Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 1 of 12 PageID 352
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`TAMPA DIVISION
`
`
`INTENZE PRODUCTS, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No: 8:15-cv-1074-T-36UAM
`
`
`v.
`
`DEAD MAN SUPPLIES CORP., NANCY
`PARKER and KEVIN PARKER,
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`___________________________________/
`
`ORDER
`
`This cause comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Intenze Products, Inc.’s Motion for
`
`Default Judgment Against Defendants (Doc. 46); Defendant Nancy Parker’s (“Nancy”) response
`
`to the Motion (Doc. 48); and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of its
`
`Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants (Doc. 52). Defendants Dead Man Supplies Corp.
`
`(“Dead Man”) and Kevin Parker (“Kevin”) failed to respond to the Motion, and the time to do so
`
`has expired. The Court, having considered the Motion, the Supplemental Memorandum, and being
`
`fully advised in the premises, will now GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART the Motion.
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`This is an action for trademark and copyright infringement. The Complaint alleges as
`
`follows: Plaintiff is a manufacturer, developer, marketer, and distributor of tattoo ink. Doc. 1
`
`(“Compl.”) ¶ 14. Plaintiff has common law trademarks in INTENZE and lines of INTENZE ink,
`
`as well as several federally registered trademarks, including INTENZE, INTENZE PROD., and
`
`ZUPER BLACK (collectively, the “Intenze Marks”). Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff also owns registered and
`
`unregistered copyrights in relation to the labeling and packaging of INTENZE ink (collectively,
`
`the “Intenze Works”). Id. ¶ 19.
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 2 of 12 PageID 353
`
`
`
`Nancy and Kevin are individuals who own Dead Man (collectively, “Defendants”). Id. ¶
`
`11. In November 2013, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against one
`
`of Defendants’ suppliers (“New York Lawsuit”). Id. ¶ 32. In February 2014, Plaintiff discovered
`
`that Defendants were advertising and selling products bearing the Intenze Marks and/or the Intenze
`
`Works, and/or products substantially similar to the Intenze Marks and/or the Intenze Works,
`
`through their retail store as well as their website, without Plaintiff’s permission. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27-28.
`
`Plaintiff served Defendants with a cease and desist letter, requesting that Defendants voluntarily
`
`surrender the infringing products. Id. ¶ 29. In the presence of Plaintiff’s investigators, Defendants
`
`pulled the infringing products from their shelves, attempted to peel the labels containing the
`
`Intenze Marks and Intenze Works off of the products, and placed the products into a box. Id. ¶ 30.
`
`However, Defendants refused to surrender the infringing products to Plaintiff’s investigators. Id.
`
`Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff amended its complaint in the New York Lawsuit to add Tattoo
`
`Supplies Wholesale Corporation a/k/a Dead Man Tattoo Supplies as a party. Id. ¶ 32. In April
`
`2014, the Clerk entered a default against Dead Man in the New York Lawsuit. Id. Nancy
`
`subsequently sent correspondence to the judge in the New York Lawsuit indicating that she is the
`
`owner of Dead Man but that Dead Man is not affiliated with Tattoo Supplies Wholesale
`
`Corporation. Id. In January 2015, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Tattoo Supplies Wholesale
`
`Corporation from the New York Lawsuit. Id.
`
`Despite Plaintiff’s efforts to prevent Defendants’ unauthorized acts, as recently as March
`
`2015, Defendants have continued to distribute, display, offer for sale, and sell infringing products.
`
`Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 3 of 12 PageID 354
`
`In the Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for copyright infringement (First Cause of
`
`Action); trademark counterfeiting (Second Cause of Action); trademark infringement (Third Cause
`
`of Action); false designation of origin, passing off, and unfair competition (Fourth Cause of
`
`Action); violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et
`
`seq. (“FDUTPA”) (Fifth Cause of Action); unfair competition (Sixth Cause of Action); and unjust
`
`enrichment (Seventh Cause of Action).
`
`A summons was issued as to Defendants, and service was executed as to each of the
`
`Defendants on May 14, 2015. Docs. 2, 15-17. On June 19, 2015, Plaintiff sought the entry of a
`
`clerk’s default against each of the Defendants, Docs. 18-20, and on June 23, 2015, the Clerk
`
`entered default as to each of the Defendants, Docs. 21-23. The Magistrate Judge subsequently
`
`withdrew the Clerk’s entry of default as to Nancy because the docket reflected that Nancy had
`
`filed an answer to the Complaint on May 21, 2015, Doc. 24, but after all of Nancy’s purported
`
`answers had been stricken,1 Plaintiff again moved for entry of a clerk’s default, Doc. 43. The
`
`Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s request, and the Clerk entered default as to Nancy on January
`
`4, 2016. Docs. 44, 45. Plaintiff now moves for entry of a default judgment, arguing that it is
`
`entitled to permanent injunctive relief as well as statutory damages in the amount of $150,000 and
`
`reasonable attorneys’ fees.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A defendant who defaults is deemed to have “admit[ted] the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
`
`allegations of fact.” Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987); see also
`
`
`1 Plaintiff moved to strike Nancy’s answer on the grounds that it was deficient and did not otherwise comply with the
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 29. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion with leave to submit an amended
`answer. Doc. 33. Nancy thereafter submitted a letter purporting to be an amended answer, Doc. 36, which Plaintiff
`again moved to strike, Doc. 38. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion, and again struck Nancy’s purported answer.
`Doc. 40.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 4 of 12 PageID 355
`
`Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The
`
`defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on
`
`those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.”).
`
`However, “default does not in itself warrant the court in entering a default judgment”—a court
`
`must still determine whether the factual allegations of the complaint provide a sufficient basis for
`
`the judgment entered, and “[t]he defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or
`
`to admit conclusions of law.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. Similarly, a plaintiff is
`
`entitled to only those damages adequately supported by the record. See Adolph Coors Co. v.
`
`Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985).
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`
`A.
`
`Clerk's Entry of Default
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides: “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment
`
`for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
`
`affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” A district court may enter a default
`
`judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to defend or otherwise appear pursuant to
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). DirectTV, Inc. v. Griffin, 290 F.Supp. 2d 1340, 1343 (M.D.
`
`Fla. 2003).
`
`Under the federal rules, a plaintiff may serve an individual defendant by
`
`[L]eaving a copy of [the summons and of the complaint] at the
`individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of
`suitable age and discretion who resides there ...
`
`
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B). A plaintiff may also serve a defendant by “following state law for
`
`serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the
`
`district court is located or where service is made[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1).
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 5 of 12 PageID 356
`
`Plaintiff's affidavit of service filed on May 14, 2015, shows that the process server
`
`effectuated service on Dead Man Supplies Corporation, Kevin Parker and Nancy Parker by serving
`
`Nancy Parker individually, as the spouse and co-resident of Kevin Parker2, and as the registered
`
`agent for Dead Man Supplies Corporation at her business address. Doc. 15-17. Under the
`
`guidelines established in Rule 4(e), service on the Defendants was proper. The returns of service
`
`also state that specific inquiry was made of the persons served, and the individual Defendants are
`
`not on active duty with any of the armed forces of the United States. Id.
`
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1), Defendants were required to respond to
`
`Plaintiff's complaint within twenty-one (21) days from the date of service. The federal rules require
`
`court clerks to enter a defendant's default “[w]hen service of process is properly effected, but the
`
`served party fails to respond in a timely manner....” Kelly v. Florida, 233 F. App'x 883, 885 (11th
`
`Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). Defendants Dead Man Corporation and Kevin Parker
`
`failed to respond to the complaint and have otherwise failed to appear in this action. As discussed
`
`above, Nancy Parker’s responses were stricken and the Court authorized the clerk to enter a
`
`default. Doc. 44, 45. Thus, the Clerk properly entered the defaults against all of the Defendants.
`
`B.
`
`Liability
`
`Plaintiff has properly alleged in its Complaint, and has presented evidence in support
`
`thereof, that Defendants infringed on its Intenze Marks and at least one of its Intenze Works by
`
`willfully and knowingly purchasing, copying, manufacturing, importing, exporting, advertising,
`
`marketing, promoting, distributing, displaying, offering for sale, and/or selling counterfeit ink. See
`
`Doc. 1 ¶ 26-38, Exhibits D-E, G-H, J. Since Plaintiff has adequately pleaded all of the elements of
`
`
`2 Florida Statute § 48.031(2)(a) permits substitute service “on the spouse of the person to be served at any place in the
`county, if the cause of action is not an adversary proceeding between the spouse and the person to be served, if the
`spouse requests such service, and if the spouse and person to be served are residing together in the same dwelling.”
`5
`
`
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 6 of 12 PageID 357
`
`the causes of action in its Complaint, and Defendants defaulted, Defendants admit liability of the
`
`well-pleaded allegations of fact. Thus, Plaintiff has succeeded on the merits of such claims. See
`
`Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Courson, No. 307-CV-195-J-33MCR, 2007 WL 3012372, at *2 (M.D.
`
`Fla. Oct. 12, 2007) (stating “when a defendant is in default, the element of success on the merits
`
`is satisfied”) (citing Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Glob. Arts Prods., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D.
`
`Fla. 1999)).
`
`1.
`
`First Cause of Action – Federal Copyright Infringement
`
`“To prevail on its claim of copyright infringement, Plaintiff must show: (1) that it owns valid
`
`copyrights in the designs in question; and (2) that Defendant copied original elements of the
`
`copyrighted materials.” Tiffany (NJ), LLC v. Dongping, No. 10-61214-CIV, 2010 WL 4450451,
`
`at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2010).
`
` With regards to the first prong, a “certificate of a registration made before or within five years
`
`after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the
`
`copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Plaintiff has provided the
`
`Court with two copyright registrations for the Intenze Works made within five years after its first
`
`publication. Doc. 1 ¶ 19, Exhibit C.
`
`
`
`With regards to the second prong, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that the alleged infringers
`
`violated at least one exclusive right granted to the copyright holders.” Priority Records, LLC v.
`
`Lee, No. 5:06CV231 CAR, 2007 WL 1087418, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2007). Plaintiff has
`
`provided evidence that Defendants intentionally manufactured, imported, exported, advertised,
`
`marketed, promoted, distributed, displayed, retailed, offered for sale and sold counterfeit ink, using
`
`the Intenze Work or artwork that is identical or substantially similar to the Intenze Work, thereby
`
`infringing upon Plaintiff’s rights in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). Doc. 1 ¶ 31, 33-36, 40-46,
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 7 of 12 PageID 358
`
`Exhibit D-E, G. Thus, Plaintiff has successfully demonstrated that Defendants committed willful
`
`copyright infringement. See Dish Network L.L.C. v. TV Net Sols., LLC, No. 6:12-CV-1629-ORL-
`
`41, 2014 WL 6685351, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2014) (finding in the context of a default
`
`judgment, that the second element of a claim for copyright infringement was satisfied because the
`
`plaintiff adequately alleged that defendants infringed on its exclusive rights and since plaintiff
`
`satisfied both elements, plaintiff had sufficiently stated a cause of action for copyright
`
`infringement); see also Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker Enters., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313
`
`(S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that the infringement was willful due to defendant’s default and the
`
`allegations of willfulness set forth in plaintiff’s complaint).
`
`Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action – Trademark Counterfeiting,
`C.
`Trademark infringement and False Designation of Origin, Passing Off & Unfair
`Competition
`
`The second, third, and fourth causes of action are all governed by the same standard. See
`
`Kobe Japanese Steak House of Florida, Inc. v. XU, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-490-T-23MAP, 2014 WL
`
`6608967, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2014) (“A claim for federal counterfeiting and trademark
`
`infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), and a false designation of origin claim (also known as unfair
`
`competition), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), are measured by identical standards.”). To prove trademark
`
`infringement, plaintiff must prove that “(1) it is the prior owner of the trademark; (2) the defendant
`
`used the mark in commerce; and (3) defendant’s mark is likely to cause confusion.” Id.; see also
`
`Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has satisfied all three
`
`elements.
`
`First, Plaintiff provided the Court with two trademark registrations for the Intenze Marks which
`
`show that Plaintiff utilized the Intenze Marks before Defendants’ infringing conduct began in
`
`2014. Doc. 1 ¶ 18, 27, 34, Exhibit B. Thus, Plaintiff has established that it has priority. See Tiffany
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 8 of 12 PageID 359
`
`(NJ), LLC, 2010 WL 4450451 at * 4 (finding in the context of a default, plaintiff had established
`
`priority because plaintiff’s ownership and registration of the marks preceded defendant’s
`
`infringing conduct).
`
`Second, Plaintiff provided proof that Defendants intentionally offered for sale and sold
`
`counterfeit ink using the Intenze Marks (without Plaintiff’s consent), through Defendants’ retail
`
`location, as well as on Defendants’ website. As a result, Defendants used the Intenze Marks in
`
`interstate commerce. Doc. 1 ¶ 27, 31, 33, Exhibits D-E, H, J. See id.; see also Petmed Express,
`
`Inc. v. Medpets.com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“In establishing a website on the
`
`Internet, Defendants have used the infringing marks in commerce.”).
`
`Finally, Plaintiff has shown that Defendants used marks that are so similar to Plaintiff’s Intenze
`
`Marks that consumer confusion is likely. Doc. 1 ¶ 14, 24, 35-37, 48-50, 60, 68-71, Exhibit B, D-
`
`E, G-H, J; see Tiffany (NJ), LLC, 2010 WL 4450451 at 4 (finding that the marks used on the goods
`
`advertised, offered for sale and/or sold by defendant were so similar to plaintiff’s marks that
`
`consumer confusion was likely). See also Nike, Inc. v. Austin, No. 6:09-CV-796-ORL28KRS, 2009
`
`WL 3535500, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2009) (listing seven factors relevant to a likelihood of
`
`confusion, and finding that, “[b]y failing to answer the complaint, Defendants admit that . . . the
`
`marks they used are the same or colorably similar . . . [t]he products involved are the same . . .
`
`defendants also admit that they willfully infringed [] after having actual and constructive
`
`knowledge of the marks. These admissions are sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion”).
`
`Therefore, Defendants are liable for willful trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and federal
`
`8
`
`unfair competition.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 9 of 12 PageID 360
`
`IV. Relief Requested
`
`Plaintiff requests a permanent injunction, statutory damages in the amount of $150,000,
`
`and attorneys’ fees.
`
`A.
`
`Statutory Damages
`
`A prevailing plaintiff may recover actual or statutory damages under the Copyright Act. 17
`
`U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The plaintiff may make its election between actual and statutory damages “at
`
`any time before final judgment is rendered.” Jordan v. Time, Inc., 111 F.3d 102, 104 (11th Cir.
`
`1997) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)).
`
`In this case, Plaintiff requests that the Court determine its statutory damages without an
`
`evidentiary hearing. Doc. 46. The Court has three options to determine statutory damages in
`
`default judgments: (1) assess the damages without a hearing, see Capitol Records v. Rita
`
`Carmichael, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1086 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (minimum statutory damages
`
`requested); Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. Casa Los Martinez Corp., No. 1:14-CV-22859-JAL, 2014 WL
`
`4948632, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (reviewed factors to determine reasonable amount of
`
`statutory damages when plaintiff requested more than the minimum in default judgment); (2) hold
`
`an evidentiary hearing if the court deems it necessary, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) (“[T]he court may
`
`conduct hearings or make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial—when,
`
`to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to ... determine the amount of damages ....”; or (3) conduct
`
`a jury trial. See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 795 F.3d 1255, 1283 (11th Cir. 2015)
`
`(quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998)) (“[I]f a party so
`
`demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under § 504(c) in order
`
`‘to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.’ ”).
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 10 of 12 PageID 361
`
`The Court deems an evidentiary hearing necessary to determine the proper amount of
`
`damages, particularly because Plaintiff requests more than the statutory minimum, without
`
`providing a clear calculation to justify its request. Given Plaintiff’s jury trial demand in its
`
`Complaint, the Court will schedule a jury trial on damages. If Plaintiff wants to waive its right to
`
`a jury trial on damages, it may file a motion seeking such relief, and the Court will convert the jury
`
`trial into an evidentiary hearing.
`
`B.
`
`Injunctive Relief
`
`Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), the court may “grant temporary and final injunctions on
`
`such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” A
`
`plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant
`
`such relief:
`
`
`
`A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
`injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
`damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
`considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
`defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
`interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
`
`eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).
`
`“The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the
`
`district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id.
`
`The Complaint does not provide evidence of actual damages, if any, suffered by Plaintiff
`
`as a result of Defendant's infringement. But, due to the possibility of future infringement by
`
`Defendant and others, and the seemingly unknowable extent of that infringement, monetary
`
`damages alone are inadequate to compensate Plaintiff for any injury it has sustained or may sustain
`
`in the future. Further, Plaintiff has submitted evidence of continuing infringing activity in the form
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 11 of 12 PageID 362
`
`of screenshots taken by counsel on February 25, 2014, demonstrating that counterfeit Intenze ink
`
`products were still available on Defendants’ website, a receipt and corresponding photograph of
`
`Defendants’ sale of counterfeit ink on August 24, 2014, and photographs showing Defendants’
`
`display of counterfeit ink as late as March 2015. Doc. 47 ¶18. Defendants have not provided
`
`evidence of any hardship an injunction would cause them, but Plaintiff could sustain hardship,
`
`specifically lost revenue, if Defendants are not enjoined from engaging in the infringing activity.
`
`Finally, there is no indication that the public interest would be disserved by the issuance of a
`
`permanent injunction against Defendants.
`
`Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction against
`
`Defendants which enjoins Defendants from directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiff's rights in its
`
`copyright and marks including using the internet to reproduce, copy, or distribute, the products
`
`unless Defendants receive a license or express authority from Plaintiff. The injunction will require
`
`Defendants to destroy all infringing products in their possession, custody, or control. The Court
`
`will include the permanent injunction in the final judgment.
`
`C.
`
`Attorneys' Fees
`
`Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees expended on this litigation in the amount of
`
`$33,097.50, which represents a total of 125.2 hours. The billing rates range from $200 - $475 per
`
`hour for four attorneys. See Doc. 53-1. The Court agrees that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of
`
`attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
`
`1979, 1984 (2016). However, the Court will defer ruling on the issue of attorneys’ fees until after
`
`the amount of statutory damages is determined and a final judgment entered, as Plaintiff will incur
`
`more fees for a jury trial or evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages. In accordance with Rule
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`
`Case 8:15-cv-01074-CEH-AAS Document 54 Filed 08/04/16 Page 12 of 12 PageID 363
`
`54(d)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., Plaintiff may file a motion for attorneys’ fees upon entry of a final
`
`judgment.
`
`Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants (Doc. 46) is
`
`GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
`
`2.
`
`The Motion is GRANTED as to the issue of liability and entitlement to injunctive
`
`relief and statutory damages.
`
`3.
`
`The Motion is DENIED as to the amount of damages. A jury trial or evidentiary
`
`hearing will be scheduled as to the amount of damages.3 Should Plaintiff wish to
`
`waive its right to trial by jury on the issue of damages, it may file a motion seeking
`
`such relief within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date of this Order.
`
`4.
`
`The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §
`
`505, but defers ruling on the amount. Plaintiff may file a motion for attorneys’ fees,
`
`upon entry of a final judgment.
`
`DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 4, 2016.
`
`Copies to:
`Counsel of Record and Unrepresented Parties, if any
`
`
`
`
`
`3 A telephonic status conference will be scheduled for the purpose of setting this matter for a trial
`on the issue of damages.
`
`
`
`12