throbber
Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:5963
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
`ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 1:16-cv-00651
`C.A. No. 1:17-cv-07903
`(Consolidated)
`
`Hon. Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
`
`
`
`FRESENIUS KABI’S REPLY POST-TRIAL BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`FRESENIUS KABI USA, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`HOSPIRA, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 2 of 18 PageID #:5964
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`B.
`
`THE ASSERTED CLAIMS WERE OBVIOUS ................................................................ 1
`A.
`The Public Prior Art Demonstrates Claim 6 Would Have Been
`Obvious ................................................................................................................... 1
`1.
`The “About 2%” Limitation Is Inherent For 4 µg/mL ................................ 1
`2.
`The “About 2%” Limitation Was Reasonably Expected
`Based on the Compound and Stable Prior Art Products ............................. 4
`The Dexmed IND Demonstrates Claim 6 Would Have Been
`Obvious. .................................................................................................................. 7
`1.
`Farmos Is Actually the Inventor Under § 102(f) ........................................ 7
`2.
`The Invention Was On Sale Under § 102(b) .............................................. 8
`a.
`The 1994 Agreement Transferred Title to the IND ........................ 8
`b.
`The 2004 Agreement Was a Sale and Hospira Did
`Not Rebut the Law .......................................................................... 9
`The IND Was Sold For Commercial Purposes ............................... 9
`c.
`The IND Was Ready For Patenting .............................................. 10
`d.
`The IND Renders the Asserted Claims Obvious ...................................... 11
`3.
`CLAIM 6 IS NOT ENABLED ......................................................................................... 12
`A.
`Hospira Admitted the Preferred Embodiment Is Not Enabled ............................. 12
`B.
`Claim 6 Is Not Enabled to Its Full Scope ............................................................. 12
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 12
`
`
`
`i
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 3 of 18 PageID #:5965
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac,
`344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................ 12
`Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.,
`796 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................ 11
`Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, Inc.,
`No. 02-C-736, 2008 WL 1968301 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2008) ..................................................... 7
`ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC,
`603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 12
`Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc.,
`190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 4
`Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
`40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .................................................................................................... 7
`Eli Lilly and Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc.,
`471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ 10
`Endo Pharmaceuticals Solutions, Inc. v. Custopharm Inc.,
`894 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 4
`Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc.,
`45 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 9
`Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
`110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 7
`Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
`855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................. 9
`Hospira, Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC,
`285 F. Supp. 3d 776 (D. Del. 2018) ............................................................................................ 3
`In re Cygnus Telecomm. Tech., LLC, Pat. Litig.,
`536 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 10
`In re Goodman,
`11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................. 12
`In re Hamilton,
`882 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................ 10
`In re Kao,
`639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................. 7
`In re Omeprazole Pat. Litig.,
`536 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 4 of 18 PageID #:5966
`
`Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd.,
`821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 4
`Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`862 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .............................................................................................. 1, 2
`OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,
`122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................. 7, 8
`PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharms., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 1
`Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
`525 U.S. 55 (1998) ...................................................................................................................... 8
`Polara Eng’g Inc v. Campbell Co.,
`894 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................ 10
`PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp.,
`75 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................. 12
`Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp.,
`700 F. Supp. 2d 625 (D. Del. 2010) ............................................................................................ 7
`Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .............................................................................................. 2, 4
`Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd.,
`550 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 2
`U.S. v. Gen. Elec. Co,
`272 U.S. 476 (1926) .................................................................................................................... 9
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) .......................................................................................................................... 9
`35 U.S.C. § 102(f) ........................................................................................................................... 7
`35 U.S.C. § 103(c) .......................................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 5 of 18 PageID #:5967
`
`In its response, Hospira chose to ignore claim 8 of the ’049 patent—the pH claim—even
`
`though it was one of only two claims Hospira asserted at trial. As to claim 6 of the ’106 patent—
`
`the stability claim—Hospira contests only the “about 2%” limitation. Hospira raises several new
`
`arguments not part of the trial nor based on trial testimony. Yet it has no response to the fact that
`
`all data sets at 4 µg/mL, plus Dr. Ogenstad’s statistical analysis, confirmed that the “about 2%”
`
`stability limitation is an inherent property. The “about 2%” limitation would also have been
`
`reasonably expected from the published prior art or from Farmos’s IND. Finally, Claim 6 is not
`
`enabled if the 2% property is not inherent, and is not enabled to its full scope.
`
`I.
`
`THE ASSERTED CLAIMS WERE OBVIOUS
`
`A.
`
`The Public Prior Art Demonstrates Claim 6 Would Have Been Obvious
`
`Hospira concedes a POSA would be motivated to combine the public prior art to make a
`
`ready-to-use version of Precedex in glass. Fresenius Kabi also showed both that the “about 2%”
`
`limitation is inherent and was reasonably expected, and either of those is enough to prove
`
`obviousness. In response, Hospira’s formulation expert, Dr. Linhardt, said nothing about
`
`obviousness except the possibility of oxidation under non-real-world conditions. If there were
`
`anything more to Hospira’s attorney arguments, Dr. Linhardt would have addressed them.
`
`1.
`
`The “About 2%” Limitation Is Inherent For 4 µg/mL
`
`The Court may rely on all available evidence to find a property inherent, regardless of
`
`source or date. Hospira addressed none of the cases Fresenius Kabi cited for this proposition. FK
`
`Br. at 16-17. Even Hospira’s cited case states “that the patent itself” can prove inherency. PAR
`
`Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Hospira’s reliance on
`
`Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 862 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), is misplaced.
`
`The Federal Circuit’s “inventor’s own path” analysis addressed whether it would have been
`
`obvious to use mannitol to create a new compound, not questioning the “natural result” of
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 6 of 18 PageID #:5968
`
`combining bortezomib and mannitol. Id. at 1367-69. Here, all the prior art used Type I glass and
`
`dexmed with saline for the same purpose that Hospira did. Hospira did not rebut Dr. Kipp’s
`
`testimony that the “about 2%” limitation was expected, nor did it offer any evidence of secondary
`
`considerations—the focus of the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Millennium. See id. at 1367-68.
`
`Hospira also did not address Fresenius Kabi’s evidence that the 2% property is inherent
`
`based on (1) actual data from 18 batches of Hospira’s 4 µg/mL product (confirmed by Dr. Kipp
`
`and Dr. Ogenstad); (2) 36 batches of Fresenius Kabi’s 4 µg/mL product (confirmed by Ms. Mowli
`
`and Dr. Ogenstad); and (3) Example 6 of the ’106 patent (confirmed by Dr. Roychowdhury). FK
`
`Br. at 15-19. In the face of this evidence, Hospira asserts “FK turned a blind eye to numerous
`
`sources of stability data” that presumably called into question the 2% limitation. Pl’s Br. at 10.
`
`Its first such source? The “product development work from Hospira showing 2.3% loss.” Id. at
`
`10; also id. at 21. But that was the same product development report that supported the only
`
`example in the ’106 patent of the “about 2%” limitation. Trial Tr. 170:25-171:11
`
`(Roychowdhury); JTX-51.33. Dr. Roychowdhury confirmed the development report and patent
`
`example were the same, and that the 2.3% loss was “about 2%.” Trial Tr. 159:20-160:14, 192:7-
`
`22. Yet Hospira now shockingly argues that the patent example does not meet the 2% limitation.
`
`Hospira’s other supposedly overlooked data sources are from the 20 µg/mL IND
`
`formulation, not the claimed 4 µg/mL. Because the obvious embodiment of a 4 µg/mL
`
`concentration of dexmed in Type I glass and a coated stopper inherently results in a less than 2%
`
`loss at 5 months, “about 2%” is an inherent property. See Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694
`
`F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Hospira relies on Dr. Ogenstad for his assessment of the IND,
`
`but he is not a POSA, so he cannot testify about “the scope and content of prior art,” including the
`
`IND. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008). All
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 7 of 18 PageID #:5969
`
`others—Dr. Kipp, Dr. Roychowdhury, and the Farmos scientists who did the IND stability work—
`
`disagreed with Dr. Ogenstad’s approach. Dr. Kipp explained that the IND data showed no change
`
`over time, and that the regression lines were essentially flat. Trial Tr. 333:20-335:5, 336:1-11.
`
`The Farmos scientists reached the same conclusions for the very same data: it was “stable for 2
`
`years when stored at room temperature in a clear glass ampoule” and “not significantly changed.”
`
`JTX-39.5; JTX-35.276. The ’106 patent itself is ultimate proof that Dr. Ogenstad’s analysis is
`
`wrong: the patent had no statistical analysis, and according to Dr. Ogenstad, Hospira failed to
`
`substantiate its own invention. Trial Tr. 790:11-791:14.
`
`But even the IND data showed less than 2% loss at 5 months according to Dr. Ogenstad’s
`
`regression analysis, and his “confidence intervals”1 depict the acceptable error range. Trial Tr.
`
`753:17-20; PDX-44. Hospira does not address that Dr. Ogenstad’s entire analysis—per his own
`
`admission—only demonstrated the scope of the word “about” in the claim term “about 2%.” Trial
`
`Tr. 791:1-22. In response, Hospira states in a footnote that “2% +/- 3% includes negative
`
`percentages which are impossible.” Pl’s Br. at 13 n.6. But it is not impossible: measurements do
`
`go up and down. Trial Tr. 330:21-331:20, 334:3-16 (Kipp). In fact, Dr. Ogenstad testified that
`
`regression lines with “positive slope” (i.e., increasing over time), still show “that the degradation
`
`is not more than 2 percent.” Id. 767:20-768:7. A POSA would conclude that measurements within
`
`the same band over time show no change—just as Dr. Roychowdhury testified. Id. 184:3-17.
`
`Hospira also misapplies the law of obviousness and argues that Fresenius Kabi was
`
`required to prove a negative: “FK was required to exclude the possibility that an embodiment of
`
`
`1 Hospira refers to portions of the Remington reference that were never discussed at trial. But
`the use of confidence intervals in some contexts (there “predicting shelf life”) does not mean it is
`applicable here. JTX-20.10. Hospira refers to the Amneal case, but the evidence presented there
`was different, and the confidence interval issue was not related to inherency. Hospira, Inc. v.
`Amneal Pharm., LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d 776, 811 (D. Del. 2018).
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 8 of 18 PageID #:5970
`
`claim 6 would fail the 2% limitation.” Pl’s Br. at 12. But Fresenius Kabi does not have to
`
`invalidate every claimed embodiment; it only has to show that at least one claimed embodiment
`
`is invalid. FK Br. at 8 (citing In re Klein and In re Cuozzo); see also Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO,
`
`Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding claimed range invalid based on prior art within
`
`range). Hospira’s only support for its proposition, Endo Pharmaceuticals Solutions, Inc. v.
`
`Custopharm Inc., 894 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018), concerned the inherent meaning of a term
`
`(whether “castor oil” always meant “castor oil and benzyl benzoate”), not an inherent property of
`
`the combination, and is therefore inapposite. Id. at 1377, 1382. Fresenius Kabi has met its burden.
`
`2.
`
`The “About 2%” Limitation Was Reasonably Expected Based on the
`Compound and Stable Prior Art Products
`
`Contrary to Hospira’s assertion, Dr. Kipp addressed reasonable expectation of success in
`
`his report. Trial Tr. 239:21-241:19; DTX 457 at ¶¶ 64, 96, 169. Hospira wrote in the pretrial
`
`statement that “reasonable expectation of success” was a trial issue. D.I. 114-1 at 1. The Court
`
`allowed Hospira to adduce responsive evidence (Trial Tr. 242:17-23), but Hospira chose not to.
`
`Hospira again gets the law wrong when it cites Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina
`
`Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2016), to argue that one “may not prove a
`
`claim limitation that is missing in the prior art solely by reference to a reasonable expectation of
`
`success.” Pl’s Br. at 14. That case did not involve a claimed property, and instead dealt with
`
`whether the prior art taught a physical step for a method. Id. at 1367. For a property that is merely
`
`tacked on to an obvious combination, the property can be inherent or reasonably expected.
`
`Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1354. Hospira did not address Santarus, but admits “about 2%” is a “claimed
`
`property.” Pl’s Br. at 40.
`
`In any event, the prior art described the 2% limitation. The Precedex Concentrate (100
`
`µg/mL) and Dexdomitor (500 µg/mL) were both already low concentration products, and both lost
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 9 of 18 PageID #:5971
`
`not more than 10% in 24 months. PTX-62.35, JTX-51.65, 67; Trial Tr. 162:14-163:4
`
`(Roychowdhury). As Dr. Kipp explained, that works out to about 2% at 5 months. Trial
`
`Tr. 316:18-25. Though Hospira argues this observation was “during closing argument and
`
`contrary to its expert’s concession,” (Pl’s Br. at 16), it was in fact Dr. Kipp’s own testimony. And
`
`though Hospira now speculates there might be slightly more or less than 2% loss (Pl’s Br. at 17),
`
`even its speculation still does not overcome the “about 2%” limitation.
`
`Not only were the prior art concentrations already low, but the undisputed testimony
`
`showed that further lowering concentration would be expected to increase stability.2 While
`
`Hospira tries to reimagine the testimony of Dr. Kipp and Ms. Mowli, even the portions it cites
`
`show that reducing concentration could only help. Pl’s Br. at 22-23. Ms. Mowli testified that
`
`higher concentrations are likely to be less stable “because there’s more of the active ingredient to
`
`possibly interact.” Trial Tr. 734:25-735:11. And Hospira omits the testimony of Dr. Ibrahim, who
`
`explained that higher concentrations mean “more chances to have interaction” with other materials.
`
`Ibrahim Dep. Tr. 41:20-42:12. Hospira is left to repeat its refrain that losing 1 of 4 µg/mL is
`
`mathematically higher than losing 1 of 100 µg/mL, without providing any evidence for why such
`
`a loss was scientifically more likely. Pl’s Br. at 17. Even Hospira’s own expert, Dr. Linhardt,
`
`testified that if there were degradation, it would not depend on concentration. Trial Tr. 825:2-11.
`
`Next, Hospira points to the post-it note mathematical formula and contends that “data from
`
`the Precedex Concentrate NDA for 100 µg/mL and 200 µg/mL samples” somehow showed “2%
`
`loss in just one month if they had contained only 4 µg/mL dexmed.” Pl’s Br. at 10. But Dr. Kipp
`
`
`2 Hospira again refers to portions of Remington that were never discussed at trial. Pl’s Br. at 18.
`But even if considered, Remington’s reference to increasing concentration for drug “that is
`hydrolyzing” (JTX-20.9) is irrelevant here, as Dr. Kipp explained dexmed is not subject to
`hydrolysis (Trial Tr. 322:3-323:24), which Dr. Linhardt did not dispute.
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 10 of 18 PageID #:5972
`
`explained (unrebutted) that the formula could not be used to make the extrapolation Hospira was
`
`attempting to make. Trial Tr. 413:11-21, 454:3-455:19, 467:20-468:6. The argument also ignores
`
`the plethora of actual data at 4 µg/mL, which all showed less than about 2% loss at 5 months.
`
`Hospira argues that “Dr. Kipp does not know whether dexmed follows first order or zero
`
`order degradation.” Pl’s Br. at 18. Yet Hospira completely avoids Dr. Kipp’s testimony and
`
`explanation that the difference between first-order or zero-order degradation was irrelevant
`
`because there was no degradation at all in the 5-month time frame. The degradation mechanism
`
`did not matter where there was no observable loss, and the data showed a loss of less than about
`
`2% at five months. FK Br. at 17-18. It was “not at all” a “close call.” Trial Tr. 340:25-341:2.
`
`Hospira asserts dexmed is not “rock stable” based on a new argument that vial size
`
`supposedly “shows significant interaction between the glass and the dexmed.” Pl’s Br. at 21.
`
`Hospira relies on Dr. Ogenstad for this argument, who at trial said that “it’s my understanding of
`
`the physics” (Trial Tr. 777:15-778:1), but his testimony was unsupported and out of a
`
`biostatistician’s field of expertise. And Dr. Ogenstad admitted that all data for all vial sizes that
`
`used 4 µg/mL showed less than 2% degradation. Id. 779:2-10. Dr. Linhardt’s discussion of non-
`
`real-world conditions does not call the real-world data into question. FK Br. at 19-20.
`
`Hospira raises another new argument, again based on parts of documents not discussed
`
`during trial, that Hospira ended up using nitrogen “to minimize oxidation.” Pl’s Br. at 20 (citing
`
`JTX-51.43). Hospira leaves out the fact that the very same page shows that Hospira’s use of
`
`nitrogen had nothing to do with dexmed stability at all: “[t]he cause for this impurity is the Nikka
`
`Densok container integrity inspection equipment.” JTX-51.43.
`
`At trial, and even though either approach is sufficient for invalidity, Fresenius Kabi proved
`
`the “about 2% limitation” was an inherent property and it was reasonable to expect. The Kao case
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 11 of 18 PageID #:5973
`
`is instructive, which for two different limitations found two different bases for invalidity (one was
`
`inherent and one was reasonably expected). In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`B.
`
`The Dexmed IND Demonstrates Claim 6 Would Have Been Obvious.
`
`1.
`
`Farmos Is Actually the Inventor Under § 102(f)
`
`Inventorship is based on who first conceived of the claimed invention, Burroughs
`
`Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and Hospira does not
`
`dispute Farmos first conceived of ready-to-use, low-concentration dexmed in a sealed glass
`
`container. Nor does Hospira dispute that it received the IND. The named inventors admit they
`
`did not conceive of the claimed idea. FK Br. at 24. Under § 102(f), Hospira’s named inventors
`
`“did not [themselves] invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
`
`The invalidating prior invention need only be communicated to the patentee, not to the
`
`named inventors. Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1997) (“communication of that conception to the patentee”) (emphasis added). For example, in
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Pergo, Inc., No. 02-C-736, 2008 WL 1968301 (E.D. Wis. May 1, 2008), the court
`
`found that though there was “no evidence that disclosure was communicated directly to the named
`
`inventors,” the disclosure invalidated the asserted claims. Id. at *4. Hospira’s cited decisions only
`
`find that communication to the named inventors is sufficient to establish an invalidating
`
`communication, but not that such communication is necessary. Hospira’s citation to Robert Bosch
`
`also does not support its position because the enabling disclosure was created after the alleged
`
`communication. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 700 F. Supp. 2d 625, 643 (D. Del. 2010).
`
`For policy reasons, no direct communication to the inventors should be required, to discourage
`
`companies from acquiring prior art, and then using its teachings without showing the document to
`
`the “inventors.” See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`As a last-ditch effort, Hospira invokes § 103(c)’s “joint research efforts” provision (Pl’s
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 12 of 18 PageID #:5974
`
`Br. at 35-36), but that only applies to companies working together “at the time the claimed
`
`invention was made.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (emphasis added); OddzOn, 122 F.3d at 1403. Farmos’s
`
`IND work was done in 1989, 15 years before Hospira existed; the two were not working jointly.
`
`Section 103(c) cannot apply.
`
`2.
`
`The Invention Was On Sale Under § 102(b)
`
`As an initial matter, Hospira’s attempt to limit the IND to only the Shafer protocol is
`
`improper and misleading. Pl’s Br. at 24. The 1994 and 2004 Agreements resulted in the sale of
`
`the entire contents of the IND, not one singular protocol. Every witness who addressed the issue—
`
`including Hospira’s FDA expert—testified to the same thing. Sheinin Dep. Tr. 116:22-117:08.
`
`In addition, the Supreme Court in Pfaff specifically rejected Hospira’s argument that only
`
`a physical product triggers the on-sale bar, and held that “the on-sale bar is satisfied because the
`
`drawings Pfaff sent to the manufacturer before the critical date fully disclosed the invention.”
`
`Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998) (emphasis added). Like the drawings in Pfaff,
`
`the IND fully disclosed Farmos’s prior invention and therefore triggers the on-sale bar. See, e.g.,
`
`JTX-35.13-62, 223-298; Trial Tr. 257:12-258:9, 259:7-9, 261:9-10, 329:16-25, 330:7-10 (Kipp);
`
`Sheinin Dep. Tr. at 93:17-21. The IND contains orders of magnitude more information than a
`
`product by itself ever could. As Hospira admits, “the IND contains information that describes how
`
`one might make [the prior art invention].” Pl’s Br. at 25.
`
`a.
`
`The 1994 Agreement Transferred Title to the IND
`
`Hospira makes no sense when it tries to excuse away the admissions to the FDA. Hospira
`
`says the FDA does not know the circumstances of an IND transfer. Pl’s Br. at 27. So what? The
`
`parties to the agreement characterized the 1994 transaction to the FDA as changing “ownership.”
`
`DTX 353_0001; DTX 350_0001; Trial Tr. 68:4-19, 69:15-25, 70:13-71:2 (Lankau).
`
`Hospira’s license argument ignores key evidence. Even Mr. Seaton agreed that “typically
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 13 of 18 PageID #:5975
`
`in a license agreement, one doesn’t transfer titles,” even though title did transfer to the IND here.
`
`Trial Tr. 639:20-21; see U.S. v. Gen. Elec. Co, 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926) (“a license giv[es]
`
`the licensee no title in the patent”). Mr. Lankau’s ultimate conclusion—just like the contract itself
`
`at § 9.4—confirmed the IND is treated separately from “Orion Know-How.” JTX-110.15, 41-42.
`
`The provisions that relate to the IND itself control. Trial Tr. 126:12-127:24 (Lankau).
`
`Yet even if the Court finds that the 1994 Agreement only licensed the IND to Abbott, the
`
`IND is still prior art under § 102(b) because—as Fresenius Kabi showed in the opening brief and
`
`Hospira failed to address—licenses can, and do, trigger the on-sale bar. FK Br. at 28-29.
`
`b.
`
`The 2004 Agreement Was a Sale and Hospira Did Not Rebut the
`Law
`
`The 2004 Agreement constitutes a second sale of the IND. Hospira does not dispute that
`
`Abbott and Hospira were separate companies for purposes of the separation and does not address
`
`the Ferag case cited in Fresenius Kabi’s opening brief, which clearly held that a spin-off does
`
`constitute a sale in circumstances analogous to the 2004 Agreement. FK Br. at 30 (citing Ferag
`
`AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Hospira’s cited cases do not stand for
`
`the proposition that a corporate spin-off is immune from the on-sale bar. Pl’s Br. at 29.
`
`c.
`
`The IND Was Sold For Commercial Purposes
`
`In arguing that the IND was sold for experimental purposes, Hospira confuses
`
`confidentiality with control. A sale need not be publicly disclosed to trigger the on-sale bar.
`
`Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2017). And
`
`contrary to Hospira’s assertion, Farmos did not maintain control over the IND because Orion, then
`
`Abbott, and then Hospira controlled the IND. DTX 353_0001, 02; DTX 350_0001; DTX
`
`351_0002; JTX-40.1. Neither Eli Lilly nor Polara are applicable to the present case, as they (a)
`
`were both related to the separate issue of prior use, not prior sale, and (b) involved the inventor
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 14 of 18 PageID #:5976
`
`testing his invention. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380-81
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2006); Polara Eng’g Inc v. Campbell Co., 894 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). And
`
`contrary to Hospira’s assertion, In re Hamilton holds that “[t]he experimental use doctrine
`
`operates…to allow the inventor to refine his invention.” 882 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
`
`d.
`
`The IND Was Ready For Patenting
`
`As a threshold issue, Hospira ignores that the Asserted Claims are not limited to
`
`administration to humans; the parties stipulated that the term “subject” includes “a non-human
`
`animal.” D.I. 63 at 3. It is undisputed that the IND was ready for patenting for animal subjects.
`
`JTX-35.21-43; Trial Tr. 490:17-491:6, 505:14-506:17 (Maile); id. 707:15-19 (Ramsay); Sheinin
`
`Dep Tr. at 57:15-24, 59:13-17, 59:20.
`
`Hospira tries to frame the Shafer protocol of the IND as a “failed experiment” because
`
`20 µg/mL administered without dilution caused side effects. Pl’s Br. at 31. But all sedatives have
`
`side effects, and this would not have discouraged a POSA from using dexmed, either by changing
`
`the concentration, dose, or rate. Trial Tr. 545:7-546:4 (Maile). Further, the side effects reported
`
`were the same side effects that are still present on the FDA-approved dose of dexmed. DTX
`
`335_0006-07; JTX-15.8; Trial Tr. 548:6-21, 550:8-551:7 (Maile).
`
`More fundamentally, the Shafer protocol demonstrates that the product was completed;
`
`otherwise it could not have been administered to people. Trial Tr. 546:15-25 (Maile). Hospira
`
`does not even argue otherwise, and instead argues by assertion that a POSA would think the study
`
`failed because of a problem with formulation stability. Pl’s Br. at 32, 36. But the IND contains
`
`data and written conclusions confirming the stability for the 20 µg/mL formulation. JTX-35.276-
`
`277. Once reduced to practice as in the IND, experimental use cannot negate the on-sale bar. In
`
`re Cygnus Telecomm. Tech., LLC, Pat. Litig., 536 F.3d 1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Hospira’s
`
`cited case, In re Omeprazole Pat. Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008), says the same thing,
`10
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 145 Filed: 08/14/18 Page 15 of 18 PageID #:5977
`
`although Hospira cites it for the proposition that clinical trials can be experimental if no one knows
`
`if they work at all—but the IND proved the formulation and drug did work. JTX-35.45
`
`(“Dexmedetomidine had a significant, dose-dependent sedative effect”).
`
`As explained in the opening brief, FDA approval is not required for ready for patenting,
`
`and the ’106 patent itself was filed before FDA approval for the Premix. FK Br. at 26, 32; Trial
`
`Tr. 57:4-6. Hospira’s argument also contradicts reality: a subset of this IND testing was already
`
`enough for an actual patent. The ’840 patent to Orion/Farmos (DTX 002) contains a dog study
`
`and one clinical trial for medetomidine. Trial Tr. 505:9-24, 506:22-507:7 (Maile). The patent
`
`issued with claims to the perioperative use of dexmed in mammals, including humans. DTX
`
`002_0003 at 4:35-54 (claims). The same data cannot now be too experimental for patenting.
`
`3.
`
`The IND Renders the Asserted Claims Obvious
`
`Hospira does not dispute that the IND disclosed 20 µg/mL dexmed in a ready-to-use glass
`
`ampule. Nor does Hospira dispute the combination of the IND with Precedex Concentrate, which
`
`already used 4 µg/mL and showed it to be safe and effective, was obvious.
`
`Hospira attempts to argue that the IND taught away from developing dexmed at a
`
`concentration lower than 20 µg/mL. Pl.’s Br. at 36. But Hospira waived this argument when it
`
`represented to the Court that it would not rely on any secondary considerations. July 6, 2018
`
`Hearing Tr. 56:15-23; Trial Tr. 303:7-9. “Teaching away” is a secondary consideration. Allergan,
`
`Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 796 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Regardless, the IND did not teach away:
`
`it

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket