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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 1 of 35 PageID #:14065
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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` Plaintiff,
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` v.
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`CHARLES CUI,
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` Defendant.
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`
`
`
`
` No. 19 CR 322-3
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` Judge Virginia M. Kendall
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`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`
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`Businessman and lawyer Charles Cui faced dire financial consequences to his commercial
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`real estate development project if he did not obtain a pole sign permit and certain tax financing
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`funds from the City of Chicago. The Government contended that Cui took matters into his own
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`hands, offering Ed Burke—the powerful 14th Ward Alderman and Chair of the Committee on
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`Finance for the City Council—legal business in exchange for his assistance. On May 30, 2019, a
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`grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging Cui with five counts of corruptly offering
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`or agreeing to give things of value; using interstate commerce to promote such unlawful activity;
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`and making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Dkt. 30). Following a six-
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`week trial, a jury convicted Cui on all five counts. (Dkt. 395). At the close of evidence, Cui moved
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`for a judgment of acquittal on those counts. (Dkt. 379). Cui now renews his motion for a judgment
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`of acquittal and also moves for a new trial. (Dkts. 448, 449). For the following reasons, Cui’s
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`motions [379, 448, 449] are denied. The jury’s verdict stands.
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`1
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`

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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 2 of 35 PageID #:14066
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`BACKGROUND
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`A May 30, 2019 Superseding Indictment alleged former 14th Ward Alderman Ed Burke
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`exploited his position on the Chicago City Council in four “episodes”: the (1) Post Office; (2)
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`Burger King; (3) Pole Sign; and (4) Field Museum. (Dkt. 30; see Dkt. 504 at 4–10). Within the
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`Pole Sign episode, the Government indicted Charles Cui, a Chicago-based businessman and
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`immigration attorney, for offering a bribe to Burke and making false statements to the FBI. (Dkt.
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`30, Counts 12–15, 17). Specifically, the Indictment charged Cui with one count of offering a bribe
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`to a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), three counts of using interstate commerce
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`in furtherance of such activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), and one count of making
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`false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).1
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`The trial spanned roughly six weeks. At the conclusion of the evidence and the parties’
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`arguments, the Court read the jury 326 pages of instructions. (Dkt. 384). After deliberating for
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`approximately four days, the jury found Cui guilty of all five counts. The convictions against Cui
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`and his various challenges are laid out below:
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`Count(s)
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`12
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`13, 14, 15
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`17
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`Violation(s)
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`18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)
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`18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)
`720 ILCS 5/33-
`1(a)
`720 ILCS 5/33-
`1(d)
`720 ILCS 5/29A-
`1
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`
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`18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)
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`Challenge
`Description
`Bribery — Offering Rule 29
`Rule 33
`Rule 29
`Rule 33
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`Travel Act
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`Bribery
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`Bribery
`Commercial
`Bribery
`False Statements
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`
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`Rule 29
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`1 Defendants Burke and his associate Peter Andrews were also charged with corruption-related counts. The jury
`acquitted Andrews of all counts in which he was charged. (Dkt. 393). The jury convicted Burke on thirteen counts,
`(Dkt. 392), and the Court denied Burke’s motions for acquittal and a new trial in a separate opinion, (Dkt. 504).
`2
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`

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`At the close of the Government’s case, Cui moved orally for a judgment of acquittal under
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`Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) for all counts in which he was charged. (Dkt. 430 at
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`4090:14–17). Cui also filed a written motion that same day, (Dkt. 379), which the Court took under
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`advisement, (Dkt. 430 at 4091:7). On February 8, 2024, Cui renewed his motion for a judgment of
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`acquittal under Rule 29 and also moved for a new trial under Rule 33. (Dkts. 448, 449).
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`I.
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`Relevant Factual Summary
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`The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case from its previous rulings. (See
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`Dkts. 196, 317, 504). For efficiency, the Court recounts only the evidence pertinent to Cui’s
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`arguments and a basic understanding of the events.
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`a. Pole Sign
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`Since 2014, Cui served as the sole member and manager of Irving Park Property Holdings,
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`LLC. (GX 455). The jury heard evidence that in 2015, Cui entered into a lease agreement with
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`Binny’s Beverage Depot for a commercial property located at 4901 West Irving Park Road (“4901
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`Property”). (GX 407). The lease agreement was for a period of 15 years, with the option to renew
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`for up to seven five-year extensions. (Id.) In June 2016, Cui entered into a redevelopment
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`agreement with the City of Chicago. (GX 414). The redevelopment agreement provided Cui’s
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`company with up to $2 million in tax increment financing (“TIF”) funds from the City of Chicago
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`to finance the redevelopment of the 4901 Property.2 (GX 410, 411). The City would distribute the
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`TIF funds by September 2017, at the completion of the redevelopment project. (GX 414)
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`2 TIF funding is a “special funding tool used by the City of Chicago to promote public and private investment across
`the City.” (Dkt. 461 at 2). The Chicago City Council—with Burke’s support as Chairman of the Finance Committee—
`passed an ordinance in March 2016 providing Cui with up to $2 million in TIF funds. The parties entered into a
`stipulation regarding the passage that “the redevelopment agreement was negotiated and entered into prior to the time
`period of the offenses charged[.] . . . There is no allegation of wrongdoing in connection with the negotiation,
`development, or passage of the redevelopment agreement.” (Dkt. 433 at 4379:3–15).
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`3
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`In exchange for the TIF funds, Cui was required to lease the 4901 Property back to Binny’s.
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`(GX 414). In that lease, Cui gave Binny’s the exclusive right to use the pole sign in front of the
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`property. (GX 407). Binny’s then applied to the Chicago Department of Buildings (“CDOB”) for
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`a pole sign permit in April 2017, which was denied. (GX 418, 453; see Dkt. 427 at 3724–28).
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`CDOB’s Bureau of Zoning determined the property had been re-zoned for pedestrian use. (GX
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`281, 453, 604). And the pole sign was ineligible for a non-conforming use as it was vacant since
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`2011 or 2012. (Id.) After the denial, Cui entered a lease addendum that gave Binny’s a rent
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`reduction if Cui did not obtain a pole sign permit by October 2017. (GX 424). The stakes were
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`high: If Cui failed, he would lose about $750,000 in rent revenue over the lease period and
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`potentially the TIF funds. (GX 270, 304).
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`The pole sign was in the 45th Ward. Yet Cui chose to email Burke, the 14th Ward
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`Alderman, in August 2017. (GX 270). Burke is the longest-serving member of Chicago’s City
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`Council, serving as both the 14th Ward Alderman from 1969 to 2023 and the Council’s Chairman
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`of the Committee on Finance from 1989 to 2019. Concurrently, he also owned a private law firm,
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`Klafter & Burke, that represented clients in property tax assessment contests and appeals.
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`On August 23, 2017, Cui called Burke and left a voicemail noting that he needed help on
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`a legal matter. (GX 79, 80). In a follow-up email, Cui told Burke that Binny’s pole sign permit
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`was “denied by zoning” for falling out of use, and “now [the sign] is illegal.” (GX 270). He asked
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`Burke to “look into the matter” and asked, “how to proceed” because he faced serious financial
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`repercussions. (Id.) Namely, Binny’s may “cancel the lease” and ask for a significant reduction,
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`and Cui might fail to receive the TIF funds disbursement. (Id.)
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`Cui had not heard back from Burke by the next day. He forwarded Burke’s email to a
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`mutual friend, Ray Chin, and noted “[m]aybe [Burke] thinks there is conflict of interest, because
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`4
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`of his position. I’ll ask him to represent me for property tax appeal, which will be a big bite,
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`comparing with this.” (GX 271). Shortly after expressing his plan to Chin, Cui emailed his property
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`tax appeal attorney, George Reveliotis, asking for a “favor”—to shift the 4901 Property’s tax
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`appeal work to Burke “at least for this year.” (GX 272). Cui explained that he “ha[d] [a] TIF deal
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`going with the City, and [Burke] is the Chairman of Finance Committee.” (Id.) Thus, Cui,
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`“need[ed] [Burke’s] favor for [his] tif money” and “help for [his] zoning” issue. (Id.) Cui ended
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`by emphasizing to Reveliotis that Burke “is a powerful broker in City Hall, and [Cui] need[s] him
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`now” but that Cui would transfer the work back to Reveliotis after the year. (Id.)
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`Almost immediately after sending Reveliotis this email, Cui emailed Burke offering him
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`tax appeal work for the 4901 Property. (GX 273). Burke then replied that someone with his law
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`firm would be in touch with Cui to move forward. (Id.) On August 30, 2017, an attorney at Burke’s
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`law firm reached out to Cui to formalize Klafter & Burke’s property tax appeal work
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`representation. (GX 277). That same day, Burke directed his assistant to reach out to CDOB
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`Commissioner Judy Frydland to “see if she’d . . . review [the pole sign permit] and see if they . . .
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`can . . . help [Cui].” (GX 88). Burke also separately called Frydland on August 31, 2017 and left
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`Cui’s information with her. (Dkt. 425 at 3507–10; see GX 301). Burke’s assistant then replied to
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`Cui’s original August 23, 2017 email about the pole sign and confirmed that Frydland would reach
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`out to him. (GX 270).
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`On September 1, 2017, Cui emailed his zoning attorney, Tom Moore, with an image that
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`depicted the pole sign in use for advertising tenancy opportunities. (GX 278, 282). Cui asked
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`Moore to contact Frydland and relay the message that the pole sign had been in continuous use,
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`which would be a basis to grant the permit as a non-conforming use. (GX 278). Moore did so. (GX
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`280, 282). Yet, in an email to Frydland and Moore, CDOB First Deputy Commissioner Matt
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`5
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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 6 of 35 PageID #:14070
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`Beaudet reaffirmed the denial, based, in part, on his personal knowledge of the pole sign’s lack of
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`continuous use and conclusion that Cui’s image was photoshopped. (GX 281, 284).
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`Cui passed along Beaudet’s assessment to Burke, noting “First Deputy Commissioner Matt
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`Beaudet has issue with this.” (GX 279). Cui also emailed Frydland and explained that the
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`photoshopped image was from his “broker.” (GX 286). The following week, Frydland emailed
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`Burke’s assistant, informing her that the permit denial was reaffirmed, and that Cui submitted a
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`photoshopped image of the pole sign. (GX 95). As a next step, Frydland suggested that Burke
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`contact Zoning Administrator Patti Scudiero regarding the denial. (Id.; Dkt. 426 at 3538–40).
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`Burke did so to see if she could “look into,” or review, the denial. (See Dkt. 427 at 3728).
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`Ultimately, Scudiero took no further action. On September 5, 2017, Cui entered into a contingency
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`fee agreement with Klafter & Burke for the tax appeal work. (GX 277, 427). The pole sign was
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`removed in the fall of 2017. (See Dkt. 427 at 3787:23).
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`b. FBI Interview
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`On November 29, 2018, the FBI interviewed Cui at his office located at the 4901 Property.
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`(GX 145; Dkt. 427 at 3840–47). The Indictment charged three false statements made by Cui to the
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`FBI agents: that Cui (1) “made no business offers to Burke during the pole signage matter”; (2)
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`“offered business to Burke ‘just because he is a good tax appeal lawyer’ ”; and (3) “[t]he
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`information Cui provided to federal agents during his interview was accurate to the best of his
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`knowledge.” (Dkt. 30, Count 17).
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`Specifically, the interview transcript reads:
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`• Agent: Okay, did you, did you ever, um offer to, um offer [Burke] business again
`after—
`• Cui: No.
`• Agent:—he had represented you before, did you ever offer business to him again, right
`around the time when you were seeking help about the pole sign issue?
`• Cui: No.
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`6
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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 7 of 35 PageID #:14071
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`. . .
`• Agent: But you don’t recall ever offering Mr. Burke business during the time when
`you’re trying to resolve the pole sign issue?
`• Cui: No, I offered Mr. Burke business a while ago, just because he’s a good tax appeal
`lawyer.
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`(GX 145 at lines 752–61, 902–09, 1163–67). At trial, the Court admitted into evidence the entire
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`approximately forty minute recorded conversation between Cui and the agents. (Dkt. 363).
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`DISCUSSION
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`I.
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`Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
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`a. Legal Standard
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`A court “must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is
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`insufficient to sustain a conviction” either after the government has closed its evidence or within
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`fourteen days after a jury has rendered a verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), (c)(1); United States v.
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`Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496 (7th Cir. 2019). A court will overturn the jury’s verdict only if, “after
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`viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the record is devoid of
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`evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
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`v. Wrobel, 841 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556,
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`571–72 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. White, 95 F.4th 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 2024);
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`United States v. Orlando, 819 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A defendant faces an uphill battle
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`in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.”); United States v. Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d 988,
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`993 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing defendant’s challenge as a “nearly insurmountable hurdle”).
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`Further, courts “do not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the jury’s credibility
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`determinations.” United States v. Taylor, 637 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2011). “In short, if there is a
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`reasonable basis in the record for the verdict, it must stand.” White, 95 F.4th at 1078 (cleaned up).
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`7
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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 8 of 35 PageID #:14072
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`b. Count Twelve, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)
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`Count Twelve charged Cui with federal program bribery for corruptly offering or agreeing
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`to give legal fees involving $5,000 or more to Burke with the intent to influence or reward Burke
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`in connection with some business of the City of Chicago. (See Dkt. 30 at 50–51); 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 666(a)(2). The Court instructed the jury that an act is “in connection with some business” of the
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`City of Chicago—or an “official action”—if it is a “formal exercise of governmental power.” (Dkt.
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`384 at 242).
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`To preface, individuals in Chicago may deal with Chicago aldermen in their “second jobs”
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`or outside employment. Yet, dealings with a public official may cross the line into federal program
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`bribery when the bribe-giver offers a thing of value to the public official with the intent to influence
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`them in their official action. The jury found that Cui crossed that line when he knowingly offered
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`Burke lucrative tax appeal work in order to ensure he received financial benefits from his
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`redevelopment project. Though Cui attempts to downplay the criminality of his actions, the law
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`supports the Government’s theory and the jury’s determination. Under the stringent standard of
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`viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and deferring to the jury’s
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`credibility determinations and rational inferences, the Court finds that the record substantiates
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`Cui’s guilty verdict on Count Twelve.
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`i. Bona Fide Compensation under 18 U.S.C. § 666(c)
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`First, Cui argues that he retained Burke’s law firm as bona fide compensation paid in the
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`usual course of business and should be exempted under 18 U.S.C. § 666(c)’s safe harbor provision.
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`For its part, the Government argues that Cui’s offer of tax appeal work was made for the express
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`purpose of influencing Burke in his official capacity, constituting a bribe, rather than a bona fide
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`arrangement. (See Dkt. 448 at 3–6; Dkt. 460 at 22).
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`8
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`Under § 666(c), “bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses
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`paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business” are exempted from the statute’s coverage. 18
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`U.S.C. § 666(c). The safe harbor is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial. United States v.
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`Lupton, 620 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010).3 Cui raised this theory to the jury at trial and they were
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`properly instructed.4 Here, a reasonable jury could find that Cui’s engagement of Burke was not
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`in the “usual course of business” or “bona fide” because the legal work was the quid or bribe in a
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`scheme to influence Burke in his official capacity. In fact, Cui’s written intent in his emails to Chin
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`and Reveliotis and the timing and circumstances of his offer support the jury’s finding. See United
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`States v. Oros, 578 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. McClain, 2024 WL 50868, at
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`*7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2024) (collecting cases and noting that courts assessing § 666(c)’s application
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`analyze corrupt intent, actions, behavior of the defendant, and whether the defendant was entitled
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`to the money, among other factors).
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`CDOB’s denial of the pole sign permit jeopardized the Binny’s lease agreement’s financial
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`viability and disbursement of the $2 million in TIF funds. Facing serious financial repercussions,
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`the evidence showed that Cui sought out Burke specifically for his position as a “powerful broker”
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`in City Hall. Cui was not Burke’s constituent, nor was the pole sign and redevelopment project
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`located in Burke’s ward. Yet, Cui identified Burke, noting to Chin that “because of [Burke’s]
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`position” he was planning to give him a “big bite” of tax appeal work.
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`Cui’s also made his intention behind the offer of legal work clear to Reveliotis, Cui’s tax
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`appeal attorney. In justifying that he had to transfer some of the city-related tax appeal work to
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`3 Cui first raised this argument at the motion-to-dismiss stage, where the Court, through Judge Dow, noted that whether
`any fees Cui agreed to pay were made “in the usual course of business” was a “jury question.” (Dkt. 196 at 59).
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` The jury instructions stated that “[b]ona fide fees or other compensation paid in the usual course of business do not
`qualify as a thing of value solicited or demanded, given, offered, or agreed to be given by the defendant.” (Dkt. 384
`at 243).
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` 4
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`9
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`Burke for the year, Cui again leaned heavily on Burke’s position as Chairman of the Finance
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`Committee and “powerful broker in City Hall.” In fact, Burke’s position was the very reason Cui
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`“need[ed]” him for the TIF funds and pole sign permit. No where did Cui mention Klafter &
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`Burke’s excellent track record, legal prowess, or other rationales that Cui now raises to frame this
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`arrangement as compensation in the “usual course of business.” In fact, Cui’s email to Reveliotis
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`established that Cui in fact already had a property tax appeal attorney handling the work. The jury
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`could thus reasonably infer that Cui sought to hire Burke for no other reason than to influence him
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`in his official action for Cui’s own financial benefit. See United States v. Whiteagle, 759 F.3d 734,
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`756 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting the jury could reasonably infer that a hiring an individual for a duplicate
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`position was to influence or reward a public official for his assistance).
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`Further, the timeline of events supports the jury’s rejection of the § 666(c) safe harbor. Cui
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`emailed Burke asking for assistance with the pole sign permit and explained the financial
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`repercussions he faced. The next day, Cui received no response. He then expressed his plan to
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`Chin and Reveliotis to give Burke legal work, which the jury could infer, based on Cui’s own
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`words, was to compensate and incentivize Burke to conduct an official action on Cui’s behalf.
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`Minutes later—and within a day of his original email—Cui emailed Burke with the offer.
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`In light of the evidence in Cui’s own words explaining his rationale behind offering Burke
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`legal work, the jury was permitted to find that the engagement of Klafter & Burke was not “bona
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`fide” or in the “usual course.” Rather, the offer of legal work itself was the “thing of value” offered
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`by Cui with the intent to influence of reward under § 666(a)(2). See United States v. Bryant, 556
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`F.Supp.2d 378, 427 (D.N.J. 2008) (holding that § 666(c) was inapplicable to salary payments that
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`were allegedly the quid of the quid pro quo). In fact, that Cui offered Burke legal work under a
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`guise of legitimate business services displays a deeper intent to conceal the true nature of the
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`10
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`payment. Lupton, 620 F.3d at 802 (“Cash payments, payments to sham companies, and
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`mischaracterization of payments are hallmarks of concealment and fraud.”). Moreover, whether
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`Cui’s conduct was technically allowed under local and state ethics laws and regulations has no
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`bearing on the jury’s conclusion. As the Court repeatedly instructed—and Cui himself requested—
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`the jury could not apply Burke’s violation or compliance with local and state ethics laws when
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`evaluating Cui’s guilt. (See Dkt. 434 at 4613:17–22).
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`That Burke conducted the legal work for “real” properties is also no matter. Under Cui’s
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`interpretation, only “sham” transactions fall outside of § 666(c)’s ambit. 5 Cui primarily relies on
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`United States v. Mills to argue that since Cui ultimately received legal services from Burke, the
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`fees constitute bona fide compensation as a matter of law. 140 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 1998). In
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`Mills, the Sixth Circuit found § 666(c) applied where the indictment failed to allege paid jobs
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`“were unnecessary or that the individuals who obtained those employment positions did not
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`responsibly fulfill the duties associated with their positions.” Id. at 633. Yet, the court’s ruling was
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`in part based on the indictment’s failure to allege the $5,000 transactional value under § 666. Id.
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`at 634. Further, Mills seems to suggest that the § 666(c) exception would not apply if the
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`government had proved that the salaries paid for the jobs were unjustified. The Court is disinclined
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`to adopt Mill’s nonbinding and broad reasoning when considering the weight of cases finding that
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`legitimate payments can fall outside of § 666(c)’s exception; especially where, as here, the
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`legitimate payment is alleged to be the bribe itself. See, e.g., Bryant, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 428
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`(analyzing Mills and finding it distinguishable where the “salary itself constitutes the bribe”);
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`United States v. Cornier–Ortiz, 361 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2004) (“That the payments were made for a
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`5 Cui incorporates his arguments regarding § 666(c) made in his motion to dismiss. (Dkts. 89, 153). Judge Dow
`analyzed and rejected Cui’s prior arguments, and the Court incorporates that analysis by reference here. (Dkt. 196 at
`59–63) (noting that it would be “untenable” that Cui could “cleanse the tainted procurement process if he receives
`some non-sham services”).
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`11
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`legitimate purpose . . . does not render them bona fide under the statute if they were intentionally
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`misapplied.”); see also United States v. Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 2007) (collecting
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`cases where legitimate employees received payments that were not covered by § 666(c)). Thus,
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`the jury could properly accept the Government’s theory that the offer of legal fees to Burke was
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`unjustified and intentionally used to cover up a payment made to influence an official action.
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`Finally, it is irrelevant that Burke’s and Cui’s agreement was contingent. Under
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`§ 666(a)(2), Cui had to offer the legal work with the requisite intent. United States v. Mitziga, 2024
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`WL 383670, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2024) (rejecting a similar argument that proof of an actual loss
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`is required); United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Lupton,
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`2008 WL 647028, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 5, 2008) (“The wire fraud statute punishes a scheme, not
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`its success[.]” (first citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005); and then United
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`States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998))). At this stage, the Court cannot take the same
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`facts and make inferences in Cui’s favor. Cui’s characterization of his conduct was a theory the
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`jury was allowed to reject. Ultimately, Burke was not permitted to sell his office for legal work,
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`nor could Cui offer such legal work, and then benefit from the use of § 666(c)’s safe harbor.
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`i. Intent and Quid Pro Quo
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`Next, Cui challenges the jury’s finding as to his corrupt intent and the existence of a quid
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`pro quo between himself and Burke. The Court addresses these arguments together. Cui’s attacks
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`on the evidence surrounding his corrupt intent echoes his previously attempted—and rejected—
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`characterization of Cui’s engagement of Klafter & Burke as a bona fide business transaction
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`occurring in the usual course of business. Overall, Cui’s arguments are misplaced.
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`Cui argues that there is no evidence that (1) Cui and Burke discussed the TIF funds; (2)
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`Cui and Burke discussed the pole sign permit; (3) Cui obtained the pole sign permit; or (3) Burke
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`
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`12
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`

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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 13 of 35 PageID #:14077
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`obtained anything of value from Cui. (See Dkt. 448 at 1). First, the evidence supports the jury’s
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`reasonable finding that Cui possessed corrupt intent in offering Burke the legal work in exchange
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`for his actions on the pole sign permit. Under § 666(a)(2), a person acts corruptly when he acts
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`with the intent to offer or give something of value to influence or reward a government agent in
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`connection with the agent’s official duties. (See Dkt. 384 at 239); Mitziga, 2024 WL 383670 at *4.
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`In other words, Cui must understand that the payment given is a bribe or reward. See United States
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`v. Mullins, 800 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2015). Whether he ultimately obtained the pole sign permit
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`or gave Burke the legal fees are irrelevant to his intent. Whiteagle, 759 F.3d at 753 (“It was not
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`necessary for the government to prove as to these counts that [the legislator] actually received the
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`bribes [under § 666(a)(2)].”); United States v. McClain, 2022 WL 488944, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17,
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`2022) (“However, the plain text of the statute demonstrates there does not have to be proof that
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`the agent of local government received the illegal gratuity with requisite intent, only that the person
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`attempting to provide the illegal gratuity ‘corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give’ a thing of
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`value.” (citing Whiteeagle, 759 F.3d at 753)).
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`Cui’s commission of the crime was complete at the moment he offered the legal fees with
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`the requisite intent to influence Burke’s official action.6 See Lupton, 2008 WL 647028, at *3
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`(“[T]he anti-bribery statute covers the solicitation of a bribe as well as it’s receipt.” (citation
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`omitted)); United States v. Suhl, 885 F.3d 1106, 1113 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 172
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`(2018) (“[A] defendant completes the crime [] of bribery as soon as he gives or offers payment in
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`exchange for an official act.”); see also United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir.
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`1997) (noting that section 666(a)(2) focuses on the offer of a bribe, whereas section 666(a)(1)(B)
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`6 Section 666(a)(2), under which Cui was charged, captures bribe-givers. Section 666(a)(1)(B), under which Burke
`was charged in Count Eleven, contains the parallel offense of soliciting or accepting a bribe. These “two subsections
`cover anyone who gives or takes a bribe with the prohibited intent.” United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 271 (7th
`Cir. 2011).
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`
`
`13
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`

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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 14 of 35 PageID #:14078
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`criminalizes the receipt of the bribe); Ring, 706 F.3d at 467 (stating an official need not accept the
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`“mere ‘offer’ ” of something of value to violate federal bribery provisions). Thus, the relevant
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`inquiry is whether Cui offered to give a bribe to Cui with the intent to influence or reward him in
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`connection with business of the City of Chicago. As already discussed, the jury had sufficient
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`evidence to find just that. See supra, pp. 8–12.
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`Moreover, Cui and Burke did not need to share the same intent in order to be guilty of
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`§ 666(a)(2). See Suhl, 885 F.3d at 1112 (“Neither [the honest-services fraud or federal-funds
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`bribery] statutes, nor McDonnell, imposes a universal requirement that bribe payors and payees
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`have a meeting of the minds about an official act.”); United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006,
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`1017 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The intent of the payor, not the intent of the payee, is determinative of
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`whether a crime occurred.”); see also United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 548–50 (2d Cir. 2020),
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`cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 656 (2021) (“Nothing [the defendant] points to suggests that the payor and
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`recipient must share a common purpose”)); United States v. Burke, 2022 WL 1970189, at *56
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`(N.D. Ill. June 6, 2022).
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`As further discussed in Cui’s motion for a new trial, infra pp. 23–26, the evidence
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`supported a bribery theory of the case. Here, Cui and Burke established the “ask” and “give” up
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`front: Cui asked Burke for assistance with the pole sign permit and noted its implications on his
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`TIF funds. He then offered Burke a “big bite” of legal work in exchange for that assistance. Only
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`after Burke accepted Cui’s offer by replying to the email and directing his firm to move forward
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`with formalizing the representation did Burke began taking official action on behalf of Cui with
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`respect to the pole sign permit, with knowledge and expectation of the legal fees. This timeline of
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`events is consistent with a bribery theory and comports with a before-the-fact agreement.
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`Moreover, the agreement between the two “need not be explicit.” McDonnell v. United States, 579
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`
`
`14
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`

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`Case: 1:19-cr-00322 Document #: 523 Filed: 08/16/24 Page 15 of 35 PageID #:14079
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`U.S. 550, 572 (2016); United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2015) (“ ‘Nudge,
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`nudge, wink, wink, you know what I mean’ can amount to [a quid pro quo].”); United States v.
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`Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 972 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he government need not show an explicit agreement,
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`but only that the payment was made in return for official acts.”). Rather, “[i]t is up to the jury,
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`under the facts of the case, to determine whether the public official agreed to perform an ‘official
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`act’ at the time of the alleged quid pro quo . . . considering a broad range of pertinent evidence.”
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`McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 572–73.
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`In sum, the Court will not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the jury’s credibility
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`determinations in Cui’s favor now. See Taylor, 637 F.3d at 815–16. The jury had sufficient
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`evidence considering the context of the emails and timing and circumstances of the events to find
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`Cui’s corrupt intent. That is to say, a jury could reasonably conclude that Cui knew what he was
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`doing when he made the offer and thus violated § 666(a)(2).
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`ii. Official Action
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`Under § 666(a)(2), Cui had to act with corrupt intent to influence or reward Buke “in
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`connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the City of Chicago; or in
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`other words, an official action. (Dkt. 384 at 239). Cui argues that Burke did not take or agree to
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`take an “official act” under the meaning of McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016),
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`thereby compelling Cui’s acquittal under § 666(a)(2). (Dkt. 448 at 10–13).
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`The Court thoroughly exhausted McDonnell’s implications for § 666 and the state law
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`bribery predicates when upholding Burke’s corresponding conviction under Count Eleven. (Dkt.
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`504 at 28–34). Moreover, fatal to Cui, the jury could properly find him guilty of violating
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`§ 666(a)(2) even if Burke did not in fact perform an official act. (Dkt 384 at 242); se