Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 120 Filed: 07/15/18 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:4839
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`HOSPIRA, INC.,
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`FRESENIUS KABI USA, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`v.
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`Civil Action Nos. 1:16-cv-00651
` 1:17-cv-07903
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`Hon. Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
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`MOTION TO EXCLUDE DR. ERIC SHEININ’S TESTIMONY
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`INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Hospira, Inc. (“Hospira”) files this motion in limine to exclude certain
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`designated deposition testimony of an expert witness, Dr. Eric Sheinin.
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`Defendant Fresenius Kabi (“Fresenius”) listed Dr. Sheinin on their may-call witness list,
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`and designated testimony from his deposition transcript last week. Fresenius has not disclosed
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`Dr. Sheinin as a witness pursuant to the parties’ advance-disclosure exchanges, so this motion
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`may not be ripe. However, Hospira is filing this motion in the event that Fresenius attempt to
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`play Dr. Shenin’s deposition during trial.
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`Hospira designated Dr. Sheinin as a rebuttal expert and served an expert report. Dr.
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`Sheinin is an expert on the regulatory process at the FDA. As such, he offered opinions on a
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`single, narrow topic: Whether documents submitted to the FDA in connection with an
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`Investigational New Drug (“IND”) application established whether that drug was “ready for
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`patenting” and not for “experimental use,” for purposes of the so-called “on-sale bar” to
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`patentability. At his deposition, Hospira’s counsel stipulated on the record that he was not
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`offering opinions on other topics, including enablement and obviousness.
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`Yet, despite those stipulations, counsel for Fresenius posed questions on enablement,
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`obviousness based on inherency, and other issues beyond the scope of the witnesses’ expertise.
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`Hospira’s counsel noted her objections on the record and allowed Dr. Sheinin to respond, as
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`required by the Federal Rules. Dr. Sheinin attempted to provide answers to Fresenius’ questions,
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`despite the fact that they addressed matters wholly outside the scope of the opinions he was
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`designated to provide. Hospira did not conduct a re-direct examination at the deposition;
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`Hospira assumed that he could testify at trial and that Fresenius’ cross-examination would be
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`limited to matters addressed in his direct testimony.
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`After Dr. Sheinin’s deposition, he experienced an unexpected medical issue that renders
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`him unable to testify at trial. Fresenius now seeks to take advantage of Dr. Sheinin’s unexpected
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`unavailability by introducing into evidence Dr. Sheinin’s testimony on issues outside the scope
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`of his report as affirmative evidence in support of its case-in-chief.
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`The Court should exclude this testimony. Not only is this testimony unhelpful to the
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`Court, but admitting it would violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not permit a
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`party to obtain expert testimony by ambushing an opposing expert with questions on topics
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`outside the scope of his report. Additionally, given that Dr. Sheinin gave extemporaneous
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`answers on issues he had never studied, the testimony lacks basic indicia of reliability and is
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`inadmissible under Daubert. The Court should also exercise its discretion to exclude the
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`testimony under Rule 403, because it is not probative and would waste the Court’s time—
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`particularly given courts’ consistent reluctance to admit un-cross-examined expert deposition
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`testimony. The Court should instead decide the issues via the live testimony of experts who
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`were and are designated to testify on topics in their expertise.
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`ARGUMENT
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`At Dr. Sheinin’s deposition, Fresenius posed questions on enablement and obviousness—
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`despite the express stipulations of Hospira’s counsel that he was not offering opinions on those
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`matters. The Court should exclude Dr. Sheinin’s testimony on those topics.
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`I.
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`Fresenius posed questions beyond the scope of Dr. Sheinin’s expert report.
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`Hospira designated Dr. Sheinin as a rebuttal expert to provide opinions related to a single
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`discrete issue: whether the patent is invalid because it is subject to the “on-sale bar” under 35
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`U.S.C. § 102. Fresenius takes the position that the patent-in-suit is invalid because it was “on
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`sale” based on a license and supply agreement between Orion (which developed the
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`dexmedetomidine compound at issue) and Abbott Laboratories in 1994. It argues that Orion’s
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`Investigational New Drug (“IND”) application submitted to the FDA in 1989 confirms that the
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`criteria for the on-sale bar are satisfied—that is, that the invention was “ready for patenting,” and
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`the use of the invention was not “experimental.” See Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics
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`Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 996-97 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Dr. Sheinin’s opinions pertained solely to
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`whether, from a regulatory perspective, the IND application established that the criteria for the
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`on-sale bar are satisfied. He opined that the documents submitted to the FDA were
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`“experimental in nature, and do not disclose a ready to use dexmedetomidine formulation that
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`was ready for patenting.” Ex. A, Sheinin Rep. ¶ 22.
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`Dr. Sheinin’s opinions were tailored to his expertise. Dr. Sheinin’s report explains that
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`he is a “regulatory specialist and organic chemist with substantial experience in the regulatory
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`process at the [FDA].” Ex. A, Sheinin Rep. ¶ 1. At his deposition, he testified he was offered as
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`an expert on “certain aspects of regulatory issues.” Ex. B, Sheinin Tr. 19:10-11. He elaborated
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`that he would opine on “what an IND is, what the various phases of an IND are, what types of
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`information are in an IND, who at FDA would be involved in reviewing an IND, what kind of
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`3
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`information they would be reviewing, similar expertise in as it would relate to a New Drug
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`Application, how it’s filed, what type of information, and so on, as well as just general FDA
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`procedures for the review and approval of applications and the allowing, how FDA determines
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`whether or not to allow an IND protocol to go forward and have a drug introduced into humans.”
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`Id. 19:13-23.
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`Consistent with this testimony, Hospira’s counsel expressly stipulated on the record that
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`Dr. Sheinin was not offering any opinions on obviousness or enablement:
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`5 MS. HORTON: I can stipulate that Dr. Sheinin does
`6 not have an obviousness opinion, if that helps.
`…
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`12 MR. RIAZ: ... And with respect to
`13 enablement, can you also stipulate that he doesn’t have
`14 any opinion?
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`15 MS. HORTON: He does not have any 112 opinions.
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`Ex. B, Tr. 26:5-15.
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`Yet, after receiving that stipulation, Fresenius’ counsel then proceeded to pose questions
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`on those very topics, over Hospira’s objection. Fresenius has now designated Dr. Sheinin’s
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`deposition testimony on those topics.
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`Specifically, Fresenius has designated the following testimony:
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`17 Q. Sure. So a POSA looking at the data in the
`18 ‘049 patent would understand that you could obtain no
`19 more than 2 percent loss after five months if
`20 dexmedetomidine is stored in what type of container
`21 closure system?
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`22 MS. HORTON: Object to form. Beyond the scope.
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`23 A. I don’t see that there is any data here that
`24 would allow one to say it would be stable for five
`1 months at 25 degrees, because there is no data for five
`2 months.
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`4
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` 3
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` Q. Is there data enough in the patent to come to
`4 the conclusion that dexmedetomidine would not lose more
`5 than 2 percent concentration after, at least, five
`6 months?
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` 7
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` MS. HORTON: Object to form. Asked and answered.
`8 Beyond the scope of his opinions in this case.
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` 9
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` A. I don’t see data that would support that.
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`Ex. B, Tr. 82:17-83:9.1 This testimony relates to Fresenius’ enablement defense under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 112. Fresenius contends that the claim limitation that dexmedetomidine would not lose more
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`than 2 percent concentration after five months is not enabled based on the patentee’s data. Dr.
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`Sheinin, however, offered no opinions on enablement.
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`Fresenius has also designated the following testimony:
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`24 Q. -- that’s the actual charting of the linearity
`1 data, correct?
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` 2
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` A. Correct.
`…
`10 Q. Okay. And here they actually test it as low
`11 as 5 mcg/mL; do you see that? It’s going to be
`12 difficult.
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`13 A. I believe it was 5. They talk about it.
`14 Actually, they said that concentrations were between
`15 zero and 30 mcg/mL. So they do have a test point at
`16 zero.
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`17 Q. Okay. And so this shows that, as low as 5
`18 mcg/mL, that dexmedetomidine is stable for the duration
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`1
`By expressly objecting to these questions on the ground that they were beyond the scope,
`Hospira’s counsel preserved Hospira’s objection, even though the witness answered the question
`to the best of his ability. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(3) (“An objection at the time of the examination
`… must be noted on the record, but the examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject
`to any objection.”). Indeed, it would have been for improper Hospira’s counsel to instruct the
`witness not to answer the question. See id. (instruction not to answer permissible only “when
`necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a
`motion under Rule 30(d)(3),” none of which apply here).
`5
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`19 of the study?
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`20 MS. HORTON: Object to form. Beyond the scope of
`21 his report.
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`22 A. Stable for the length of time that the
`23 procedure was being performed.
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`24 Q. Okay. So do you agree with me that this data
`1 shows that 5 mcg/mL dexmedetomidine is stable, just as
`2 stable as, let’s just say, 20 mcg/mL for the length of
`3 time that the procedure was being performed?
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` 4
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` MS. HORTON: Object to form. Vague. Beyond the
`5 scope of his report.
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` 6
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` A. Yes.
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`Ex. B, Sheinin Tr. 107:22-109:6.2
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`This testimony relates to Fresenius’ obviousness defense based on inherency. Hospira
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`contends that the limitation requiring a 2 percent concentration loss after five months renders the
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`patent non-obvious; Fresenius claims that this limitation is an inherent property, and therefore
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`cannot be used to establish non-obviousness. But Dr. Sheinin offered no opinions on inherency.
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`Although his expert report does generally discuss reporting requirements for stability data in an
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`IND application as compared to a New Drug Application, Ex. A, Sheinin ¶¶ 85-86; 93-94, he
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`offered no opinions on stability data for dexmedetomidine.
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`Finally, Fresenius has designated the following testimony:
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`19 Why would a statistician be required to review
`20 the stability data provided?
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`21 MS. HORTON: Objection. Vague.
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`22 A. If the stability data showed variation, the
`23 review chemist might ask the statistician to look at the
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`2
`Again, Hospira preserved its objections by expressly stating that the questions were
`beyond the scope of Dr. Sheinin’s report.
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`6
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`24 data. I would not expect the statistician to do that on
`1 their own.
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` 2
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` Q. Okay. And the statistician would be reviewing
`3 actual data; is that fair?
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` 4
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` MS. HORTON: Object to form.
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` 5
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` A. Yeah. I mean, what other kind of data?
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` 6
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` Q. Well, certainly, there wouldn’t be, for
`7 example, simulated replicates; would there?
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` 8
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` MS. HORTON: Object to form.
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` 9
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` A. God, no.
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`10 Q. Did you say, “God, no”?
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`11 MS. HORTON: Object to form.
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`12 A. Okay. No more. It has to be real data.
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`Ex. B, Sheinin Tr. 73:22-75:12. Although vague, this testimony also appears to relate to
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`obviousness based on inherency. A different Hospira expert conducted a statistical analysis to
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`rebut Fresenius’ inherency argument; this testimony is apparently intended to show that such
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`statistical analysis is improper. Although Dr. Sheinin’s expert report contains a general
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`discussion of the role of a statistician at the FDA (Ex. A, Sheinin ¶ 72), Dr. Sheinin is not a
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`statistician himself3 and offered no opinions on whether statistical analysis could be used to
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`show inherency, or even whether statistical analysis could be submitted to the FDA.4
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`3 Indeed, illustrating Dr. Sheinin’s lack of statistical expertise, Dr. Sheinin’s response is
`inconsistent with express guidance from the FDA which provides: “A simulation study can be
`useful, if applicable, to demonstrate that the statistical properties of the alternative procedure
`selected are appropriate.” Ex. C, FDA Guidance for Industry Q1E Evaluation of Stability Data.
`4 Although Hospira’s counsel did not specifically state in her objections that the questions were
`beyond the scope of the expert report, she preserved her objection by objecting to the “form.”
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3) (stating that objection to “the form of a question or answer” must be
`“timely made during the deposition”). Moreover, these questions were vague (as Hospira’s
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`II.
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`Dr. Sheinin’s Deposition Testimony Should Be Excluded.
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`The Court should exclude Dr. Sheinin’s testimony on matters outside the scope of the
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`opinions in his expert report.
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`Fresenius intends to introduce Dr. Sheinin’s testimony as expert testimony in support of
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`its affirmative case. This is not impeachment testimony: Dr. Sheinin is not testifying at trial, so
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`there is nothing to impeach. Nor is this fact testimony: Dr. Sheinin has no personal knowledge
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`relevant to this case. It is expert testimony. For example, only an expert witness would be asked
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`a question such as “So a POSA looking at the data in the ‘049 patent would understand that you
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`could obtain no more than 2 percent loss after five months if dexmedetomidine is stored in what
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`type of container closure system?” Supra at 4.
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`The Seventh Circuit has recognized that there is no right to introduce prior deposition
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`testimony; the admission of such testimony lies within the sound discretion of the District Court.
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`Oostendorp v. Khanna, 937 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
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`Civil Procedure permits the use of depositions in civil cases, but contrary to the plaintiff's
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`assertion that deposition testimony must be admitted when offered, the decision to admit
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`deposition testimony is within the sound discretion of the district court.”). This Court should
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`exercise its discretion to exclude Dr. Sheinin’s outside-the-scope testimony for four reasons.
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`First, Fresenius has not followed the Federal Rules governing the admission of expert testimony.
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`Second, the testimony is inadmissible under Rule 702. Third, the testimony is inadmissible
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`under Rule 403. Fourth, federal courts have been skeptical about admitting expert deposition
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`testimony absent a showing of compelling need, and Fresenius cannot make any such showing.
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`counsel noted in her objection); it was not yet clear until later in the deposition that Fresenius’
`counsel was posing questions on inherency. Hospira’s counsel expressly noted her objection at
`that time, as shown above.
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`A.
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`The testimony is inadmissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
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`The Court should exclude the deposition testimony because Fresenius has not followed
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`the rules governing the admission of expert testimony. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)
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`prescribes an orderly procedure for expert discovery: among other things, it requires parties to
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`serve expert reports disclosing their experts’ opinions. While Hospira served an expert report
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`written by Dr. Sheinin, that report does not contains opinions addressing enablement or
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`inherency—the topics on which Fresenius posed questions at the deposition.
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`Testimony on opinions not contained in an expert report is inadmissible, unless the
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`failure to disclose the opinions is “substantially justified or harmless.” Rembrandt Vision Techs.,
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`L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 725 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Here, there
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`is nothing justified about Fresenius’ improper questions, and it would be harmful for Fresenius to
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`present testimony on core issues that Dr. Sheinin had no opportunity to adequately consider.
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`If Fresenius wishes to present expert testimony at trial addressing enablement or
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`inherency, it should present the testimony of its own experts on those topics, preceded by timely
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`expert reports. It should not ambush Hospira’s expert with questions on topics he did not offer
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`opinions on, and then attempt to inject his extemporaneous responses into the trial record.
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`Indeed, a federal district court has relied on similar reasoning to exclude designated
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`expert testimony that fell within the scope of the expert’s report. In Livers v. Schenck, No.
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`8:08CV107, 2013 WL 5676881, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 18, 2013), an expert, Stanley Walters, was
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`“retained by the defendants, deposed, and later abandoned by the defendants.” Id. at *5. The
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`plaintiff then “represent[ed] that it seeks to present portions of Walters’s deposition testimony
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`that covered subjects in the expert report the defendants had submitted to the plaintiff.” Id. The
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`court granted a motion in limine to exclude this deposition testimony, noting that the plaintiff
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`had never “retain[ed] or designate[d] Walters as an expert,” and that it would only “allow
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`testimony by experts on behalf of the party or parties that retained and properly disclosed them.”
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`Id. at *6. This case is an even stronger case for exclusion of deposition testimony, given that the
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`designated testimony does not cover subjects in the expert report submitted to Fresenius.
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`B.
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`The testimony is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert.
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`Dr. Sheinin’s testimony is also inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule
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`702 requires expert testimony to be “based on sufficient facts or data”; “the product of reliable
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`principles and methods” and requires a showing that the expert “reliably applied the principles
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`and methods to the facts of the case”; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
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`(1993). In the ordinary course, it would be Hospira who bears the burden of proving that the
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`testimony of its own expert is admissible, and Fresenius who would cross-examine Dr. Sheinin
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`to undermine his credibility. Here, however, because Dr. Sheinin is not testifying at trial and
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`Fresenius (but not Hospira) is designating his deposition testimony, Fresenius bears the
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`affirmative burden to show his testimony is admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. It cannot
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`meet that burden because there is nothing in the record to establish the reliability or basis for his
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`unprepared answers. Indeed, there is nothing in the record indicating that Dr. Sheinin was even
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`aware of the legal standard for enablement or inherency. The expert report does not establish
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`any such basis because it contains no opinions on enablement or inherency. Nor did Fresenius
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`establish any such basis at the deposition. It simply posed questions on matters that Dr. Sheinin
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`did not opine on in his report, and Dr. Sheinin answered to the best of his ability.
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`For instance, Fresenius seeks to introduce into the record the following exchange: “Q.
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`Okay. So do you agree with me that this data shows that 5 mcg/mL dexmedetomidine is stable,
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`just as stable as, let’s just say, 20 mcg/mL for the length of time that the procedure was being
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`performed? MS. HORTON: Object to form. Vague. Beyond the scope of his report. A. Yes.”
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`Supra at 5-6. As Hospira’s counsel noted, Dr. Sheinin offered no opinions on that topic in his
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`report. While Dr. Sheinin is a PhD chemist, Fresenius cannot establish the admissibility of
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`expert testimony via credentials alone; it must show that the opinion is based on a reliable
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`methodology. There is no basis for reaching that conclusion here, given that Dr. Sheinin had not
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`considered that issue until the moment he was asked about it in his deposition.
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`Likewise, Fresenius seeks to introduce the following exchange: “Q. Is there data enough
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`in the patent to come to the conclusion that dexmedetomidine would not lose more than 2 percent
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`concentration after, at least, five months? MS. HORTON: Object to form. Asked and answered.
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`Beyond the scope of his opinions in this case. A. I don’t see data that would support that.”
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`Supra at 4. Again, Dr. Sheinin offered no opinions in his report on whether the “data … in the
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`patent” was “enough” to come to any conclusion regarding dexmedetomidine’s behavior. Nor
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`was he instructed on the legal standard for enablement. Nothing in the record shows that Dr.
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`Sheinin’s answer satisfies the rigorous standards for admission of expert testimony.
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`C.
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`The testimony is inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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`Dr. Sheinin’s testimony is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because its
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`“probative value” would lead to “undue delay” and would be “substantially outweighed” by
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`“unfair prejudice.” As explained above, the probative value of this testimony is minimal because
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`it reflects extemporaneous testimony on topics Dr. Sheinin did not previously consider.
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`Dr. Sheinin’s testimony is also unhelpful because Hospira did not conduct a redirect
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`examination at the deposition. At a trial, Hospira could conduct a redirect examination to clean
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`up any ambiguity in Dr. Sheinin’s testimony; but because of Dr. Sheinin’s unavailability, it
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`cannot. Thus, not only does the Court lack the benefit of watching Dr. Sheinin testify live, the
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`Court lacks the benefit of redirect testimony that would put Dr. Sheinin’s testimony in context.
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`Dr. Sheinin’s testimony is surely less helpful than the testimony of the experts who were
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`actually designated to testify on enablement and obviousness. These experts served reports on
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`those topics; they were deposed on those topics; they will testify live on those topics; and they
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`will be cross-examined on those topics. That testimony will be far more helpful to the Court
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`than the vague snippets of testimony at Dr. Sheinin’s deposition.
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`Admitting Dr. Sheinin’s testimony would waste the court’s time. Not only will the
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`parties litigate the precise inferences to be drawn from ambiguous snippets of deposition
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`testimony, but Hospira would have to prepare its own witnesses to address Dr. Sheinin’s
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`testimony at the trial in order to clean up the record. This will yield a mini-trial over what Dr.
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`Sheinin was, and was not, trying to say at his deposition. That is unlikely to assist the Court.
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`Admitting Dr. Sheinin’s testimony would also be unfairly prejudicial. Again, the record
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`is unbalanced because Hospira did not conduct any redirect testimony—and Hospira had a
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`legitimate basis for not asking follow-up questions. Posing questions on these topics might have
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`been construed as a waiver of Hospira’s objections to Fresenius’ outside-the-scope questions.
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`Moreover, at trial, Hospira assumed that it could pose questions to Dr. Sheinin within the scope
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`of his report, and he would be cross-examined on those opinions. Dr. Sheinin encountered an
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`unexpected medical issue, and Fresenius is now seeking to take advantage of this medical issue
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`by designating his unprepared answers, secure in the knowledge that Hospira will be unable to
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`conduct a re-direct examination. It would be unfair to admit Dr. Sheinin’s testimony. See
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`Polozie v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D. Conn. 1993) (“[I]t would be unfair for the
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`defendant to be bound at trial by the strategy it employed in examining an expert witness during
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`a discovery deposition taken at a time when it was expected that the witness would be available
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`to testify at trial.”).
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`D.
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`The Court should exercise its discretion to exclude the testimony, given
`courts’ preference for live expert testimony.
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`As noted above, there is no right to introduce former deposition testimony; the admission
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`of such testimony lies within a district court’s sound discretion. Supra, at 8. In exercising that
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`discretion, courts have expressed skepticism regarding the use at trial of expert deposition
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`testimony. They have held that courts generally should not admit such testimony unless there is
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`a compelling need. None exists in this case.
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`The leading case on this issue is Judge Friendly’s opinion in Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte,
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`474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972). In that decision, the Second Circuit held that when an expert
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`witness is unavailable to testify at trial, his prior testimony ordinarily should not be used; rather,
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`a different expert should testify live, unless there is a showing that no other comparable expert is
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`available. The court explained:
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`[E]ven the unavailability of a particular expert witness should not
`without more allow the use of his prior testimony in a second
`action. It must be recognized that the general preference of the
`federal rules, as expressed in F.R.Civ.P. 43(a), is for oral testimony
`so that there will be an opportunity for live cross-examination and
`observation of the demeanor of the witness. While the use of
`previous testimony is a well-established exception to this rule, it is
`an exception based on the necessity of using the prior testimony
`when the alternative is loss of that testimony entirely. When the
`ordinary witness is unavailable, his unique knowledge of the facts
`will be lost unless the use of his prior testimony is allowed. But the
`expert witness generally has no knowledge of the facts of the case.
`Instead, he is called upon to express a professional opinion upon
`the facts as they are presented to him, often expressing his opinions
`in the form of answers to hypothetical questions. Thus, even if one
`particular expert is unavailable, there is no need to use his previous
`testimony to prevent the loss of evidence, because there will
`usually be other experts available to give similar testimony orally.
`It seems to us, therefore, that before the former testimony of an
`expert witness can be used, there should be some showing not only
`that the witness is unavailable, but that no other expert of similar
`qualifications is available or that the unavailable expert has some
`unique testimony to contribute.
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`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 120 Filed: 07/15/18 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:4852
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`Id. at 536-37 (citation omitted). More recent decisions have agreed with and adopted the Second
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`Circuit’s reasoning. See Livers v. Schenck, No. 8:08CV107, 2013 WL 5676881, at *3 (D. Neb.
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`Oct. 18, 2013); Aubrey Rogers Agency, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.97–529 MMS, 2000
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`WL 135129, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2000).
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`Under the Second Circuit’s approach, Dr. Sheinin’s testimony is inadmissible. There is
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`no basis for concluding that “no other expert of similar qualifications is available or that the
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`unavailable expert has some unique testimony to contribute.” Carter-Wallace, 474 F.2d at 536.
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`To the contrary, Dr. Sheinin’s testimony is uniquely unhelpful to the Court given that it was off-
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`the-cuff testimony on topics he had never considered. Live testimony by experts who will be
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`examined by both sides will be far more helpful to the Court.
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`Dated: July 15, 2018
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Bradford P. Lyerla
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`Bradford P. Lyerla
`Sara T. Horton
`Aaron A. Barlow
`Yusuf Esat
`Ren-How H. Harn
`JENNER & BLOCK LLP
`353 N. Clark Street
`Chicago, IL 60654-3456
`(312) 222-9350
`blyerla@jenner.com
`shorton@jenner.com
`abarlow@jenner.com
`yesat@jenner.com
`rharn@jenner.com
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff Hospira, Inc.
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`Case: 1:16-cv-00651 Document #: 120 Filed: 07/15/18 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:4853
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I, Yusuf Esat, an attorney at the law firm of Jenner & Block LLP, certify that on July 15,
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`2018, the foregoing Motion to Exclude Dr. Eric Sheinin’s Testimony was electronically served
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`on counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF system.
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`/s/ Yusuf Esat______
`Yusuf Esat
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`