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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`RICHARD DENT, STEVE FULLER
`WILLE GAULT, JIM MCMAHON, MIKE
`RICHARDSON, and OTIS WILSON,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`RENAISSANCE MARKETING
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`CORPORATION and JULIA MEYER,
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`Defendants.
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`No. 14 C 02999
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`Judge Edmond E. Chang
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Six members of the 1985 Chicago Bears football team, Richard Dent, Steve
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`Fuller, Willie Gault, Jim McMahon, Mike Richardson, and Otis Wilson (collectively
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`Plaintiffs or the Shufflin’ Crew), filed this suit against Renaissance Marketing
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`Corporation and Julia Meyer. R. 1-1, Compl. ¶ 1.1 On its face, the complaint alleges
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`several state-law claims, and the case was initially filed in state court. Id. Plaintiffs
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`allege that Defendants used Plaintiffs’ performance in the “Super Bowl Shuffle”
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`without authorization, and these ex-Bears players now bring claims for a
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`constructive trust, declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief, conversion,
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`unjust enrichment, and an accounting. Id. ¶¶ 35-66. Defendant Julia Meyer
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`1Citation to the docket is “R.” followed by the entry number.
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:260
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`removed the case to federal court, arguing that the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et
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`seq., preempts Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. R. 1, Defs.’ Notice of Removal ¶¶ 17, 51.
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`Plaintiffs now move to remand. R. 15, Pls.’ Mot. Remand. For the reasons detailed
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`below, the Plaintiffs’ motion is denied because three of the claims actually assert
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`rights under the federal Copyright Act, not merely state law. The case must remain
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`in federal court.
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`I. Background
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`The Shufflin’ Crew are six former members of the Super-Bowl-champion
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`Chicago Bears. Compl. ¶¶ 4-9.2 In 1985, Richard E. Meyer, who was at that time the
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`president of Red Label Records, Inc., approached Plaintiffs and other members of
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`the 1985 Chicago Bears hoping to capitalize on the Bears’ successful season. Id.
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`¶ 12. The parties agreed to develop and record the Super Bowl Shuffle, a song and
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`music video trumpeting the success of the 1985 Chicago Bears, and entered into a
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`Royalty Agreement in November 1985 to define each party’s rights in the work. Id.
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`¶¶ 12-14. The Agreement also set an expiration date: March 31, 1989. Id. ¶ 32. On
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`September 15, 1986, Red Label Records purportedly assigned its interest in the
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`Super Bowl Shuffle to its President, Richard Meyer. Id. ¶ 18. Julia Meyer, Richard
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`Meyer’s widow, claims she now has survivorship rights in the Super Bowl Shuffle
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`based on that assignment. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant Renaissance Marketing Corporation
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`is Julia Meyer’s exclusive licensing agent for the Super Bowl Shuffle. Id. ¶ 10.
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`2The 1985 Bears won the Super Bowl by thrashing the New England Patriots, 46-10,
`which at the time was the largest margin of victory of any Super Bowl. Still, that margin
`was not as wide as most of the Chicago Superfans’ comedic predictions of Bears matchups,
`including a puzzling but memorable 31 to minus-7 prediction.
`2
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:261
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`The Shufflin’ Crew argues that Red Label Records’s initial assignment to
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`Richard Meyer was inoperative. Id. ¶ 19. Under § 16 of the Royalty Agreement, Red
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`Label Records could not assign its interest without the Shufflin’ Crew’s consent. Id.
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`¶¶ 19-20. Red Label Records allegedly never sought nor received the Shufflin’
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`Crew’s permission, and the Shufflin’ Crew maintains that they had no reason to
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`believe that any assignment took place. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Because they believe that the
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`initial assignment to Richard Meyer was not valid, the Shufflin’ Crew argues that
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`Julia Meyer and Renaissance could never have acquired an interest in the
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`performance. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiffs claim, therefore, that Defendants improperly
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`benefitted from marketing, distributing, and licensing the Super Bowl Shuffle
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`without authorization. Id. ¶¶ 24, 33-34. They filed this suit in state court, bringing
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`claims for a constructive trust, declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief,
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`conversion, unjust enrichment, and an accounting. Id. ¶¶ 35-66. Defendants
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`removed Plaintiffs’ suit to federal court, claiming that the state-law claims were
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`preempted by the Copyright Act. See Defs.’ Notice of Removal. The Shufflin’ Crew
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`now moves to remand, arguing that that the removal was untimely and that the
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`claims were not preempted by the Copyright Act. See Pls.’ Mot. Remand.
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`II. Legal Standard
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`Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides, in pertinent part,
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`that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
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`United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
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`defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district . . . embracing
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`3
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:262
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`the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Only state-court
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`actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to
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`federal court.” Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “The party seeking
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`removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and federal courts
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`should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the
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`plaintiff’s choice of forum in state court.” Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., 577 F.3d
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`752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir.
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`1993)); see also Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power
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`Ass’n, Inc., 707 F.3d 883, 893 (7th Cir. 2013).
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`In general, federal district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions
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`arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
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`1331. The usual test for federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 is the “well
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`pleaded complaint rule,” which requires federal courts to look only at the complaint
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`itself “to determine if the case arises under federal law.” Vorhees v. Naper Aero
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`Club, Inc., 272 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, “[c]omplete preemption
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`‘confers exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain instances where Congress intended
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`the scope of a federal law to be so broad as to entirely replace any state-law claim.’”
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`Nelson v. Welch (In re Repository Techs.), 601 F.3d 710, 722 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
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`Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & Welfare Trust
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`Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Under this jurisdictional doctrine, certain
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`federal statutes have such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that they ‘convert [ ]
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`an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim.’” Id.
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`4
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:263
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`(citing Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, 538 F.3d at 596; Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
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`542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004)). “Complete preemption, therefore, creates an exception to
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`the rule that courts look only to the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint to determine
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`whether federal jurisdiction exists. If the complaint pleads a state-law claim that is
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`completely preempted by federal law, the claim is removable to federal court.” Id.
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`(citing Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, 538 F.3d at 596-97).
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`The federal Copyright Act preempts “all legal and equitable rights that are
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`equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
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`specified by section 106” and are “in a tangible medium of expression and come
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`within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103.” 17
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`U.S.C. § 301(a). “Even though [a] claim is created by state law, a case may ‘arise
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`under’ a law of the United States if the complaint discloses a need for determining
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`the meaning or application of . . . [the federal] law.” See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,
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`339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964); Int’l Armor & Limousine Co. v. Moloney
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`Coachbuilders, Inc., 272 F.3d 912, 915-16 (7th Cir. 2001) (adopting the reasoning of
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`T.B. Harms). But not every claim that involves a copyright will be preempted by the
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`Copyright Act. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825-27; Nova Design Build, Inc. v.
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`Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2011). Preemption applies when
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`“establishing the plaintiff’s right [under the state-law cause of action] will require
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`interpreting federal law.” Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816
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`F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987).
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`5
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:264
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`Two conditions must be satisfied for copyright preemption of a state-law
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`cause of action under § 301. “First, the work in which the right is asserted must be
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`fixed in tangible form and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified
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`in § 102. Second, the right asserted must be equivalent to any of the rights specified
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`in § 106.” Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
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`663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986). Section 106 of the Copyright Act specifies five exclusive
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`and
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`fundamental rights
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`in a copyrighted work: reproduction, adaptation,
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`publication, performance, and display. 17 U.S.C. § 106; Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,
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`406 F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2005). To avoid preemption, a state-law claim must
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`claim a right that is “qualitatively distinguishable” from these five rights. Toney,
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`406 F.3d at 910. In determining if a claim is qualitatively distinguishable, courts
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`will look to the right that the plaintiff seeks to protect and the reasons he believes
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`those rights should be protected. Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373
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`F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004). If even one claim is preempted, then removal is proper.
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`See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Vaughn v. Kelly, No. 06 C 6427, 2007 WL 804694, at *3, (N.D.
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`Ill. Mar. 13, 2007).
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`III. Analysis
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`A. Preemption
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`Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Super Bowl Shuffle is fixed in tangible form
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`and comes within the subject matter of copyright. R. 16, Pls.’ Br. at 8-14; see also 17
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`U.S.C. § 102(a). But they argue that the right to be enforced in each count of the
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`complaint is not equivalent to any of the rights specified in § 106, and that their
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`6
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:265
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`claims are therefore not preempted by the Copyright Act. Pls.’ Br. at 8-14. Although
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`only a single claim must be preempted for removal to be proper (because then there
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`would be federal-question jurisdiction over that claim, and possibly supplemental
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`jurisdiction over the other genuinely state-law claims), Vaughn, 2007 WL 804694 at
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`*3, the Court will address each count in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
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`1. Claims for Declaratory Judgment and Related Injunctive Relief
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`In Counts 2 and 3 of their complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment
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`that the assignment to Richard Meyer was invalid and that the Plaintiffs “own their
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`identities, images, names, photographs, likenesses, voices and performances in the
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`Super Bowl Shuffle.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 48. In both counts, Plaintiffs also seek an injunction
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`barring Defendants from using or benefitting from the Shufflin’ Crew’s “identities,
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`images, names, photographs, likenesses, voices and performances in the Super Bowl
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`Shuffle and/or otherwise.” Id. ¶¶ 44, 49. Defendants argue that these claims are
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`preempted because the declaratory and injunctive relief sought would “control the
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`sale, licensing, distribution, reproduction, publishing, performance and display of
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`the Shuffle.” Defs.’ Notice of Removal ¶ 47. Rights equivalent, they argue, to the
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`rights described in § 106. Id. Plaintiffs respond that their request for declaratory
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`and injunctive relief is premised on the contract between the Shufflin’ Crew and
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`Red Label Records. Pls.’ Br. at 12-13. They argue that the Shufflin’ Crew is
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`attempting to enforce rights granted to them against Defendants by the Royalty
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`Agreement, not a “claim against the world” established by the Copyright Act. Id.
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`(quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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`7
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:266
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`That view of the asserted rights is incorrect. The relief that the Shufflin’
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`Crew seeks in these counts makes clear that Plaintiffs are not seeking to enforce
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`just the Royalty Agreement. Unlike rights derived from copyright law, contracts
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`“generally affect only their parties.” ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454. Defendants were not
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`parties to the agreement, and Plaintiffs’ own complaint alleges that Richard Meyer,
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`the source of Defendants’ supposed rights in the Super Bowl Shuffle, was not a valid
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`assignee to the contract. See Compl. ¶¶ 19-20. So based on Plaintiffs’ own
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`allegations in the complaint, Defendants are effectively strangers to the contract. In
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`Counts 2 and 3, Plaintiffs ask the Court to prevent these non-parties from
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`marketing, distributing, or licensing the Super Bowl Shuffle at all. That is, they are
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`asking the Court to protect their rights in the underlying work against these non-
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`contractual-party Defendants based, really, on rights “against the world.” See
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`ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454. Look at this way: if Plaintiffs win an invalidation of the
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`assignment, then what would justify their request that Defendants be barred from
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`using the Shufflin’ Crew’s “identities, images, names, photographs, likenesses,
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`voices and performances in the Super Bowl Shuffle and/or otherwise”? Id. ¶¶ 44, 49.
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`The answer: the source of the relief would not be the contract; it would be the
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`federal Copyright Act. Rights of this nature are not qualitatively distinguishable
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`from the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under § 106, so the Court
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`cannot grant this form of relief without relying on federal copyright law.
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`Even if Defendants were valid assignees, the Royalty Agreement expired in
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`March of 1989. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs themselves claim that the rights of the
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`8
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 9 of 16 PageID #:267
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`parties under the contract terminated at that time. Id. ¶ 33. Although neither party
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`had any rights under contract after 1989 (at least according to the complaint itself),
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`Plaintiffs still seek declaratory and injunctive relief concerning their “identities,
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`images, names, photographs, likenesses, voices, and performances in the Super
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`Bowl Shuffle” after 1989 and going forward. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44, 48-49. This relief is
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`not based on the contract, let alone the allegedly expired contract. Again, Plaintiffs
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`ask the Court to prevent Defendants from marketing, distributing, and licensing
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`the Super Bowl Shuffle outside the bounds of the Royalty Agreement. Plaintiffs are
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`essentially asking to enforce the copyright, and that relief cannot be granted
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`without determining the meaning or application of copyright law.
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`Plaintiffs argue the relief that they seek “mirrors that in Toney v. L’Oreal,” in
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`which the plaintiff brought a state-law publicity claim against the defendants for
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`using plaintiff’s likeness in an advertisement. 406 F.3d at 907. In Toney, the
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`plaintiff’s publicity claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act because the
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`state-law publicity claim protected the plaintiff’s identity, not any particular
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`embodiment of that identity. Id. at 908-09. The state-law claim challenged the use
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`of the plaintiff’s identity for a commercial purpose. That the particular embodiment
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`of her identity in question was subject to a copyright owned by the defendants was
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`irrelevant to the plaintiff’s claim. Id. The plaintiff was not challenging the
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`defendant’s right to use the photograph, but its right to use her identity for
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`commercial purposes. Id.
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`9
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:268
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`By contrast, the Shufflin’ Crew is not asking for protection of solely their
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`identities in general; they seek a declaration that they own their “identities, images,
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`names, photographs, likenesses, voices and performances in the Super Bowl
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`Shuffle,” and ask the Court to “extinguish[ ] any rights Defendants purport to have
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`in the Super Bowl Shuffle.” Compl. ¶¶ 43, 47-48 (emphasis added). The crucial point
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`is that they seek to prevent use of their identities in the song itself—a particular
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`copyrighted embodiment. Cf. Toney, 406 F.3d at 908-09; see also Laws v. Sony Music
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`Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e think it is clear that federal
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`copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappropriation of one’s voice when the
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`entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is contained within a
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`copyrighted medium.”); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
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`Here, extinguishing Defendants’ rights in the Super Bowl Shuffle implicates the
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`Copyright Act’s exclusive rights of reproduction, publication, and performance. 17
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`U.S.C. § 106; see also Toney, 706 F.3d 907-08; Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 307. No court
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`can grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek without relying on federal copyright law.
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`Counts 2 and 3 of Plaintiffs’ complaint are therefore preempted by the Copyright
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`Act.
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`2. Claim for Conversion
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`Plaintiffs also bring a claim for conversion (Count 4). To state a claim for
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`conversion under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show (1) he has a right to the
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`property in question; (2) he has an absolute and unconditional right to the
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`immediate possession of the property; (3) he made a demand for possession of that
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`10
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:269
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`property; and (4) the defendant wrongfully assumed ownership or control over that
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`property. Loman v. Freeman, 890 N.E.2d 446, 461 (Ill. 2008). In Count 4, Plaintiffs
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`claim that they have “an absolute, unconditional and immediate right to their
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`identities, images, names, photographs, likenesses, voices and performances in the
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`Super Bowl Shuffle and/or otherwise.” Compl. ¶ 52. They claim that Defendants
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`“misappropriated” this property when they “marketed, distributed and sold licenses
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`related to the Super Bowl Shuffle.” Compl. ¶ 51.
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`Like the counts seeking declaratory judgment, the conversion count seeks to
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`protect an interest in the song itself, rather than the Shufflin’ Crew’s persona in
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`general. Plaintiffs claim a property interest in their identities, but these allegations
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`do not go beyond the unauthorized publication of the Super Bowl Shuffle. Plaintiffs
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`claim that Defendants did not have rights in the Super Bowl Shuffle, and by
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`marketing, licensing, and distributing the song, Defendants gained improper
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`benefits. Compl. ¶ 51(d), (f)-(h). The crux of the conversion claim is the
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`unauthorized use of the song; Plaintiffs’ claim is thus “focused on the defendants’
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`unauthorized publishing . . . of the protected work.” Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648
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`F.3d 489, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2011). This is not qualitatively distinguishable from the
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`exclusive rights set forth in § 106 and necessarily implicates copyright ownership in
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`the Super Bowl Shuffle.
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`The extent of the relief requested also demonstrates that Plaintiffs are not
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`relying on a contractual obligation. Just like Counts 2 and 3, Plaintiffs seek relief in
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`Count 4 for Defendants’ unlawful use of the Shufflin’ Crew’s performance “after
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`11
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:270
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`September 15, 1986 and through the present.” Compl. ¶ 51(d) (emphasis added). The
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`Royalty Agreement expired on March 31, 1989, and the parties’ rights under the
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`contract (if any) terminated at that time. Id. ¶ 32. This illustrates that Plaintiffs are
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`not seeking adjudication of their rights under just the Royalty Agreement, but are
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`instead seeking adjudication of their rights to performance, display, and publication
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`of the copyrighted work. The Court could not grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek
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`without relying on federal copyright law, and Count 4 of Plaintiffs’ complaint is
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`therefore preempted by the Copyright Act.
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`3. Remaining Claims
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`Plaintiffs also bring claims for a constructive trust (Count 1), unjust
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`enrichment (Count 5), and an accounting (Count 6). In Count 5, Plaintiffs allege
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`that any benefit that Defendants derived from the Shufflin’ Crew’s “identities,
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`images, names, photographs, likenesses, voices and performances in the Super Bowl
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`Shuffle, or otherwise” were improperly acquired. Compl. ¶ 55. In Count 6, Plaintiffs
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`seek an accounting of any improper financial benefit that Defendants derived as a
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`result of “the Shufflin’ Crew members’ identities, images, names, photographs,
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`likenesses, voices and performances in the Super Bowl Shuffle and/or otherwise,” id.
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`¶ 66, and in Count 1, they ask that these benefits be placed in a constructive trust,
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`id. ¶¶ 35-39. Defendants argue that any claims for ill-gotten gains are derived to
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`the rights to reproduce, publish, perform, and display the Super Bowl Shuffle under
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`§ 106 and are therefore preempted. See Defs.’ Notice of Removal at ¶¶ 35-44.
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`12
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:271
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`In contrast, Plaintiffs’ claims for a constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and
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`an accounting do not necessarily “require interpreting federal law.” Saturday
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`Evening Post, 816 F.2d at 1194; see also Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795,
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`800 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a state-law claim is “‘completely preempted’ only
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`when it is ‘inextricably intertwined’” with the federal statute). Resolving doubts
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`about removal in favor of Plaintiffs, Northeastern Rural Elec., 707 F.3d at 893, it is
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`possible for Plaintiffs’ claims to plead a non-copyright basis for Counts 1, 5, and 6.
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`For example, Plaintiffs may sue Defendants for unjust enrichment by alleging that
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`Defendants held themselves out as if they had an affiliation with or authorization
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`from the Shufflin’ Crew, even though any affiliation ended no later than 1989 when
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`the Royalty Agreement expired. If Defendants were unjustly enriched by
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`misrepresenting their relationship with the Shufflin’ Crew, that could support
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`requiring an accounting by Defendants, and any ill-gotten proceeds could be ordered
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`to be put in a constructive trust. Claims of this nature would not turn on any
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`interpretation of the validity or ownership of the underlying copyrights; they would
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`concern only the relationship between the parties. Counts 1, 5, and 6 of Plaintiffs’
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`complaint are therefore not preempted by the Copyright Act.
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`Nevertheless, the Court may still exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
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`these state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A federal court can exercise supplemental
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`jurisdiction over state-law claims when the claims “derive from a common nucleus
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`of operative facts.” Sanchez & Daniels v. Koresko, 503 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2007)
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`(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A loose factual connection
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`13
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:272
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`between the claims is generally sufficient.” Id. The facts underlying all counts of the
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`Plaintiffs’ complaint are essentially the same; the claims all stem from Defendants’
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`allegedly unauthorized marketing, distribution, and licensing of the Super Bowl
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`Shuffle. See Compl. ¶¶ 36, 42, 47, 51, 55, 60. The Court therefore retains
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`jurisdiction over Counts 1, 5, and 6.
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`B. Timeliness of Removal
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`Plaintiffs argue that the Notice of Removal filed by Julia Meyer was
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`untimely. Pls.’ Br. at 13-14. A defendant must file a notice of removal “within 30
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`days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
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`the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
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`proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). A later-served defendant has “30 days
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`after receipt by or service on that defendant of the initial pleading or summons” to
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`file a notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B); see also H.R. Rep. No. 112-10 at
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`14 (2011), reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576 (noting that the addition of
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`§ 1446(b)(2)(B) was to clarify “that each defendant will have 30 days from his or her
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`own date of service (or receipt of initial pleading) to seek removal”). Defendant
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`Renaissance Marketing was served with the complaint on February 6, 2014, and
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`Defendant Julia Meyer was served on April 21, 2014. Pls.’ Br. at 14.
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`Although Meyer filed for removal on April 25, 2014, well within the 30-day
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`time limit established by § 1446, Plaintiffs argue that removal was untimely
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`because Meyer, as the sole officer of Renaissance Marketing, was likely made aware
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`of the pending lawsuit when Renaissance Marketing was served back in February
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:273
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`2014. Id. at 13-14. Plaintiffs contend that formal service is not required to start the
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`removal clock; Meyer only needed to receive, “through service or otherwise,” a copy
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`of the complaint. Id. (quoting Cook v. Travelers Companies, 904 F. Supp. 841, 842
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`(N.D. Ill. 1995)). “Mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service,”
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`however, is not sufficient to start the 30-day removal clock. Murphy Bros., Inc. v.
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`Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (“An individual or entity
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`named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the
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`action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.”). Meyer might
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`have received notice of the complaint or even taken action in the litigation on behalf
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`of Renaissance Marketing, but mere receipt of the complaint without formal service
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`is not enough to trigger the removal period. See Dultra v. U.S. Medical Home, Inc.,
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`No. 13 C 07598, 2014 WL 1347107, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2014) (quoting Murphy
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`Bros., 526 U.S. at 348). Meyer filed her notice of removal within 30 days after
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`receiving service, and her removal petition is therefore timely.
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`Case: 1:14-cv-02999 Document #: 36 Filed: 10/28/14 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:274
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`IV. Conclusion
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`For the reasons discussed above, Counts 2, 3, and 6 are preempted by the
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`Copyright Act. This Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over these
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`claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338. Jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
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`claims is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as the claims derive from a common
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`nucleus of operative facts. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is denied.
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`ENTERED:
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`s/Edmond E. Chang
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`Honorable Edmond E. Chang
`United States District Judge
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`DATE: October 28, 2014
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