrepresented respondents:
`
`• Bozhou Wanxingyu Technology Co., Ltd. (“Bozhou Wanxingyu”) by email to
`
`multiple email addresses provided to the United States Patent and Trademark Office
`
`(“USPTO”) in relation to a trademark that is not at issue in this investigation;
`
`• Bozhou Zhongdaxiang Technology Co., Ltd. (“Bozhou Zhongdaxiang”) by email
`
`to multiple email addresses provided to the USPTO in relation to the same
`
`trademark; and
`
`• Liping Zhan by email to multiple email addresses provided to the USPTO in
`
`relation to a different trademark.
`
`Mot. No. 1426-003 at 1.
`
`On February 5, 2025, the Office of Unfair Import Investigations (“OUII”) filed a response
`
`to Cricut’s motion. See EDIS Doc. ID 842670. OUII states that it “supports Complainant’s Motion
`
`

`

`with respect to LiPing Zhan, but not as to [Bozhou Wanxingyu] and [Bozhou Zhongdaxiang].” Id.
`
`at 6.
`
`No other parties filed a response to the motion.
`
`For the reasons set forth below, Cricut’s motion is denied.
`
`Ordinarily, the Commission attempts service of the complaint and notice of investigation
`
`upon each respondent. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.11(a)(1) (2025). Under the rules governing this
`
`investigation, however, “the complainant[ ], rather than the Commission,” was required “to serve
`
`all nonconfidential copies of the complaint and any appendices, supplements, motions for
`
`temporary relief, exhibits, and attachments onto each proposed respondent and appropriate
`
`embassy, upon notice of institution of investigation, and provide proof of service.” 85 Fed. Reg.
`
`15798.1
`
`Further, under Commission Rule 210.7(a)(1), service of process shall initially be in
`
`accordance with Commission Rule 201.16, which identifies two methods for service on an
`
`unrepresented party other than by the Commission: (1) mailing or delivery to the party, and
`
`(2) leaving a copy at a principal office of the party. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 201.16, 210.7(a)(1).
`
`Commission Rule 210.7(a)(1) authorizes the administrative law judge to permit deviation
`
`from these methods:
`
`The service of process . . . shall be in accordance with § 201.16 of this
`chapter, unless the Commission, the administrative law judge, or this or
`another section of this part specifically provides otherwise.
`
`19 C.F.R. § 210.7(a)(1).
`
`
`1 Amendments to the Commission’s Rules were recently promulgated. See 90 Fed. Reg. 225 (Jan.
`3. 2025). Those rule amendments “apply to investigations and proceedings instituted subsequent
`to” February 3, 2025. Id.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Commission Rule 210.11(b) additionally provides:
`
`With leave from the presiding administrative law judge, a complainant may
`attempt to effect personal service of the complaint and notice of investigation upon
`a respondent, if the Secretary’s efforts to serve the respondent have been
`unsuccessful. If the complainant succeeds in serving the respondent by personal
`service, the complainant must notify the administrative law judge and file proof of
`such service with the Secretary.
`
`19 C.F.R. § 210.11(b).
`
`Liping Zhan
`
`Consistent with Commission Rule 201.16(a), Cricut attempted to serve Zhan with the
`
`complaint and notice of institution of Investigation by sending the materials to Zhan via Federal
`
`Express. Mot. No. 1426-003 at 7. The tracking information for that shipment indicates that on
`
`December 17, 2024, the “[d]elivery was refused by the recipient.” Mot. No. 1426-003, Ex. 9 at 5.
`
`Under Commission precedent, a refusal of service is “a sufficient indication of receipt” of
`
`the complaint and notice of investigation “to justify the issuance of a show-cause order under
`
`Commission Rule 210.16(a)(1).” Certain Toner Cartridges, Components Thereof, and Systems
`
`Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-1174, Order No. 14 at 2 (Oct. 30, 2019); see also Certain
`
`Portable Battery Jump Starters and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1256, Order No. 17
`
`at 2 (May 17, 2021); Certain LED Photographic Lighting Devices and Components Thereof, Inv.
`
`No. 337-TA-804, Order No. 9 at 3 (Nov. 23, 2011).
`
`In view of the foregoing, Cricut has not adequately explained why there is an ongoing need
`
`in this investigation to “effect[ ] service on Liping Zhan by alternative” electronic means under
`
`Commission Rule 210.11. Cricut’s motion “to find that Complainant effected” personal “service
`
`on Liping Zhan by alternative” electronic means pursuant to Commission Rule 210.11(b) is
`
`therefore denied as moot. Mot. No. 1426-003 at 1, 8.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Cricut’s motions states in the alternative that “Complainant respectfully requests that the
`
`Chief Administrative Law Judge find that service to Liping Zhan was effective on December 17,
`
`2024, when Liping Zhan refused delivery of the post-institution service package materials . . . .”
`
`Mot. No. 1426-003 at 9. If Cricut intends to file a motion requesting an order directing Zhan to
`
`show cause why Zhan should not be found in default, Cricut may rely on the Commission
`
`precedent that a refusal of service is “a sufficient indication of receipt” of the complaint and notice
`
`of investigation “to justify the issuance of a show-cause order under Commission Rule
`
`210.16(a)(1).” Certain Toner Cartridges, Components Thereof, and Systems Containing Same,
`
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1174, Order No. 14 at 2 (Oct. 30, 2019); see also Certain Portable Battery Jump
`
`Starters and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1256, Order No. 17 at 2 (May 17, 2021);
`
`Certain LED Photographic Lighting Devices and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-804,
`
`Order No. 9 at 3 (Nov. 23, 2011).
`
`Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang
`
`Cricut states that it was not able to serve two of the three respondents—Bozhou Wanxingyu
`
`and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang—that Cricut collectively refers to as the “Vevor respondents” in
`
`accordance with Commission Rule 201.16. Mot. No. 1426-003 at 3-5. Cricut now seeks
`
`retroactive approval of its attempts to serve Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang by
`
`alternative electronic means pursuant to Commission Rule 210.11. Id. at 1, 5 (“Cricut additionally
`
`attempted to serve Bozhou Zhongdaxiang and Bozhou Wanxingyu on December 13, 2024 . . . via
`
`email and TitanFile transfer (FTP) to all three of Respondents’ email addresses that were provided
`
`to the USPTO in connection with Registration No. 6225158 for the ‘VEVOR’ name”), 8
`
`(requesting a finding that Cricut “effected service . . . by alternative means” on December 13,
`
`4
`
`

`

`2025, via “the email addresses provided by Respondents to the USPTO in connection with
`
`Registration No. 6225158 for the ‘VEVOR’ name”).
`
`OUII responds that Cricut’s “request should be denied” because Cricut has not adequately
`
`demonstrated that it effectively served Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang at the
`
`identified email addresses. EDIS Doc. ID 842670 at 5. OUII also states that it is “unclear whether
`
`requesting permission to serve by alternative means can be requested retroactively or must be
`
`obtained before such service is attempted.” Id. at 6 n.3.
`
`With respect to Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang, Cricut’s motion is denied.
`
`Cricut has not persuasively demonstrated that its efforts to send documents to Bozhou Wanxingyu
`
`and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang at the identified email addresses constituted sufficient service of
`
`process that meets the requirements of due process. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust
`
`Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (due process requires “notice reasonably calculated . . . to apprise
`
`interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
`
`objections.”). In particular, Cricut has not provided evidence that persuasively supports an
`
`inference that the identified emails belong to Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang or
`
`people that work at those entities. Nor has Cricut provided evidence that persuasively
`
`demonstrates that the identified email addresses belong to entities or people that may accept service
`
`on behalf of Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang. Because Cricut has not persuasively
`
`demonstrated that its efforts were reasonably calculated to effect service, Cricut’s motion is denied.
`
`Cricut has also failed to provide any argument that an Administrative Law Judge may
`
`retroactively approve attempts to serve by alternative means under Commission Rule 210.11(b).
`
`That rule states “[w]ith leave from the presiding administrative law judge, a complainant may
`
`attempt to effect personal service of the complaint and notice of investigation upon a respondent.”
`
`5
`
`

`

`19 C.F.R. § 210.11 (emphasis added). The plain language of the rule at least arguably suggests
`
`that a party may not attempt to effect personal service without leave of the presiding administrative
`
`law judge, as Cricut did. Moreover, some federal courts, when interpreting a similar rule of federal
`
`civil procedure, have held that that retroactive approval of alternative service is not permitted. See,
`
`e.g., In re Old DDUS, Inc., 659 B.R. 810, 831 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“In the absence of an
`
`advance approval under Rule 4(f)(3) a defendant would have no way of knowing whether a
`
`particular form of service was purportedly valid. It would hardly be fair to allow service to be
`
`validated in hindsight and at the time when a default had already occurred.”); but see Marks v. Alfa
`
`Grp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (retroactively “authorizing alternative service”
`
`based on the circumstances of that case but cautioning that “[p]rudent plaintiffs will continue to
`
`seek prior approval of alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) rather than gamble that such approval
`
`will be granted retroactively.”).
`
`I find that Cricut has failed to demonstrate that the circumstances of this investigation
`
`warrant retroactive approval of an alternative service attempt.2 For this independent reason,
`
`Cricut’s motion is denied with respect to Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou Zhongdaxiang.
`
`While Cricut’s motion does not concern the third Vevor respondent, Shanghai Sishun
`
`E-Commerce Co., Ltd., it appears that this entity has been successfully served. On Thursday,
`
`January 2, 2025, Mr. Alan Tan “a Chinese counsel engaged by Vevor.com in response to [Cricut’s]
`
`337 claim” reached out to Cricut’s counsel seeking to settle the dispute giving rise to this
`
`Investigation. Mot. No. 1426-003, Ex. 6 at 3. Mr. Tan represented:
`
`Our client has determined to refrain from importing into the US the accused
`product and will be willing to make a settlement with your client without any
`further need to go through the lengthy legal process. I guess this is also beneficial
`
`
`2 I do not reach the question of whether retroactive approval is unavailable in all investigations.
`
`6
`
`

`

`for your client as the outcome shall not be any different. Just wonder if this is
`possible.
`
`Id. at 2.
`
`Against that record, Cricut’s motion does not explain what different relief it would obtain
`
`with respect to the Vevor product if it were permitted to serve Bozhou Wanxingyu and Bozhou
`
`Zhongdaxiang by alternative means. Those circumstances further counsel against granting the
`
`present motion.
`
`Motion No. 1426-003 is denied.
`
`SO ORDERED.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`