Case 0:18-cv-60890-BB Document 37 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/27/2018 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`Case No. 18-cv-60890-BLOOM/Valle
`(Bankr. Case No. 15-20095-BKC-JKO)
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`Appellant,
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`MUSIC ROYALTY CONSULTING, INC.,
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`
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`v.
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`SCOTT STORCH MUSIC, LLC,
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`Appellee.
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`_____________________________________/
`
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`ORDER DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY APPEAL
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`
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`THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Appellant Music Royalty Consulting, Inc.’s
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`(“Appellant” or “MRCI”) Notice of Appeal of (1) Order Granting Debtor[’]s Motion to Deem
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`Pre-Petition Contracts [R]ejected And Determine Ownership of “All Eyez” (the “Rejection
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`Order”) and (2) Order Denying MRCI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Order Granting
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`Debtor[’]s Motion to Deem Pre-Petition Contracts Rejected and Determine Ownership of “All
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`Eyez” (the “Reconsideration Order”) (together, the “Orders”), ECF No. [1] (“Notice”). The
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`Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record on appeal and the applicable law, and
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`is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, this case is dismissed for lack of
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`jurisdiction.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This appeal arises in the context of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The parties do
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`not dispute the essential underlying facts. Scott Storch (“Storch”) is a songwriter and music
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`producer. In pertinent part, Storch provided songwriting services through his company, Tuff Jew
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`Productions, LLC (“Tuff Jew”). In 2000, Tuff Jew entered into an Exclusive Songwriter and Co-
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`Publishing Agreement (the “Publishing Agreement”) with an entity called TVT Music, Inc.
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`(“TVT”). Pursuant to the Publishing Agreement, Tuff Jew was required to write songs, and
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`grant copyrights and a portion of its publisher’s share of future royalties to TVT. TVT collected
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`both the publisher’s and writer’s share of Tuff Jew’s royalties, collected its portion of the
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`publisher’s share, and then remitted the balance of the publisher’s share and the writer’s share to
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`Tuff Jew. Appellee Reservoir Media Management, Inc. (“Reservoir”) later became the successor
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`in interest to TVT.
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`In 2011, Tuff Jew and a number of other Storch-related entities entered an Asset
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`Purchase Agreement, through which Reservoir became the 100% owner of copyrights and
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`entitled to 100% of the publisher’s share in a defined set of musical compositions. Reservoir
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`collected the resulting royalty payments and administered the proceeds in pertinent part by
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`remitting the writer’s share to Tuff Jew. In 2012, MRCI purchased the writer’s share from Tuff
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`Jew, in a document signed by all the Storch-related entities (Storch, individually, Tuff Jew, Scott
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`Storch Music, LLC a/k/a Scott Storch Music, Scott Storch Music, Scotty Kat Music, and Great
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`Scott Publishing, LLC) (collectively, the “Storch Entities”). Thereafter, pursuant to a letter of
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`direction, Reservoir was to remit the writer’s share of royalties to MRCI, which Reservoir did
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`from June 19, 2012 until September, 2017.
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`In 2015, Storch filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. See Case No. 15-20095-BKC-JKO
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`(the “Main Bankruptcy” case).1 In August, 2016, the appointed bankruptcy trustee, Scott N.
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`Brown (“Trustee”), filed an adversary proceeding in which he sought consolidation of all the
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`Storch Entities with the bankruptcy estate of Storch. See Case No. 16-01421-JKO, (the “Sub
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`1 References to docket entries in the Main Bankruptcy case are cited as “BK ECF No. [x].”
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`2
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`Con” case).2 As the Sub Con case proceeded, the Trustee sought and obtained the Bankruptcy
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`Court’s approval for a settlement agreement in the Main Bankruptcy case, pursuant to which
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`Storch agreed to support and consent to the consolidation sought by the Trustee in the related
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`adversary proceeding, and the Trustee agreed to reject all pre-petition executory contracts if he
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`was successful in obtaining consolidation. See BK ECF Nos. [120], [123]. Thereafter, the
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`Trustee obtained a consent judgment consolidating all the Storch Entities with the Storch
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`bankruptcy estate on September 30, 2016. See SC ECF No. [6], BK ECF No. [126] (the “Sub
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`Con Judgment”).
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`On November 10, 2016, the Trustee filed a Motion for Entry of Order Deeming Co-
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`Publishing Agreement between Reservoir Media Management, Inc. and (A) Tuff Jew
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`Productions LLC and (B) Debtor, and All Amendments Thereto, Rejected Nunc Pro Tunc to
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`Petition Date, BK ECF No. [132], which was later withdrawn on January 9, 2017, BK ECF No.
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`[137]. On June 1, 2017, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding, Case No. 17-01220-
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`JKO, against MRCI for fraudulent transfer with respect to the sale of Storch’s writer’s share to
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`MRCI. See BK ECF No. [140]. The Trustee and MRCI ultimately reached a settlement of the
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`adversary claims. See BK ECF No. [222].
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`On November 3, 2017, Storch filed his own motion in the Main Bankruptcy to deem pre-
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`petition contracts rejected, BK ECF No. [146] (“Rejection Motion”). MRCI filed a response on
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`November 24, 2017, BK ECF No. [163], arguing that the relief sought by Storch in the Rejection
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`Motion could only be obtained, if at all, through another adversary proceeding, and not by
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`motion, because several issues remained to be determined—including whether the Publishing
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`Agreement was executory, whether the Sub Con Judgment was binding upon MRCI, and the
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`2 References to docket entries in the Sub Con case are cited as “SC ECF No. [x].”
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`3
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`effect of a rejection on MRCI, which had purchased Tuff Jew’s pre-petition writer’s share. On
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`December 5, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Rejection Motion after a hearing held on
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`November 28, 2017. BK ECF Nos. [168] (the Rejection Order), [171].
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`MRCI then moved for partial reconsideration, arguing that the entry of the Rejection
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`Order worked a manifest injustice to MRCI by granting relief without an adversary proceeding,
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`because MRCI purchased Tuff Jew’s rights, and Reservoir expressly stated that it would use the
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`Rejection Order as justification for not paying MRCI the writer’s share royalties. BK ECF No.
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`[173]. After full briefing and a hearing held on February 28, 2018, the Court denied the
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`Reconsideration Motion. See BK ECF Nos. [184] (the Reconsideration Order), [187].
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`On appeal, MRCI argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred by entering the Rejection Order
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`(1) without first analyzing whether the Publishing Agreement is executory, or contains severable
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`non-executory obligations; (2) determining that an adversary proceeding was not required; and
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`(3) effectively binding MRCI to the Sub Con Judgment when MRCI was not provided adequate
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`notice of the Sub Con case. MRCI also contends that it was error for the Bankruptcy Court to
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`deny reconsideration.
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`II.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`A bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions and application of the law to the facts of a given
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`case are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. Carrier Corp. v. Buckley (In
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`re Globe Mfg. Corp.), 567 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009); Club Assocs. v. Consol.
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`CapitalRealty Inv’rs (In re Club Assocs.), 951 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1992). “Under de
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`novo review, a Court independently examines the law and draws its own conclusions after
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`applying the law to the facts of the case, without regard to decisions made by the Bankruptcy
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`Court.” In re Mut. Ben. Offshore Fund, Ltd., 508 B.R. 762, 769 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Kaiser
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`4
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`Aerospace & Elecs. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 244 F.3d 1289,
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`1295 (11th Cir. 2001)). Reviewing for clear error, “findings of fact are not clearly erroneous
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`unless, in light of all of the evidence, [the reviewing court is] left with the definite and firm
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`conviction that a mistake has been made.” Westgate Vacation Villas, Ltd. v. Tabas (Int'l
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`Pharmacy & Discount II, Inc.), 443 F.3d 767, 770 (11th Cir. 2005). “Where there are two
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`permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
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`erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
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`Additionally, the determination of certain matters is committed to the discretion of the
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`bankruptcy court, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips (In re
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`Phillips), 2013 WL 1899611, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2013) (“Where a matter is committed to
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`the discretion of the bankruptcy court, the district court must affirm unless it finds that the
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`bankruptcy court abused its discretion.”) (citing Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500
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`F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2006)); Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos (In re Charter
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`Co.), 125 B.R. 650, 654 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (same, regarding admission of evidence) (citing Miller
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`v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981)). “A bankruptcy court
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`abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law or on misapplication of the law
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`to the facts.” Park Nat. Bank v. Univ. Ctr. Hotel, Inc., 2007 WL 604936, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Feb.
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`22, 2007); see also Amlong & Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1238 (“A decision that is contrary to the law
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`plainly is an abuse of discretion.”); West v. Smith (In re Cecil), 2012 WL 3231321, at *2 (M.D.
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`Fla. Aug. 3, 2012) (“A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law or
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`a misapplication of law to the facts. In its application, the abuse of discretion standard is nearly
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`indistinguishable from the clearly erroneous standard.”).
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`5
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`a. The Orders Appealed Are Not “Final” Orders
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`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from
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`final judgments and orders, and interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy judges, with prior leave of
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`court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1),(3). MRCI did not seek leave to appeal; rather it asserts that the
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`Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 158(a)(1).3 Although the parties do not appear to dispute
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`that this Court has jurisdiction, the Court is obligated to consider jurisdiction “even if it means
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`raising the issue sua sponte.” In re Donovan, 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
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`AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 494 F.3d 1356, 1359 (11th
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`Cir. 2007)); see also Figueroa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 382 B.R. 814, 819 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
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`(“A Federal court must always determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a case.”).
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`In bankruptcy cases, “[t]he statutory requirement of finality is a flexible concept,
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`grounded in the practicalities of the situation.” In re Allied Holdings, Inc., 376 B.R. 351, 355
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`(N.D. Ga. 2007) (quoting Jove Eng’g Inc. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 92 F.3d 1539, 1548 (11th
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`Cir. 1996). A bankruptcy case is “an aggregation of controversies, many of which would
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`constitute individual lawsuits had a bankruptcy petition never been filed.” Id. at 355. As a
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`result, “[f]inality of bankruptcy orders cannot be limited to the last order concluding the
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`bankruptcy case as a whole.” Id. However, the increased flexibility “does not render appealable
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`an order which does not finally dispose of a claim or adversary proceeding.” In re Donovan, 532
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`F.3d at 1136. Indeed, to be final, “a bankruptcy court order must completely resolve all of the
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`issues pertaining to a discrete claim, including issues as to the proper relief.” Id. at 1136-37
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`(quoting In re Atlas, 210 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). “It is
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`3 As neither Storch nor Reservoir Media, the Appellees, address the issue of jurisdiction in their
`response briefs, the Court assumes their agreement with MRCI’s jurisdictional statement.
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`6
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`generally the particular adversary proceeding or controversy that must have been finally resolved
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`rather than the entire bankruptcy litigation.” Commodore Holdings Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
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`331 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003). “In short, the same concepts of finality apply in
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`bankruptcy as in any other case, but they are applied to the discrete controversies within the
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`administration of the estate; ‘the separate dispute being assessed must have been finally resolved
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`and leave nothing more for the bankruptcy court to do.’” In re Donovan, 532 F.3d at 1137
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`(quoting In re Charter Co., 778 F.2d 617, 621 (11th Cir. 1985)).
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`Upon review, contrary to MRCI’s conclusory statement of jurisdiction, the Orders are not
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`final orders of the Bankruptcy Court. Indeed, the Orders do not completely resolve the issues
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`pertaining to any claim involved in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding; rather, they merely
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`confirm an action that otherwise occurs by operation of law. As the record and the briefing make
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`evident, MRCI’s protestations regarding the Orders are ancillary to the Main Bankruptcy
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`proceeding. MRCI is not a party to the Publishing Agreement and MRCI is not a creditor of
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`Storch. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court made it amply clear that the Rejection Order did not
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`determine what the effect of the rejection of the Publishing Agreement is on any rights that
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`MRCI may have. See BK ECF No. [187] at 37.
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`b. Leave to Appeal is Not Warranted
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`Nevertheless, a party may appeal a non-final order of a bankruptcy court with leave of the
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`district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (“jurisdiction to hear appeals . . . with leave of the
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`court, from other interlocutory order and decrees”); Tobkin v. Calderin, 2012 WL 3609867, at *1
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`(S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2012) (“district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals with leave of the
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`court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees”); In re Fillard Apartments, Ltd., 104 B.R.
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`480, 480-81 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (“Interlocutory appeals, however, may only be taken to the district
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`court with the leave of the district court.”). Under the applicable Rules, the Court may treat the
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`Notice as a motion for leave to appeal, and consider whether interlocutory review is warranted
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`under § 158(a)(3). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(d).
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`Interlocutory review is generally disfavored for its piecemeal effect on cases. See Prado-
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`Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]nterlocutory appeals
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`are inherently disruptive, time-consuming, and expensive and, consequently, are generally
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`disfavored.”) (quotations omitted). However, a district court may grant interlocutory review of a
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`bankruptcy order if the moving party demonstrates “that: (1) the order presents a controlling
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`question of law; (2) over which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion among
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`courts; and (3) the immediate resolution of the issue would materially advance the ultimate
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`termination of the litigation.” Laurent v. Herkert, 196 F. App’x 771, 772 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
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`28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); see In re Pac. Forest Prods. Corp., 335 B.R. 910, 919 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
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`(hereinafter, “Colonial Bank”). This “three-part standard is analogous to that set forth in 28
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`U.S.C. § 1292(b), which governs appeals from the district court to the circuit court of appeals.”
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`Colonial Bank, 335 B.R. at 919; see In re Celotex Corp., 187 B.R. 746, 749 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
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`(citing In re Charter Co., 778 F.2d 617, 620 (11th Cir. 1985)) (“In determining when to exercise
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`this discretionary authority, a district court will look to the standards which govern interlocutory
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`appeals from the district court to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”). “Leave
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`must be denied if the party seeking leave to appeal fails to establish any one of the three
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`elements.” Figueroa, 382 B.R. at 824.
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`As the party seeking interlocutory review, MRCI “bears the burden of persuading the
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`court that exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing
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`appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. v. AASI
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`Liquidating Trust ex. Rel. Welt, 2013 WL 704775, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2013) (quoting
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`Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) (discussing the role of the court of
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`appeals in interlocutory appeals)); see also Soler v. Yip, 2013 WL 5446674, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
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`30, 2013) (“interlocutory bankruptcy appeals should be the exception, not the rule.”). Even
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`when a party has established the three factors warranting interlocutory appeal, a court “has
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`discretion to turn down” an interlocutory appeal, as liberal use of the interlocutory appeal
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`process “is bad policy.” McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir.
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`2004).
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`Here, MRCI fails to make a showing as to the second and third factors. The only
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`properly identified issue of law is whether the Bankruptcy Court could deem the Publishing
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`Agreement rejected by entry of the Rejection Order, or whether an adversary proceeding was
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`required.4 As the Court has already noted, the Bankruptcy Court did not decide the effect of the
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`Publishing Agreement being rejected on any rights that MRCI may have to the writer’s share
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`royalties.
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`Second, MRCI fails to point to authority that would indicate a substantial difference of
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`opinion. MRCI points to case law indicating that substantive consolidation should be used
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`sparingly and that the legal character of a contract is a threshold determination, In re Learning
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`Publications, Inc., 94 B.R. 763, 764 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). However, MRCI fails to provide
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`support for its main proposition that it was improper for the Bankruptcy Court to enter an order
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`essentially confirming an event that occurs automatically by operation of law, and with respect to
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`4 The argument that MRCI could not be bound by the Sub Con Judgment due to insufficient
`notice was not made to the Bankruptcy Court in the first instance. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.
`Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an
`issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be
`considered by this court.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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`a contract to which MRCI is not a party. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (“In a case under Chapter 7 of
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`this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an executory contract . . . of the debtor within 60
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`days after the order for relief, . . . , then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.” Indeed,
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`MRCI is not a party to the Publishing Agreement, to which the Rejection Order related. MRCI’s
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`true objection to the Orders in the instant appeal is the potential effect that the Rejection Order
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`will have on its rights to the assignment of the writer’s share royalties, which is not a part of the
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`Publishing Agreement and, as previously stated, is not an issue that has been decided by the
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`Bankruptcy Court.
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`Third, MRCI fails to demonstrate how the immediate resolution of the issues presented in
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`this appeal would materially advance the termination of litigation. The Court understands that a
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`ruling as to the effect of the Rejection Order upon MRCI’s rights to the writer’s share of
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`royalties, sooner rather than later, would be preferable from MRCI’s perspective. However, that
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`is not a sufficient basis to justify interlocutory review. Accordingly, the Court declines to
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`entertain an interlocutory appeal in this instance.
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`c. The Bankruptcy Orders Should Be Affirmed
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`Even assuming the Court was to exercise jurisdiction to consider the merits of this
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`appeal, MRCI’s arguments fail for several reasons. First, as the Court already noted, the
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`argument that MRCI cannot be bound by the Sub Con Judgment was not made to the Bankruptcy
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`Court in the first instance. Tellingly, MRCI’s counsel conceded at the hearing on the Rejection
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`Motion that, although not a party, MRCI was aware of the Sub Con proceedings. See BK ECF
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`No. [187] at 34 (“I want to be clear, I want to be very clear, I'm not saying that we were unaware
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`that the substantive consolidation was happening. I want to be very clear about that.”).
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`Therefore, MRCI’s argument on appeal regarding the sufficiency of notice of the Sub Con
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`proceedings is belied by the record.
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`Second, the Court does not agree with MRCI’s contention that an adversary proceeding
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`was required. The parties appear to agree in their characterization of the Rejection Order as a
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`“comfort order,” though MRCI argues that the relief requested in the Rejection Motion could not
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`be granted through a comfort order, but that Bankruptcy Rule 7001 required an adversary
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`proceeding. Pursuant to Rule 7001, “a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of
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`a lien or other interest in property,” or “a proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment relating to
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`any of the foregoing” are adversary proceedings. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2), (9). MRCI argues
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`that the relief sought through the Rejection Order was the determination of rights in property or a
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`declaratory judgment. While the Bankruptcy Court noted its “sense that [Storch is] seeking a
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`determination here of the extent, validity and priority of liens,” see ECF No. [171] at 4, the
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`Bankuptcy Court ultimately disagreed with such a characterization during the hearing on the
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`Reconsideration Motion. See ECF No. [187] at 8 (“I frequently play Socratic dialogue with
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`counsel, Mr. Throckmorton . . . [so i]t’s not shocking to me that I may have given rise to hopes
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`on one side of the room and dashed them on the other.).
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`In contrast, in bankruptcy, “[c]omfort orders serve a valuable purpose. The orders are
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`entered primarily for a third party’s benefit . . . [t]he orders merely identify and reiterate what has
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`already occurred by operation of law.” In re Hill, 364 B.R. 826, 828 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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`According to Appellees, and as determined by the Bankruptcy Court, the Rejection Order
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`reiterated what occurred by operation of law under § 365, when the Trustee did not expressly
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`assume the Publishing Agreement.
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`However, “[c]omfort orders are not appropriate when a court must consider information
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`outside of a case’s docket or outside of the court’s immediate purview.” Id. at 831. MRCI
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`argues that because the factual issues it identifies (i.e. whether the contract was executory and
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`whether MRCI was bound by the Sub Con Judgment) remained and could not be determined
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`from the record, a comfort order was inappropriate. MRCI argues further that the Bankruptcy
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`Court failed to review the Publishing Agreement because it was not attached to the Rejection
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`Motion, and it was not referenced in the Rejection Order or hearing transcript.
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`Once again, MRCI’s arguments are not supported by the record or case law cited.
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`Indeed, although the Publishing Agreement was not attached to the Rejection Motion, it was
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`attached to the Trustee’s motion filed in November, 2016. See BK ECF No. [132] at 8-88.
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`Thus, the Publishing Agreement was readily available for the Bankruptcy Court’s review, even if
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`it was not re-filed until it was attached to Reservoir’s objection to the Reconsideration Motion.
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`Furthermore, while MRCI contends that the Bankruptcy Court entered the Rejection Order
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`without reviewing the Publishing Agreement because it was not referenced in the Rejection
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`Order or the hearing transcript, MRCI points to no authority that requires the Bankruptcy Court
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`to enter orders containing such references. Section 365 by its terms applies only to executory
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`contracts. In deeming the Publishing Agreement rejected, the Bankruptcy Court necessarily
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`made the determination that the Publishing Agreement was executory. Moreover, while MRCI
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`identified the determination of whether the Publishing Agreement is executory as one of the
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`factual issues in support of its argument regarding the necessity of an adversary proceeding, it
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`did not indicate to the Bankruptcy Court in the Reconsideration Motion that it believed the
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`Bankruptcy Court had failed to review the Publishing Agreement, as it argues here.
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`How Reservoir intends to use the Rejection Order with respect to payments of the
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`writer’s share to MRCI under an assignment made subsequent to and not embodied in the
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`Publishing Agreement is not an issue that was resolved by entry of the Rejection Order. Nor may
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`it be resolved by this Court in the context of the instant appeal. As the Bankruptcy Court noted,
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`there has been no ruling with respect to the effect of the Rejection Order upon Reservoir’s
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`obligation to pay MRCI the writer’s share. See BK ECF No. [187] at 137. “Section 365 was
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`included in the Bankruptcy Code to give the debtor the option of assuming contracts where
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`performance by the non-bankrupt party will benefit the estate, or, of rejecting contracts where
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`further performance by the debtor will not benefit the estate.” In re Gencor Indus., Inc., 298
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`B.R. 902, 909 (M.D. Fla. 2003). However, “[r]ejection does not embody the contract-vaporizing
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`properties so commonly ascribed to it . . . . Rejection merely frees the estate from the obligation
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`to perform; it does not make the contract disappear.” Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476
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`F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R.
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`687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). “More specifically, rejection has
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`absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence; the contract is not cancelled,
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`repudiated, rescinded, or in any other fashion terminated.” Id. Indeed, MRCI does not take issue
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`with a purported non-performance by Storch or the consolidated debtor Storch Entities. Rather, it
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`takes issue with the potential position that Reservoir, a non-debtor, may take with respect to
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`payment obligations to MRCI, another non-debtor. Therefore, MRCI’s appeal is not well-taken.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk of
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`Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
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`Case 0:18-cv-60890-BB Document 37 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/27/2018 Page 14 of 14
`Case No. 18-cv-60890-BLOOM/Valle
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`DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 26th day of December,
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`2018.
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`Copies to:
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`Counsel of Record
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` _________________________________
` BETH BLOOM
` UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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