UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`
`Washington, D.C.
`
`
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN LOCATION-SHARING
`SYSTEMS, RELATED SOFTWARE,
`COMPONENTS THEREOF, AND
`PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME
`
`
`ORDER NO. 22:
`
`
`Inv. No. 337-TA-1347
`
`
`DENYING NON-PARTIES FABRICANT LLP AND CERTAIN
`FABRICANT LLP ATTORNEYS’ MOTION TO QUASH
`SUBPOENAS PROPOUNDED BY GOOGLE LLC
`
`
`
`I.
`
`(June 12, 2023)
`
`BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
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`This dispute arises out of discovery relating to Respondent Google LLC’s (“Google”)
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`defense of inequitable conduct. On April 10, 2023, Google moved to amend its response to the
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`complaint and notice of investigation to add a defense of inequitable conduct.1 EDIS Doc. 794093.
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`On April 27, 2023, I granted Google’s motion. Order No. 11 (Apr. 27, 2023). Google’s defense of
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`inequitable conduct is based on the alleged withholding of certain litigation history from the U.S.
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`Patent and Trademark Office during ex parte reexamination proceedings for U.S. Patent No.
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`8,213,970 (“the ’970 patent”). See generally EDIS Doc. 795085 at 58–77. The claim of inequitable
`
`
`1 The remaining Respondents, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America,
`Inc. (collectively, “Samsung”), OnePlus Technology (Shenzen) Co., Ltd. (“OnePlus”), TCL
`Technology Group Corporation, TCL Electronics Holdings Limited, TCL Communication
`Technology Holdings Limited, TCT Mobile (US) Inc. (collectively, “TCL”), Lenovo Group Ltd.,
`Lenovo (United States) Inc., Motorola Mobility LLC (collectively, “Lenovo”), HMD Global,
`HMD Global OY (collectively, “HMD”), Sony Corporation, Sony Mobile Communications, Inc.
`(collectively, “Sony”), ASUSTek Computer, Inc., ASUS Computer International (collectively,
`“ASUS”), BLU Products (“BLU”), Panasonic Holdings Corporation (substituted by Panasonic
`Holdings Corporation), Panasonic Corporation of North America (“Panasonic”), Xiaomi
`Corporation, Xiaomi H.K. Ltd., Xiaomi Communications Co., Ltd., and Xiaomi Inc.
`(collectively, “Xiaomi”), have also moved for leave to amend their responses to add the same
`inequitable conduct defense. EDIS Doc. 797451 (Mot. 1347-011).
`
`

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`conduct identifies four individuals who represented Complainants Advanced Ground Information
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`Systems, Inc. and AGIS Software Development LLC (“Complainants” or “AGIS”) before the
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`USPTO as having allegedly acted with intent to deceive the USPTO: Vincent Rubino, Enrique
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`Iturralde, Jialin Zhong, and Peter Lambrianakos. Id. at 60, 68, 71–75. Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde,
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`and Lambrianakos are counsel of record for AGIS in this investigation. EDIS Doc. 787098. The
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`potential of depositions of Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde, and Lambrianakos was raised as an argument
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`against permitting Google’s amendment. EDIS Doc. 794981 at 12. In granting Google’s motion, I
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`explained that the potential depositions of its litigation counsel did not cause the kind of prejudice
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`that could defeat the amendment. Order No. 11 at 6.
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`After I granted Google’s motion, Google submitted ex parte applications for subpoenas to
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`Fabricant LLP and Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde, and Lambrianakos (collectively, “Fabricant”). EDIS
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`Doc. 797173 (“Fabricant Mot.”) Exs. 1–4 (subpoenas to Fabricant LLP, Iturralde, Lambrianakos,
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`and Rubino, respectively). The subpoenas were issued on May 12, 2023.2 The subpoenas were
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`sent by Google via email on May 12, 2023, and served via FedEx Priority Overnight on May 15,
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`2023. EDIS Doc. 797173 (“Fabricant Mot.”) at 2–3.
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`The subpoena to Fabricant LLP included one Request for Production and one Deposition
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`Topic. Fabricant Mot. Ex. 1, Attachment A at 7–8, Attachment B at 1. The Request for Production
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`reads:
`
`
`2 Fabricant argued, in a footnote, that the subpoenas should be quashed for failure to comply with
`Ground Rule 6.5.1 because Google did not include the Amended Protective Order which was
`issued on May 12, 2023. Fabricant Mot. at 2–3 n.2. Fabricant’s argument, which was only raised
`in a footnote, is waived. Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1383
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing cases). But even if it were not, there was no violation of Ground Rule
`6.5.1. I issued these subpoenas before the Amended Protective Order was issued on EDIS. And
`any alleged violation of Ground Rule 6.5.1 would have been harmless here because the
`subpoena’s recipients are counsel in this investigation who were served the Amended Protective
`Order when it issued.
`
`2
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`

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`All Documents related to proceedings associated with the Asserted Patents before
`United States Patent Office or the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, including without
`limitation the following reexamination proceedings, related interviews, new claims
`and amendments added during the reexaminations, and communications with co-
`counsel in the reexaminations:
`
`• U.S. Patent No. 8,213,970: 90/014,507
`
`This request includes, but is not limited to, the following specific materials
`concerning Reexamination 90/014,507:
`
`• All Documents (including drafts and notes) concerning the interviews
`conducted with individuals at the Patent Office on or about May 17, 2021,
`September 13, 2021, and October 19, 2021.
`
`• All Documents (including drafts and notes) concerning new claims and
`amendments to existing claims proposed during the reexamination process.
`
`• All Documents concerning Your indication during the interview on or about
`May 17, 2021 that “corresponding disclosure” for “proposed new claims 15
`and 16” was “found in the ’728 patent, incorporated by reference into the
`’970 patent disclosure” (i.e., as reflected in the Continuation Sheet of the
`Ex Parte Reexamination Interview Summary)
`
`• All Documents embodying or reflecting communications with co-counsel
`involved in the reexamination, including but not limited to Jialin Zhong
`
`Id. Attachment A at 7–8. The subpoena seeking a deposition of Fabricant LLP has since been
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`withdrawn by Google. EDIS Doc. 797868 (“Google Resp.”) at 2.
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`The subpoenas to Messrs. Iturralde, Lambrianakos, and Rubino did not include any
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`deposition topics. Fabricant Mot. Exs. 2–4. However, the applications for issuance of those
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`subpoenas, included with each subpoena, noted that each of these individuals were involved in ex
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`parte reexamination proceedings and may possess relevant information about the reexamination,
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`which was relevant to Google’s inequitable conduct defenses. Id.
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`On May 24, 2023, Fabricant filed its motion (Motion 1347-010). In the motion, Fabricant’s
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`Ground Rule 5.1 Certification stated that it “contacted Respondents’ counsel and the Commission
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`Investigative Staff in a good faith effort to obtain their position on the Motion.” Fabricant Mot. at
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`3
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`

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`cover. On June 6, 2023, Google filed a brief opposing this motion. Google Resp. The Commission
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`Investigative Staff also filed a brief opposing this motion. EDIS Doc. 797807 (“Staff Resp.”). On
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`June 9, 2023, Fabricant moved (Mot. 1347-013) for leave to file a reply in support of their motion.
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`EDIS Doc. 798139 (Fabricant Reply).3
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`After Fabricant filed its motion, on May 26, 2023, Google proposed narrowing the scope
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`of the subpoena as follows:
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`• The document request and deposition topic for the subpoena to Fabricant
`LLP would be narrowed only to Reexamination 90/014,507 concerning the
`’970 patent, and only to the bullets given at the end of the document request
`and deposition topic.
`
`• The individual subpoenas’ depositions would be limited to the same
`narrowed topic as the Fabricant subpoena, and to the attorneys’ awareness
`of and involvement in the Life360 litigation.
`
`• Fabricant and the individuals could maintain privilege and work product
`objections as appropriate under the ITC’s rules and the relevant case law.
`
`Google Resp., Ex. A at 1. Google identified specific, narrower document requests for Fabricant
`
`LLP:
`
`For Reexamination No. 90/014,507:
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`• All Documents (including drafts and notes) concerning the interviews
`conducted with individuals at the Patent Office on or about May 17, 2021,
`September 13, 2021, and October 19, 2021.
`
`• All Documents (including drafts and notes) concerning new claims and
`amendments to existing claims proposed during the reexamination process.
`
`• All Documents concerning Your indication during the interview on or about
`May 17, 2021 that “corresponding disclosure” for “proposed new claims 15
`and 16” was “found in the ’728 patent, incorporated by reference into the
`
`
`3 Fabricant’s motion for leave to file a reply is granted. Motions for leave to file a reply are
`disfavored and are rarely granted. In this case, however, good cause exists for Fabricant to file a
`reply. Because Google offered proposals to attempt to narrow the subpoena after Fabricant’s
`motion and, in one case, for the first time in its opposition brief, Fabricant did not have an
`opportunity to address the narrowed subpoenas in its motion.
`
`4
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`

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`’970 patent disclosure” (i.e., as reflected in the Continuation Sheet of the
`Ex Parte Reexamination Interview Summary)
`
`• All Documents embodying or reflecting communications with co-counsel
`involved in the reexamination, including but not limited to Jialin Zhong
`
`Id. at 1. Google also withdrew its deposition subpoena to Fabricant LLP. Google Resp. at 2. And
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`Google identified specific deposition topics for Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde, and Lambrianakos:
`
`1.
`
`For Reexamination No. 90/014,507:
`
`•
`
`Interviews conducted with individuals at the Patent Office on or about May
`17, 2021, September 13, 2021, and October 19, 2021.
`
`• New claims and amendments to existing claims proposed during the
`reexamination process.
`
`• Your indication during the interview on or about May 17, 2021 that
`“corresponding disclosure” for “proposed new claims 15 and 16” was
`“found in the ’728 patent, incorporated by reference into the ’970 patent
`disclosure” (i.e., as reflected in the Continuation Sheet of the Ex Parte
`Reexamination Interview Summary)
`
`• Communications with co-counsel involved in the reexamination, including
`but not limited to Jialin Zhong
`
`Your awareness of and involvement in the Life360 litigation (i.e., Advanced
`2.
`Ground Information Systems, Inc. v. Life360, Inc., SDFL-9-14-cv-80651),
`including the district court’s Nov. 21, 2014 Markman decision and the Federal
`Circuit’s July 28, 2016 decision.
`
`Google Resp., Ex. A at 2.
`
`On June 1, 2023, Fabricant provided its own proposal to narrow and resolve the dispute:
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`Google agrees it is not seeking any privileged documents, information, or
`1.
`testimony.
`
`Fabricant LLP and the Fabricant Attorneys do not otherwise have any non‐
`2.
`privileged documents or information in their possession, custody, or control.
`
`Google will take the deposition of the Zhong Law Firm in response it its
`3.
`subpoena. Thereafter, Google will only seek the deposition of a Fabricant Attorney
`upon a showing of good cause and that the Fabricant Attorneys are the “only means
`to obtain” relevant, necessary, and non‐privileged information that Google could
`not otherwise obtain from the Zhong Law Firm.
`
`5
`
`

`

`The parties will jointly move to hold in abeyance the Motion to Quash until
`4.
`the deposition of the Zhong Law Firm, and request an extension of Google’s and
`Staff response until two days after the deposition of the Zhong Law Firm.
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`Fabricant Reply, Ex. 1 at 4. Google rejected this proposal. See generally Fabricant Reply, Ex. 1.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`“[A] party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to . . .
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`the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery[.]” 19 C.F.R § 210.27(b). However, an ALJ
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`must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if “[t]he burden or expense of the proposed
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`discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the investigation, the importance
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`of the discovery in resolving the issues to be decided by the Commission, and matters of public
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`concern.” 19 C.F.R. § 210.27(d)(4).
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`“When a party seeks to quash a subpoena, the burden is on the party seeking suppression
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`to show, for example, that the material sought by the subpoena is irrelevant, or that the need of the
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`party requesting the information is less than the burden on the recipient of providing it.” Certain
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`Tobacco Heating Articles & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1199, Order No. 13 at 2 (Aug.
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`5, 2020) (cleaned up). In determining whether a subpoena should be quashed, the Commission
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`balances three factors: “(1) the relevance of the discovery sought; (2) the need of the requesting
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`party; and (3) the potential hardship to the party responding to the subpoena.” Certain Light-Based
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`Physiological Measurement Devices & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1276, Order No.
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`45 at 2 (June 3, 2023).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Fabricant argued that the subpoenas should be quashed for three reasons. First, Fabricant
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`argued that the subpoenas were overly broad and unduly burdensome because they sought
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`information that was not relevant to the inequitable conduct defense and sought “all” documents
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`or communications. Fabricant Mot. at 6–9. Second, Fabricant argued that the subpoenas
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`6
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`

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`improperly sought privileged material and it would be unduly burdensome to provide a privilege
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`log. Id. at 9–12. Finally, Fabricant argued that the subpoenas to Messrs. Iturralde, Rubino, and
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`Lambrianakos should be quashed because subpoenas of trial counsel are improper. Id. at 12–15. I
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`address those issues in turn.
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`A.
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`Google’s Narrowed Document Requests and Deposition Topics Are Not
`Overly Broad or Unduly Burdensome
`
`Fabricant’s arguments were directed towards the subpoenas as issued. Fabricant Mot. at 6–
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`9. In response to Fabricant’s motion, Google has substantially narrowed its requests, including
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`narrowing its request for documents and identifying specific deposition topics for the individuals.
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`Fabricant admits that this narrowing resolved certain issues. Fabricant Reply at 3. But Fabricant
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`still argues that the narrower requests are overbroad. Id. at 3–4. In reviewing Google’s four
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`narrower requests, they do not appear to be overly broad or unduly burdensome, and they all appear
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`to be focused on obtaining relevant information. Fabricant’s arguments are not persuasive as to
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`Google’s narrower requests. For example, Fabricant argued that seeking “all documents (including
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`drafts and notes)” and “all communications” would be overly broad even as to the more specific
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`examples in the subpoena because they lacked any limit or a temporal limit. Fabricant Mot. at 7–
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`8. But the topics themselves limit both the subject matter and, inherently, the timeframe. The
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`requests are focused on specific events and communications which are identified in Google’s
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`inequitable conduct defense. And although there is no explicit temporal limit, the reexamination
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`itself was limited in time, and thus the lack of a temporal limit in the requests does not render them
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`overbroad or unduly burdensome. Nor does using the term “all documents” or “all
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`communications” in this case render the requests overly broad because the topic is reasonable.
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`Google’s narrowed requests for documents therefore are proper and permissible under
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`Commission Rules.
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`7
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`

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`Fabricant’s argument that the narrower requests are not tailored towards the inequitable
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`conduct defense is unpersuasive. Fabricant Reply at 5–8. The inequitable conduct defense does
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`not just relate to the prior Life360 litigation, it relates to the alleged withholding of information
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`about that litigation during the ex parte reexamination. Fabricant’s arguments are detached from
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`the actual allegations made by Google in its inequitable conduct defense, which identify specific
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`interviews and amendments during the reexamination as relevant. EDIS Doc. 795085 at 60–62.
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`The narrowed requests appear focused on the events identified in Google’s response, and thus are
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`clearly seeking relevant information. Fabricant’s argument that these requests are a “pretext to
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`obtain discovery related to an alleged protective order violation” in co-pending litigation, Fabricant
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`Reply at 6, is also unpersuasive. The requests clearly seek information relevant to Google’s
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`inequitable conduct claim as pled; the fact that they may also seek information relevant to a defense
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`not raised in this investigation does not change that.
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`Fabricant has also failed to show that the deposition subpoenas to Messrs. Iturralde,
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`Rubino, and Lambrianakos are overly broad or unduly burdensome. Fabricant argued in its motion
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`that the subpoenas were overbroad and unduly burdensome because they did not include deposition
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`topics. Mot. at 5, 8–9. But there is no requirement under Commission Rules or my Ground Rules
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`that a subpoena or deposition notice to a natural person requires deposition topics; that is because
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`a natural person, unlike a corporate person, is testifying on their own behalf. The purpose of
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`deposition topics for a corporation is to enable the corporation to designate representatives to
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`testify on behalf of the corporation. Fabricant’s reliance on the template subpoena attached to my
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`Ground Rules is misplaced because the template is merely a sample which does not impose any
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`substantive requirement on parties. Google’s provision of deposition topics is thus inherently a
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`8
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`

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`narrowing of the deposition subpoenas.4 In any event, Google’s proposed deposition topics are
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`neither overbroad nor unduly burdensome and are clearly directed towards relevant information
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`about the inequitable conduct defense.
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`B.
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`Fabricant’s Blanket Assertions of Privilege Are Insufficient to Quash the
`Subpoena for Production of Documents
`
`Fabricant also argued that the subpoena to Fabricant LLP was overly broad and unduly
`
`burdensome because the subpoena as written clearly encompassed privileged material and required
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`Fabricant to provide a privilege log. Fabricant Mot. at 11–12. Neither of these arguments are a
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`sufficient basis to quash the subpoena. As narrowed, the subpoena does not appear to clearly
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`encompass only privileged material. Because there is clearly non-privileged information sought
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`by the subpoenas, Fabricant’s blanket assertions of privilege cannot be a basis to quash the
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`subpoena.
`
`Blanket claims of privilege are rarely, if ever, sufficient to quash a subpoena. Certain Video
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`Game Sys. & Wireless Controllers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-770, Order No. 35 at
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`5 (Jan. 19, 2012). The Ground Rules in this, and other, Investigations as well as the Commission’s
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`Rules reflect the ordinary practice in litigation: when a party from whom discovery is sought
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`claims that documents are being withheld based on privilege, that party must provide a log to
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`substantiate those claims on a document-by-document basis. See Ground Rule 6.8; see also 19
`
`C.F.R. § 210.27(e). Fabricant’s blanket claims of privilege cannot be sufficient to quash the
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`subpoenas because the subpoenas clearly seek at least some non-privileged material. The fact that
`
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`4 In its reply, Fabricant argues that Google’s true purpose for the depositions is “to harass”
`Fabricant and that the inequitable conduct defense is “merely a façade for Google to attack the
`credibility of Fabricant and the Fabricant Attorneys.” Fabricant Reply at 9–10. There is no
`evidence in the record to support these allegations.
`
`9
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`

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`privileged material might also fall within the scope of the subpoena is not enough to defeat the
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`subpoena.
`
`Fabricant’s argument that the need to produce a privilege log is unduly burdensome is also
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`unpersuasive. Fabricant relies on the parties’ agreement to not exchange privilege logs for
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`document requests between the parties to argue that privilege logs are unduly burdensome.
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`Fabricant Mot. at 11–12. While the private parties may have agreed to forgo privilege logs between
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`each other, this stipulation does not apply to third party discovery, and does not supplant the normal
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`procedure for claiming privilege. The Commission Rules require a privilege log unless the parties
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`waive to agree compliance with that Rule. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.29(e)(1), (3). Although Fabricant
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`makes a blanket claim of undue burden, there is no indication in the record that the number of
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`documents at issue is unduly burdensome or that it would be unduly burdensome to review those
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`documents and provide a privilege log. Absent such an evidentiary showing, I am not persuaded
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`that the need to provide privilege logs would be unduly burdensome.
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`C.
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`The Requested Depositions of Trial Counsel are Permitted
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`Fabricant also argues that the deposition subpoenas to trial counsel are not permitted under
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`the Shelton test. Fabricant Mot. at 12–13.5 Google and Staff both argue that this deposition is
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`permitted under the Shelton test. Google Resp. at 12–15; Staff Resp. at 4–5. The Shelton test is not
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`the only test applied to determine whether depositions of trial counsel are permitted, and Google
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`argued in the alternative that it is not the proper test here. Google Resp. at 12–13 & nn. 9–10. For
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`instance, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Sotomayor, directly rejected the Shelton
`
`
`5 Although Fabricant appeared to argue that the document subpoenas should be quashed under
`Shelton, Fabricant Mot. at 13, that is not a valid basis to quash document subpoenas. On its face,
`Shelton clearly applies only to depositions, and Fabricant has not identified any case where
`Shelton was applied to a subpoena seeking documents. Shelton is not a proper basis to quash the
`subpoenas
`
`10
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`test as inappropriate and instead focused on the burdens and requirements set forth in the ordinary
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`discovery rules (i.e., Rules 26 and 45). In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65,
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`71–72 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sotomayor, J.). In this case, however, I do not need to address which test
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`applies because even under the more demanding Shelton standard, Google has established that it
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`may depose Messrs. Iturralde, Rubino, and Lambrianakos.
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`The Shelton test was developed by the Eighth Circuit because it “view[ed] the increasing
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`practice of taking opposing counsel’s deposition as a negative development in the area of litigation,
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`and one that should be employed only in limited circumstances.” Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp.,
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`805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986). The Shelton test is a three-part test to help identify the limited
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`circumstances under which depositions of trial counsel should be permitted: “(1) no other means
`
`exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is
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`relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case.” Id.6
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`Google has satisfied all three prongs of the Shelton test. First, no other means exist to get
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`evidence relating to Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde, and Lambrianakos’s knowledge of the Life360
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`litigation and their intent regarding the disclosure or non-disclosure of that information to the
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`USPTO. Each prosecuting attorney has their own unique information relating to their own
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`knowledge and state of mine during the ex parte reexamination which cannot be obtained via any
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`other means but to depose them. See Ed Tobergte Assocs. Co. v. Russell Brands, LLC, 259 F.R.D.
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`550, 556–60 (D. Kan. 2009); Alcon Labs., Inc. v. Pharmacia Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343–45
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2002). Fabricant argues that the subpoena of the Zhong Law Firm will be sufficient, but
`
`
`6 Even under the Eighth Circuit’s standards, Shelton may not apply here because the subpoenas
`only seek testimony about representation in the concluded ex parte reexamination. See Pamida,
`Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 281 F.3d 726, 730–31 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Shelton did not
`apply to subpoenas seeking testimony about information regarding a prior, concluded case).
`
`11
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`Mr. Zhong cannot provide the kind of direct evidence that Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde, and
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`Lambrianakos can.
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`Second, the information sought is not non-privileged. Although the subpoenas and topics
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`may also encompass some privileged information, the evidence being sought here undoubtedly
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`includes non-privileged information relevant to the inequitable conduct defense, including
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`information about Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde, and Lambrianakos’s knowledge of the Life360
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`litigation and alleged withholding of that litigation. I cannot “rule, in a vacuum, that every question
`
`to be asked will seek to elicit privileged information.” In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig.,
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`92 F.R.D. 429, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Although Google may ask questions that elicit privileged
`
`information, it will also seek non-privileged information, for example, Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde,
`
`and Lambrianakos’s knowledge of the Life360 litigation. Fabricant argues in reply that Google
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`has allegedly admitted that it is seeking privileged information by seeking the mental impressions
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`of its attorney about the reexamination, Fabricant Reply at 12, but I cannot make that assessment
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`in a vacuum because the work product doctrine is not an absolute immunity from discovery. The
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`parties should thus address privilege or work product issues as they arise in these depositions just
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`as they would in any other deposition.
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`Third, the information sought is crucial to the preparation of the case. Messrs. Rubino,
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`Iturralde, and Lambrianakos have unique information relating to the inequitable conduct defenses
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`that no other witness can provide, including evidence relating to knowledge and intent. No other
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`witness can speak directly to this information on their behalf.
`
`As I noted in Order No. 11, “[i]n choosing to use its reexamination counsel as litigation
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`counsel in this investigation, AGIS took the risk that its counsel could become witnesses if a claim
`
`of inequitable conduct arose.” Order No. 11 at 6. In these circumstances, “it would be unfair to
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`12
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`accused patent infringers if patentees could shield potentially harmful discovery related to
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`[inequitable conduct] merely by using their prosecution counsel, or patentability opinion counsel,
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`as trial counsel.” aaiPharma, Inc. v. Kremers Urban Dev. Co., 361 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775 (N.D. Ill.
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`2005); see also Certain Marine Sonar Imaging Sys., Prods. Containing the Same, & Components
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`Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-926, Order No. 7 at 8–9 (Dec. 16, 2014) (explaining that prosecution
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`counsel “cannot hide behind the cloak of privilege from being [the complainant’s] litigation
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`counsel”). Google has satisfied the Shelton test and is entitled to depose Messrs. Rubino, Iturralde,
`
`and Lambrianakos.
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`For the reasons discussed above, Fabricant’s motion to quash is denied.
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`
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`SO ORDERED.
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`13
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`

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`CERTAIN LOCATION-SHARING SYSTEMS, RELATED
`SOFTWARE, COMPONENTS THEREOF, AND
`PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME
`
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` Inv. No. 337-TA-1347
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`PUBLIC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I, Lisa R. Barton, hereby certify that the attached ORDER has been served via EDIS
`upon the Commission Investigative Attorney, MONISHA DEKA, and the following parties as
`indicated, on June 12, 2023.
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`Lisa R. Barton, Secretary
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street, SW, Room 112
`Washington, DC 20436
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`On Behalf of Complainants Advanced Ground Information
`Systems, Inc and AGIS Software Development LLC:
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`Evan H. Langdon, Esq.
`FABRICANT LLP
`1101 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 300
`Washington, DC 20004
`Email: elangdon@fabricantllp.com
`On Behalf of Respondent Google LLC:
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`Gregory F. Corbett, Esq.
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`Email: gregory.corbett@wolfgreenfield.com
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`On Behalf of Respondent OnePlus Technology (Shenzhen)
`Co., Ltd.:
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`Theodore J. Angelis, Esq.
`K&L GATES LLP
`925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900
`Seattle, WA 98104
`Email: theo.angelis@klgates.com
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`On Behalf of Respondents Sony Corporation and Sony Mobile
`Communications, Inc.:
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`Charles T. Steenburg, Esq.
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
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`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
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`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`CERTAIN LOCATION-SHARING SYSTEMS, RELATED
`SOFTWARE, COMPONENTS THEREOF, AND
`PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME
`
`Certificate of Service – Page 2
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`Email: charles.steenburg@wolfgreenfield.com
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`On Behalf of Respondents Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Lenovo Group Ltd., Lenovo
`(United States), Inc., and Motorola Mobility LLC:
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`D. Sean Trainor, Esq.
`O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`1625 Eye Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Email: dstrainor@omm.com
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`On Behalf of Respondent Kyocera Corporation:
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`Jose L. Patiño, Esq.
`EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP
`12255 El Camino Real, Suite 100
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Email: JosePatino@eversheds-sutherland.us
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`On Behalf of Respondents ASUSTeK Computer Inc. and
`ASUS Computer International:
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`Chris R. Schmidt, Esq.
`ERISE IP, P.A.
`7015 College Blvd, Suite 700
`Overland Park, KS 66211
`Email: chris.schmidt@eriseip.com
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`On Behalf of Respondents Xiaomi Corporation, Xiaomi H.K.
`Ltd., Xiaomi Communications Co., Ltd., and Xiaomi Inc.
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`Siddhesh V. Pandit, Esq.
`MAIER & MAIER PLLC
`345 S. Patrick Street
`Alexandria, VA 22314
`Email: svp@maierandmaier.com
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` Inv. No. 337-TA-1347
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`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`CERTAIN LOCATION-SHARING SYSTEMS, RELATED
`SOFTWARE, COMPONENTS THEREOF, AND
`PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME
`
`Certificate of Service – Page 3
`On Behalf of Respondents Panasonic Holdings Corporation
`and Panasonic Corporation of North America:
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`Benjamin Levi, Esq.
`LEVI SNOTHERLY & SCHAUMBERG, PLLC
`1101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 450
`Washington, DC 20036
`Email: blevi@levisnotherly.com
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`On Behalf of HMD America, Inc., HMD Global, and HMD
`Global Oy:
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`William J. McCabe, Esq.
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`700 Thirteenth Street N.W.
`Suite 800 Washington, DC 20005
`Email: WMcCabe@perkinscoie.com
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`On Behalf of BLU Products, Inc:
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`Bernard L. Egozi, Esq.
`EGOZI & BENNETT, P.A.
`2999 NE 191st Street, Suite 407
`Aventura, Florida 33180
`Email: begozi@egozilaw.com
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`On Behalf of TCL Communication Technology Holdings
`Limited, TCL Electronics Holdings Limited, TCL Technology
`Group Corporation, and TCT Mobile (US) Inc.:
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`John P. Schnurer, Esq.
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`11452 El Camino Real, Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130-2080
`Email: JSchnurer@perkinscoie.com
`On Behalf of Non-Parties Fabricant LLP, Enrique W.
`Iturralde, Peter Lambrianakos, and Vincent J. Rubino, III:
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`Evan H. Langdon, Esq.
`FABRICANT LLP
`1101 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 300
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` Inv. No. 337-TA-1347
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`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
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`
`
`
`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
`
`
`
`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
`
`
`
`
`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`☒ Other: Email Notification
`of Availability for Download
`
`
`
`☐ Via Hand Delivery
`☐ Via Express Delivery
`☐ Via First Class Mail
`
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`

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`CERTAIN LOCATION-SHARING SYSTEMS, RELATED
`SOFTWARE, COMPONENTS THEREOF, AND
`PRODUCTS CONTAINING SAME
`
`Certificate of Service – Page 4
`Washington, DC 20004
`Email: elangdon@fabrican