Case 1:21-cv-21088-BB Document 182 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/22/2021 Page 1 of 16
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`
`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`ANIMACCORD LTD.,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`THE INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS
`AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
`IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A,
`
`Defendants.
`
`_______________________________________/
`
`
`ORDER ON MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT
`
`THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Animaccord, Ltd.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
`
`for Entry of Final Default Judgment, ECF No. [177] (the “Motion”), filed on July 21, 2021. A
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`Clerk’s Default, ECF No. [170], was entered against Defendants1 on July 6, 20212, as Defendants
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`failed to appear, answer, or otherwise plead to the Complaint, ECF No. [1], despite having been
`
`served. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the record in this case, the applicable law,
`
`and is otherwise fully advised. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`Plaintiff sued Defendants for trademark counterfeiting and infringement under § 32 of the
`
`Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; false designation of origin pursuant to § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
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`
`1 Defendants are the Individuals, Partnerships, or Unincorporated Associations identified on Schedule “A”
`of Plaintiff’s Motion, and Schedule “A” of this Order.
`
` 2
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` The Clerk did not enter default as to Defendant Sarah Bahamid d/b/a pinkbow89. See ECF No. [171].
`That defendant has since been dismissed. See ECF No. [176].
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`

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`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
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`15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3),
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`(4) & 501, and common law unfair competition; and common law trademark infringement.
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`The Complaint alleges that Defendants are advertising, promoting, distributing, and
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`performing Plaintiff’s copyrighted works using counterfeits and confusingly similar imitations of
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`Plaintiff’s registered trademarks within the Southern District of Florida by operating the
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`Defendants’ Internet based e-commerce stores operating under each of the Seller IDs identified on
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`Schedule “A” attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment (the “Seller IDs”).
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`See ECF No. [177-1].
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`Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants’ unlawful activities have caused, and will continue
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`to cause, irreparable injury to Plaintiff because Defendants have 1) deprived Plaintiff of its right
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`to determine the manner in which its trademarks are presented to consumers; (2) defrauded
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`consumers into thinking Defendants’ illicit copies of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works are authorized
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`by Plaintiff; (3) deceived the public as to Plaintiff’s sponsorship of and/or association with
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`Defendants’ counterfeit products and the websites on online storefronts through which such
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`products are sold, offered for sale, marketed, advertised, and distributed; (4) wrongfully traded and
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`capitalized on Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill and the commercial value of the Plaintiff’s
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`trademarks; and (5) wrongfully damaged Plaintiff’s ability to market its branded products and
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`copyrighted works and products and educate consumers about its brand via the Internet in a free
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`and fair marketplace.
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`In its Motion, Plaintiff seeks the entry of default final judgment against Defendants in an
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`action alleging trademark counterfeiting and infringement, false designation of origin, common-
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`law unfair competition, common law trademark infringement, and infringement of copyright.
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`Plaintiff further requests that the Court (1) enjoin Defendants unlawful use of Plaintiff’s
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`2
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`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
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`trademarks and copyrighted works; (2) award Plaintiff damages; and (3) instruct any third party
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`financial institutions in possession of any funds restrained or held on behalf of Defendants to
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`transfer these funds to the Plaintiff in partial satisfaction of the award of damages.
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`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the Court is authorized to enter a
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`final judgment of default against a party who has failed to plead in response to a complaint. “[A]
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`defendant’s default does not in itself warrant the court entering a default judgment.” DirecTV, Inc.
`
`v. Huynh, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v.
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`Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). Granting a motion for default judgment
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`is within the trial court’s discretion. See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. Because the defendant is
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`not held to admit facts that are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law, the court must first
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`determine whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleading for the judgment to be entered. See
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`id.; see also Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[L]iability is well-pled
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`in the complaint, and is therefore established by the entry of default . . . .”). Upon a review of
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`Plaintiff’s submissions, it appears there is a sufficient basis in the pleading for default judgment to
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`be entered in favor of Plaintiff.
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`II.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
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`Plaintiff Animaccord Ltd. is the registered owner of the following trademarks registered
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`on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (collectively, the
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`“Masha and the Bear Marks”):
`
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`3 The factual background is taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No.[1], Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of
`Final Default Judgment and supporting evidentiary submissions.
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`3
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`

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`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
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`Trademark
`
`Registration
`Number
`
`Registration
`Date
`
`First Use
`Date
`
`Classes / Goods
`
`IC 009: Pre-recorded
`DVDs, namely, motion
`picture films featuring
`children's
`entertainment;
`
`IC 016: Paper products,
`namely, children's
`storybooks, notebooks,
`coloring books,
`greetings cards,
`stationery, stickers and
`pens;
`
`IC 018: Backpacks;
`
`IC 025: Apparel, namely,
`T-shirts and shoes;
`
`IC 028: Toys, namely,
`dolls, stuffed toys,
`board games and card
`games; and
`
`IC 030: Candy.
`
`IC 009: Pre-recorded
`DVDs, namely, motion
`picture films featuring
`children's
`entertainment; and
`
`IC 041: Entertainment
`services, namely,
`production of motion
`picture films and
`motion picture film
`distribution services
`rendered through the
`media of cable
`television, broadcast
`
`4,790,909
`
`08/11/2015
`
`4/15/2015
`
`
`
`MASHA AND THE
`BEAR
`
`4,790,906
`
`08/11/2015
`
`08/04/201
`2
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`4
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`

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`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
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`Trademark
`
`Registration
`Number
`
`Registration
`Date
`
`First Use
`Date
`
`Classes / Goods
`
`MASHA AND THE
`BEAR
`
`5,420,550
`
`03/13/2018
`
`06/16/201
`6
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`television, and the
`Internet.
`
`
`See n. 3 below4
`
`
`4 IC 003: Non-medicated soaps; almond soaps; antiperspirant soap; balms other than for medical or
`pharmaceutical purposes, namely, lip balms, body balms; bath salts, not for medical purposes; breath
`freshening sprays; breath freshening strips; cakes of toilet soap; cleaning preparations; cosmetic creams;
`cosmetic kits comprised on non-medicated cosmetics; cosmetics; cosmetic cotton wool; deodorant soap;
`deodorants for human beings or for animals; disinfectant soap; dry shampoos; dry cleaning preparations;
`hair lotions; hair sprays; laundry preparations, namely, laundry detergents, laundry softener, laundry bleach;
`lip glosses; lipstick; lipstick cases; lotions for cosmetic purposes; make-up; medicated soaps; mouth
`washes, not for medical purposes; mouthwashes; nail varnish; nail polish; nail art stickers; perfumes;
`shampoos; toilet water; toiletries, namely, non-medicated toiletry preparations; eau de cologne; perfumery;
`scented body splash water;
`
`IC 012: Vehicles, namely, bicycles, tricycles, sleighs, kick sledges, baby carriages, prams,
`pushchairs, strollers; bicycles; tricycles; sleighs for transport purposes; kick sledges; baby carriages; prams;
`pushchairs; strollers; scooters, namely, motor scooters;
`
`IC 014: Precious metals; jewelry; jewelry cases; imitation jewelry; clocks; wall clocks; electronic
`clocks; alarm clocks; clocks and watches; stands for clocks; horological instruments; chronometric
`instruments; precious stones; key rings of precious metal; watches;
`
`IC 015: Accordions; cases for musical instruments; castanets; drums; drumsticks; electric musical
`instruments; flutes; guitars; harmonicas; horns; music synthesizers; music stands; musical boxes; pianos;
`saxophones; stands for musical instruments; tambourines; triangles; trombones; trumpets; violins;
`xylophones; musical instruments; basses;
`
`IC 020: Furniture; furniture shelves; furniture of metal; figurines of wood, wax, plaster or plastic;
`fans for personal use, non-electric; air pillows, not for medical purposes; air mattresses, not for medical
`purposes; armchairs; baby changing mats; baskets, not of metal, namely, baker's bread baskets, Moses
`baskets; bead curtains for decoration; bed bases; bedding, except linen, namely, bed frames, bumper guards
`for cribs; beds; benches; bolsters; book rests; bottle caps, not of metal; cases of wood or plastic; bins of
`wood or plastic; boxes of wood or plastic; chests of drawers; chests for toys; clothes hooks, not of metal;
`coat hangers; clothes hangers; coat stands; containers, not of metal for storage and transport; costume
`stands; cupboards; curtain rings; curtain rails; curtain rollers; curtain pins; curtain rods; curtain hooks;
`curtain fittings; cushions; deck chairs; decorations of plastic for foodstuffs; desks; divans; door handles, not
`of metal; door bells, not of metal, non-electric; door knockers, not of metal; doors for furniture; dressing
`tables; easy chairs; embroidery frames; toilet mirrors being hand-held mirrors; head-rests; high chairs for
`babies; house numbers, not of metal, non-luminous; hydrostatic beds, not for medical purposes;
`identification bracelets, not of metal; indoor window blinds; infant walkers; inflatable furniture; inflatable
`publicity objects; keyboards for hanging keys; ladders of wood or plastics; letter boxes not of metal or
`masonry; lockers; mats for infant playpens; mattresses; medicine cabinets; mirrors; decorative mobiles;
`office furniture; packaging containers of plastic; paper blinds; picture frames; pillows; placards of wood or
`plastics; plastic key cards, not encoded and not magnetic; playpens for babies; school furniture; chairs;
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-21088-BB Document 182 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/22/2021 Page 6 of 16
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`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
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`Trademark
`
`Registration
`Number
`
`Registration
`Date
`
`First Use
`Date
`
`Classes / Goods
`
`MASHA AND THE
`BEAR
`
`4,800,025
`
`08/25/2015
`
`04/15/201
`5
`
`IC 016: Paper products,
`namely, children's
`storybooks, notebooks,
`coloring books,
`greetings cards,
`stationery, stickers and
`pens;
`
`IC 018: Backpacks;
`
`IC 025: Apparel, namely,
`T-shirts and shoes;
`
`IC 028: Toys, namely
`dolls, stuffed toys,
`board games and card
`games;
`
`IC 030: Candy.
`
`
`
`
`shelves for storage; writing desks; sleeping bags for camping; sofas; stuffed animals; tables; tables of metal;
`tea trolleys; interior textile window blinds; tool and tool accessory trays, not of metal; umbrella stands;
`wall-mounted diaper changing platforms; table tops; slatted indoor blinds;
`
`IC 021: Aerosol dispensers, not for medical purposes; baby bathtubs, portable; baskets for domestic
`use; bottles, sold empty; bowls; brushes, namely, toothbrushes, hair brushes; buckets; buckets made of
`woven fabrics; non-electric candelabra; candy boxes; ceramics for household purposes, namely, ceramic
`figurines, ceramic vases, ceramic vessels, bowls, plates and pots; coffeepots, non-electric; combs; electric
`combs; comb cases; confectioners' decorating bags; containers for household or kitchen use; cookery
`molds; cookie jars; cooking pots; cosmetic utensils, namely, cosmetic brushes; cups; cups of paper or
`plastic; dishes; disposable table plates; drinking bottles for sports; drinking glasses; dustbins; egg cups;
`floss for dental purposes; cups for eating fruits; frying pans; glass jars; glass bowls; gloves for household
`purposes; hot pots; ice buckets; ice cube molds; kitchen containers; lunch boxes; mugs; napkin holders;
`painted beverage glassware; paper plates; perfume vaporizers sold empty; perfume sprayers; porcelain
`ware, namely, mugs, statuettes; pots; pottery, namely, mugs, statuettes; salad bowls; soap holders; dishes
`for soap; soap boxes; soup bowls; straws for drinking; sugar bowls; tableware, other than knives, forks and
`spoons, namely, scoops for serving or portioning; tea services in the nature of tableware; teapots;
`toothbrushes, electric; toothbrushes; toothpicks; trays for domestic purposes; trays for domestic purposes,
`of paper; vases; vegetable dishes; and
`
`IC 024: Textile material; bed covers; plastic table covers; bed linen; tablecloths, not of paper;
`handkerchiefs of textiles; travelling rugs; towels of textile; bed blankets; shower curtains of textile or
`plastic; curtains of textile or plastic; net curtains; table runners, not of paper; oilcloth for use as tablecloths.
`
`6
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`

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`Case No. 21-cv-21088-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes
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`See Composite Exhibit 1 to Complaint, ECF No. [1-1] containing Certificates of Registrations for
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`the Masha and the Bear Marks at issue. The Masha and The Bear Marks are used in connection
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`with the design, marketing, and distribution of high-quality goods in at least the categories
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`identified above. See Declaration of Iuliia Belkova, ECF No. [5-1] at 4. Plaintiff has exclusive
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`rights in and to the Masha and the Bear Marks. Id.
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`Plaintiff is also the owner of the following copyrights registered in the United States of
`
`America:
`
`Registration Number
`VA 1-835-810
`PA 1-813-099
`PA 1-813-100
`PA 1-813-101
`PA 1-813-102
`PA 1-813-103
`TX 8-552-180
`TX 8-588-442
`TX 8-431-770
`TX 8-537-380
`TX 8-444-776
`
`Registration Date
`Aug. 21, 2012
`July 12, 2012
`July 12, 2012
`July 12, 2012
`July 12, 2012
`July 12, 2012
`Dec. 27, 2017
`Aug. 14, 2017
`June 23, 2017
`Dec. 27, 2017
`Aug. 7, 2017
`
`Title of Work
`Masha and the Bear Logo
`First day of school
`Laundry day
`Holiday on ice
`One, two, three! Light the Christmas tree!
`Recipe for disaster
`Masha and the Bear: A Magical Holiday
`Masha and the Bear: A Spooky Bedtime
`Masha and the Bear: Kidding Around!
`Masha and the Bear: The Best Birthday
`Masha and the Bear: The Girl Who Called Wolf
`
`
`
`Id at 5. Moreover, Plaintiff is the owner of many unregistered copyrights, including but not limited
`
`to those specifically identified in paragraph 35 of the Complaint and in Exhibit 3 thereto, ECF No.
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`[1-3]. See Declaration of Iuliia Belkova, ECF No. [5-1] at 5. Collectively, these registered and
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`unregistered copyrighted works are referred to herein as the “Copyrighted Works.” Plaintiff has
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`exclusive rights in and to the Copyrighted Works. Id.
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`Defendants, through the various Internet based e-commerce stores operating under each of
`
`the Seller IDs identified on Schedule “A” hereto (the “Seller IDs”) have advertised, promoted,
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`offered for distribution, distributed and/or publicly performed the Copyrighted Works under what
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`Plaintiff has determined to be counterfeits, infringements, reproductions, and/or colorable
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`7
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`imitations of the Masha and the Bear Marks and Copyrighted Works. See Declaration of Iuliia
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`Belkova, ECF No. [5-1] at 15-18; see also Declaration of Richard Guerra, ECF No. [5-2] at 4.
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`Although each Defendant may not copy and infringe each of Plaintiff’s trademarks for each
`
`category of services protected, Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence showing each Defendant
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`has infringed, at least, one or more of the Masha and the Bear Marks and the Copyrighted Works
`
`at issue. See Declaration of Iuliia Belkova, ECF No. [5-1] at 15-18, and Schedule “E” to
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`Declaration of Richard Guerra.5 Defendants are not now, nor have they ever been, authorized or
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`licensed to use, reproduce, or make counterfeits, reproductions, or colorable imitations of the of
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`the Masha and the Bear Marks and/or reproduce or distribute the Copyrighted Works. See
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`Declaration of Iuliia Belkova, ECF No. [5-1] at 15-18.
`
`As part of its ongoing investigation regarding the sale of counterfeit and infringing
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`products, Plaintiff hired a third party investigator to access Defendants’ Internet based e-commerce
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`stores operating under each of the Seller IDs. The third party investigator initiated orders from
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`each of the Seller IDs for the purchase of various products, all bearing, or suspected of bearing,
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`counterfeits of, at least one of the Masha and The Bear Marks or Copyrighted Works, and requested
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`each product to be shipped to an address in the Southern District of Florida. Accordingly,
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`Defendants’ Goods are being promoted, advertised, offered for sale, and sold by Defendants within
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`this district and throughout the United States. See Declaration of Richard Guerra, ECF No. [5-2]
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`at 5. A representative for Plaintiff personally analyzed the Masha and The Bear branded items
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`wherein orders were initiated via each of the Seller IDs by reviewing the e-commerce stores
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`operating under each of the Seller IDs, or the detailed web page captures and images of the items
`
`
`5 Evidence of each Defendant’s infringement was attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Richard Guerra
`in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment. Due to the size restriction for filing
`with the CM/ECF, the exhibit to the declaration was filed separately, in parts, in order to meet the maximum
`allowable size constraints on July 20, 2021.
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`8
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`bearing the Masha and The Bear Marks and Copyrighted Works, and concluded the products were
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`non-genuine, unauthorized Masha and The Bear products. See Declaration of Iuliia Belkova, ECF
`
`No. [5-1] at 18.
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`III. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claims
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`1.
`
`Trademark Counterfeiting and Infringement Pursuant to § 32 of the
`Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1114) (Count I)
`
`Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides liability for trademark
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`infringement if, without the consent of the registrant, a defendant uses “in commerce any
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`reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark: which is likely to cause
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`confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114. In order to prevail on its
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`trademark infringement claim under Section 32 of the Lanham Act, Plaintiff must demonstrate that
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`(1) it had prior rights to the mark at issue; and (2) Defendants adopted a mark or name that was
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`the same, or confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s trademark, such that consumers were likely to
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`confuse the two. Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir.
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`2001) (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 360
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`(11th Cir. 1997)).
`
`2.
`
`False Designation of Origin Pursuant to § 43(A) of the Lanham Act
`(15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) (Count II)
`
`
`
`To prevail on a claim for false designation of origin under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
`
`Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), Plaintiff must prove that Defendants used in commerce, in
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`connection with any goods or services, any word, term, name, symbol or device, or any
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`combination thereof, or any false designation of origin that is likely to deceive as to the
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`affiliation, connection, or association of Defendants with Plaintiff, or as to the origin,
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`9
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`sponsorship, or approval, of Defendants’ services by Plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
`
`The test for liability for false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) is the same as
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`for a trademark counterfeiting and infringement claim – i.e., whether the public is likely to be
`
`deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks at issue. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
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`Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992).
`
`3.
`
`Common Law Unfair Competition and Trademark Infringement
`(Counts III and IV)
`
`Whether a defendant’s use of a Plaintiff’s trademarks created a likelihood of confusion
`
`between the Plaintiff’s and the defendant’s services or goods is also the determining factor in the
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`analysis of unfair competition under Florida common law. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Forrester,
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`1986 WL 15668, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 1987) (“The appropriate test for determining whether
`
`there is a likelihood of confusion, and thus trademark infringement, false designation of origin,
`
`and unfair competition under the common law of Florida, is set forth in John H. Harland, Inc. v.
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`Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 972 (11th Cir. 1983.)”.); see also Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n,
`
`Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975) (“As a general
`
`rule . . . the same facts which would support an action for trademark infringement would also
`
`support an action for unfair competition.”).
`
`The analysis of liability for Florida common law trademark infringement is the same as the
`
`analysis of liability for trademark infringement under § 32(a) of the Lanham Act. See PetMed
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`Express, Inc. v. MedPets.com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217-18 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
`
`4.
`
`Infringement of Copyright (Count V)
`
`To prevail on a claim of direct infringement of copyright pursuant to the Copyright Act, 17
`
`U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3) and (4), Plaintiff must “satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie
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`case of direct copyright infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the allegedly infringed
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`10
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`material, and (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violated at least one exclusive
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`right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
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`F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Disney Enters. v. Hotfile Corp., Case No. 11-20427-
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`CIV-Williams, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172339, at *94 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
`
`B. Liability
`
`The well-pleaded factual allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint properly allege the elements
`
`for each of the claims described above. See ECF No. [1]. Moreover, the factual allegations in
`
`Plaintiff’s Complaint have been substantiated by sworn declarations and other evidence and
`
`establish Defendants’ liability under each of the claims asserted in the Complaint. Accordingly,
`
`default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is appropriate.
`
`C. Injunctive Relief
`
`Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a district court is authorized to issue an injunction “according
`
`to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable,” to prevent
`
`violations of trademark law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Indeed, “[i]njunctive relief is the remedy of
`
`choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for
`
`the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.” Burger King Corp. v. Agad, 911 F.
`
`Supp. 1499, 1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d
`
`1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, even in a default judgment setting, injunctive relief is
`
`available. See e.g., PetMed Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23. Defendants’ failure to
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`respond or otherwise appear in this action makes it difficult for Plaintiff to prevent further
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`infringement absent an injunction. See Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (N.D. Cal.
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`2003) (“[D]efendant’s lack of participation in this litigation has given the court no assurance that
`
`defendant’s infringing activity will cease. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive
`
`11
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`relief.”)
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`Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) it has
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`suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardship
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`favors an equitable remedy; and (4) an issuance of an injunction is in the public’s interest. eBay,
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`Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006). Plaintiffs have carried their burden on
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`each of the four factors. Accordingly, permanent injunctive relief is appropriate.
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`Specifically, in trademark cases, “a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of
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`confusion . . . may by itself constitute a showing of a substantial threat of irreparable harm.”
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`McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Levi Strauss &
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`Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1995) (“There is no doubt that the
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`continued sale of thousands of pairs of counterfeit jeans would damage LS & Co.’s business
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`reputation and might decrease its legitimate sales.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants’
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`unlawful actions have caused Plaintiff irreparable injury and will continue to do so if Defendants
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`are not permanently enjoined. See ECF No. [1]. Further, the Complaint alleges, and the
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`unauthorized Masha and The Bear products sold, offered for sale, marketed, advertised, and
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`distributed by Defendants are nearly identical to Plaintiff’s genuine Masha and The Bear products
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`and that consumers viewing Defendants’ counterfeit products would actually confuse them for
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`Plaintiff’s genuine products. See id. “The effect of Defendants’ actions will cause confusion of
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`consumers, at the time of initial interest, sale, and in the post-sale setting, who will believe
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`Defendants’ Counterfeit Goods are genuine goods originating from, associated with, or approved
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`by Plaintiff.” See ECF No. [1] at 40.
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`Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law so long as Defendants continue to operate the Seller
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`IDs because Plaintiff cannot control the quality of what appears to be its Masha and The Bear
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`products in the marketplace. An award of monetary damages alone will not cure the injury to
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`Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill that will result if Defendants’ infringing and counterfeiting and
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`infringing actions are allowed to continue. Moreover, Plaintiff faces hardship from loss of sales
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`and its inability to control its reputation in the marketplace. By contrast, Defendants face no
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`hardship if they are prohibited from the infringement of Plaintiff’s trademarks and copyrights,
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`which are illegal acts.
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`Finally, the public interest supports the issuance of a permanent injunction against
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`Defendants to prevent consumers from being misled by Defendants’ counterfeit products. See
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`Nike, Inc. v. Leslie, 1985 WL 5251, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1985) (“[A]n injunction to enjoin
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`infringing behavior serves the public interest in protecting consumers from such behavior.”). The
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`Court’s broad equity powers allow it to fashion injunctive relief necessary to stop Defendants’
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`infringing activities. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
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`(1971) (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable
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`powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for . . . [t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
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`power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
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`case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
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`Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944) (“Equity has power to eradicate the evils of a condemned scheme
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`by prohibition of the use of admittedly valid parts of an invalid whole.”).
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`Defendants have created an Internet-based infringement scheme in which they are profiting
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`from their deliberate misappropriation of Plaintiff’s rights. Accordingly, the Court may fashion
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`injunctive relief to eliminate the means by which Defendants are conducting their unlawful
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`activities.
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`D. Statutory Damages for the Use of Counterfeit Marks
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`In a case involving the use of counterfeit marks in connection with a sale, offering for sale,
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`or distribution of products, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) provides that a plaintiff may elect an award of
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`statutory damages at any time before final judgment is rendered in the sum of not less than
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`$1,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00 per counterfeit mark per type of good or service. 15 U.S.C.
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`§ 1117(c)(1). In addition, if the Court finds that Defendants’ counterfeiting actions were willful, it
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`may impose damages above the maximum limit up to $2,000,000.00 per mark per type of good or
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`service. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), Plaintiff has elected to recover
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`an award of statutory damages as to Count I of the Complaint.
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`The Court has wide discretion to determine the amount of statutory damages. See PetMed
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`Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (citing Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc.,
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`902 F.2d 829, 852 (11th Cir. 1990)). An award of statutory damages is appropriate despite a
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`Plaintiff’s inability to prove actual damages caused by a defendant’s infringement. Under Armour,
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`Inc. v. 51nfljersey.com, No. 13-62809-CIV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56475, at *22-*23 (S.D. Fla.
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`Apr. 23, 2014) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[A]
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`successful plaintiff in a trademark infringement case is entitled to recover enhanced statutory
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`damages even where its actual damages are nominal or non-existent.”)); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
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`Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-6961, 1998 WL 767440, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998)
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`(awarding statutory damages where plaintiff failed to prove actual damages or profits). Indeed,
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`Congress enacted a statutory damages remedy in trademark counterfeiting cases because evidence
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`of a defendant’s profits in such cases is almost impossible to ascertain. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-
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`177, pt. V(7) (1995) (discussing purposes of Lanham Act statutory damages); see also PetMed
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`Express, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (statutory damages are “especially appropriate in default
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`judgment cases due to infringer nondisclosure”). This case is no exception.
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`This Court may award statutory damages “without holding an evidentiary hearing based
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`upon affidavits and other documentary evidence if the facts are not disputed.” Perry Ellis Int’l,
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`Inc. v. URI Corp., No. 06-22020-CIV, 2007 WL 3047143, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2007).
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`Although the Court is permitted to conduct a hearing on a default judgment with regard to damages
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`pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B), an evidentiary hearing is not necessary where there is
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`sufficient evidence on the record to support the request for damages. See SEC v. Smyth, 420 F.3d
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`1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Rule 55(b)(2) speaks of evidentiary hearings in a permissive
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`tone . . . We have held that no such hearing is required where all essential evidence is already of
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`record.”) (citations omitted); see also PetMed Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (entering default
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`judgment, permanent injunction and statutory damages in a Lanham Act case without a hearing).
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`Here, the allegations in the Complaint, which are taken as true, clearly establish that
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`Defendants intentionally copied the Masha and the Bear Marks for the purpose of deriving the
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`benefit of Plaintiff’s world-famous reputation. As such, the Lanham Act permits the Court to
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`award up to $2,000,000.00 per infringing mark on each type of service a