USDC IN/ND case 3:25-cv-00133-DRL-SJF document 15 filed 03/03/25 page 1 of 15
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`SOUTH BEND DIVISION
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`JANE DOE,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`JONATHAN REES,
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`Defendant.
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`CASE NO. 3:25-CV-133-DRL-SJF
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`OPINION and ORDER
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`Plaintiff filed this case on February 10, 2025, along with the following two
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`motions: a Motion to Proceed Anonymously [DE 3] and a Motion for Prejudgment
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`Attachment [DE 5]. On February 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Expedited
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`Consideration of her Motion for Prejudgment Attachment, or, in the alternative, to
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`Proceed Ex Parte [DE 13]. Given Plaintiff’s request for expedited review, the Court now
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`considers the latter two motions.1
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`The Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Consideration and,
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`accordingly, has expedited its review of her Motion for Prejudgment Attachment. But
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`for the reasons stated below, the Court must take the Motion for Prejudgment
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`Attachment under advisement so that Plaintiff may demonstrate compliance with
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`Indiana Code § 34-25-2-5.
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`1 The Court will address Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously via separate order in due course.
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`

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`I.
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`Background
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`Plaintiff filed the above captioned action under Indiana’s Uniform Fraudulent
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`Transfers Act, Ind. Code § 32-18-2-1 et seq.2 In her complaint, Plaintiff explains that, in
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`October 2023, she sued Defendant in the United States District Court for the Northern
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`District of New York (“the NDNY Action”) after Defendant engaged in a “campaign of
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`harassment, threats and false publications” against her.3 [DE 6 at 2]. Plaintiff’s
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`complaint in the NDNY Action alleged that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 6851
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`because, as part of his campaign against her, Defendant disclosed an Intimate Visual
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`Depiction of Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleged tort claims under New York law: violation of
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`New York Civil Rights Law § 52-b(1), intentional infliction of emotional distress,
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`defamation, and malicious prosecution. [Id.] Plaintiff served Defendant in the NDNY
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`Action on November 15, 2023. [DE 6-1 at 10, ¶35]. After protracted litigation—including
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`the withdrawal of Defendant’s counsel and Defendant’s violation of many court orders
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`while he proceeded pro se—Plaintiff obtained a Clerk’s Entry of Default against
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`Defendant and moved for default judgment seeking damages, attorneys’ fees, and
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`2 Plaintiff does not directly cite this statute in her complaint, but because she invokes this Court’s
`diversity jurisdiction, Indiana law applies. See Land v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 272 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2001)
`(“A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state in which it
`sits.”). Plaintiff confirms that she is proceeding under this statute in her Motion for Prejudgment
`Attachment. [DE 6 at 15, 17 (discussing potential choice-of-law questions and noting that both Indiana
`and New York have enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.)].
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`3 Plaintiff’s complaint and declaration raise several concerning allegations about Defendant’s actions and
`the parties’ prior relationship. In the interest of entering an expeditious ruling on Plaintiff’s motion, the
`Court does not recount all of Plaintiff’s allegations in detail here. But the Court’s summary description of
`Plaintiff’s allegations is not intended to diminish their seriousness or to suggest that the Court has not
`considered them when ruling on the motions.
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`2
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`

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`interest in an amount between $3-$5 million. Her motion for default judgment in the
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`NDNY Action remains pending. [DE 6 at 17].
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`Plaintiff contends that, after she filed the NDNY Action, Defendant took several
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`actions meant to hinder, delay, and defraud her. First, on November 21, 2023—about a
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`month after Plaintiff began the NDNY Action and six days after Defendant was
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`served—Defendant entered a contract to sell the property he owned in New York state
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`(“the New York Property”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sold the New York Property
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`“quietly,” as he sold it to his neighbor without the use of a real estate broker/agent or
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`any public marketing of the property. [DE 6 at 6]. Defendant then purchased property
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`in Michigan City, Indiana (“the Indiana Property”) using the proceeds from the sale of
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`the New York Property. Plaintiff’s motion includes a copy of the Sales Disclosure Form
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`for the Indiana Property. [See Exhibit E; DE 6-6]. The Sales Disclosure Form lists the
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`buyer as “Jonathan Rees a/k/a Greg Ellis, Special Trustee.” [Id. at 3].
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`Plaintiff also alleges that on January 22, 2024, Defendant organized a limited
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`liability company (“LLC”) – Morf LLC – under the laws of the State of Wyoming. That
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`same day, Defendant made Morf, LLC the titular owner of his Tesla vehicle. Finally, on
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`January 23, 2024—the very next day—Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s counsel
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`informed her counsel that Defendant was “judgment-proof.” [DE 13 at 4].
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`Plaintiff contends that these transfers were made to hinder, delay, and defraud
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`Plaintiff, prompting her to file this action here. Plaintiff now also seeks prejudgment
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`attachment of the Indiana Property to protect the status quo while her case is pending
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`3
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`in this Court. [Id.]. Plaintiff also seeks expedited review of her motion for prejudgment
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`attachment.
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`II.
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`Legal Standard
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`Indiana law applies to Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment attachment. See Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 64(a) (“At the commencement of and throughout an action, every remedy is
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`available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing
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`a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment.”); see also Granny
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`Goose Foods v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423,
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`436 n.10 (1974) (stating that federal courts must apply state law to determine whether
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`attachment is permitted). The Indiana Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act—through
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`which Plaintiff brings her claims here—likewise provides for the use of the provisional
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`remedy of prejudgment attachment. See Ind. Code § 32-18-2-17(a)(2) (“In an action for
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`relief against a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the
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`limitations in section 18 of this chapter, may obtain any of the following: . . (2) An
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`attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property
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`of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by IC 34-25-2-1 . . . .”)
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`Indiana law has two provisions authorizing prejudgment attachment. First,
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`Indiana Trial Rule 64(A)(1) provides that “all remedies providing for seizure of person
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`or property for purposes of securing satisfaction of the judgment . . . are available under
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`the circumstances and in the manner provided by law.” Second, as referenced in the
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`Indiana Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Indiana Code § 34-25-2-1(b) authorizes
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`4
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`prejudgment attachment. Specifically, it provides six circumstances through which a
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`plaintiff may seek to attach property to secure satisfaction of a potential judgment:
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`The plaintiff may attach property when the action is for the recovery of
`money and the defendant:
`(1) is . . . a foreign corporation or a nonresident of Indiana;
`(2) is . . . secretly leaving or has left Indiana with intent to defraud:
`(A) the defendant’s creditor’s;
`(B) the state;
`(C) a municipal corporation;
`(D) a political subdivision, or
`(E) a school corporation . . .;
`(3) is concealed so that a summons cannot be served upon the defendant;
`(4) is removing or about to remove the defendant’s property subject to
`execution . . . outside Indiana, not leaving enough behind to satisfy the
`plaintiff’s claim;
`(5) has sold, conveyed or otherwise disposed of the defendant's property
`subject to execution, or permitted the property to be sold with the
`fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder, or delay:
`(A) the defendant's creditors;
`(B) the state;
`(C) a municipal corporation;
`(D) a political subdivision; or
`(E) a school corporation ...; or
`(6) is about to sell, convey, or otherwise dispose of the defendant's
`property subject to execution with the fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder,
`or delay:
`(A) the defendant's creditors;
`(B) the state;
`(C) a municipal corporation;
`(D) a political subdivision; or
`(E) a school corporation....
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`How a plaintiff moves for prejudgment attachment is provided for in Ind. Code §§ 34-
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`25-2-4 to -5. First, a plaintiff must include an affidavit stating “(1) the nature of the
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`plaintiff’s claim; (2) that the plaintiff’s claim is just; (3) the amount that the plaintiff
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`ought to recover; and (4) that one (1) of the grounds in [Indiana Code § 34-25-2-1(b)] is
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`present.” Ind. Code § 34-25-2-4. Second, a plaintiff must also “execute a written
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`undertaking, with sufficient surety . . . to the effect that the plaintiff will (1) duly
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`prosecute the proceeding in attachment; and (2) pay all damages that may be sustained
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`5
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`by the defendant if the proceedings of the plaintiff are wrongful and oppressive.” Ind.
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`Code § 34-25-2-5.
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`“Because statutory attachment operates in derogation of the common law,
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`Indiana strictly construes [these statutory] provisions in determining its applicability.”
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`Woodward v. Algie, No. 1:13-CV-1435-RLY-DKL, 2014 WL 1414264, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr.
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`14, 2014); see also Bond v. Templeton Coal Co., 988 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“It
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`is well established that ‘a statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly
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`construed,’ as we ‘presume that the legislature is aware of the common law and intends
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`to make no changes therein beyond its declaration either by express terms or
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`unmistakable implication.’”) (internal citations omitted). Once the Court finds that the
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`prejudgment attachment statute applies, “the statute should be liberally construed to
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`effect its remedial nature.” Woodward, 2014 WL 1414264, at *3 (citing Schwedland v.
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`Bachman, 512 N.E.2d 445, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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`III. Discussion
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`A. Motion for Expedited or Ex Parte Consideration [DE 13]
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`The Court must first address Plaintiff’s motion for expedited or ex parte
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`consideration of her motion for prejudgment attachment. Plaintiff filed this case and
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`moved for prejudgment attachment on February 10, 2025, but Defendant was not served
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`until February 21, 2025.4 [See DE 14]. Defendant has not yet appeared, either through
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`4 At least one court has found that service of process in the underlying action is required for the court to
`obtain jurisdiction over the action itself and the attachment proceedings See Provisional Remedies:
`Indiana, Practical Law State Q&A w-001-8431 (citing (Boorum v. Ray, 72 Ind. 151, 157 (1880)). Plaintiff has
`now submitted an affidavit of service, so the Court need not address this further.
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`6
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`counsel or pro se. Moreover, under this Court’s local rules, an adverse party has fourteen
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`days after service of a motion in which to serve and respond. N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-1(d)(3)(A).
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`But Plaintiff asks that the Court consider her motion without waiting for Defendant to
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`appear or answer because of Defendant’s pattern of deception.
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`Indiana’s attachment statutes do not address whether an adverse party requires
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`notice before issuance of a prejudgment attachment. But, as Plaintiff contends, courts
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`have considered such motions ex parte. See Woodward, 2014 WL 1414264, at *3; Am.
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`Acceptance Co LLC v. Goldberg et al., Case No. 2:08-cv-00009-JVB-PRC, docket entry 13
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`(citing Lakes & Rivers Transfer, a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel Co., 736 N.E.2d
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`285, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Runner v. Scott, 50 N.E. 479, 482 (Ind. 1898)(“It is
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`not necessary that notice to the defendant in attachment be served at or before the
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`issuance of the writ.”)
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`Finding that the Court may consider a motion for prejudgment attachment on an
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`expedited or ex parte basis, the Court must now determine whether to do so here.
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`Plaintiff alleges that there is good cause to do so. In support, Plaintiff refers to
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`Defendant’s alleged fraudulent conduct after Plaintiff filed the NDNY Action—conduct
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`which prompted Plaintiff to file this action. Plaintiff also directs the Court to
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`Defendant’s deceptive conduct in other litigation between the parties—conduct which
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`led to Defendant’s indictment in Chenango County, New York, for perjury, false
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`statements, unlawful dissemination of an intimate image, harassment, and coercion.
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`[See Exhibit A, Indictment of Defendant, at DE 6-2]. As to the latter conduct, Plaintiff
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`explains that the parties were also involved in two domestic violence proceedings—one
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`7
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`in New York and one in California. Defendant filed the proceeding in New York, and in
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`support of his domestic proceeding, Defendant submitted certain written evidence
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`under penalties of perjury. [DE 13 at 4]. Computer forensics later showed that
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`Defendant had materially altered the evidence he had submitted to the court, resulting
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`in the referenced indictment. [Id. at 5].5
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`For these reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited
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`Consideration and will proceed to rule on Plaintiff’s Motion for Prejudgment
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`Attachment. [DE 13].
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`B. Motion for Prejudgment Attachment of the Indiana Property [DE 6]
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`As stated, a plaintiff moving for prejudgment attachment must meet certain
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`requirements. These requirements are “strictly construed.” Woodward, 2014 WL 1414264,
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`at *3. The Court now considers each requirement in turn.
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`1.
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`Requirements (1), (2), and (3): the Nature of Plaintiff’s Claim,
`Plaintiff’s Claim is Just, and the Amount Plaintiff Ought to
`Recover
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`First, a plaintiff must present an affidavit showing “(1) the nature of the
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`plaintiff’s claim; (2) that the plaintiff’s claim is just; (3) the amount that the plaintiff
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`ought to recover; and (4) that one (1) of the grounds in [Indiana Code § 34-25-2-1(b)] is
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`5 Finally, Plaintiff also alleges that her motion should be given expedited or ex parte review because her
`multiple tries to serve Defendant were initially thwarted. Plaintiff explains that Defendant has listed
`addresses in three states as his residence, but it is unclear whether any of these addresses are current. [DE
`13 at 8]. Plaintiff thus maintains that Defendant’s whereabouts are unknown and cannot be determined.
`That said, a week after Plaintiff filed the instant motion, she filed an Affidavit of Proof of Personal Service
`showing that Defendant had been served on February 21, 2025, at 7:27 a.m., when a process server left a
`copy of the summons and complaint at the front door of the Indiana Property. [DE 14 at 1]. Still, since
`Plaintiff alleges failed service attempts at multiple addresses previously provided by Defendant, the
`Court has considered this information here.
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`8
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`present.” Ind. Code § 34-25-2-4. “The term affidavit has been defined at common law as
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`being a written statement under oath taken before an authorized officer.” Yang v.
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`Stafford, 515 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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`Here, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746. [DE 6-1]. This
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`provision states that: “[w]herever, under any law of the United States . . . any matter is
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`required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn .
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`. . affidavit . . . such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced,
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`established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement,
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`in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury .
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`. .” 28 U.S.C. § 1746. But, as stated, “[i]n a diversity case, federal courts apply federal
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`procedural law and state substantive law[.]” Burkhart Advert., Inc. v. Lowe's Home Ctr.,
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`Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 809, 814 (N.D. Ind. 2002). Thus, it is unclear whether this provision
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`applies when the Court is construing Indiana law to determine whether to grant a
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`prejudgment attachment. Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 436 n.10. In any event, Ind. R.
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`Trial P. 11(B) similarly provides:
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`Verification by Affirmation or Representation. When in connection with any civil or special
`statutory proceeding it is required that any pleading, motion, petition, supporting
`affidavit, or other document of any kind, be verified, or that an oath be taken, it shall be
`sufficient if the subscriber simply affirms the truth of the matter to be verified by an
`affirmation or representation in substantially the following language:
`“I (we) affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representation(s) is
`(are) true.
`(Signed) ____________”
`Any person who falsifies an affirmation or representation of fact shall be subject to the
`same penalties as are prescribed by law for the making of a false affidavit.
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`Here, Plaintiff’s Declaration concludes by stating that “I declare under penalty of
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`perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge[,]
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`9
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`information and belief.” [DE 6-1 at 12]. As Plaintiff’s Declaration both invokes 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1746 and affirms the truth in language substantially similar to that written in Trial
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`Rule 11(B), the Court finds that the Declaration satisfies the form required by Ind. Code
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`§ 34-25-2-4.
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`Turning to the substance of her Declaration, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
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`intentionally transferred assets from New York to Indiana to hinder, delay, and defraud
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`Plaintiff in violation of Indiana’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act. Plaintiff reports
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`that, after she filed the NDNY Action, Defendant transferred the New York Property for
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`at least $999,999 and then paid $914,000 for the Indiana Property. [DE 6-1 at 10, ¶ 73; at
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`12 ¶42]. Plaintiff states that she seeks to attach the Indiana Property purchased for
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`$914,000, which would secure a portion of her ultimate recovery against Defendant.6
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`[Id. at 9, ¶43].
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`Plaintiff need only meet notice pleading standards in her submission. See Wee
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`Scots, LLC v. Fleming, 765 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Her statements
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`demonstrate the nature of the claim, the amount to recover, and that her claim is just.
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`Though she does not specifically say her claim is just in her Declaration, the justness of
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`her claim is made plain by the nature of her claim and the allegations included in her
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`affidavit. Ludlow v. Ramsey, 78 U.S. 581, 586, 20 L. Ed. 216 (1870). Accordingly, the Court
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`finds that the substance of her Declaration suffices for the first three requirements of
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`6 Plaintiff’s motion also explains that she “seeks to avoid the transfers at issue, a money judgment for the
`value of the assets transferred, and an injunction against further transfers, as authorized by I.C. §§ 32-18-
`2-17 and 32-18-2-18(b) and (c).” [DE 6 at 17].
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`10
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`Ind. Code § 34-25-2-4. See also Vukadinovich v. Posner, No. 2:22-CV-118-TLS-JPK, 2023
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`WL 4348059, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July 3, 2023).
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`2.
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`Requirement (4): One of the Grounds in Indiana Code § 34-25-2-
`1(b) is Present
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` Ind. Code § 34-25-2-4 also requires that “that one (1) of the grounds in [Ind.
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`
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`Code § 34-25-2-1(b)] is present.” Plaintiff contends that three grounds are present here:
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`The plaintiff may attach property when the action is for the recovery of
`money and the defendant:
`(1) is . . . a foreign corporation or a nonresident of Indiana;
`(2) is . . . secretly leaving or has left Indiana with intent to defraud:
`(A) the defendant’s creditor’s;
`. . .
`(6) is about to sell, convey, or otherwise dispose of the defendant's
`property subject to execution with the fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder,
`or delay:
`(A) the defendant's creditors[.]
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`As to the first ground, Plaintiff contends that, based on the address Defendant provided
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`in the NDNY Action, he is a resident of Arizona. Plaintiff reports that Defendant was
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`proceeding pro se in the NDNY Action and that, as a result of his pro se status, the court
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`ordered him to provide a valid mailing address and email address. [DE 6-1 at 11 fn. 5].
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`The address Defendant provided to the court is an address in Phoenix, Arizona.7
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`Plaintiff also states that Defendant is a dual British/American citizen with a British
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`passport. [DE 6-1 at 2, ¶8].
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`
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`Plaintiff’s declaration also states the following under paragraphs (2)(A) and
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`(6)(A): that she has “good reason to believe and do[es] believe, that Defendant is
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`secretly leaving or has left Indiana with intent to defraud [her], as one of Defendant’s
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`creditors. [She] also [has] good reason to believe and do[es] believe, that Defendant is
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`7 The address Defendant provided in the NDNY Action is a UPS branch in Phoenix, AZ. [See DE 6 at 12].
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`11
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`about to sell, convey, or otherwise dispose of his property subject to execution with the
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`fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder or delay [her], one of Defendant’s creditors.” [DE 6-1
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`at 12, ¶44]. As stated, courts have found that only “notice pleading” is required, and as
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`such, has found such statements to be sufficient to obtain an attachment by motion. Wee
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`Scots, 765 N.E.2d at 671-72 (“The fact that [Plaintiff] tracked the statutory language in
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`drafting her attachment motion does not render it insufficient); see also Vukadinovich,
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`2023 WL 4348059, at *5; Wayne Mfg. LLC v. Cold Headed Fasteners & Assemblies Inc., No.
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`1:21-CV-00290-HAB-SLC, 2022 WL 2704478, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ind. July 12, 2022).
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`Accordingly, Plaintiff has shown that three grounds for attachment in Ind. Code
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`§ 34-25-2-1(b) are present. The Court now turns to the final requirement for
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`prejudgment attachment in Ind. Code § 34-25-2-5.
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`3. Written Undertaking with Sufficient Surety
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`Ind. Code § 34-25-2-5 provides another requirement for prejudgment attachment:
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`[T]he plaintiff or a person representing the plaintiff shall execute a written
`undertaking, with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk, payable
`to the defendant, to the effect that the plaintiff will:
`(1) duly prosecute the proceeding in attachment; and
`(2) pay all damages that may be sustained by the defendant if the
`proceedings of the plaintiff are wrongful and oppressive.
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` Plaintiff’s Declaration [DE 6-1] does not include this written undertaking, nor has any
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`such undertaking been separately filed. See Am. Acceptance Co LLC v. Goldberg et al., Case
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`No. 2:08-cv-00009-JVB-PRC, docket entry 5. But Plaintiff’s motion does address this
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`requirement by explaining that: “if and when the Court grants this motion for an
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`attachment, Plaintiff will promptly execute such an undertaking, in an amount to be
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`12
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`fixed by the Court. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court fix that amount at
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`$100,000.” [DE 6 at 18].
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`Though Plaintiff indicates that she will execute a written undertaking, she has
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`not yet done so. “The bond or written undertaking must be filed before the issuance of
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`the order of attachment.” 3 Ind. Law Encyc. Attachment § 15. Another court in this
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`district has denied a motion for prejudgment attachment for failure to execute the
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`written undertaking at the time of filing of the motion. See Vukadinovich, 2023 WL
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`4348059, at *5 (“Plaintiff has not shown that he has executed a written undertaking with
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`sufficient surety to cover the damages Defendant would incur if the attachment is
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`‘wrongful and oppressive,’ in satisfaction of the requirements of § 34-25-2-5. For this
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`reason alone, Plaintiff's Motion must be DENIED without prejudice.”) (emphasis
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`added).
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`Even if the Court found the statements that Plaintiff “will promptly execute such
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`an undertaking” to suffice, without more, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff’s
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`proposed undertaking provides sufficient surety “to pay all damages that may be
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`sustained by the defendant if the proceedings of the plaintiff are wrongful and
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`oppressive.” Ind. Code § § 34-25-2-5. In her motion, Plaintiff requests that the amount
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`be fixed at $100,000—even though she seeks to attach real property that Defendant
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`purchased for $914,000. [DE 6 at 18; DE 6-1 at 12, ¶42]. In requesting this amount, “[n]o
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`explanation of the calculation of this proposed amount was provided, specifically, no
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`showing of how it meets the likely or possible damages that [Defendant] might sustain
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`if these proceedings are found to be wrongful and oppressive.” Woodward, 2014 WL
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`13
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`1414264, at *4. Other courts have denied motions for prejudgment attachment without
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`prejudice for failure to explain a proposed surety or when the amount proposed by the
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`plaintiff is otherwise insufficient. Id.; see also Wayne Mfg. LLC, 2022 WL 2704478, at *3-*4
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`(finding that a plaintiff’s statement that it “is prepared to deposit $300,000 cash in a
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`segregated fund to satisfy the surety requirement” was “woefully inadequate” to obtain
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`a prejudgment attachment when the defendant submitted an affidavit stating its
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`damages from the attachment would exceed $2 million).
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`As stated, “Indiana strictly construes [these statutory] provisions in determining
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`its applicability.” Woodward, 2014 WL 1414264, at *3. Moreover, “some courts have held
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`that ‘[p]re-judgment attachments are not favored, principally because they are subject to
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`a constitutional attack on due process grounds.’” Vukadinovich, 2023 WL 4348059, at *6
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`(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, without more, the Court cannot find that all
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`statutory provisions apply to allow the Court to grant Plaintiff’s motion. Still, given the
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`nature of Plaintiff’s claim and the expeditious review, the Court will not deny the
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`motion without prejudice at this time. Instead, the Court will take the motion under
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`advisement to let Plaintiff present a written undertaking with sufficient surety in
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`compliance with the requirements in Ind. Code § 34-25-2-5.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`For these reasons, the Court now:
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`• GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Consideration of Plaintiff’s
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`Motion for Prejudgment Attachment [DE 13]; and
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`14
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`USDC IN/ND case 3:25-cv-00133-DRL-SJF document 15 filed 03/03/25 page 15 of 15
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`• TAKES UNDER ADVISEMENT Plaintiff’s Motion for Prejudgment
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`Attachment. [DE 5]. Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit:
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`(1) a written undertaking as contemplated by Ind. Code § 34-25-2-5;
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`(2) an explanation regarding how the amount she has proposed provides
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`sufficient surety for the damages Defendant would incur if an attachment
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`order is found to “wrongful and oppressive” under Ind. Code § 34-25-2-5;
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`and
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`(3) a proposed order of attachment for the Court’s use in the event that
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`the Court finds that the motion for prejudgment attachment may be
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`granted upon receipt of Plaintiff’s additional filings.
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`These filings must be submitted by March 6, 2025, or else the Court will deny the
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`motion without prejudice.
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`SO ORDERED this 3rd day of March 2025.
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`s/ Scott J. Frankel
`Scott J. Frankel
`United States Magistrate Judge
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`15
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