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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`MAXIMILIANO PILIPIS,
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`Defendant.
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`CAUSE NO. 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
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`MAXIMILIANO PILIPIS’ MOTION TO FULLY DISMISS COUNTS 1-5 AND DENY
`GOVERNMENT’S PENDING APPLICATION FOR A RESTRAINING ORDER, AND
`THEREBY TERMINATE THE EXISTING TRO
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`Mr. Pilipis files this Motion to respectfully ask the Court to resolve two pending motions
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`that are fully briefed and ready for resolution—(1) to fully grant Mr. Pilipis’ Motion [Filing No.
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`77.] and dismiss Counts 1-5 in their entirety; and (2) to deny the government’s pending application
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`for a post-indictment restraining order [Filing No. 73.] (the “Application”) which would in turn
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`automatically dissolve the existing temporary restraining order (TRO) against Mr. Pilipis’ property
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`by the TRO’s own terms. [Filing No. 75.] Mr. Pilipis respectfully asks the Court to resolve these
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`pending motions without further briefing: The government chose to forego its opportunity to
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`further brief these issues by defying the Court’s order directing it to do so [Filing No. 99.], and
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`every day that goes by with Mr. Pilipis’s assets restrained, he faces additional significant personal
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`harm.
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`Mr. Pilipis has persevered in the face of the government’s restraints on effectively all of
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`his financial assets. The restraints were always astronomical, overbroad, and unjust. [Filing No.
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`80 at 18.] They are doubly so now. The government’s position is, apparently, that the Court’s
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`Order changed nothing in this case, and the Court has no power to act. That position is untenable,
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`Case 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK Document 112 Filed 02/27/25 Page 2 of 7 PageID #:
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`contrary to law, and frankly outrageous. It bears repeating that the Court found in favor of Mr.
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`Pilipis and granted his Motion to Dismiss. [Filing No. 98.] The government may not act as if it
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`prevailed on the motion and is therefore somehow entitled to keep its restraints on all of Mr.
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`Philips’s assets. Denying the government’s fully-briefed, pending Application and thereby
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`dissolving the TRO will allow Mr. Pilipis access to virtual currency that is rightfully his. As set
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`forth in Mr. Pilipis’s opposition to the Application [Filing No. 80.], the government lacks any basis
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`to restrain those assets regardless of the Court’s February 13, 2025 Order, and the futility of the
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`government’s position is all the clearer now that Counts 1-5 have been dismissed.∗
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`The government obtained a grand jury indictment against Mr. Pilipis for money laundering
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`in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 in January 2024. [Filing No. 6.] In May 2024, the government
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`obtained a 14-day TRO (temporarily extended multiple times) barring Mr. Pilipis from moving
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`and converting his virtual currency. [Filing No. 42; Filing No. 47; Filing No. 56; Filing No. 62.]
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`On October 16, 2024, the government obtained a superseding indictment charging Mr. Pilipis with
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`five counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and two counts of willful failure
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`to file tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. [Filing No. 66.] The following day, October
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`17, 2024, the government filed its Application for a post-indictment restraining order under 21
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`U.S.C. § 853(e), which relied on the five money-laundering counts as predicates. [Filing No. 73.]
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`As the government admits, a TRO ordinarily “‘shall expire not more than fourteen days
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`after the date on which it is entered,’” and the TRO in place when the government filed its
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`∗ The TRO is the only thing preventing Mr. Pilipis from using his virtual currency. The only other
`existing restraints on Mr. Pilipis’ property—the criminal and civil seizure warrants in No. 1:24-
`mj-00449-MKK and No. 1:23-cv-02081-JMS-MJD (“Forfeiture Case”)—apply only to certain of
`Mr. Pilipis’ accounts. In accordance with the Court’s February 26, 2025 Orders in this case and the
`Forfeiture Case, Mr. Pilipis will file separate motions seeking to set aside the seizure warrants,
`release the physical items the government has seized, and modify the conditions of his release.
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`Case 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK Document 112 Filed 02/27/25 Page 3 of 7 PageID #:
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`restraining-order application was set to expire on October 21, 2024. [Filing No. 75 (quoting 21
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`U.S.C. § 853(e)(2).] To avoid the government taxing the Court’s and parties’ resources with
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`reapplications for the TRO every fourteen days, the parties agreed to extend the TRO “pending the
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`Court’s ruling on the government’s application for a post-indictment restraining order.” [Filing
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`No. 75 at 2 (emphasis added).]
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`Mr. Pilipis moved to dismiss the indictment’s five money-laundering counts and opposed
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`the government’s application for a post-indictment restraining order on October 25, 2025. [Filing
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`No. 77; Filing No. 80.] On February 13, 2025, this Court granted Mr. Pilipis’ Motion to Dismiss
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`“as to any portions of Counts 1 through 5 that are based on specified unlawful conduct – violations
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`of § 1960 – that took place before September 14, 2013.” [Filing No. 98 at 20.] The Order
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`recognized this left at least two remaining issues undecided—(1) “whether any portions of Counts
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`1 through 5 remain – i.e., whether AurumXchange operated after the September 14, 2013
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`registration deadline,” and (2) whether the Court’s Order requires denial of the government’s
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`pending Application (which is predicated on the now-dismissed counts). [Filing No. 98 at 20.] The
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`Court thus set a hearing on these issues, and ordered the parties to file statements addressing the
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`issues in advance of the hearing. [Filing No. 98 at 20-21; Filing No. 99.] Mr. Pilipis complied with
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`this directive, and his statement explained, inter alia, (1) that Counts 1-5 of the Superseding
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`Indictment should be dismissed in full because it is undisputed that AurumXChange did not
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`operate after September 14, 2013; and (2) that the government’s pending Application should be
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`denied. [Filing No. 108 at 6-8.]
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`The government chose not to comply with the Court’s order. As the Court observed, the
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`government did “not state its position regarding whether any specified unlawful conduct took place
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`before September 14, as ordered to do so by the Court.” [Filing No. 111 at 1.] Nor did the
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`Case 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK Document 112 Filed 02/27/25 Page 4 of 7 PageID #:
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`government comply with the Court’s directive to address how the February 13 dismissal order
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`affected the government’s Application. [Filing No. 105.]
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`Instead, the government filed a motion to vacate the scheduled hearing that took the
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`remarkable and unsupported position that the government stripped this Court of jurisdiction to rule
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`on its pending Application by taking an interlocutory appeal of the February 13 dismissal order—
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`which the government took the day before it filed its motion to vacate, and less than two weeks
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`after the Court’s dismissal order. [Filing No. 100; Filing No. 105.] The upshot of the government’s
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`position: The government has unilaterally extended the current TRO, which again the government
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`concedes is ordinarily limited to 14 days, to bar Mr. Pilipis from using his property, which he needs
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`to pay for defense counsel and living expenses, for the entirety of the government’s interlocutory
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`appeal—which could easily take a year or more.
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`That is simply not how interlocutory appeals work. As Mr. Pilipis has explained [Filing
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`No. 108 at 3-6], the government failed to identify any authority supporting its theory that
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`interlocutory appeals automatically pause the underlying case. On the contrary, that theory is
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`squarely foreclosed by the Seventh Circuit’s precedents, which correctly recognize that an
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`interlocutory appeal only bars the district court from altering the “decision that is under appellate
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`review.” United States v. McHugh, 528 F.3d 538, 540 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). That is
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`why “an appeal taken from an interlocutory decision does not prevent the district court from
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`finishing its work and rendering a final decision.” Wisconsin Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 441
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`F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2006).
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`The Court gave the government a chance to explain—indeed, ordered the government to
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`explain—why the Court should not dismiss Counts 1-5 in their entirety and deny the government’s
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`Application for a post-indictment restraining order. The government refused to do so. And the
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`Case 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK Document 112 Filed 02/27/25 Page 5 of 7 PageID #:
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`government could not do so. The government has repeatedly acknowledged that AurumXChange
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`ceased operating sometime in June 2013, which requires that Counts 1-5 be fully dismissed. [Filing
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`No. 108 at 6-7.] In turn, the government’s Application must be denied because the government has
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`no qualifying offense under 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (in addition to the further independently
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`sufficient reasons for denying the application that Mr. Pilipis has outlined). [Filing No. 108 at 8;
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`Filing No. 80 at 12-19.]
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`If the government wishes to restrain Mr. Pilipis from using his property during the
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`pendency of its appeal, there is a way to make that request. The government can take an
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`interlocutory appeal of an order denying its Application, United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d
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`784, 788 (7th Cir. 1998), and can ask this Court (and then the Seventh Circuit) to stay that order
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`pending appeal. Of course, such a “stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration
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`and judicial review, and accordingly is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might
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`otherwise result to the appellant.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (quotation marks and
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`citation omitted). The government would thus need to satisfy the demanding criteria for stays
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`pending appeal set forth in Nken—(1) that the government “has made a strong showing that he is
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`likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) that the government will be irreparably injured absent a stay,
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`(3) that issuance of the stay will not substantially injure Mr. Pilipis, and (4) that the public interest
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`favors a stay. Id. at 434 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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`The government’s position is nothing more than a misplaced attempt to evade these well-
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`established requirements. The Court should reject the government’s position as a meritless gambit.
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`Mr. Pilipis’ motion to dismiss and the government’s Application for a post-indictment restraining
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`order are fully briefed and ready for resolution. The Court should resolve those motions.
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`Case 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK Document 112 Filed 02/27/25 Page 6 of 7 PageID #:
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Josh Minkler
`Josh Minkler (Atty. No. 18483-49)
`Kathleen L. Matsoukas (Atty. No. 31833-49)
`Alyssa Hughes (Atty. No. 34645-71)
`Kian J. Hudson (Atty. No. 32829-02)
`Barnes & Thornburg LLP
`11 South Meridian Street
`Indianapolis, IN 46204
`Telephone: 317-236-1313
`Facsimile: 317-231-7433
`Email: Josh.Minkler@btlaw.com
`Kathleen.Matsoukas@btlaw.com
`Alyssa.Hughes@btlaw.com
`Kian.Hudson@btlaw.com
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`Todd Foster
`Todd Foster Law Group
`601 Bayshore Blvd. Suite 615
`Tampa, FL 33606
`Telephone: 813-565-0600
`Email: tfoster@tfosterlawgroup.com
`Admitted pro hac vice
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`David M. Garvin
`David M. Garvin, P.A.
`2333 Ponce De Leon Blvd. Ste 314
`Coral Gables, FL 33134
`Telephone: 305-371-8101
`Email: dgarvin@garvin.law
`Admitted pro hac vice
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`Attorneys for Defendant Maximiliano Pilipis
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`Case 1:24-cr-00009-JMS-MKK Document 112 Filed 02/27/25 Page 7 of 7 PageID #:
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing has been served on
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`all counsel of record via the Court’s electronic filing system on this 27th day of February, 2025.
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`/s/ Josh Minkler
`Josh Minkler
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