`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 1 of 6
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`
`) )
`
`) )
`
`ASA GORDON,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`) Civil Case No. 16-2458 (RJL)
`
`F I |_ E D
`
`JUN 2 0 2017
`Clark. u.s. Dlstrlct a. Bankruptcy
`Courts for the Dlstrlct of Columbla
`
`) )
`
`)
`
`)
`)
`
`))
`
`)
`
`NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND
`
`RECORDS ADMINISTRATION,
`DAVID s. FERRIERO, and OLIVER
`POTTS,
`
`Defendants°
`
`MbDZMOPINION
`(June 71?, 2017) [# 7]
`Pro se plaintiff, Asa Gordon (“Gordon” or “plaintiff’), filed this action against the
`
`National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA” or “the Agency”) and two of its
`
`officials (collectively, “defendants”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
`
`way in which the Agency runs the Electoral College system. Specifically, he contends
`
`that there are eleven states whose state laws do not require a winner-take-all allocation of
`
`electoral votes, and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment requires these states to allocate
`
`their electoral votes proportionally, according to the popular vote. This matter is now
`
`before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 7]. Upon consideration of the
`
`
`
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 2 of 6
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 2 of 6
`
`parties’ submissions and the entire record herein, defendants’ motion is GRANTED and
`
`plaintiff’ 3 case will be DISMISSED with prejudice.I
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff identifies himself as Executive Director of the Douglass Institute of
`
`Government, an advocacy think tank. See Complaint at 11 7. He is a US. citizen, resident
`
`of the District of Columbia, and voter in the 2016 presidential election. Id; Proposed
`
`Amended Complaint at 11 14. Gordon alleges that the allocation of presidential electors
`
`has been unconstitutional in some states since the ratification of the Fourteenth
`
`Amendment. See Complaint at 11 10. Specifically, he claims that there are eleven
`
`unbounded states,2 and pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 6, electors in those states must be
`
`apportioned to the presidential candidates based on the percentage of the popular vote
`
`they received. Id. Otherwise, Gordon alleges, these states violate Section 2 of the
`
`Fourteenth Amendment, which penalizes states for abridging the right of citizens to vote
`
`by reducing the number of their Representatives in Congress. Id. at 11 18; US. CONST.
`
`amend. XIV, § 2.
`
`To remedy this alleged violation, plaintiff seeks an order requiring that NARA:
`
`(1) inform state governors that the electors must abide by the Fourteenth Amendment
`
`
`
`' On February 10, 2017, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint [Dkt. # 12] in an attempt
`to bolster the facts supporting his claim of Article II! standing. There are no new factual allegations in his
`proposed amended complaint, however, that would alter this Court’s ruling on Article III standing. His
`motion is therefore DENlED as moot. Plaintiff also filed a motion to present oral argument for summary
`judgment [Dkt. # 2]. Because this Memorandum Opinion dismisses plaintiff’s claim with prejudice, that
`motion is also DENIED as moot.
`2 Plaintiff identifies these eleven states as: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, lowa, Michigan, North
`Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See Complaint at 1] ll.
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 3 of 6
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 3 of 6
`
`during their December 19 meetings and notify them that reference to Section 2 of the
`
`Fourteenth Amendment should have been included in the information packet sent to
`
`them; and (2) examine the Certificates of Vote to ensure that they comply with plaintiff’s
`
`reading of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and reject those that do not. See
`
`Complaint at 9.
`
`On January 3, 2017, Gordon filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and
`
`preliminary injunction, seeking to compel defendants to reject Certificates of Vote that
`
`allocate electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis where state law does not so require.
`
`Pl.’s Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 1] 5.
`
`I heard
`
`argument on the motion on January 9, 2017 and denied the motion for a temporary
`
`restraining order as moot. See January 9, 2017 Minute Entry. Plaintiff’s motion for a
`
`preliminary injunction is all that remains.
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`Article III of the US Constitution restricts federal court jurisdiction to cover only
`
`“cases” and “controversies.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US. 555, 559
`
`(1992). The burden is on the party invoking federal jurisdiction to show that he has
`
`standing to sue. Id. at 561. To satisfy Article 111’s jurisdictional requirement, a plaintiff
`
`must establish three elements:
`
`(1) that he suffered an injury-in-fact that is “concrete and
`
`particularized,” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) that there is
`
`a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of that is “fairly
`
`traceable” to the action challenged; and (3) that it is likely—as opposed to “merely
`
`speculative”—that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 4 of 6
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 4 of 6
`
`(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because standing is essential to a
`
`federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must first determine whether plaintiff
`
`has satisfied Article III’s standing requirement before examining the merits ofhis
`
`complaint. Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Env’t, 523 US. 83, 98 (1998).
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`The problem for Gordon—among others—is that he has not established an injury
`
`sufficient to satisfy Article III’s inj ury-in-fact requirement. Plaintist constitutional
`
`theory is not a new one; he has filed at least seven lawsuits substantially similar to this
`
`one. and each has been dismissed, with three dismissed for lack of standing.3 But no new
`
`facts alleged in the present complaint alter the fatal shortcomings of his case. Gordon
`
`resides—and votes—only in Washington, DC, which is not one of the unbounded states
`
`whose electoral systems he challenges. See Complaint at W 7, 11. He therefore has
`
`suffered no direct infringement on his own right to vote. Indeed, as our Circuit noted in
`
`one of plaintiff’s more recent Electoral College challenges, Gordon “is not injured by the
`
`operation of the [eleven] states’ winner-take—all systems because he does not vote in
`
`
`
`3 Gordon’s previous related lawsuits include: (1) a suit against former Vice President Richard
`Cheney. Gordon v. Cheney, No. 1:05—cv—00006 (HHK) (D.D.C. 2005] (voluntarily dismissed on grounds
`of mootness); (2) a suit against the mayor of the District of Columbia, Gordon v. Williams, No. 1:04—cv—
`01904 (HHK) (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to respond to show cause order); (3) another
`suit against the National Archives and Records Administration, Gordon v. Nat ‘1 Archives and Records
`Administration, No. 1:02—ev—01 551 (TH) (D.D.C.. 2003) (dismissed with prejudice for lack of standing);
`(4) a suit against former Vice President Albert Gore, Gordan v. Gore, No. 1:00—cv—031 12 (RCL) (D.D.C.
`2001) (voluntarily dismissed); (5) a suit against former Senate majority leader Trent Lott, Gordon v.
`Lott, 1:U()~cv—03 087 (RCL) (D.D.C. 2000) (voluntarily dismissed); (6) a suit against former Vice
`President Joseph Biden, Gordon v. Biden, 606 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissed for lack of
`standing), afl'd 364 F. App’x 651 (DC. Cir. 2010); and (7) a suit against the clerk ofthe United States
`House of Representatives, Gordon v. Haas, 828 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissed for lack of
`standing).
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 5 of 6
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 5 of 6
`
`those states.” Gordon v. Biden, 364 F. App’x 651, 652 (DC. Cir. 2010) (affirming the
`
`district court’s dismissal of Gordon’s complaint seeking to enjoin Vice President Joseph
`
`Biden from presiding over tabulation of five unbounded electoral states that, by practice,
`
`traditionally award presidential electors on a winner-take-all basis); see also Gordon v.
`
`Haas, 828 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing Gordon’s complaint against the
`
`clerk of the United States House of Representatives for lack of Article III standing). As
`
`such, plaintiff has not suffered a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to establish
`
`Article III standing.
`
`Even if plaintiff could show that he suffered a particularized injury-in-fact,
`
`however, his theory of causation is fatally flawed because his alleged injury is caused
`
`entirely by independent actions of third parties. The Supreme Court has made clear that
`
`“the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. 111 still requires that a federal court act only
`
`to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and
`
`not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the
`
`court.” Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org, 426 US. 26, 41-42 (1976). Here,
`
`third party states and state officials decide how to allocate electoral votes; defendants
`
`have no role in these decisions. NARA provides information to state governors and
`
`election officials regarding the law governing the Electoral College, accepts Certificates
`
`of Vote, and reviews those Certificates for any technical deficiencies. See Defs.’ Mot. to
`
`Dismiss, at 6. Crucially, the Agency in no way decides how the electoral votes from the
`
`eleven unbounded states are allocated, and it has no power to change the way states
`
`allocate their electoral votes. Plaintiff therefore has failed to plead facts sufficient to
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 6 of 6
`Case 1:16-cv-02458-RJL Document 22 Filed 06/20/17 Page 6 of 6
`
`satisfy Article III’s causation requirement. And this result should come as no surprise to
`
`plaintiff, as his 2008 complaint against the Vice President was dismissed for largely the
`
`same reasons. Gordon v. Biden, 606 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2009), afl'd 364 F.
`
`App’x 651 (DC. Cir. 2010) (“Because Gordon’s alleged injury is not ‘fairly traceable’ to
`
`the Vice President’s actions, which in fact are purely ministerial, but rather is attributable
`
`to the actions of third-party states and state officials, he fails to satisfy the causation
`
`element of standing”).
`
`Therefore, because Gordon has failed to establish an Article III injury, and
`
`because his alleged injury is not fairly traceable to defendants’ actions, his claim fails for
`
`lack of standing. Accordingly, I need not—and will not—reach the merits of Gordon’s
`
`claims. See Steel C0,, 523 US. at 98 (“[There are] two centuries ofjurisprudence
`
`affirming the necessity of determining jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits”).
`
`For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice and
`
`his motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. A separate order consistent with this
`
`decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
`
` faded
`
`RICHARD J. LEON
`
`United States District Judge
`
`