Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 22848
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`C.A. No. 22-311 (WCB)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`) ) ) ) ) ) )
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`) ) )
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`IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC.,
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`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`MOTIF FOODWORKS, INC. and
`GINKGO BIOWORKS, INC.,
`
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANT MOTIF FOODWORKS, INC.’S
`SUR-REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 22849
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................1
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`A.
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`Term 1 ......................................................................................................................1
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`1.
`
`2.
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`“Promoter Element” Is Indefinite ................................................................1
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`If Construed, “Promoter Element” Is Means-Plus-Function and
`Invalid ..........................................................................................................3
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`B.
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`Terms 2-3 .................................................................................................................4
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`1.
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`2.
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`Term 2.a .......................................................................................................4
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`Term 3 ..........................................................................................................5
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`Term 4 ......................................................................................................................6
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`Term 5 ......................................................................................................................6
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`Term 6 ......................................................................................................................7
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`Term 7 ......................................................................................................................8
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`Term 8 ......................................................................................................................8
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`G.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................9
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`i
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 22850
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Page(s)
`
`Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................8
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB, 2016 WL 6138124 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2016) .................................4
`
`IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp.,
`825 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................3
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) .........................................................................2, 5, 9
`
`Shaw v. New Castle Cnty.,
`No. CV 20-950-CFC, 2021 WL 4125648 (D. Del. Sept. 9, 2021) ........................................6, 7
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) .........................................................................3, 7, 8
`
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`
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`
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`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 22851
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`ABBREVIATIONS
`
`Citation
`
`“promoter element”
`(all asserted claims)
`
`[2.a] “a Mxr1 transcriptional activator sequence”
`(’492 patent, all asserted claims)
`
`[2.b] “a methanol expression regulator 1 (Mxr1) transcriptional activator”
`(’656 patent, cls. 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 23, 24)
`
`[2.c] “a Mxr1 transcriptional activator sequence”
`(’656 patent, cls. 26, 28)
`
`“[x] from P. pastoris” / “[x] from Pichia pastoris”
`(’492 patent, all asserted claims; ’656 patent, cls. 7, 10, 11, 26, 28)
`
`“wherein the recombinant nucleic acid molecule comprises [x], wherein
`the recombinant nucleic acid molecule comprises [y]”
`(’656 patent, cls. 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 23, 24)
`
`“a nucleic acid molecule encoding [x] and [y]”
`(’492 patent, all asserted claims)
`
`“sequence to which [the/a] Mxr1 transcriptional activator binds”
`(’656 patent, all asserted claims)
`
`“wherein each nucleic acid is operably linked to a methanol-inducible
`promoter element”
`(’656 patent, cls. 26, 28)
`
`“wherein the [methanol-inducible] promoter element” / “wherein the [at
`least one] methanol-inducible promoter element”
`(’492 patent, cls. 5, 7; ’656 patent, cls. 10, 11; ’656 patent cl. 28
`(contingently))
`
`Declaration of Geoffrey Lin-Cereghino in Support of Motif’s Sur-Reply
`Claim Construction Brief dated February 9, 2024
`
`Abbreviation1
`Term 1
`
`Term 2
`(“Mxr Terms”)
`
`Term 3
`
`Term 4
`
`Term 5
`
`Term 6
`
`Term 7
`
`Term 8
`
`Lin-Cereghino-
`Sur-Reply
`
`
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`1 Terms reflect usage in Ginkgo’s Opening Claim Construction Brief, D.I. 333.
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`iii
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 22852
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`I.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Term 1
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`1.
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`“Promoter Element” Is Indefinite
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`
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`“Promoter element” is indefinite. D.I. 340, 5-7. Nothing in Impossible’s newly-amended
`
`proposed construction supports a different conclusion.
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`
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`Impossible concedes that a “promoter element” is only “part” of an (unspecified) promoter.
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`D.I. 338, 2. However, Impossible does not identify any structural feature of a “promoter element,”
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`much less how a promoter could be “truncated” or “expanded” to result in a “promoter element.”
`
`See id. Instead, Impossible contends that any unspecified “part” of a promoter can be a “promoter
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`element” so long as it is a “nucleic acid sequence” that is “functional.” Id. Impossible’s generic
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`characterization demonstrates the lack of reasonable certainty a POSA would need to delineate the
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`structural bounds of a “promoter element.” D.I. 120, 25-27; D.I. 148, 8-9; D.I. 340, 5.
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`
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`Contrary to Impossible’s assertion, the specification does not “contain examples of
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`promoter elements.” D.I. 338, 3 (citing D.I. 339, ¶¶34,38). In fact, the cited support refers
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`expressly to full promoters. D.I. 340, 5; D.I. 341, ¶¶62-63; Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply, ¶18.
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`Teachings of promoters is not the same as teaching “discrete” “parts” of those promoters with
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`“particular identity.” Similarly, Impossible asserts that certain Examples teach “promoter
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`elements” (D.I. 339, ¶33), but those Examples do not mention or describe “promoter elements” at
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`all. Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply, ¶19.
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`
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`Impossible’s characterization of “promoter elements” as “positioned upstream of” and
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`“adjacent (or in proximity to)” a sequence to be expressed is also unavailing. D.I. 338, 2. As
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`explained previously, this characterization conflates “promoter element” with “operably linked.”
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`D.I. 340, 7-8; Ex. 2 (’656 patent), 4:47-51. Moreover, Impossible has not identified any disclosure
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`
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`1
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 22853
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`supporting this characterization of “promoter element.” E.g., Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply, §II.A.2.
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`Regardless, relative positioning does not confer any structure or scope to a “promoter element.”
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`Id., ¶21. And Impossible’s assertion that “promoter element”—a “specific structure[] within a
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`promoter” (D.I. 338, 4)—is broader than promoter further underscores the former’s vagueness.
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`
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`To fill the patents’ silence, Impossible reverts to extrinsic evidence. It contends that a
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`“promoter element” is “not just any sequence, but rather a discrete unit with a particular identity
`
`in the scientific literature.” D.I. 338, 2 (emphasis altered). Yet Impossible cannot point to any
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`accepted scientific definition of what the “discrete unit” or its “particular identity” is. Lin-
`
`Cereghino-Sur-Reply, §II.A.1; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
`
`banc) (recognizing treatises/dictionaries “endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms”).
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`
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`Lacking a definition, Impossible relies instead on scattershot instances of this term in other
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`patents and literature, confirming its idiosyncratic usage. D.I. 338, 2-3; Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply,
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`§II.A.3. Even assuming that these usages are relevant, Impossible’s superficial argument based
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`on them is unpersuasive because those references do not address what “promoter element” means
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`in the context of the Yeast Patents. E.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (finding extrinsic evidence
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`“less reliable” given the “virtually unbounded universe of potential extrinsic evidence of some
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`marginal relevance that could be brought to bear on any claim construction question”).
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`
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`In fact, Impossible does not dispute that a “promoter element” is context-dependent. D.I.
`
`340, 6. Even Impossible’s expert’s research shows that functional sites in one polynucleotide
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`sequence can be non-functional elsewhere, even when positioned to drive transcription. Lin-
`
`Cereghino-Sur-Reply, §II.A.4. As a result, it is entirely unclear how any given structure can have
`
`the “particular identity” of a functional “promoter element” if it is identical to structures that are
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`non-functional in other contexts. Impossible’s expert further amplifies this confusion by
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`2
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 22854
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`suggesting “promoter elements” can be defined by the absence of structure: “[A] promoter element
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`may lack sequences determined to be dispensable for driving transcription.” D.I. 339, ¶28
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`(emphasis added). This admission underscores the term’s total lack of structural boundaries.
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`
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`At bottom, the scope of the term “promoter element” must be discerned from the intrinsic
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`record, which is impossible here. IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp., 825 F. App’x 900, 904 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (“[I]mportance of the intrinsic evidence reaches its zenith” when term lacks ordinary
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`meaning). Defendants do not need to show that the claim term “was not understood amongst the
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`industry”—only that a POSA would not be reasonably certain of its scope in light of the record for
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`these patents. Id. at 907. This is true here, where neither intrinsic nor extrinsic evidence illuminate
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`whether any structure—or lack thereof—is a “promoter element.”
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`2.
`
`If Construed, “Promoter Element” Is Means-Plus-Function and
`Invalid
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`
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`Impossible has not shown that “promoter element” has “sufficiently definite meaning as
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`the name for structure.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
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`(en banc). An unbounded, undefined “polynucleotide sequence”—or, sometimes, the lack
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`thereof—with no consistent features and defined entirely by function, is not enough. Supra.
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`“Element” is well-known to be a “generic” term and does not delineate any structures within a
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`promoter. D.I. 340, 9. Thus, this term, if construed, is means-plus-function. Id.
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`
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`UroPep does not support Impossible because “promoter element” is not understood by
`
`POSAs “to have a meaning that denotes structure.” Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly
`
`& Co., No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB, 2016 WL 6138124, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2016). UroPep
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`involved a class of drugs with somewhat-different structures but consistent activity—they inhibit
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`the PDE(V) enzyme. Id. at *10-11. It is inapt here, where according to Impossible’s interpretation
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 22855
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`any nucleotide sequence, no matter how large or small, could be a “promoter element” if the
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`context is right.
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`
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`Impossible’s remaining arguments merely confirm that, if construed, “promoter element”
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`is defined solely as a “functional part of a promoter.” E.g., D.I. 338, 2; D.I. 339, ¶27 (“drives
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`transcription of a gene”); ¶28 (“capable of driving transcription”). Impossible’s proposed
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`construction confirms that this term is means-plus-function for which no structure distinct from a
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`full promoter is disclosed. D.I. 340, 9-10. Under these circumstances, the term clearly lacks
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`sufficiently definite structure corresponding with the alleged function and thus the claims are
`
`invalid. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1354 (invalidating means-plus-function claims containing “nonce
`
`word[s]” such as module, “mechanism, element, [and] device,” which are “tantamount to using
`
`the word ‘means’” for failing to disclose a corresponding structure).
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`B.
`
`Terms 2-3
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`1.
`
`Term 2.a
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`
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`A POSA would understand that Term 2.a, like Terms 2.b-2.c, means a sequence encoding
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`native Mxr1.2 E.g., D.I. 340, 12-16. Impossible’s contrary interpretation of claim 1’s “paradigm”
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`is incorrect and confusing as previously explained. Id.
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`
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`Indeed, tacitly recognizing the potential redundancy of claim 1 reciting both a “promoter
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`element” and—separately—a “binding site” (its Term 2.a interpretation), Impossible goes even
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`farther afield by asserting Term 2.a is something else—“an expression element, specifically an
`
`enhancer sequence.” D.I. 338, 8. However, Impossible does not show where in the specification
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`an “expression element” or “enhancer sequence” is defined as a Mxr1 encoding sequence, Mxr1
`
`binding site, or anything related to Mxr1.
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`2 Defendants’ proposals for Terms 2-3 do not materially differ.
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`4
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 22856
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`This silence also underlies an analytical flaw in Impossible’s constructions which its expert
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`does not remedy. D.I. 107, ¶¶52-56, D.I. 144, ¶¶6-10, D.I. 339, ¶¶39-43. Presumptively, a
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`“promoter element” is different from Term 2.a. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade
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`Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022). But Impossible does not explain how a POSA
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`would understand that the two terms are different from each other. Indeed, from plain claim
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`language, a “promoter element” can comprise a Mxr1 binding site. E.g., Ex. 2, cl. 26. This re-
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`affirms the lack of reasonable certainty about the scope of “promoter element” while showing the
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`implausibility of Impossible’s interpretation of Term 2.a.
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`2.
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`Term 3
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`
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`Motif did not brief this term separately as no separate interpretation is required. See D.I.
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`340, §II.B.2. The Mxr1 Terms refer to sequences encoding Mxr1 that are native to (originating
`
`in) an organism’s genome—a genome which, as recited in some claims, is the P. pastoris genome.
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`Id. (Terms 2.a/2.c). Impossible’s expert even agrees that Mxr1 Terms reciting “from P. pastoris”
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`and “from Pichia pastoris” “indicate[] to a POSA that a given sequence has its origins in the Pichia
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`pastoris genome.” D.I. 339, ¶59.
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`
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`The parties appear to diverge on the extent to which the native Mxr1 sequence can be
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`modified, if at all, and still be within the meaning of “Mxr1” (whether “from” P. pastoris or another
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`species). Here, the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence support Motif. D.I. 340, 16-18.
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`
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`Impossible incorrectly characterizes Motif’s proposal as “rigid[ly]” excluding all
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`engineering manipulations. D.I. 338, 14. In fact, as Motif explained, the specification discloses
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`adding sequences, such as a tag, to the native Mxr1 sequence (which itself is unaltered). D.I. 340,
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`17-18. It does not disclose modifications to the native Mxr1 sequence. D.I. 340, 16-18; D.I. 341,
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`§VIII.B.2.b.
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 22857
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`Impossible’s expert’s contrary views are incorrect. D.I. 338, 14. The patents do not teach
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`“codon-optimization” of Mxr1. Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply, ¶¶71-73. Modification is taught solely
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`for genes that are not yeast-native (soybean leghemoglobin) to facilitate their expression in yeast.
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`Id., ¶72; Ex. 2, 6:12-16; 23:48-52; 27:37-42; 32:7-54; SEQ ID NOS:3-6. Impossible’s reference
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`to “mutations” and “cut sites” (D.I. 338, 14) is unpersuasive as the patents do not use that
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`terminology with respect to Mxr1. Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply, ¶70. Whether such techniques were
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`“within the knowledge of a POSA” does not bear on the scope of “Mxr1” as claimed. “Mxr1”
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`refers to the native sequence. Id., §II.B.2.
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`C.
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`Term 4
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`
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`Defendants’ understanding of Term 4 is consistent with principles of claim interpretation
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`and estoppel and should be adopted. D.I. 340, 91-21. Impossible ignores these facts to avoid the
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`consequences of its prior strategy and thus has waived any contrary argument. D.I. 338, 18-19;
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`e.g., Shaw v. New Castle Cnty., No. CV 20-950-CFC, 2021 WL 4125648, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 9,
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`2021) (collecting cases finding abandonment/waiver for failure to respond).
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`
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`Nor does Impossible address its statements to the PTAB about Term 4, or the PTAB’s
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`reliance thereon. D.I. 340, 91-21; Ex. 6, 23, 30; Ex. 7, 10. Impossible merely re-argues its merits
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`defense from that proceeding. D.I. 338, 18-19. Impossible must be held to its prior position to
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`avoid inconsistent and unfair results. D.I. 340, 19-21.
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`D.
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`Term 5
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`
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`Defendants’ interpretation of Term 5 should be adopted as previously explained. D.I. 340,
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`21-22. Nothing in Impossible’s counterargument warrants a different result.
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`
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`Impossible concedes that its Term 5 construction rises and falls with its interpretation of
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`Term 2.a, D.I. 338, 14-15. D.I. 340, 21-22; Section I.B.1 supra. Impossible also cites the agreed-
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`6
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 22858
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`on definition of “operably linked” to argue there is “no support” for Defendants’ interpretation
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`(D.I. 338, 15), but it does not explain how “operably linked” supports its position if the Court
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`agrees that Term 2.a is an encoding sequence, not a binding site.
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`
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`Impossible does not even address the unique estoppel issues related to Term 5, merely
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`contending that Defendants are wrong “for the reasons discussed … with respect to Ginkgo’s Term
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`2.” D.I. 338, 15. Again, this amounts to waiver. Shaw, 2021 WL 4125648, at *2.
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`E.
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`Term 6
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`
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`This term is indefinite because it is part of an indefinite “promoter element” term. D.I.
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`340, 23-24. If the Court finds otherwise, however, Impossible’s construction compels a finding
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`that Term 6 is means-plus-function and invalid.
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`
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`For example, Impossible’s argument focuses on “consensus” binding sequences as the
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`structure. D.I. 338. 11-12. However, Mxr1 does not bind to consensus sequences in all cases.
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`D.I. 340, 24; D.I. 341, ¶¶67-69, 120-122. In fact, Mxr1 does not even always bind to consensus
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`sequences in promoters. D.I. 341, ¶69, n.8 (discussing portions of DHAS/PEX8 promoters). This
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`negates Impossible’s suggestion that the “context of this claim language” (D.I. 338, 12) confers
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`either reasonable certainty or sufficiently definite structure to Term 6 corresponding to the alleged
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`function. Impossible ignores this fact and mischaracterizes Mxr1 as “consistently” binding
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`consensus sequences. D.I. 338, 11; Lin-Cereghino-Sur-Reply ¶¶10-15. Thus, a consensus
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`sequence alone is inadequate to be a “binding” site and cannot constitute “a sufficiently definite
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`meaning as the name for [the] structure” of Term 6. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
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`
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`Impossible’s remaining argument—that Term 6 “recites a nucleic acid structure,” which is
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`“definite structure” (D.I. 338, 12)—misstates the Williamson standard and is hopelessly vague.
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`Even consensus sequences are insufficiently definite names for structure. Supra.
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`7
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 22859
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`F.
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`Term 7
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`Defendants’ Term 7 construction is consistent with principles of claim interpretation and
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`estoppel and should be adopted. D.I. 340, 25-26. Impossible’s contrary argument focuses on
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`whether the articles “a” and “the” mean singular or plural terms, applying Baldwin’s rule-of-thumb
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`principle that the article “a,” in patent claims, generally means “one or more.” D.I. 338, 19-20.
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`
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`Impossible’s argument fails because Term 7 falls within Baldwin’s exception to this rule—
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`namely, when a patentee “‘evince[s] a clear intent’ to limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to ‘one.’” Baldwin Graphic
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`Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
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`
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`Here, Impossible clearly intended to limit “a” to “one” in connection with the ’656 patent
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`IPR to avoid institution. D.I. 340, 26 & Ex. 6, 31-32; see Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856
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`F.3d 1353, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting patentee’s repeated use of “only” to characterize
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`claims and distinguish prior art). “[S]tatements made by a patent owner during an IPR proceeding
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`can be considered during claim construction and relied upon to support a finding of prosecution
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`disclaimer.” 856 F.3d at 1361. This principle applies to statements made in a patent owner’s
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`preliminary response, even if institution is denied. Id. at 1361 (finding such statements “part of an
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`IPR proceeding”), 1363 (noting institution denial). Prosecution disclaimer “precludes patentees
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`from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.”
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`Id. at 1359 (cleaned up). The claims should be construed accordingly.
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`G.
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`Term 8
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`
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`The Term 8 terms each recite “promoter element,” which is indefinite. D.I. 340, 27.
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`Impossible offers no reason why the Term 8 terms are more definite than “promoter element.” D.I.
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`338, 15-17.
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`8
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 22860
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`Impossible’s counterarguments miss the mark. For example, the indefiniteness issue is not
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`whether “the” recited in the Term 8 terms means “one or more.” Impossible’s discussion of
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`Baldwin’s principle is thus off-point. Rather, the issue is that it is entirely unclear which of
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`multiple “promoter elements” recited in independent claim(s) is “the” promoter element recited in
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`the Term 8 dependent claims. Impossible cannot answer this question. Instead, it relies cursorily
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`on its expert to argue that a POSA would “readily” understand these claims without explaining
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`how a POSA would understand them. D.I. 338, 17 (citing Alper III, ¶¶54-57).
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`
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`The “only evidence in the record” Impossible cites (D.I. 338, 17) is its expert’s unsupported
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`say-so. D.I. 339, ¶¶54-57. It is unnecessary for an expert to explain the ordinary meaning of a
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`non-technical term—for Term 8, the article “the”—to the Court. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314.
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`In sum, the claims recite more than one antecedent “promoter element,” and Impossible
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`wholly fails to explain how a POSA would not be reasonably certain of which is “the” “promoter
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`element” recited in the dependent Term 8 terms.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Respectfully, the Court should adopt Motif’s constructions.
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`9
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 22861
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
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`/s/ Jeremy A. Tigan
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`Jeremy A. Tigan (#5239)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jtigan@morrisnichols.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant Motif FoodWorks, Inc.
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Joseph M. Paunovich
`Ryan Landes
`Sandra L. Haberny
`Sarah Cork
`Razmig Messerian
`Patrick T. Schmidt
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
` & SULLIVAN, LLP
`865 South Figueroa Street
`10th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`(213) 443-3000
`
`Stephen Q. Wood
`Trevor J. Quist
`Derek Huish
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
` & SULLIVAN, LLP
`2755 E. Cottonwood Parkway
`Suite 430
`Salt Lake City, UT 84121
`(801) 515-7300
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`Geoffrey A. Kirsner
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
` & SULLIVAN, LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor,
`New York, NY 10010
`(212) 849-7000
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`Sandy Shen
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
` & SULLIVAN, LLP
`1300 I Street, NW, Suite 900
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 538-8000
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`February 9, 2024
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 22862
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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`I certify that this document complies with Paragraph 13 of Court’s Scheduling Order (D.I. 37)
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`because it contains 2482 words as determined by the word count feature of Microsoft Word (excluding
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`the caption, tables, and signature blocks).
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`/s/ Jeremy A. Tigan
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`Jeremy A. Tigan (#5239)
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 22863
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on February 9, 2024, I caused the foregoing to be electronically filed
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`with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
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`February 9, 2024, upon the following in the manner indicated:
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`David E. Moore, Esquire
`Bindu A. Palapura, Esquire
`Andrew M. Moshos, Esquire
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc.
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`Matthew R. Reed, Esquire
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc.
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`Wendy L. Devine, Esquire
`Susannah M. L. Gagnon, Esquire
`Kristina Hanson, Esquire
`Jessica Ramsey, Esquire
`Shannon Gillespie McComb, Esquire
`Joyce K. Yao, Esquire
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`One Market Plaza
`Spear Tower, Suite 3300
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc.
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`Lorelei P. Westin, Esquire
`Natalie J. Morgan, Esquire
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`12235 El Camino Real
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 352 Filed 02/09/24 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 22864
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`Michael T. Rosato, Esquire
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5100
`Seattle, WA 98104
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc.
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`Daniel M. Silver, Esquire
`Alexandra M. Joyce, Esquire
`MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP
`Renaissance Centre
`405 N. King Street, 8th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Defendant Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc.
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`Daralyn J. Durie, Esquire
`Adam R. Brausa, Esquire
`Vera Ranieri, Esquire
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`425 Market Street
`San Francisco, CA 94105-2482
`Attorneys for Defendant Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc.
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`Aaron D. Bray, Esquire
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`755 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1018
`Attorneys for Defendant Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc.
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`Caleb D. Woods, Esquire
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`2100 L Street, NW
`Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20037
`Attorneys for Defendant Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc.
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`/s/ Jeremy A. Tigan
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`Jeremy A. Tigan (#5239)
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`2
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