throbber
Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 22833
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C.A. No. 22-311-WCB
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`))))))))))
`
`IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`MOTIF FOODWORKS, INC. and
`GINKGO BIOWORKS, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`PLAINTIFF IMPOSSIBLE FOODS INC.’S
`SUR-REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Wendy L. Devine
`Kristina M. Hanson
`Shannon P. Gillespie McComb
`Jessica Ramsey
`Susannah M. L. Gagnon
`Joyce K. Yao
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`One Market Plaza
`Spear Tower, Suite 3300
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`(415) 947-2000
`
`Matthew R. Reed
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`(650) 493-9300
`
`David E. Moore (#3983)
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Andrew M. Moshos (#6685)
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 984-6000
`dmoore@potteranderson.com
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
`amoshos@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods
`Inc.
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Lori P. Westin
`Natalie J. Morgan
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`12235 El Camino Real
`San Diego, CA 92130
`(858) 350-2300
`
`Michael T. Rosato
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`701 Fifth Avenue
`Suite 5100
`Seattle, WA 98104
`(206) 883-2529
`
`Dated: February 9, 2024
`11318570/ 20200.00002
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 22834
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`PAGE
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`Term 1–“Promoter element” ................................................................................................1
`
`Term 2–Mxr1 .......................................................................................................................3
`
`Term 6–Sequence to which [the/a] Mxr1 transcriptional activator binds ............................5
`
`Term 3–From P. pastoris .....................................................................................................5
`
`Term 5–claims 1 and 14 of the ’492 patent .........................................................................6
`
`Term 8–“the” promoter element ..........................................................................................7
`
`VII. Term 4–“nucleic acid molecule” .........................................................................................7
`
`VIII. Term 7–wherein each nucleic acid is operably linked to a methanol-inducible
`promoter element .................................................................................................................8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Operably linked to promoter element ......................................................................8
`
`Same nucleic acid ....................................................................................................9
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 22835
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys. Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................8
`
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,
`875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)........................................................................................3, 5
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
`616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................4, 5
`
`C.f., Nevro Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
`955 F.3d 35 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................3, 5
`
`Finjan LLC v. SonicWall, Inc.,
`84 F.4th 963 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ..............................................................................................8
`
`Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc.,
`423 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................8
`
`Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Polar Electro Oy,
`656 F. App’x 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................1
`
`In re Vogel,
`442 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970) .............................................................................................4
`
`Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.,
`99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..............................................................................................8
`
`IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp.,
`825 F. App’x. 900 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .....................................................................................1
`
`Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`22 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................4
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 22836
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`Abbreviation
`
`Phrase
`
`Impossible
`
`Impossible Foods Inc.
`
`Ginkgo
`
`Motif
`
`’492 patent
`
`’656 patent
`
`’327 patent
`
`Ginkgo Bioworks, Inc.
`
`Motif FoodWorks, Inc.
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,273,492
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,689,656
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,938,327
`
`Yeast Patents
`
`’492 and ’656 patents, collectively
`
`Term __
`
`POSA
`
`Alper I
`
`Alper II
`
`Alper III
`
`Alper IV
`
`Numbered list of terms in the Joint Claim Construction Statement for
`the Yeast Patents (D.I. 314-1).
`
`Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`
`D.I. 107
`
`D.I. 144
`
`D.I. 339
`
`Declaration of Dr. Hal Alper filed herewith
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 22837
`
`I.
`
`Term 1–“Promoter element”1
`
`Defendants’ fail to distinguish between “element” in the law and “element” in the term
`
`“promoter element.” In the claims, “element” is not a substitute for “means,” “device,” or
`
`another stand-in for a purely functional limitation. “Promoter element” refers to an art-
`
`recognized physical and chemical object (i.e., nucleic acid) that also exhibits a function (i.e.,
`
`directing or regulating transcription of downstream genes).
`
`Promoter elements may vary in their specific nucleic acid sequences or activities; yet, a
`
`POSA would be reasonably certain of the term’s meaning. Defendants’ expert admits,
`
`“component[s] [of prior art promoters] can be generically referred to as an ‘element’” and “it is
`
`also possible to identify ‘elements’ of a promoter with some role in the promoter’s activity.”
`
`D.I. 123, 45, n.2. Likewise, the literature establishes common characteristics associated with
`
`promoter elements that are not specific to the context of a particular study and does not reflect a
`
`“varied and indiscriminate use of that term,” as Motif alleges without support. D.I. 340, 6; Alper
`
`III, ¶¶26-34; Alper IV, ¶¶6-8.2
`
`1 Ginkgo selectively ignores Impossible’s first two briefs and expert declarations to
`mischaracterize Impossible’s position. D.I. 346, 1. Ginkgo’s self-serving narrative is false.
`Compare, e.g., D.I. 338, 1 (plain and ordinary meaning is “a polynucleotide that regulates (e.g.,
`drives transcription…”)), D.I. 107, ¶67 (“a POSA would understand the term ‘promoter element’
`to refer to a nucleic acid sequence that regulates transcription of downstream genes”), D.I. 142,
`13-14 (same); D.I. 144, ¶17 (same). Selective ignorance also underlies Ginkgo’s false allegation
`that Impossible does not provide specification support for its position (D.I. 106, 15-16; D.I. 142,
`13), and that Dr. Alper “specifically says nothing about what [promoter element] actually is.”
`D.I. 107, ¶¶65-67 (defining “promoter element” in June 14, 2023 declaration).
`
`2 Motif’s reliance on Icon Health is misplaced—“promoter element” is not a “relative term”
`which “only has meaning in a given context.” D.I. 340, 7 (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v.
`Polar Electro Oy, 656 F. App’x 1008, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Likewise, IQASR, where the
`plaintiff relied on “an email exchange between an associate of the inventor and [defendant’s]
`engineer” to show that “magnetic fuzz” was not indefinite, is inapplicable. IQASR LLC v. Wendt
`Corp., 825 F. App’x. 900, 903-904 (Fed. Cir. 2020); D.I. 340, 8.
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 22838
`
`The use of “promoter” and “promoter element” in the literature is not inconsistent.
`
`Rather, the literature reflects that a promoter includes promoter elements that allow transcription
`
`of downstream nucleic acids. Alper IV, ¶¶5-7, 11-12. These terms are used similarly in the
`
`Yeast Patents’ specification, as Impossible explained. D.I. 142, 12-14. That use in the
`
`specification is consistent with claim 11 of the ’327 patent, which supports Impossible’s
`
`position.
`
`Defendants’ “relativity” arguments also fail to account for the context of the claim
`
`language. In the asserted ’492 patent claims, “promoter element” is limited by “from P.
`
`pastoris.” Alper IV, ¶¶22-23, 30-33. The ’492 patent’s dependent claims and the ’656 patent’s
`
`claims are narrower still, reciting specific promoter elements by name (e.g., AOX1) and
`
`characteristics (e.g., methanol-inducible). Motif’s expert authored a paper characterizing the
`
`generalized functional elements of the P. pastoris AOX1 promoter; he should not be heard to
`
`opine that such elements only have “relative” meaning. Id., ¶25.
`
`Impossible’s interpretation of “promoter element” does not render “operably linked”
`
`superfluous. “Operably linked” provides the relationship between the promoter element and the
`
`recited encoding sequence in the context of the claims. Id., ¶21.
`
`As Impossible has explained, Defendants’ experts authored IPR declarations that
`
`contradict their arguments here. D.I. 142, 12-13; Alper IV, ¶¶12, 16-17.
`
`Defendants’ remaining arguments focus on the functional nature and breadth of
`
`“promoter element” and do not demonstrate indefiniteness. It is undisputed that “promoter
`
`element” is understood by a POSA and used in the literature and Yeast Patents consistently. It is
`
`also undisputed that the literature and specification reflect exemplar promoter elements. Alper
`
`IV, ¶¶ 8-9, 17-20. The functional characteristics of “promoter element” do not render the term
`
`-2-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 22839
`
`indefinite. BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
`
`(“Nothing inherent in the standard of ‘reasonable certainty’ precludes a relevant skilled artisan
`
`from understanding with reasonable certainty what compositions perform a particular
`
`function.”). Similarly, whether a POSA must rely on their knowledge, including pertinent
`
`literature and/or routine testing, to determine if a given promoter element has the claimed
`
`function does not prove indefiniteness.3 C.f., Nevro Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 955 F.3d 35, 40
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Definiteness does not require that a potential infringer be able to determine ex
`
`ante if a particular act infringes the claims.”).
`
`II.
`
`Term 2–Mxr1
`
`Defendants’ assumption that the PTAB endorsed their construction is unsupported. The
`
`PTAB addressed, and rejected, Motif’s flawed invalidity theory, which incorporated Motif’s
`
`mistaken understanding of the claims (which Impossible had no duty to correct). D.I. 338, 9.
`
`Defendants’ contention that the specification does not discuss Mxr1 binding is also
`
`wrong; it discusses constructs consistent with Impossible’s construction. Id., 9-10; ’656 patent
`
`5:18-24. Mxr1 functions through binding and the specification is about recombinant expression
`
`of proteins using transcriptional activator such as Mxr1—this is undisputed. Alper IV, ¶¶32-34.
`
`To argue the specification must detail the POSA’s knowledge regarding Mxr1 binding for the
`
`claims to reflect an Mxr1 binding site places form over substance.
`
`Defendants contend that different phrases in claim 14 should receive the same meaning
`
`lacks support. Alper IV, ¶35. Notably, only Defendants’ interpretation of the independent
`
`3 Ginkgo’s discussion of Dr. Alper’s paper regarding promoter element screening (D.I. 346, 4-5)
`demonstrates only that a POSA would know how to experimentally verify that a sequence is a
`“promoter element,” not that promoter elements were unknown.
`
`-3-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 22840
`
`claims requires adopting the same meaning for different claim phrases. The claims should be
`
`interpreted as written, not as Defendants argue.
`
`Ginkgo fails to address the error in ’327 patent claim 18 of the ’327 patent, which claim
`
`17 also reflects. D.I. 338, 10.
`
`Ginkgo’s contention that Dr. Alper’s opinions are not grounded in the specification is
`
`directly contradicted by his declarations, which discuss the specification substance and
`
`relationship to his opinions. E.g., Alper I, ¶¶47-51. Ginkgo’s accounting of citations under
`
`particular headings, again, places form over substance.4
`
`Motif’s conflation of “promoter element” and Mxr1 binding sites also does not support
`
`its construction. The Yeast Patents’ specification describes nucleic acids encoding proteins
`
`operably linked to promoter elements and other expression elements, including an Mxr1 binding
`
`site. Alper IV, ¶¶37-38. Motif does not cite any law mandating claim language used for Mxr1
`
`binding sites in the ’656 patent must be used in the ’492 patent, because the law is contrary. In
`
`re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
`
`Motif’s self-serving color-coding and law do not support its construction. D.I. 340, 14.
`
`Kyocera involved two mechanically separate components of a “fastener driving tool”: “(iii) a
`
`safety contact element” and “(vi) a prime mover.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. ITC, 22
`
`F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The claims at issue separately enumerated these
`
`components. Id. Becton involved a “shieldable needle assembly,” where the claims separated
`
`the “spring means” and “hinged arm” limitations and “[t]he specification, moreover, confirm[ed]
`
`4 In view of this drafting error, Motif’s contention regarding prosecution history and non-
`statutory double patenting supports Impossible’s construction. D.I. 340, 13-14.
`
`-4-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 22841
`
`that the spring means is a separate element.” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp.,
`
`LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`III.
`
`Term 6–Sequence to which [the/a] Mxr1 transcriptional activator binds
`
`Defendants concede sequences to which Mxr1 binds were known in the prior art. That
`
`the known Mxr1 binding sequences are not functional in some contexts reflected in the art, and
`
`that a POSA may need to confirm binding for a context not discussed in the art, is not evidence
`
`of indefiniteness. Alper IV, ¶¶46-47; BASF, 875 F.3d at 1366; Nevro, 955 F.3d at 40.
`
`IV.
`
`Term 3–From P. pastoris5
`
`Impossible explained “native” is a term in the Yeast Patents’ specification used to
`
`contrast exogenous nucleic acids. D.I. 142, 11; Alper IV, ¶¶39-40. Motif argues “native” should
`
`be inserted into the claims with a meaning different from that in the specification. D.I. 340, 18.
`
`Such a claim construction finds no support in the law.
`
`Motif also contends, without explanation, its insertion of “native” does not exclude
`
`variation or mutants. D.I. 340, 17. This is contradicted by Motif characterizing its construction
`
`as limited to a GenBank sequence. Id., 18. Limitation to that single sequence is unsupported.
`
`First, if the claims intended to recite a sequence identification, they would have. E.g., ’656
`
`patent, claim 3. Second, a single native sequence for a species is not a realistic concept; natural
`
`variation is significant and common. Alper IV, ¶¶41-45. Defendants’ contention that Example
`
`15 contains a sequence added on to the native sequence ignores that the specification also
`
`5 This term was briefed last year and Ginkgo’s expert submitted declarations specifically about
`this claim phrase. D.I. 123, ¶¶124-129, D.I. 149, ¶¶28-31. Ginkgo “modified” Motif’s
`construction from that briefing to “clarify the dispute,” yet states that briefing is irrelevant, after
`telling the Court (to secure a deadline extension) that it did not understand what the dispute was.
`
`-5-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 22842
`
`teaches modifications such as codon-optimization and truncation. E.g., ’656 patent, 6:12-17,
`
`32:30-54, Examples 19, 21.
`
`Ginkgo’s argument that this claim phrase is “not definable” if it includes variation or
`
`mutation is contradicted by the specification and Motif’s admission that variation and mutation
`
`are not excluded. Ginkgo fails to address the specification’s discussion of engineering (D.I. 338,
`
`14), and instead professes not to understand “ordinary, art-known manipulations.” D.I. 346, 11-
`
`12. Ginkgo’s failure to consult its own expert (who opined on this term for Motif) is not reason
`
`to adopt Ginkgo’s proposed construction.
`
`V.
`
`Term 5–Claims 1 and 14 of the ’492 patent
`
`Defendants contend that Impossible advocated for their construction during Motif’s failed
`
`IPR, which Impossible’s IPR statements—including those cited by Defendants—directly
`
`contradict. First, Defendants point to Impossible’s recitation of the exact same position
`
`Impossible advocates for here. D.I. 340, 22, citing D.I. 340-1, Ex. 4, 1 (“nucleic acid molecules
`
`encoding [proteins] that are each operably liked to a promoter element and a Mxr1
`
`transcriptional activator sequence”). Defendants’ only other citation to Impossible’s IPR filing is
`
`a recitation of Motif’s IPR contention and is also consistent with Impossible’s position here. D.I.
`
`341-1, Ex. 4, 8 (“Petitioner then turns to Vogl to further operably link to each construct ‘a
`
`promoter element from P. pastoris’… and ‘a Mxr1 transcriptional activator sequence from P.
`
`pastoris.’”).6 Defendants’ only other support is a quote from the PTAB’s denial of institution—
`
`which does not reflect claim construction (the PTAB declined to construe claims)—rejecting
`
`Motif’s positions. D.I. 333-8, 7, 11; D.I. 338, 9. That Motif presented an argument based on a
`
`6 Because Impossible’s position in IPR and here are consistent, the law cited by Motif is
`inapposite. D.I. 340, 26.
`
`-6-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 22843
`
`flawed claim interpretation which the PTAB rejected does not estop Impossible from advocating
`
`for a correct claim construction here.
`
`VI.
`
`Term 8–“the” promoter element
`
`Defendants do not dispute that each claim phrase in the dependent claims match their
`
`antecedent phrases in the claims from which they depend. This undisputed fact renders Bushnell
`
`inapposite. D.I. 338, 17. Ginkgo now concedes there is no support for its prior construction of
`
`“the” as singular and instead argues the dependent claims may only further limit one recitation of
`
`the antecedent limitation in the independent claims. D.I. 346, 16. Ginkgo’s new argument lacks
`
`legal and evidentiary support—it should be rejected.
`
`VII. Term 4–“nucleic acid molecule”
`
`Ginkgo’s characterization of the details of the IPR as “word salad” evinces Ginkgo’s
`
`failure to consider that context. Impossible’s position here is consistent with its position (and
`
`Motif’s position) in Motif’s failed IPR—no construction is necessary. D.I. 333-6, 4. In the IPR,
`
`Impossible correctly distinguished Motif’s prior art regarding vectors and plasmids that did not
`
`contained the claimed inventions’ features. D.I. 338, 18-19.7
`
`As discussed in Impossible’s Answering Brief, Impossible only disputes the notion that
`
`the “recombinant nucleic acid” resides on a single chromosome in the yeast genome. Id., 19.
`
`Ginkgo indicates the parties agree on that claim scope. D.I. 346, 12 (“[T]his assertion has
`
`nothing to do with the proper construction of the term at issue.”).
`
`7 Motif only repeats Ginkgo’s arguments.
`
`-7-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 22844
`
`VIII. Term 7–wherein each nucleic acid is operably linked to a methanol-inducible
`promoter element
`
`A.
`
`Operably linked to promoter element
`
`Ginkgo acknowledges it must identify intrinsic evidence to qualify for the “extremely
`
`limited” exception to the rule that “a” can mean “one or more.” D.I. 346, 15; Baldwin Graphic
`
`Sys. Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Such evidence must “evince a
`
`clear intent to limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to one.” Baldwin, 512 F.3d at 1342-43. The portion of the
`
`specification Ginkgo cites does not demonstrate an intent to limit the claims to every sequence
`
`being operably linked to one and the same promoter element. D.I. 333, 15 (citing ’656 patent,
`
`6:62-7:10 (stating a single promoter can drive transcription of the transcriptional activator and
`
`“one or more” additional nucleic acids)). Likewise, consistent with Federal Circuit law, claim 26
`
`recites “the” as a reference to antecedent “a,” which “simply reinvokes that non-singular
`
`meaning.” Baldwin, 512 F.3d, at 1342-43. The recited sequences are operably linked to one or
`
`more promoter elements and those promoter elements comprise at least one sequence to which
`
`an Mxr1 transcriptional activator binds. ’656 patent, Fig.2. That is the only interpretation
`
`consistent with the law and intrinsic evidence.
`
`Ginkgo’s attempt to analogize to Insituform is unconvincing. D.I. 346, 15 (citing
`
`Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). There, the
`
`Federal Circuit applied a singular construction because “adding elements eliminates an inherent
`
`feature” of the invention: “In light of the [intrinsic evidence], we conclude the only correct …
`
`interpretation of claim 1 limits the scope of that claim to a process using only one vacuum cup
`
`which inherently creates a discontinuous vacuum.” Insituform, 99 F.3d, 1105-06; see Free
`
`Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
`
`Insituform). The law Motif cites also does not support this construction. D.I. 340, 25 citing,
`
`-8-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 22845
`
`Finjan LLC v. SonicWall, Inc., 84 F.4th 963 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“a computer” performed a first
`
`function and “the computer” performed a second function, showing the claim required the same
`
`computer perform both functions).
`
`Defendants’ argument that “a” followed by “the” always indicates singularity directly
`
`contradicts Baldwin—Federal Circuit law.
`
`B.
`
`Same nucleic acid
`
`Ginkgo’s Reply Brief only reiterates its Opening Brief and does not even attempt to
`
`respond to Impossible’s Answering Brief. Motif’s Answering Brief offers the same arguments
`
`as Ginkgo.8
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Wendy L. Devine
`Kristina M. Hanson
`Shannon P. Gillespie McComb
`Jessica Ramsey
`Susannah M. L. Gagnon
`Joyce K. Yao
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`One Market Plaza
`Spear Tower, Suite 3300
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Tel: (415) 947-2000
`
`Matthew R. Reed
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Tel: (650) 493-9300
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`
`By: /s/ David E. Moore
`David E. Moore (#3983)
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Andrew M. Moshos (#6685)
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 984-6000
`dmoore@potteranderson.com
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
`amoshos@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Impossible Foods Inc.
`
`8 By adding emphasis to a quote from Impossible’s IPR filing, Motif implies Impossible argued
`the claim requires operable linkage to a singular promoter. D.I. 340, 26. Not so. Impossible
`quoted the claim language, which must be interpreted consistent with Federal Circuit law, as
`Impossible’s position here does. D.I. 333-6, 31-32.
`
`-9-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 22846
`
`Lori P. Westin
`Natalie J. Morgan
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`12235 El Camino Real
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Tel: (858) 350-2300
`
`Michael T. Rosato
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`701 Fifth Avenue
`Suite 5100
`Seattle, WA 98104
`Tel: (206) 883-2529
`
`Dated: February 9, 2024
`11318570 / 20200.00002
`
`-10-
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00311-WCB Document 351 Filed 02/09/24 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 22847
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`I hereby certify that the foregoing document complies with the Court’s December 22,
`
`2023 Oral Order (D.I. 321) because it contains 2,497 words as determined by the word count
`
`feature of Microsoft Word (excluding the caption, tables, and signature blocks).
`
`/s/ David E. Moore
`David E. Moore (#3983)
`
`-11-
`
`

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