Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: 8835
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C.A. No. 22-305-JLH
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`ROBOCAST, INC.,
`
` Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,
`
`
`v.
`
`)))))))))
`
`
`NETFLIX, INC.,
`
`
` Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff.
`)
`
`DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
`THE PLEADINGS OF INVALIDITY OF U.S. PATENT NO. 7,155,451 IN VIEW OF IN
`RE CELLECT
`
`Kelly E. Farnan (#4395)
`Sara M. Metzler (#6509)
`RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER P.A.
`One Rodney Square
`920 North King Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 651-7700
`farnan@rlf.com
`metzler@rlf.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Netflix, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Tara D. Elliott (#4483)
`Rachel Weiner Cohen
`Ashley M. Fry
`Diane E. Ghrist
`Alessandra M. Schaszberger
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, NW
`Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004-1304
`(202) 637-2200
`
`Kimberly Q. Li
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`200 Clarendon Street
`Boston, MA 02116
`(617) 880-4500
`
`Dated: January 11, 2024
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: 8836
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`A Decision Granting Google’s Motion To Dismiss Based on ODP Satisfies The
`“Actually Litigated” Requirement ...........................................................................2
`
`A Decision Granting Google’s Motion To Dismiss Based on ODP Satisfies The
`“Finality” Requirement ............................................................................................3
`
`III.
`
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: 8837
`
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs. Private Ltd.,
`No. 19-1727-RGA, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2023 WL 6295496 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2023) ..........7, 8
`
`Anderson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
`698 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2012)...................................................................................................5, 6
`
`Astrazeneca AB v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc.,
`209 F. Supp. 3d 744 (D. Del. 2016) .......................................................................................5, 7
`
`Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. SB Holdings LLC,
`No. 20-1463-GBW-CJB (Dec. 29, 2023) ..................................................................................3
`
`Braemar Mfg, LLC v. ScottCare Corp.,
`816 F. App’x 465 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................5
`
`In re Brown,
`951 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1991).......................................................................................................4
`
`In re Cellect,
`81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ......................................................................................1, 4, 7, 8
`
`Clausen Co. v. Dynatron/Bondo Corp.,
`889 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1989).......................................................................................................6
`
`Douris v. Schweiker,
`229 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D. Pa. 2002) .........................................................................................5
`
`f’Real Foods, LLC v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc.,
`No. 16-41-CFC (D. Del. June 24, 2020) ....................................................................................4
`
`Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC,
`529 F. Supp. 3d 316 (D. Del. 2021) ...........................................................................................8
`
`Hart v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`No. 22-2229, 2023 WL 3244574 (3d Cir. May 4, 2023) ...........................................................4
`
`Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
`260 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).......................................................................................................7
`
`Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,
`458 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2006).......................................................................................................6
`
`Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
`515 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1975).......................................................................................................6
`ii
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: 8838
`
`
`
`Scripps Clinic & Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Baxter Travenol Laby’s, Inc.,
`729 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Del. 1990) ..............................................................................................6
`
`Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Cequel Commc’ns, LLC,
`No. 18-1919-RGA, 2020 WL 3048175 (D. Del. June 8, 2020) .................................................4
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility LLC,
`52 F.4th 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................6
`
`STATUTES & RULES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 154(b) ...........................................................................................................................8
`
`Local Rule 7.1.3(c)(2) ......................................................................................................................4
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 13 .......................................................................................4
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: 8839
`
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Robocast’s Answering Brief confirms that should the Court rule in favor of Google LLC
`
`and YouTube LLC’s (collectively, “Google”) renewed motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of
`
`obviousness-type double patenting (“ODP”), it should find that Robocast is precluded from
`
`asserting those same claims against Netflix. Robocast does not contest any of the relevant facts.
`
`Notably, Robocast does not and cannot deny that it will have had the opportunity to actually litigate
`
`the ODP issue in the companion Google case. While Robocast challenges whether there would be
`
`a final, sufficiently firm judgment under factor three of the four-part test for collateral estoppel,
`
`there is no credible dispute that a judgment of invalidity on Google’s motion to dismiss would be
`
`final and should be accorded conclusive effect. And Robocast’s assertion that the Court is unable
`
`to issue a reasoned opinion on ODP because there is a pending petition for re-hearing in In re
`
`Cellect, 81 F.4th 1216 (Fed. Cir. 2023), ignores that In re Cellect is a precedential and binding
`
`decision to be followed by this Court. Accordingly, should the Court hold the ’451 patent as
`
`invalid under ODP in the companion Google case (and it should), the Court should preclude
`
`Robocast from re-litigating the same issue on the same claims of the same patent in this matter.
`
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`As Netflix set forth in its opening brief, and Robocast does not dispute, the first and fourth
`
`collateral estoppel factors—that the ODP issue sought to be precluded (invalidity of the ’451 patent
`
`for ODP) is the same in both cases and that this Court’s ruling on the ODP issue is essential to any
`
`judgment dismissing the ’451 patent in the companion Google case—are met. See D.I. 158 at 8-
`
`10 (hereinafter “Br.”). Nor does Robocast contest the relevant facts that each and every claim of
`
`the ’451 patent asserted against Netflix has been challenged by Google in its renewed motion to
`
`dismiss based on ODP, namely claims 1-2, 22-29, 37-39, 41-42 of the ’451 patent. See D.I. 168
`
`at 2-3 (hereinafter “Opp.”). Robocast thus concedes that there is complete overlap in the patent
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 6 of 13 PageID #: 8840
`
`
`
`claims at issue such that invalidation of the ’451 patent claims under ODP in the companion
`
`Google case is essential, and will apply equally, to Robocast’s allegations against Netflix here. Br.
`
`8-9. Robocast also does not argue that any discretionary factors warrant denying Netflix motion,
`
`effectively conceding that judicial efficiency warrants the application of collateral estoppel here.
`
`Br. 9-10.
`
`Instead, Robocast half-heartedly contends in its five-page opposition that factors two and
`
`three—whether the issue has been actually litigated and whether the issue has been decided by a
`
`final and valid judgment—are not met. Robocast’s argument that Google’s ODP defense has not
`
`been “actually litigated” is solely based on the fact that Google’s motion to dismiss remains
`
`pending. But that is the point—Netflix’s motion is premised on this Court granting Google’s
`
`motion to dismiss, which has been fully briefed and will have been fully litigated. Netflix agrees
`
`with and joins Google’s arguments that the ‘451 patent is invalid for ODP. Robocast next argues
`
`that even if this Court grants Google’s ODP motion to dismiss and finds the asserted claims of the
`
`’451 patent invalid for ODP, that decision would not satisfy the finality requirement of collateral
`
`estoppel because it would not be immediately appealable, or alternatively, would not be
`
`“sufficiently firm.” Opp. 4-5. Robocast is simply wrong on the issue of finality—there is no
`
`requirement that for collateral estoppel to apply, a judgment must be immediately appealable. See
`
`Opp. 4. Under the appropriate standard, a decision granting judgment on the invalidity of the
`
`asserted claims of the ’451 patent for ODP would be final and sufficiently firm to collaterally estop
`
`Robocast from asserting those same invalid patent claims against Netflix.
`
`A.
`
`A Decision Granting Google’s Motion To Dismiss Based on ODP Satisfies The
`“Actually Litigated” Requirement
`
`Notably, Robocast does not contest that it was entitled to fully and fairly litigate the ODP
`
`issue before this Court in the Google case. Opp. 4. Robocast only argues that Netflix’s motion is
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: 8841
`
`
`
`premature because it is contingent on the outcome of Google’s motion to dismiss. Opp. 2-3. But
`
`this is no reason to deny Netflix’s motion. See D.I. 158 at 8 (“Should the Court grant Google’s
`
`renewed motion to dismiss, the Court should preclude Robocast from asserting infringement of
`
`the ’451 patent against Netflix.” (emphasis added)).
`
`Robocast instead attempts to re-argue the merits of Google’s underlying motion, citing to
`
`the recent Report and Recommendation in Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. SB Holdings LLC, No. 20-1463-
`
`GBW-CJB (Dec. 29, 2023) (D.I. 102 at 6-8) (“Bausch”), for the proposition that deciding ODP
`
`prior to claim construction is improper. But, Bausch & Lomb is inapposite. Here, claim
`
`construction briefing is complete and Robocast does not dispute that the relevant constructions
`
`apply equally across the three asserted patents in this matter. See generally D.I. 149 (Joint Claim
`
`Construction Brief). Irrespective of how the disputed claim constructions are construed, it cannot
`
`save the ’451 patent from being found invalid under ODP. This is a far cry from “invit[ing] the
`
`Court ‘to make a five-minute comparison’ of the respective claims” on a “minimalist record.”
`
`Bausch at 6-7). Accordingly, the cited Report and Recommendation in Bausch & Lomb has no
`
`bearing on the disputed issues here. For these reasons, in addition to the reasons provided in
`
`Google’s response to Robocast’s notice of supplemental authority (D.I. 128 in No. 22-304-JLH),
`
`Robocast’s attempt to rely on Bausch to delay resolution of the ODP issue fails.
`
`B.
`
`A Decision Granting Google’s Motion To Dismiss Based on ODP Satisfies The
`“Finality” Requirement
`
`Robocast’s next argument—that collateral estoppel would not apply to any decision by this
`
`Court to grant Google’s motion to dismiss based on ODP because such a decision would not
`
`constitute a valid and final judgment—fares no better. Opp. 3-4. Robocast erroneously argues
`
`that a decision by this Court applying ODP to the ’451 patent in the Google companion case (1)
`
`would not be “final” because it would be “an interlocutory, non-appealable ruling” and (2) would
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: 8842
`
`
`
`not be “sufficiently firm,” despite the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cellect, because Cellect
`
`LLC filed a petition for rehearing en banc. Id. The Court should reject Robocast’s unfounded
`
`arguments.
`
`First, Robocast argues that any decision by the Court on Google’s motion to dismiss would
`
`result in an interlocutory, non-appealable ruling “that would have no impact on the other two
`
`asserted patents and thus not fully resolve the case.” Opp. 3.1 In so arguing, Robocast conflates
`
`claim preclusion (res judicata) with issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), the latter of which is the
`
`subject of Netflix’s motion. Id. But it is well-settled under Third Circuit law that “[u]nlike claim
`
`preclusion, the effectiveness of issue preclusion, sometimes called collateral estoppel, does not
`
`require the entry of a judgment, final in the sense of being appealable,” but rather “‘doctrine of
`
`collateral estoppel applies whenever an action is ‘sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive
`
`effect.’” In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
`
`Judgments, § 13 at 132); see Hart v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 22-2229, 2023 WL 3244574, at
`
`*1 (3d Cir. May 4, 2023) (holding that a non-appealable decision satisfies the finality requirement
`
`of collateral estoppel, as the decision “reflect[s] the requisite ‘appreciation of the relevant facts
`
`and familiarity with the appliable law’ to be sufficiently firm.” (internal citation omitted)); Sprint
`
`Commc’ns Co. v. Cequel Commc’ns, LLC, No. 18-1919-RGA, 2020 WL 3048175, at *5 (D. Del.
`
`June 8, 2020) (applying the Restatement 2(d) of Judgments § 13 for issue preclusion as “black
`
`
`1 Robocast argues that Netflix cannot argue that collateral estoppel does not require an appealable
`order for the first time in its Reply. But Netflix could not have anticipated that Robocast would
`make such a baseless argument in it Answering Brief. Regardless, it is well settled that a reply
`brief can respond to arguments made in an answering brief. See f’Real Foods, LLC v. Hamilton
`Beach Brands, Inc., No. 16-41-CFC (D. Del. June 24, 2020) (D.I. 369 at 2) (“[T]he movant does
`not violate Local Rule 7.1.3(c)(2) when the new material in its reply brief responds to arguments
`raised in the non-movant’s answering brief” (citing Bos. Sci Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 434 F.
`Supp 2d 308, 314 (D. Del. 2006), rev’d in part on other grounds, 554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009))).
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: 8843
`
`
`
`letter law”). Courts in this District have found the finality requirement for collateral estoppel
`
`satisfied even in instances where no judgment has been entered on an issue, such as when the issue
`
`was decided as part of a preliminary injunction, which is an interlocutory order (Astrazeneca AB
`
`v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 744, 753 (D. Del. 2016)). And just like the
`
`circumstances present here, the Federal Circuit, applying Third Circuit law, has affirmed holdings
`
`of collateral estoppel where only a subset of asserted patents were held invalid in the prior district
`
`court adjudication. See Braemar Mfg, LLC v. ScottCare Corp., 816 F. App’x 465, 468-69 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2020) (affirming in relevant part CardioNet, LLC v. ScottCare Corp., No. 325 F. Supp. 3d
`
`607, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2018)).
`
`Moreover, Robocast’s cited cases are wholly inapplicable. Robocast cites to an Eastern
`
`District of Pennsylvania case, Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D. Pa. 2002), for the
`
`proposition that a partial motion to dismiss, if granted, is interlocutory. Opp. 3. Ironically, Douris
`
`is a denial of a motion for reconsideration of a decision barring certain claims on grounds of
`
`collateral estoppel and res judicata and declining to certify an interlocutory appeal on those issues.
`
`Douris, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 399-400, 410. Robocast also cites to Anderson v. Commissioner of
`
`Internal Revenue, 698 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2012) for the standard that a “final judgment” is
`
`required for collateral estoppel to apply. But there, the party seeking preclusion attempted to rely
`
`on a procedural motion to sever as a final judgment that did not address the case merits. Id. at 166.
`
`Robocast in fact later concedes that a decision satisfies the finality requirement, when it is
`
`sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect, and thus by extension does not require an
`
`immediately appealable judgment. See Opp. 4 (“law in this circuit requires, at minimum, an
`
`adjudication that is ‘sufficiently firm’ to warrant preclusive effect” (citing Glen v. Trip Advisor
`
`LLC, 529 F. Supp. 3d 316, 325 (D. Del. 2021) and Brown, 951 F.2d at 569)). In stark contrast
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: 8844
`
`
`
`with Anderson, here, a finding that the asserted claims of the ’451 patent is invalid for ODP, and
`
`thus cannot be infringed, is a final, or sufficiently firm, decision on the merits.
`
`Last, Robocast relies on Clausen Co. v. Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 889 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir.
`
`1989) for the proposition that res judicata requires a final judgment. But here, Netflix is not
`
`invoking the doctrine of res judicata, rather issue preclusion. In any event, none of these cases can
`
`override the Supreme Court’s decision in Blonder Tongue, which stands for the proposition that
`
`“[a] court must treat the prior determination of invalidity as an estoppel unless the patentee
`
`demonstrates that it was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in
`
`the prior action.” Scripps Clinic & Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Baxter Travenol Laby’s, Inc., 729 F.
`
`Supp. 1473, 1475 (D. Del. 1990) (citing Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d
`
`1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964,
`
`976-77 (3d Cir. 1975) (recognizing that the “outcome” of Blonder-Tongue, “was the creation of a
`
`pragmatic formula that harmonized considerations of due process and judicial economy,” and “was
`
`aimed at producing substantial justice while avoiding needlessly repetitious litigation”). Notably,
`
`Robocast does not contend that it has been denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue,
`
`even if adversely decided.
`
`It is also well settled that the doctrine of issue preclusion requires only finality as to the
`
`issue. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 52 F.4th 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
`
`(“the issue must have been determined by a valid and final judgment”); Jean Alexander Cosmetics,
`
`Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing collateral estoppel applies
`
`where “the identical issue was previously adjudicated” (emphasis added)). Here, there is no
`
`legitimate dispute that should the Court rule in favor of Google, it would be entering a final
`
`judgment that the ’451 patent is invalid based on ODP. As such, the Court’s final judgment on the
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 11 of 13 PageID #: 8845
`
`
`
`issue of invalidity based on ODP in the Google matter would satisfy the finality requirement for
`
`collateral estoppel as to the ODP invalidity issue. Robocast provides no reason why, and does not
`
`seriously contend that, the parties should relitigate this issue or that the Court should waste judicial
`
`resources to decide the same ODP issue twice as applied to the exact same patent claims. See also
`
`Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 260 F.3d 201, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2001) (“‘[f]inality’ for
`
`purposes of issue preclusion is a more ‘pliant’ concept than it would be in other context . . . [and]
`
`may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a
`
`court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.’” (citations omitted)). Nor
`
`does Robocast argue that such a decision would come out differently (it would not).
`
`Second, Robocast argues should the Court grant Google’s motion to dismiss based on ODP,
`
`such a decision would not be “‘sufficiently firm’ to warrant preclusive effect,” because the law on
`
`ODP is “not settled.” Opp. 4-5. Robocast posits that the law is unsettled because there is a pending
`
`petition for en banc rehearing before the Federal Circuit in In re Cellect. But the underlying panel
`
`decision in In re Cellect settles the relevant law on ODP, is precedential, and is binding on this
`
`Court, regardless of any rehearing petition. In fact, a court in this District has already applied In
`
`re Cellect as binding law. See Allergan USA, Inc. v. MSN Labs. Private Ltd., No. 19-1727-RGA,
`
`--- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2023 WL 6295496, at *21-22 (D. Del. Sept. 27, 2023).
`
`The factors a court considers to determine if a judgment is “sufficiently firm,” are
`
`“‘whether the parties were fully heard, whether a reasoned opinion was filed, and whether that
`
`decision could have been, or actually was, appealed.’” Astrazeneca, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 753
`
`(quoting In re Brown, 951 F.2d at 568). Here, Robocast does not (and cannot) dispute that it has
`
`been fully heard on the ODP issue over multiple rounds of briefing in the Google case or that such
`
`a judgment on the invalidity of the ’451 patent would subsequently be appealable (even if not
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 12 of 13 PageID #: 8846
`
`
`
`immediately appealable). Robocast’s sole case support for its assertion that this Court is unable
`
`to issue a reasoned opinion on ODP based on “unsettled law,” Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC, is
`
`distinguishable from the facts and law here. In Glen, the standing issue sought to be precluded
`
`was the subject of “multiple other cases” in district court with various courts “reach[ing] the
`
`opposite conclusion” on the relevant law and was the subject of a pending appeal. 529 F. Supp.
`
`3d 316, 325-326 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2021). Unlike the competing district court decisions in Glen,
`
`the issue of whether ODP applies after the application of patent term adjustment under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 154(b) was settled on appeal by the Federal Circuit in In re Cellect. Accordingly, as the court
`
`did in Allergan, this Court is more than capable of providing a “sufficiently firm,” well-reasoned
`
`opinion based on the application of ODP set forth in In re Cellect, such that the finality requirement
`
`of collateral estoppel would be satisfied.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons discussed above and in its Opening Brief, Netflix respectfully requests that,
`
`should the Court grant Google’s motion to dismiss, finding the ’451 patent is invalid for ODP,
`
`Robocast should be estopped from relitigating that very same issue in this case, and thus grant
`
`judgment on the pleadings in favor of Netflix as to Count I of the Complaint (D.I. 1).
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Tara D. Elliott (#4483)
`Rachel Weiner Cohen
`Ashley M. Fry
`Diane E. Ghrist
`Alessandra M. Schaszberger
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`555 Eleventh Street, NW
`Suite 1000
`Washington, DC 20004-1304
`(202) 637-2200
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Sara M. Metzler
`Kelly Farnan (#4395)
`Sara M. Metzler (#6509)
`RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER P.A.
`One Rodney Square
`920 North King Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 651-7700
`farnan@rlf.com
`metzler@rlf.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Netflix, Inc.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-00305-JLH Document 173 Filed 01/11/24 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: 8847
`
`
`
`
`
`Kimberly Q. Li
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`200 Clarendon Street
`Boston, MA 02116
`(617) 880-4500
`
`January 11, 2024
`
`
`
`9
`
`