`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`No. 1:18-cv-04738
`
`Judge Edmond E. Chang
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`LAURA A. MILLER,
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`THE FRENCH PASTRY SCHOOL LLC and )
`THE BUTTER BOOK LLC,
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`)
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`)
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`This case demonstrates how a failure to hammer out the legal details of a busi-
`
`ness relationship in advance is a recipe for a lawsuit. Based on the murky dealings,
`
`Laura Miller brought this copyright-infringement lawsuit against The French Pastry
`
`School, LLC and The Butter Book, LLC (for convenience’s sake, this Opinion will refer
`
`to the Defendants collectively as Butter Book).1 Miller asserts both federal and state
`
`law claims arising out of Butter Book’s use of Miller’s allegedly proprietary literary
`
`works, which Miller had originally provided to Butter Book. In turn, Butter Book has
`
`levelled counterclaims against Miller, challenging Miller’s ownership of the works.
`
`The parties now cross-move for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed in this
`
`Opinion, Miller’s motion is denied and Butter Book’s motion is granted in part and
`
`denied in part.
`
`
`1This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case via federal-question jurisdic-
`tion, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under
`28 U.S.C. § 1367. Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket entry.
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 2 of 20 PageID #:7725
`
`I. Background
`
`In deciding cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in
`
`the light most favorable to the respective non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec.
`
`Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). So, when the Court eval-
`
`uates Butter Book’s motion, Miller gets the benefit of reasonable inferences; con-
`
`versely, when evaluating Miller’s cross-motion, the Court gives Butter Book the ben-
`
`efit of the doubt.
`
`A. Miller-Butter Book Relationship
`
`The French Pastry School is a Chicago-based culinary school offering classes
`
`in pastry, baking, and the confectionary arts. DSOF ¶ 7.2 It founded the Butter Book
`
`in 2015 to provide guidance and resources to confectionary arts enthusiasts through
`
`an online website with various course descriptions, demonstration videos, employee
`
`biographies, and articles. Id. ¶¶ 10–19.
`
`In 2016, Butter Book entered into an agreement with Miller to prepare content
`
`for the website. DSOF ¶ 27. As part of the agreement, the parties signed a Confiden-
`
`tiality Agreement under which Miller was to return “[i]mmediately upon request” all
`
`confidential information to Butter Book and remove any digitally stored confidential
`
`information from any storage devices in her possession or control. Id. ¶ 32; R. 222-12,
`
`
`2Citations to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact are identified as follows:
`“DSOF” for Butter Book’s (Defendants’) Statement of Undisputed Facts (R. 221); “PSOAF”
`for Miller’s (Plaintiff’s) Statement of Additional Facts (R. 233); “PSOF” for Miller’s Statement
`of Undisputed Facts (R. 234); “Pl.’s Resp. DSOF” for Miller’s Response to the DSOF (R. 233);
`and “Defs.’ Resp. PSOF” for Butter Book’s response to Miller’s Statement of Additional and
`Undisputed Facts (R. 253).
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 3 of 20 PageID #:7726
`
`Defs.’ Exh. 11, Confidentiality Agreement ¶ 2. The parties dispute whether, under
`
`the agreement, Miller would begin by independently writing—or instead merely ed-
`
`iting—a set of sample glossary terms for Butter Book. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 31; Defs.’
`
`Resp. PSOF ¶¶ 8–9. Miller contends that she provided the “voice” for Butter Book’s
`
`ideas and any edits that Butter Book gave to her were just technical in nature. PSOF
`
`¶¶ 11–21. Butter Book denies this contention and instead asserts they gave Miller
`
`more thorough feedback and supervision throughout the project. Defs.’ Resp. PSOF
`
`¶¶ 8, 17, 20, 23, 34. In any event, Butter Book paid Miller for her work product. DSOF
`
`¶ 37.
`
`In August 2016, the parties agreed to additional contract terms in which Miller
`
`would work on additional content for the website. DSOF ¶¶ 38–39. The new projects
`
`assigned to Miller included a new glossary of terms, “learn pages” (that is, food-sci-
`
`ence instructional pages), course and series descriptions, employee biographies, and
`
`blog entries (collectively designated as the “Works”). DSOF ¶¶ 40, 42–52. The parties
`
`dispute whether Miller independently completed these Works. Defs.’ Resp. PSOF
`
`¶¶ 8, 9, 66, 67.
`
`The parties also dispute how the Works related—if at all—to Miller’s future
`
`employment with Butter Book. For example, Miller alleges that she agreed to the rate
`
`of $15.00 per glossary term because Butter Book had told her that the company was
`
`considering her for a long-term position that would provide her with “financial free-
`
`dom.” Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 39, 40. She argues that she was designated by Butter Book
`
`as “Lead Writer and Editor” during the duration and the future of the project. PSOF
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 4 of 20 PageID #:7727
`
`¶¶ 50–55. In contrast, Butter Book asserts that it never offered or promised Miller
`
`employment. DSOF ¶ 69. The company argues that Miller’s understanding of her em-
`
`ployment status was premised solely “on statements by Defendants’ representatives
`
`asking for Miller to deliver samples of her work to Defendants, and if Defendants’
`
`liked the samples, Defendants would give Miller more work.” DSOF ¶ 61. The defense
`
`says that, to the extent that Miller was identified as the lead writer and editor, she
`
`was in fact not the lead writer and editor during her completion of the Works, and
`
`any correspondence discussing the title actually was just “set[ting] the parameters
`
`for what future post-launch roles hoped to be.” Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 50 (emphasis
`
`added).
`
`As Miller continued to work, from October 2016 to February 2018, Butter Book
`
`paid Miller $45,166.45. DSOF ¶ 56. In February 2018, Butter Book informed Miller
`
`that it would pay her an additional $7,000. Id. ¶ 83. But the parties dispute the rea-
`
`son for this payment. For its part, Butter Book contends that this payment was made
`
`in response to an email from Miller, sent back in November 2017, in which she asked
`
`to renegotiate her compensation. Id. ¶¶ 79, 83. In contrast, Miller argues that Butter
`
`Book paid the $7,000 as “back pay.” Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 83.
`
`Moving forward two more months, on April 20, 2018, Butter Book requested
`
`that Miller turn over all of the Works they had sent her, as well as all of the edits
`
`that she had completed or was in the process of completing. DSOF ¶ 85; Pl.’s Resp.
`
`DSOF ¶ 85. Miller did not do so. Instead, she eventually sent Butter Book copyright
`
`license agreements to cover her edits. PSOF¶ 4; Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 85. But Butter
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 5 of 20 PageID #:7728
`
`Book refused to sign the agreements, DSOF ¶ 92, so Miller filed applications for reg-
`
`istration of copyrights with the U.S. Copyright Office for the disputed edits. PSOF
`
`¶¶ 5, 68–72. On July 5, 2018, Miller offered to provide Butter Book with the Works if
`
`Butter Book agreed that Miller owns the Works, or at least agreed not to reproduce,
`
`distribute, publicly display, or otherwise use the Works edited by Miller. PSOF ¶ 7;
`
`Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 7. Butter Book refused the proposal. PSOF ¶ 7.
`
`B. Procedural Background
`
`With those facts (and disputed facts) as the backdrop, the litigation too reflects
`
`the contentious relationship between the parties. As pertinent for the here and now,
`
`Miller eventually filed a Third Amended Complaint against the Defendants, seeking
`
`declarations that (1) Miller owns copyrights to the Works; (2) Miller did not grant an
`
`implied license to the Defendants to use the Works; and (3) unauthorized use by the
`
`Defendants of the Works constitutes copyright infringement. R. 179, Third Am.
`
`Compl. ¶ 4. Miller further asserted claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent con-
`
`cealment, and promissory estoppel under Illinois law. Id. ¶ 5. The Defendants re-
`
`sponded with counterclaims, alleging breach of contract, breach of a confidentiality
`
`agreement, copyright ownership over the Works, conversion, and a request for a dec-
`
`laration that the Defendants own an implied license to use the disputed Works.
`
`R. 141, Defs.’ Am. Counterclaim.
`
`Both parties now cross-move for summary judgment on the implied license and
`
`copyright infringement claims. Miller moves for summary judgment on copyright
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 6 of 20 PageID #:7729
`
`ownership and Butter Book moves for summary judgment against Miller’s fraudulent
`
`inducement, fraudulent concealment, and promissory estoppel claims.
`
`II. Legal Standard
`
`Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
`
`genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
`
`matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
`
`evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
`
`party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating sum-
`
`mary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences
`
`in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
`
`(2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determina-
`
`tions, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011),
`
`and must consider only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be ad-
`
`missible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment
`
`has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they are
`
`entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d
`
`451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
`
`Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the ad-
`
`verse party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
`
`for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 7 of 20 PageID #:7730
`
`III. Analysis
`
`A. Implied License (Count 2 and Counterclaim 5)
`
`Both parties move for summary judgment on Butter Book’s counterclaim that
`
`Miller granted Butter Book an implied license to use her Works. The counterclaim’s
`
`converse is Miller’s Count 2, which seeks a declaration that there is no such implied
`
`license. Butter Book argues it has an implied license to copy, display, and distribute
`
`the Works, R. 220, Defs.’ Br. at 5. Conversely, Miller contends that no reasonable jury
`
`could conclude that Miller provided an implied license to Butter Book, and that the
`
`counterclaim is “premature” to the extent that it seeks an implied-license declaration
`
`for “interim” drafts. R. 232, Pl.’s Br. 5–7. The motion is denied on both sides, because
`
`whether Miller granted an implied license to Butter Book is a genuinely disputed
`
`question of fact.
`
`“An accused infringer can avoid liability for copyright infringement if he or she
`
`can prove the existence of an implied non-exclusive license to make use of copyrighted
`
`material.” Kay Bros. Enters. V. Parente, 2018 WL 3630155 at *22 (N.D. Ill. July 31,
`
`2018) (citing Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2016)).
`
`An implied non-exclusive license is granted when “(1) a person (the licensee) requests
`
`the creation of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and
`
`delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licen-
`
`see-requestor copy and distribute this work.” I.A.E. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th
`
`Cir. 1996). “When the totality of the parties’ conduct indicates an intent to grant such
`
`permission, the result is a legal nonexclusive license.” Kay Bros. Enterprises, Inc.
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 8 of 20 PageID #:7731
`
`2018 WL 3630155, at *8 (cleaned up).3 “And the relevant intent is the licensor’s ob-
`
`jective intent at the time of the creation and delivery of the work.” Id. (cleaned up).
`
`An implied license is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, so But-
`
`ter Book bears the burden of proof on it. See Muhammad-Ali, 832 F. 2d at 761. As a
`
`threshold matter, Miller argues Butter Book’s motion for summary judgment on their
`
`implied license counterclaim is premature because it was pled in the alternative. Pl.’s
`
`Br. at 5. Miller cites two district court cases, id. (citing Broussard v. TMR Co., 2013
`
`WL 5516462, at *7 (W.D. La. Oct. 1, 2013); West Linn Paper Co. v. Alberta-Pacific
`
`Forest Indus., Inc., 2018 WL 5116062, at *5 (D. Ore. Oct. 19, 2018)), but Butter Book
`
`correctly points out that both cases are starkly different from this case, see R. 254,
`
`Am. Defs.’ Reply at 5. Neither Broussard nor West Linn Paper involve copyright
`
`claims or implied-license defenses. In Broussard, an environmental contamina-
`
`tion/remediation case, the Court held that, at the summary judgment stage, it was
`
`too early to decide comparative fault and reduction of damages because there were
`
`several other defendants that might have contributed to liability. Broussard, 2013
`
`WL 5516462 at *4, *6. In West Linn Paper, the Court determined genuine disputes of
`
`material fact needed to be resolved before a counterclaim for reclamation or stoppage
`
`could be granted. West Linn Paper Co., 2018 WL 5116062 at *5. So those two cases
`
`simply stand for the proposition that sometimes an alternatively pleaded claim will
`
`
`3This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
`and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
`18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 9 of 20 PageID #:7732
`
`not be ready for a decision at the summary judgment stage. But that is not the case
`
`here. Here, if indeed Butter Book has an implied license to the Works, then the cop-
`
`yright dispute would be over and there would be no need to decide whether Miller
`
`owns the copyright in the Works. Alternative claims (or defenses) can render primary
`
`claims (or defenses) moot, so there is nothing “premature” about deciding alterna-
`
`tively pleaded claims before primary ones. (As it turns out, neither side wins sum-
`
`mary judgment on the implied-license defense anyway.)
`
`Miller also contends that deciding Butter Book’s implied-license defense now
`
`(presumably in Butter Book’s favor) would “result in severe unfairness to [her],” be-
`
`cause she has expended time and resources on litigating her copyright-ownership
`
`claim. Pl.’s Br. at 5. Again, sometimes that is just the way the litigation ball bounces,
`
`but there is no general requirement to decide claims before defenses. It is not as if,
`
`for example, a plaintiff can demand that a court decide whether there has been a
`
`breach of contract when a statute of limitations defense would defeat the contract
`
`claim anyway. Again, as it turns out, Butter Book’s summary judgment motion on
`
`the implied-license defense is not a winner, but the Court will not simply skip decid-
`
`ing it.
`
`Moving to the substance of the implied-license defense, Butter Book argues
`
`that there is no genuine issue that Miller granted an implied nonexclusive license in
`
`the use of her Works. Defs.’ Br. at 5–9. In support, Butter Book cites to I.A.E., Inc. v.
`
`Shaver, 74 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 1996). In I.A.E., an architect agreed to provide multiple
`
`drafts of schematic drawings to a construction company for $10,000 under the
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 10 of 20 PageID #:7733
`
`assumption that he would remain staffed on the project. Id. at 771. When the archi-
`
`tect realized that he would no longer be involved in the project, he tried to take own-
`
`ership of the work by writing, “We trust that our ideas and knowledge exhibited in
`
`our work will assist [the company] in realizing a credible and flexible use … facility”.
`
`Id. The Seventh Circuit rejected the architect’s too-late attempt to assert rights in
`
`the drawings. Id. In particular, I.A.E. relied on the architect’s written permission for
`
`the company to use his works and the payment of $10,000 ….” Id. at 775 n.10, 776–
`
`77.
`
`It is true that there are some similarities between this case and I.A.E. Like the
`
`architect in I.A.E., Miller sent several drafts of her Works to Butter Book and was
`
`paid for her efforts. DSOF ¶ 37. Also, as in I.A.E., Miller sent the Works to Butter
`
`Book without warning Butter Book—until after Butter Book requested the entirety
`
`of her works in April 2018—that unauthorized use would infringe her copyrights. Id.
`
`¶ 86. Unlike I.A.E., however, Miller did propose (in April and June 2018) copyright
`
`licensing agreements for the Works, PSOF ¶ 4, before the parties hammered out any
`
`specific ownership or licensing arrangement. Also, unlike in I.A.E., Miller applied for
`
`and received U.S. copyright registrations for the Works. Id. ¶ 5. In fact, she did not
`
`sign the Content Provider Agreement proposed by Butter Book; instead, Miller coun-
`
`ter-offered with her own licensing proposal. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Miller’s refusal to provide the
`
`final version of the Works also adds to the dispute over whether an implied license
`
`existed, and if so, what Works it covered.
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 11 of 20 PageID #:7734
`
`Indeed, there is even a genuine dispute over whether Miller actually delivered
`
`the Works to Butter Book. Butter Book alleges that the final Works comprise the
`
`drafts that Miller submitted. Defs.’ Am. Reply at 2. But Butter Book does not point
`
`to examples in the record or comparisons between the work product it received and
`
`what Miller asserts are the final copyrighted works. With this gap in evidence, a rea-
`
`sonable jury could find against an implied license. For her part, Miller argues that
`
`materials in the record demonstrate drastic differences between the interim drafts
`
`and final work. R. 255, Pl.’s Reply 3. For support, Miller relies on (1) a 223-page chart
`
`comparing the interim and final glossary of terms; (2) a 22-page table comparing the
`
`interim and final “Food Lover’s Glossary of Terms”; and (3) an eight-page chart com-
`
`paring the interim and final course descriptions. See R. 235-1, 235-2, and 235-3, Mil-
`
`ler Decl. Exhs. A–C. But these three exhibits are devoid of Bates numbers, authenti-
`
`cating evidence, or foundational citations. When the evidence is viewed in the light
`
`most favorable to Butter Book, a reasonable jury could find that there was an implied
`
`license. Consequently, neither party provides enough evidence on the delivery of the
`
`final Works, thus preventing the entry of summary judgment either for or against the
`
`implied license. See I.A.E, 74 F.3d at 776.
`
`Miller also argues that, even if she provided an implied license to Butter Book
`
`at some point, she later revoked it when she sent Butter Book the proposed licensing
`
`agreements and filed this suit. But here too an important fact dispute prevents sum-
`
`mary judgment in her favor. Pl.’s Br. at 7–8. It is true that, as a matter of Illinois
`
`contract law, a license might very well be revocable (that is, terminable) at will by
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 12 of 20 PageID #:7735
`
`either side. Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that copyright
`
`licenses of indefinite duration can be terminated at any time by either party). The
`
`parties in Walthal entered into a written contract that had no specified term and did
`
`not identify the circumstances under which the contract would end. Id. at 482. The
`
`Seventh Circuit held that applying Illinois contract law would present no conflict with
`
`federal copyright law, so a copyright-license agreement could be terminated at will.
`
`Id. at 484.
`
`But that does not answer the question in this case. Here, Butter Book contends
`
`that it paid for an implied license to use the Works indefinitely. See Defs.’ Br. at 7. If
`
`this is true, the license might not be revocable. See Myers v. Harold, 279 F. Supp. 3d
`
`778, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (holding that “an implied license is irrevocable if there is
`
`consideration” for the license to be irrevocable). As noted earlier, however, the scope
`
`of the implied license—if there was a license at all—is not definitively proven by ei-
`
`ther side, making summary judgment inappropriate. See Natkin v. Winfrey, 111 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (concluding that material issues of fact prevented
`
`summary judgment on whether the license to copyrighted photographs was of indef-
`
`inite duration). In this case, a reasonable jury could go either way on whether the
`
`$45,000 in payments were for interim drafts or the final copyrighted Works. So too
`
`with the final $7,000 paid by Butter Book to Miller: viewed in the opposing parties’
`
`respective favor, either that money was additional consideration or just “back pay.”
`
`Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 83. Neither side wins summary judgment on the implied license.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 13 of 20 PageID #:7736
`
`B. Copyright Ownership (Count 1)
`
`Next, Miller moves for summary judgment on her claim of ownership over the
`
`copyrighted material. Miller argues she is the sole author of the copyrighted Works
`
`because (1) Butter Book’s contributions are not copyrightable; (2) Miller was the lead
`
`writer and editor of the Works; and (3) the text that Butter Book did provide was not
`
`original content. Pl.’s Br. at 18–22. Butter Book argues there are “factual issues re-
`
`butting Plaintiff’s copyright ownership and validity.” Defs.’ Am. Reply at 7. That is
`
`right: summary judgment is denied on copyright ownership.
`
`The Copyright Act provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists ... in original
`
`works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ... from which they
`
`can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
`
`aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
`
`The Copyright Act defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more
`
`authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or in-
`
`terdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. For a joint work, the co-
`
`authors hold undivided interests in it, despite any differences in the authors’ contri-
`
`butions. 17 U.S.C. § 201. “Each author … has the right to use or license the use of the
`
`work, subject to an accounting to the other co-authors for any profits.” Erickson v.
`
`Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, even a contributor
`
`whose contribution is relatively minor enjoys full rights to the work if the author is
`
`truly a joint author. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068.
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 14 of 20 PageID #:7737
`
`Miller argues that she is the sole author of the Works because any contribu-
`
`tions made by Butter Book are not copyrightable. See Pl.’s Br. at 18–20. To Miller’s
`
`thinking, she provided the “voice” for Butter Book’s ideas and Butter Book only pro-
`
`vided technical edits. Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 12, 30. Butter Book contends that it gave
`
`Miller language from its website and Miller relied on its videos to generate the Learn
`
`Pages (the online pages that teach food-science concepts). Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶¶ 83,
`
`86, 89. Again, there is a genuine dispute of material fact over whether Butter Book’s
`
`contributions went beyond general “[i]deas, refinements, and suggestions” sufficient
`
`to pass the test of copyrightability. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1072. If the evidence is viewed
`
`in Butter Book’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Butter Book was a joint au-
`
`thor.
`
`Miller also asserts that she was the lead editor and writer of the Works, which
`
`points toward her sole authorship. It is true that Miller has registered the Works
`
`with the Copyright Office, PSOF ¶¶ 68–72, which imbues the Works with a rebuttable
`
`presumption of validity. Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F.
`
`Supp. 1292, 1294–95 (7th Cir. 1991). It is also correct that, contrary to Butter Book’s
`
`arguments, Miller may be granted copyright ownership where she “selected, coordi-
`
`nated, and arranged in such a way” to render her work original. Feist Publications v.
`
`Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (cleaned up). Again, however, these legal
`
`principles must be applied to facts, and the mere title of lead writer and editor is not
`
`dispositive. As explained earlier, Miller’s contention that there is only a 0.98% over-
`
`lap between the materials provided to her by Butter Book and the final copyrighted
`14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 15 of 20 PageID #:7738
`
`glossary of terms, Pl.’s Reply at 11 (citing Exh. A), is not fully supported or explained
`
`by the offered exhibits. The jury will have to decide whether Butter Book was a joint
`
`author of the Works.
`
`C. Copyright Infringement (Count 3): Actual Controversy
`
`Both parties move for summary judgment on Miller’s claim of copyright in-
`
`fringement. Miller argues there is definitive evidence of Butter Book’s infringement.
`
`Pl.’s Reply at 15. Butter Book argues that Miller is improperly seeking an advisory
`
`opinion because no act of actual or threatened infringement has occurred. Defs.’ Br.
`
`at 10. Yet again the motions are denied on both sides.
`
`The Copyright Act confers on the owner of a copyright the exclusive rights to
`
`reproduce the work, to prepare derivative works based upon it, and to display the
`
`copyrighted work publicly. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (2), (5). In order to prevail on a claim
`
`of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) ownership of a valid copy-
`
`right and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Janky v.
`
`Lake Cty. Convention and Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
`
`Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 361). Put another way, a work is copyrightable if it
`
`possesses a “modicum of creativity.” Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 346.
`
`To begin, Butter Book asserts that Miller fails to show that there is “any act of
`
`actual or threatened infringement in Count III.” Defs.’ Br. at 10. Butter Book con-
`
`tends that no evidence shows that it is currently using, or has threatened to use, the
`
`Works. Id. at 11. Given this very litigation, however, it is plain that Butter Book
`
`asserts licensing rights—and, indeed, even ownership rights—in the Works. See
`15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 16 of 20 PageID #:7739
`
`MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (explaining that
`
`whether an actual controversy exists depends on “whether the facts alleged, under
`
`all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
`
`having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the is-
`
`suance of a declaratory judgment.” (cleaned up)). Miller asserts, for example, that
`
`when she raised the issue of licensing in April 2018, she had not yet provided Butter
`
`Book with the copyrighted works, Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 85; and Butter Book expressed
`
`intention to publicly display at least some of the Works on their website, id. ¶ 55.
`
`What’s more, even the threat to sue for copyright infringement is a significant fact in
`
`considering whether there is “an actual rather than merely a potential controversy.”
`
`See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Est., Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 2014). Butter Book’s
`
`myriad assertions of rights in the Works, whether by license or outright ownership,
`
`make it plain that the parties are mired in an actual controversy. The copyright-in-
`
`fringement claim is ripe and thus survives.
`
`D. Fraudulent Inducement or Concealment (Counts 4 and 5)
`
`Butter Book next targets Miller’s fraudulent inducement and fraudulent con-
`
`cealment claims. According to Butter Book, no reasonable jury could find that (1)
`
`Butter Book knew or attempted to conceal at the time it hired Miller that it would
`
`not offer her employment; (2) Butter Book intended to make or conceal statements
`
`about this fact so Miller would continue providing services; and (3) Butter Book owed
`
`Miller a duty to disclose its ability to employ her and to discuss copyright ownership
`
`of the Works with her. Defs.’ Br. at 12–15. In response, Miller asserts that Butter
`16
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 17 of 20 PageID #:7740
`
`Book promised her employment and she would not have provided the services at the
`
`rates she worked for if this was not true. Pl.’s Br. at 10–14. Even when viewed in
`
`Miller’s favor, the record evidence does not support the fraud claims.
`
`In order to establish fraudulent inducement, Miller must show that (a) Butter
`
`Book made a representation of material fact; (b) Butter Book knew that the represen-
`
`tation was false when made; (c) Butter Book had the purpose of inducing Miller to
`
`act; and (d) Miller reasonably relied on the representation to her detriment. Lewis v.
`
`School Dist. #70, 648 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). Under Illinois law, fraudulent
`
`concealment (as distinct from inducement) “requires a plaintiff to allege that the de-
`
`fendant concealed a material fact when he was under a duty to disclose that fact to
`
`plaintiff.” Squires-Cannon v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., 897 F.3d 797, 805 (7th
`
`Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “The duty to disclose only arises in certain situations, includ-
`
`ing where the plaintiff and defendant are in a fiduciary or confidential relationship
`
`and where plaintiff places trust and confidence in defendant, thereby placing defend-
`
`ant in a position of influence and superiority over plaintiff.” Id. (cleaned up).
`
`Central to Miller’s claims are Butter Book’s alleged statements—as character-
`
`ized in Miller’s Local Rule 56.1 response Statement—that “[Miller] would be hired as
`
`a full-time employee,” Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 61. There are several problems with this
`
`argument. First, to the extent that Miller is relying on a promise of future action made
`
`by Butter Book—rather than a statement of then-existing fact—generally speaking,
`
`“Illinois does not recognize a cause for promissory fraud.” JPMorgan Chase Bank,
`
`N.A. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 707 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 2013).
`17
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case: 1:18-cv-04738 Document #: 267 Filed: 11/23/21 Page 18 of 20 PageID #:7741
`
`It is true that there is an Illinois-recognized form of fraud for promises if the
`
`plaintiff can “allege and then prove that, at the time the promise was made, the de-
`
`fendant did not intend to fulfill it.” Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547,
`
`570 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Typically, a plaintiff relying on this theory would
`
`offer “a pattern of fraudulent statements, or one particularly egregious fraudulent
`
`statement.” Id (cleaned up). There is no record evidence, however, that Butter Book’s
`
`actions were embedded in a larger pattern of deception to trick Miller. Indeed, when
`
`it comes down to it, Butter Book actually never promised Miller future employment.
`
`DSOF ¶ 69. A careful examination of the record bears this out. Miller cites only state-
`
`ments of vague intention and hopes, not any concrete promise of future actions. See
`
`R. 222-9, Pl.’s Exh. 8., Miller Dep. 94:15–18 (“Oh, I was told [by Butter Book] during
`
`that first meeting that eventually this would be—hopefully turn into a full-time, long-
`
`term relationship ….”); 95:2–5 (“In person they talked about being hired full time. In
`
`the e-mail they referenced long term relationship in which you could—in which I could
`
`utilize pastry background and writing skills.”); 273:3–7: (“But Sebastien said at the
`
`end of the meeting in regards to time frame to continue—we discussed continuing to
`
`work as a fr