Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:844
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`United States of America,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Thomas Lindstrom,
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`Defendant,
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`David Venkus,
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`Restitution Judgment Creditor,
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`Ryan Building Group, Inc.,
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`Third-Party Citation Respondent
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`and
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`No. 16 CR 631
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`Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`In 2019, Defendant Thomas Lindstrom was sentenced for one count of wire
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`
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`fraud and ordered to pay $13,776,518 in restitution to the victim of his crime, David
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`Venkus. Venkus served a citation to discover assets on Lindstrom’s then-employer,
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`Ryan Building Group, Inc. Before the Court is Venkus’ motion for a finding of
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`contempt and entry of judgment against RBG for transferring funds in violation of
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`the citation to discover assets. For the reasons below, Venkus’ motion is denied.
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`I.
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`Background
`Lindstrom’s Employment and Sentencing
`A.
`This motion arises out of a victim’s attempt to recover restitution through civil
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`proceedings. Defendant Thomas Lindstrom worked for Ryan Building Group, Inc.
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`1
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 2 of 21 PageID #:845
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`(“RBG”) from at least July 1, 2015 until October 9, 2023. [Dkt. 123 at 3–4.] During
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`his employment, Lindstrom acquired stock options pursuant to a Stock Options
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`Agreement. [Id.] His agreement, which was also subject to the terms and conditions
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`of RBG’s 2014 Stock Incentive Plan, allowed him to exercise his options if he (1)
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`provided written notice; (2) paid the exercise price; and (3) satisfied other
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`requirements “as may be prescribed in the Award agreement.” [Dkts. 123-2 at 2; 123-
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`3, § 6(c)(iii).] It also specified that in the event of termination, his unexercised options
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`would expire after 30 days. [Id. at § 8(b)(ii); Dkt. 123 at 3, 5.] By the end of his
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`employment, Lindstrom acquired 116,666 vested stock options worth an estimated
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`$445,633. [Dkts. 123 at 3; 123-6.]
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`Lindstrom also amassed substantial debts to RBG during his employment.
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`Between 2016 and 2017, Lindstrom either borrowed or misappropriated $230,000
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`from RBG to fund his criminal defense for this case, which began in September 2016.1
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`[Dkts. 1; 123 at 3.] Lindstrom and RBG signed two promissory notes memorializing
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`the debt.2 [Dkt. 123 at 3.] On January 23, 2019, the Court sentenced Lindstrom to
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`60-months for wire fraud. [Dkt. 54.] RBG rehired Lindstrom after his sentence.
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`Lindstrom began using his company credit card for personal expenses totaling
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`RBG claims the funds were “misappropriated” while Lindstrom represented that he
`1
`“borrowed” them. [Dkt. 127 at 8.]
`2
`Venkus initially argued that Lindstrom failed to provide enough evidence of the debt
`and that copies of promissory notes were insufficient. [Dkt. 122 at 12.] However, a “duplicate
`is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine issue is raised about the
`original’s authenticity,” Fed. R. Evid. 1003, and Venkus hasn’t given the Court any reason to
`doubt the promissory notes’ authenticity. Additionally, the precise amount of debt Lindstrom
`owed to RBG is immaterial given the Court’s conclusion that RBG’s calculation of the
`severance package based on the value of the stock options was gratuitous. See infra Part
`III.A.
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`2
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 3 of 21 PageID #:846
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`$69,010. RBG spent $10,000 on an accountant to uncover the fraud, and later
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`terminated Lindstrom in October 2023. [Dkt. 123-1, ¶¶ 12–15.] By the end of his
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`employment, Lindstrom owed RBG $372,544, including debts plus interest. [Dkt. 123
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`at 9.]
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`Restitution Dispute
`B.
`At sentencing, Lindstrom was ordered to pay $13,776,518 in restitution to the
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`victim of his fraud, David Venkus. Venkus obtained an abstract of judgment to
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`enforce the restitution award as a civil judgment creditor, and the Court granted his
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`motion to enforce the judgment. [Dkts. 54, 69.]
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`In August 2022, Venkus served a citation to discover assets on RBG to identify,
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`and then obtain, assets it held owed to Lindstrom in order to satisfy the judgment.
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`[Dkt. 122-1 at 1–3.] The citation contained a restraining provision prohibiting RBG
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`from transferring assets in its possession owed to Lindstrom. [Id. at 1; 735 Ill. Comp.
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`Stat. 5/2-1402(f)(1); see infra Part II.] RBG answered the citation, indicating that it
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`possessed earnings owed to Lindstrom and certain stock options. [Dkt. 77 at 6–8.]
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`Under Illinois law, creditors are only allowed to collect up to 15% of unpaid wages.
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`735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-803. Accordingly, Venkus moved for a turnover order for
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`Lindstrom’s nonexempt wages. In the motion, Venkus “reserve[d] his right to seek
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`relief as to the stock options identified by [RBG].” [Dkt. 77 at 2 n.2.] In September
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`2022, the Court entered the turnover order, which required RBG to deliver 15% of
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`Lindstrom’s gross earnings to Venkus. [Dkt. 82, ¶ 6.]
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`RBG sent Venkus 15% of Lindstrom’s wages until October 2023 when it
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`terminated Lindstrom. RBG informed Venkus that Lindstrom was no longer
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 4 of 21 PageID #:847
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`employed as of October 9, 2023, and that it was “still working out any severance that
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`needs to be paid out.” [Dkt. 122 at 3–4.] Venkus inquired about Lindstrom’s severance
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`multiple times between October and January 2024 but RBG’s responses were delayed
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`and lacked detail. [Dkts. 122 at 3–4; 123 at 6.] Between December and January 2024,
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`RBG sent Venkus additional funds, $10,963 of which it stated was the amount due
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`from Lindstrom’s severance, without explaining how it was calculated. [Dkt. 122 at
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`4.] After additional information demands and disputes, the Court ordered RBG to
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`produce documents and information, including about Lindstrom’s severance and
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`promissory notes. [Dkts. 103; 122 at 5.]
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`Around this time in January 2024, Venkus obtained from Lindstrom a
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`document Lindstrom made with RBG entitled “Ryan Building Group – Tom
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`Lindstrom Options Net Payout” (“December 2023 Document”). [Dkts. 122 at 5–6; 123-
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`1 at 25.] Lindstrom signed and dated it December 15, 2023. The document, which
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`appears to calculate Lindstrom’s options net payout, also seems to represent
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`Lindstrom’s severance package given that RBG’s explanation of how it calculated
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`Lindstrom’s severance matches the document. RBG explained:
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`“Lindstrom received gross severance in the amount of $73,090. RBG calculated
`this amount by taking the amount that Lindstrom would have received had he
`exercised his stock options ($445,633) and subtracted amounts Lindstrom
`owed to RBG, including repayment of personal loan for which the options were
`collateral, totaling $372,543, for a gross severance in the amount of $73,090.
`Of that gross severance amount, RBG paid 15% ($10,963) to [Venkus] based on
`its understanding of the Court’s turnover order (ECF 82) that RBG is required
`to pay 15% of amounts due to Lindstrom . . . RBG also paid 35% ($21,744) to
`[Lindstrom’s ex-wife] pursuant to a letter of direction from Lindstrom in
`accordance with a domestic relations court order dated April 11, 2023. The
`remaining amount to be paid to Lindstrom is $40,382, half of which ($20,191)
`was paid to Lindstrom on December 31, 2023 […]”
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`4
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`[Dkt. 122 at 6–7.]
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`Venkus filed this motion for § 2-1402(f)(1) liability and entry of judgment
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`against RBG for wrongfully transferring severance pay that was encumbered by
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`Venkus’ citation lien to other creditors and to Lindstrom. [Dkt. 122 at 1.] According
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`to Venkus, RBG agreed to pay Lindstrom the value of his stock options ($445,633)
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`and then paid itself back the value of Lindstrom’s debts before paying Venkus, even
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`though Venkus’ interest in the stock options was secured while RBG’s was not.
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`Venkus also argues that severance isn’t subject to a 15% garnishment cap under
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`Illinois law, so he should have received the full package. Each transfer of severance
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`to Lindstrom and his ex-wife, who also lacked a secured interest, also then violated
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`§ 2-1402(f)(1). Venkus further argues that RBG’s violations were willful and
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`contumacious, entitling Venkus to attorney’s fees for the cost of this motion.
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`II.
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`Legal Standard
`Section 2-1402 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-
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`1402 (West 2020)) allows a judgment creditor to enter supplementary proceedings to
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`discover a debtor’s assets and compel their payment towards satisfaction of the
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`judgment. To do this, the judgment creditor serves a citation to discover assets upon
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`a judgment debtor or third-party respondent, pursuant to which the court enters a
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`turnover order. Id. at § 2-1402(a)–(c). A citation to discover assets can, as it does in
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`the RBG Citation, contain a restraining provision that “prohibit[s] the party to whom
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`it is directed from making or allowing any transfer or other disposition of, or
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`interfering with, any property not exempt from the enforcement of the judgment.” Id.
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:849
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`at § 2-1402(f)(1); [Dkt. 122-1 at 1.] This provision aims to prevent the citation
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`respondent “from transferring funds which may become due to the judgment debtor,
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`in order to insure that the latter does not abscond with money that is due.” Cacok v.
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`Covington, 111 F.3d 52, 54 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kirchheimer Brothers Co. v.
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`Jewelry Mine Ltd., 426 N.E.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)). Once a citation is
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`served on a respondent, a lien is perfected on the debtor’s assets that are not
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`otherwise exempt under the law, and is superior to any lien that later attaches. § 2-
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`1402(m); Sign Builders, Inc. v. SVI Themed Constr. Sols., Inc., 30 N.E.3d 475, 479
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`(Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Cacok, 111 F.3d at 54.
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`Courts may punish any citation respondent who violates the restraining
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`provision “as and for a contempt, or if the party is a third party may enter judgment
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`against him or her in the amount of the unpaid portion of the judgment and costs
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`allowable under this Section, or in the amount of the value of the property
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`transferred, whichever is lesser.” § 2-1402(f)(1); see also Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 277(h)
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`(describing sanctions for failing to obey a citation, subpoena, or order or other
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`direction of the court); Midwest Com. Funding, LLC v. Kelly, 217 N.E.3d 985, 992 (Ill.
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`2022) (“[I]ssuance of a citation [to discover assets] imposes very real restrictions and
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`affirmative duties upon a third party—backed by the threat of contempt and
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`monetary liability.” (quoting Shipley v. Hoke, 22 N.E.3d 469, 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014))).
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`For § 2-1402(f)(1) liability to attach, Venkus must show that (1) he has an
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`enforceable judgment, (2) he properly served a citation upon RBG, and (3) RBG
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`transferred assets in violation of the citation’s restraining provision. Mendez v.
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`6
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`Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2013). Venkus, as the judgment creditor,
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`also bears the burden of showing that RBG had assets belonging to Lindstrom. Cent.
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`States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Vanguard Servs., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 988,
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`995 (N.D. Ill. 2020). If Venkus can show RBG violated § 2-1402(f)(1), the Court may
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`also impose sanctions for contempt. Mendez, 725 F.3d at 662; Shales v. T. Manning
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`Concrete, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (imposing civil
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`contempt sanctions on third-party citation respondent in the form of attorney’s fees
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`for violating § 2-1402(f)(1)); Star Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg. Grp. Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 663
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`(7th Cir. 2009) (“Under [Illinois Supreme Court] Rule 277, the court ha[s] the
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`discretion as to the nature of the sanction to impose for violating the order.”).
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`III. Analysis
`The parties don’t dispute that Venkus had an enforceable judgment, that it
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`properly served a citation on RBG, or that Venkus was entitled to some portion of
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`Lindstrom’s severance package. The parties only dispute the value of Lindstrom’s
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`severance package and what portion of it is statutorily due to Venkus under the
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`Illinois Wage Deduction Act, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-801 et seq. According to Venkus,
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`RBG underpaid him from the severance package and transferred the remaining funds
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`in violation of § 2-1402(f)(1). RBG allegedly did so willfully and contumaciously,
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`warranting sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees. RBG claims that it paid Venkus
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`the correct amount of severance and so did not violate § 2-1402(f)(1). The Court takes
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`each issue in turn. Because it does not find evidence of a § 2-1402(f)(1) violation,
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`sanctions are not appropriate.
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`7
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`Value of Lindstrom’s Severance Package
`A.
`First, the Court must determine the value of the severance package owed to
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`Lindstrom. Only then can it determine what portion of the package was statutorily
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`due to Venkus and whether RBG violated the citation to discover assets. As the
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`judgment creditor, Venkus must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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`alleged contemnor has violated a court order.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Freed, 971 N.E.2d
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`1087, 1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This includes
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`proving that RBG held assets owed to Lindstrom. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas
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`Pension Fund, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 995. For assets to belong to a creditor, they must
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`be “held under such circumstances that in an action” by the debtor, the creditor could
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`“recover them in specie or obtain a judgment for the proceeds.” § 2-1402(c)(3). In other
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`words, Venkus can only recover what Lindstrom could recover.
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`The dispute over the severance due to Venkus derives from Lindstrom’s stock
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`options agreement and the December 2023 Document. RBG’s citation response
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`identified Lindstrom’s stock options and thereby gave Venkus a lien right to the
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`options, which was perfected when it was served on RBG. § 2-1402(m). It’s undisputed
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`that Lindstrom never exercised his options per the terms of his agreement. But the
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`December 2023 Document nevertheless calculates Lindstrom’s severance starting
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`with the value of Lindstrom’s options. The document lists the net value ($445,633) at
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`the top,3 then the debt Lindstrom owed to RBG ($372,543), and then calculates the
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`remaining sum ($73,090) and apportions it between Lindstrom and his creditors. The
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`The net value is the value of the shares minus the exercise price for the options. [Dkt.
`3
`123-1, ¶ 21.]
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`8
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 9 of 21 PageID #:852
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`question is whether Venkus had a right to the entire $445,633, or whether the
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`severance package is actually worth $73,090.
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`RBG argues that $73,090 is the value of the package that it agreed to pay out.
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`It’s reason is simple: Lindstrom’s options expired on November 8, 2023, 30 days post-
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`termination (per the terms of his agreement) and before the severance package was
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`calculated. Lindstrom had no right to exercise his options after November 8, 2023,
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`therefore Venkus also has no right to the value of the stock options. According to
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`RBG, the prior value of the now-expired options was merely a hypothetical starting
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`point to calculate what RBG felt was a “fair” severance. [Dkt. 123 at 5.]
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`Venkus argues that it’s entitled to the entire $445,633 because RBG’s citation
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`response identified the stock options and therefore gave Venkus a lien on them. RBG,
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`therefore, was prohibited from offsetting Lindstrom’s debt before paying Venkus
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`because RBG didn’t have a secured interest in the options. [Dkt. 127 at 10.] These
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`arguments are no answer to the assertion that Lindstrom’s options were expired and
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`unexercised before December 2023. Venkus is correct that the citation gave it a lien
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`right to Lindstrom’s stock options. § 2-1402(m) (citation directed against third-party
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`becomes a lien on debtor’s personal property including “money, choses in action, and
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`effects of the judgment debtor”). But Venkus hasn’t show how a lien interest would
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`survive the extinguishment of property rights pursuant to a valid agreement that
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`preexisted the citation. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Yo-Whip, Inc., 1994 WL 549002, at *2–
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`3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1994) (terms of agreement preexisting citation to discover assets
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`allowed assignee to terminate debtor’s interest in patent assets, altering lien rights
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`9
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`of creditors). RBG’s 2014 Stock Incentive Plan, which Lindstrom’s agreement
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`incorporates, clearly states that an employee’s vested options “cease to be exercisable
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`and will terminate” 30 days after the termination date. [Dkt. 123-3 at § 8(b)(ii).] RBG
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`had an undisputed right to terminate Lindstrom. By the terms of the agreement,
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`then, Lindstrom lost the right to obtain any real value from the options, therefore
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`Venkus logically lost that right as well. The expired options, then, had no value.
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`To get around this, Venkus argues that the December 2023 Document is a
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`legally binding agreement the shows the options still had monetary value owed to
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`Lindstrom. He points to the fact that the underlying spreadsheet is entitled
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`“Lindstrom Options Release Agreement,” that John Rushin, the RBG employee who
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`created the document, emailed it to Lindstrom directing him to sign it, and Lindstrom
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`did sign, below text reading “Agreed as above.” [Dkt. 127 at 13–14.] The “agreement,”
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`Venkus says, shows that RBG offset its debts against the value of Lindstrom’s
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`options, “mak[ing] it near impossible for RBG or Lindstrom to sue one another for the
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`debts offset . . . .” [Id. at 14.] Consequently, the “agreement” shows that Lindstrom’s
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`options still had monetary value. [Id. at 12–14.] RBG counters that the document
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`depicts a hypothetical valuation of the options to find “fair” severance and isn’t a legal
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`agreement because there’s no consideration and RBG didn’t sign it. [Dkt. 123 at 6 n.2,
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`13–14.]
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`The latter is more persuasive. The December 2023 Document has some
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`hallmarks of an agreement—RBG asked Lindstrom to sign it, he did sign, and then
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`RBG paid out the sums in line with the document. But Venkus hasn’t presented
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`persuasive evidence of consideration, a crucial component of a legal agreement. Nat’l
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`Prod. Workers Union Ins. Tr. v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Under
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`Illinois state law, an enforceable contract requires an offer, acceptance, consideration,
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`and mutual assent.”). Venkus states that RBG and Linstrom obtained a mutual
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`release of debts against each other—RBG for the stock options, and Lindstrom for his
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`debts. But the options had already expired, so RBG didn’t owe Lindstrom their value.
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`Additionally, a promise to repay debt already owed cannot furnish consideration for
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`a new agreement. DiLorenzo v. Valve & Primer Corp., 807 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ill. App.
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`Ct. 2004). Instead, the net payout calculation appears to be a gratuitous estimation
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`of severance.
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`Venkus also argues that the strange circumstances surrounding the December
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`2023 Document confirm that Lindstrom’s options had value. Why, Venkus asks,
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`would RBG decide to pay Lindstrom after he stole from RBG twice? Why would
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`Lindstrom walk away from a huge sum and let his options expire while still owing
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`RBG money? And why would RBG undertake this hypothetical exercise if it could
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`have simply written Lindstrom a check for $73,090 or some other value? The truth,
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`Venkus contends, is that RBG knew Venkus’ lien on the options was a problem
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`because RBG never perfected its interest in the options. RBG realized Venkus would
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`be entitled to the entire sum of the options once exercised, so it tried to convince the
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`Court that the severance calculation was a “grand hypothetical exercise” while
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`“silently direct[ing] [Lindstrom’s] stock option assets to his favored creditor, RBG,
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`over his disfavored creditor, Venkus.” [Dkt. 127 at 10–12.]
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`11
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`This account doesn’t entirely hold water because Lindstrom’s severance was
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`subject to a wage garnishment cap under the Illinois Wage Deduction Age. See infra,
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`Part III.B. Even if Venkus garnished $445,633, there would be sufficient funds
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`remaining to repay Lindstrom’s debt to RBG. But even if RBG acted contrary to its
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`own economic interests by paying Lindstrom funds that it may not have owed him,
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`Venkus’ claim that their relationship was “corrupt” instead of altruistic is speculation
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`without more. [Dkt. 127 at 7.] It also doesn’t change the fact that Lindstrom’s options
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`had expired, extinguishing his right to exercise them.
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`The outcome might be different if Venkus presented evidence that RBG
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`purposely frustrated Venkus’ ability to recover assets due to him. See In re Emerald
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`Casino, Inc., 584 B.R. 727, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Where . . . a judgment debtor
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`transfers assets to another with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
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`creditor of the debtor, Illinois law permits the creditor to collect those assets to satisfy
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`the judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Venkus does state in one
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`sentence that “RBG never gave Venkus the opportunity to exercise the options and
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`obtain their value.” [Dkt. 127 at 12.] But he failed to explain how RBG prevented him
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`from recovering the value of the options. To the contrary, the evidence presented
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`indicates that Venkus knew Lindstrom had a certain quantity of vested stock options
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`and knew when the options would expire but took no action to recover their value.
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`Venkus received Lindstrom’s Stock Options Agreement in October 2022, a year before
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`his termination. [Dkt. 122 at 3.] The Agreement references RBG’s 2014 Stock
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`Incentive Plan, which explains the terms of expiration. Venkus didn’t claim that he
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`12
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 13 of 21 PageID #:856
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`lacked information about the Stock Incentive Plan, so Venkus was presumably aware
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`the options would expire on or about November 9, 2023. RBG also told Venkus that
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`Lindstrom had 116,666 vested stock options. [Id.] Yet Venkus only sought turnover
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`of Lindstrom’s wages. It “reserve[d] his right” to the stock options but never moved to
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`recover their value even though they were set to expire. [Dkt. 77 at 2 n.2.] It’s true
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`that Venkus didn’t know how much the options were worth until after they expired,
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`but it still had notice and opportunity to pursue them. In sum, the Court finds that
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`Lindstrom’s options expired before RBG calculated his severance. Venkus therefore
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`didn’t have the right to recover the value of his stock options. The severance package
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`RBG agreed to pay is $73,090.
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`Severance Due Under Illinois Wage Deduction Act
`B.
`The next question is whether RBG paid Venkus the correct portion of the
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`$73,090 severance package or if it violated § 2-1402(f)(1) by sending unwarranted
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`severance payments to Lindstrom or his ex-wife. RBG argues that Venkus was only
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`entitled to 15% of the package under § 12-803 of the Illinois Wage Deduction Act.
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`Venkus contends it was entitled to the entire sum.
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`The Illinois Wage Deduction Act (“IWDA”) caps the percent of wages that can
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`be garnished by a creditor pursuant to a deduction order. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-
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`801 et seq. (West 2020). Turnovers pursuant to a citation to discover assets in a
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`supplementary proceeding must treat “wages” as defined by the IWDA in line with
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`its provisions, including the garnishment cap. § 2-1402(k-5). “Wages” are defined as
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`“any hourly pay, salaries, commissions, bonuses, or other compensation owed by an
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`13
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 14 of 21 PageID #:857
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`employer to a judgment debtor.” § 12-801. Section 12-803 is the wage exemption
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`provision, stating in relevant part:
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`“Wages, salary, commissions and bonuses subject to collection under a
`deduction order, for any work week shall be the lesser of (1) 15% of such gross
`amount paid for that week or (2) the amount by which disposable earnings for
`a week exceed 45 times the Federal Minimum Hourly Wage prescribed by
`Section 206(a)(1) of Title 29 of the United States Code, as amended, or, under
`a wage deduction summons served on or after January 1, 2006, the minimum
`hourly wage prescribed by Section 4 of the Minimum Wage Law, whichever is
`greater, in effect at the time the amounts are payable . . . The term ‘disposable
`earnings’ means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after
`the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be
`withheld.”
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`The parties agree that severance is “wages” under the IWDA, but dispute
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`whether it’s subject to the 15% wage garnishment cap. RBG argues that all “wages”
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`fall under § 12-803 without exception, such that Venkus is only entitled to 15% of
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`Lindstrom’s severance package. Venkus argues that § 12-803 only applies to wages
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`that are paid periodically. Lindstrom’s lump severance payment was not periodic, so
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`Venkus is owed the entire sum. [Dkts. 122 at 10–11; 123 at 10–13; 127 at 3–7.]
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`This is purely a question of state statutory interpretation, so Illinois’ rules of
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`statutory construction apply. Green v. Leibowitz, 108 F.4th 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2024).
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`In Illinois, “[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
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`effect to the intent of the legislature.” People v. Fair, 238 N.E.3d 1119, 1132 (Ill. 2024).
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`“The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given
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`its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 1132–33. When assessing legislative intent,
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`courts should “view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in
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`connection with other relevant statutory provisions rather than in isolation.” Id. at
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 15 of 21 PageID #:858
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`1133. If the statute’s language is clear, it “should be enforced as written.” Dawkins v.
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`Fitness Int’l, LLC, 210 N.E.3d 1184, 1190 (Ill. 2022). Otherwise, courts may also
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`consider “the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and
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`purposes sought.” Id. Relevant here, Illinois has long recognized that personal
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`property exemption statutes should be liberally construed to protect debtors. Matter
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`of Barker, 768 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1985); Kauffman v. Wrenn, 46 N.E.3d 805, 817
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`(Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
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`Few cases interpret § 12-803 and none address periodicity with respect to
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`lump-sum severance.4 The Court reviews this issue with fresh eyes, beginning with
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`the plain language of the statute. Venkus argues that §12-803’s periodicity
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`requirement is baked into the language: the statute caps wage deduction “for any
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`work week” at the lesser of “15% of such gross amount paid for that week” or “the
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`amount by which disposable earnings for a week exceed 45 times the Federal
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`Minimum Hourly Wage . . . .” § 12-803 (emphasis added). Venkus implies that the
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`statute’s repeated reference to wages paid on a weekly basis means the exemption
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`only applies to wages paid periodically. But the Court isn’t convinced it’s that clear.
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`Although the exemption identifies weekly wages, in practice, courts apply the
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`payment period relevant to a debtor’s wages, which might be paid biweekly or
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`monthly. See, e.g., Cooper v. City of Chi., 2018 WL 3970141, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20,
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`As the parties note, Matter of Burciaga recently addressed § 12-803. 944 F.3d 681 (7th
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`Cir. 2019). The issue was whether the IWDA applies to bankruptcy proceedings. Holding that
`it does, the Court also held that vacation pay (the assets at issue), as “a form of wages,” is
`subject to § 12-803. Id. at 685. Burciaga is inapplicable because parties agreed that § 12-803
`applies to all wages, so the Court had no occasion to consider periodicity.
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 16 of 21 PageID #:859
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`2018) (entering writ of execution to garnish monthly wages); Columbia Coll. Chi. v.
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`Cheesecake Factory, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 161058-U, ¶ 29 (comparing biweekly wage
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`to federal hourly minimum wage). The question remains: what wages does § 12-803
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`apply to? Only wages paid periodically, or also those paid once? That the statute
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`references weekly wages doesn’t provide a definitive answer. This conclusion is
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`supported by the fact that cases interpreting similarly worded wage exemption
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`provisions haven’t relied on those provisions’ references to “weekly” wages to
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`determine whether they apply to lump-sum payments, or even mentioned them as a
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`determining factor. See, e.g., United States v. Sayyed, 862 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2017)
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`(federal wage exemption provision excludes lump-sum payments based on definition
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`of “earnings”); Arrow S Credit Union v. Harrell, 248 N.E.2d 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)
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`(state wage exemption provision excludes lump-sum payments based on definition of
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`“gross wages”).
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`Venkus also relies on Arrow for textual support. In Arrow, the Illinois
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`Appellate Court interpreted a prior version of § 12-803, holding that it doesn’t apply
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`to lump-sum severance payments. But Arrow is inapplicable for two reasons. First, it
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`based its decision on language no longer in § 12-803. In 1969, the statute capped wage
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`deductions to the greater of “$45.00 per week” or “85% of gross wages, whichever is
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`greater, but in no event to exceed $200.00 per week.” It then defined “gross wages” as
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`“total compensation received for services rendered in a particular pay period prior to
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`any deductions whatsoever.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, Ch. 62, ¶ 73 (emphasis added).
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`Arrow anchored its analysis on the “particular pay period” language, but this phrase
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 17 of 21 PageID #:860
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`is noticeably absent from § 12-803. Arrow’s reasoning is also unpersuasive. It relied
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`on Kroger Co. v. Blumenthal, which held that severance isn’t “wages” with respect to
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`any pay period subsequent to termination and, consequently, a person may be entitled
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`to unemployment compensation under the Unemployment Compensation Act even if
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`they receive severance payments post-termination. 148 N.E.2d 734 (1958). Arrow
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`overread Blumenthal’s holding and—without explanation—concluded that severance
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`is “clearly not wages” received for any “particular pay period.” 248 N.E.2d at 313. To
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`the contrary, Blumenthal recognized that severance is earned for services rendered
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`during employment and, in the case of a lump-sum payment, for “one pay period.”
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`148 N.E.2d at 737. Arrow has never been cited as authoritative or persuasive and its
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`reasoning is unhelpful here.
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`Venkus hasn’t identified and the Court hasn’t located any other language in
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`the IWDA suggesting that § 12-803 has a general periodicity requirement. The IWDA
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`doesn’t define “gross amount,” and “disposable earnings” is defined broadly to include
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`“earnings of any individual remaining” after deductions required by law. § 12-803.
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`Venkus attempts to bolster its textual arguments using interpretations of the federal
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`Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA”), which restricts wage garnishment using
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`very similar language. 15 U.S.C. § 1673; [Dkt. 127 at 6–7.] Venkus is correct that the
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`Seventh Circuit has interpreted the CCPA to exclude lump-sum pension and
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`retirement payments from its wage garnishment provision, but it’s done so largely
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`based on the statute’s definition of “earnings,” which explicitly references periodic
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`payments. § 1672(a) (“earnings” are “compensation paid or payable for personal
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`Case: 1:16-cr-00631 Document #: 133 Filed: 02/18/25 Page 18 of 21 PageID #:861
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`services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
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`and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.”
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`(emphasis added)); see Sayyed, 862 F.3d at 619–20; United States v. Lee, 659 F.3d
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`619, 621 (7th Cir. 2011). That language doesn’t appear in § 12-803 and the Illinois
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`statute doesn’t define “earnings.” There’s also an open question as to whether the
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`CCP