throbber
Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 1 of 11 PageID #: 31129
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`AMO DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
`AMO MANUFACTURING USA,
`LLC and AMO SALES AND
`SERVICE, INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`ALCON VISION, LLC, ALCON
`LABORATORIES, INC. and
`ALCON RESEARCH, LLC
`
`Defendants.
`
`Civil Action No. 20-842-CFC
`
`Jack B. Blumenfeld, Anthony D. Raucci, Brian P. Egan, MORRIS, NICHOLS,
`ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael A. Morin, Matthew
`J. Moore, Rachel W. Cohen, Sarang V. Damle, Holly K. Victorson, Carolyn M.
`Homer, Susan Y. Tull, Michael E. Bern, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP,
`Washington, DC; Roger J. Chin, Allison Harms, Joseph R. Wetzel, LATHAM &
`WATKINS LLP, San Francisco, California; S. Giri Pathmanaban, LATHAM &
`WATKINS LLP, Menlo Park, California; P. Anthony Sammi, Rachel R. Blitzer,
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, New York, New York; Aaron Macris, LA THAM
`& WATKINS LLP, Boston, Massachusetts
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`John W. Shaw, Nathan R. Hoeschen, Andrew Russell, Karen E. Keller, David Fry,
`SHAW KELLER LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Jeanne M. Heffernan, James J.
`Lomeo, Ryan J. Melde, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Austin, Texas; Gregg F.
`Locascio, Sean M. McEldowney, Noah S. Frank, Kelly Tripathi, Elizabeth
`Hedges, Mary E. Miller, Nicholas Teleky, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
`Washington, DC; Joshua L. Simmons, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, New York,
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 2 of 11 PageID #: 31130
`
`New York; Caroline Lourgos, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Chicago, Illinois;
`Kristen P.L. Reichenbach, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, San Francisco, California
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`
`January 23, 2023
`Wilmington, Delaware
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 3 of 11 PageID #: 31131
`
`CHIEF JUDGE
`
`Plaintiffs AMO Development, LLC, AMO Manufacturing USA, LLC, and
`
`AMO Sales and Service, Inc. have sued Defendants Alcon Vision, LLC, Alcon
`
`Laboratories, Inc., and Alcon Research, LLC (collectively, Alcon) for copyright
`
`infringement. Pending before me is a motion titled "Alcon's Motion for Summary
`
`Judgment (No. 2) That Only AMO Development, LLC Is Entitled to Actual
`
`Damages." D.I. 360. Alcon seeks by the motion two declarations. First,
`
`notwithstanding the title of the motion, it asks for a declaratory judgment that
`
`"AMO Development, LLC is not entitled to lost profits prior to December 30,
`
`2019, or for any sales of intraocular lenses." D.I. 360-1 at 2 ( emphasis added).
`
`Plaintiffs did not oppose this request in their briefing, see D.I. 422, and therefore I
`
`will grant the motion in this respect. Second, Alcon seeks a declaratory judgment
`
`that "Johnson & Johnson Surgical Vision, Inc., AMO Manufacturing USA, LLC,
`
`AMO Sales and Service, Inc., and AMO Ireland are not entitled to claim lost
`
`profits." D.I. 360-1 at 1. This request is very much challenged by Plaintiffs, see
`
`D.I. 422; but for the reasons explained below, I will issue this declaratory
`
`judgment.
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 4 of 11 PageID #: 31132
`
`I.
`
`A court shall grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions,
`
`answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
`
`any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
`
`party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
`
`moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact
`
`exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
`
`n.10 (1986). "Facts that could alter the outcome are 'material,' and disputes are
`
`'genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the
`
`position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is
`
`correct." Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300,302 n.1 (3d
`
`Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). If the· moving party has demonstrated an absence of
`
`material fact, the nonmoving party then "must come forward with 'specific facts
`
`showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587
`
`(emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court will "view the
`
`underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
`
`to the party opposing the motion." Pa. Coal Ass 'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d
`
`Cir. 1995). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving
`
`party, however, will not be sufficient for denial of a motion for summary
`
`judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury reasonably to find for
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 5 of 11 PageID #: 31133
`
`the nonmoving party on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
`
`249 ( 1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an
`
`essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the
`
`moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
`
`Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
`
`II.
`
`Plaintiffs accuse Alcon of infringing certain copyrights ( the Asserted
`
`Copyrights) based on Alcon' s incorporation of certain computer programs in its
`
`LenSx® Laser System, a femtosecond laser assisted cataract surgery (FLACS)
`
`system approved by the FDA in 2009 and commercially launched in 2011. D.I.
`
`141 ,r,r 84, 101. Cataract surgery is performed by removing the patient's natural,
`
`opacified crystalline lens and replacing it with an artificial intraocular lens (IOL ).
`
`Plaintiffs seek damages in part based on the theory that Alcon' s sales of the
`
`LenSx and IOLs caused Counter-Defendant Johnson & Johnson Surgical Vision,
`
`Inc. (JJSV) to lose sales of the Catalys® Precision Laser System, which competes
`
`directly with the LenSx, and IOLs. D.I. 422 at 8-9. Plaintiffs also seek profits
`
`allegedly lost by three of JJSV' s subsidiaries-Plaintiffs AMO Manufacturing
`
`USA, LLC and AMO Sales and Service, Inc., and nonparty AMO Ireland-based
`
`on their share of JJSV's revenue stream for Catalys sales. D.I. 422 at 8-9. Alcon
`
`argues that neither JJSV nor any of the three subsidiaries had an ownership interest
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 6 of 11 PageID #: 31134
`
`in the Asserted Copyrights at the time of the alleged infringement and that
`
`therefore a declaration that none of these entities can recover for lost profits is
`
`warranted. D.I. 361 at 1-2. Plaintiffs counter that JJSV is entitled to the lost
`
`profits they seek because "JJSV was a legal owner of the [A]sserted [C]opyrights
`
`until it transferred both its copyright ownership and its right to seek past damages
`
`for infringement to AMO Development" and because "at all [relevant] times, ... it
`
`has been a beneficial owner" of the Asserted Copyrights. D.I. 422 at 7. Plaintiffs
`
`argue that JJSV' s three subsidiaries are entitled to lost profits because they "are
`
`involved in the manufacturing, sale, and/or service of Catalys systems throughout
`
`the world" and "[a]s such, they directly profit from the sale of Catalys, and have
`
`lost revenue due to Alcon's infringement." D.I. 422 at 8-9 (citations omitted).
`
`III.
`
`Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act provides in relevant part that "[t]he
`
`legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to
`
`institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he
`
`or she is the owner of it." 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). See also Bandai Am. Inc. v. Bally
`
`Midway Mfg. Co., 775 F.2d 70, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[B]oth the legal and the
`
`beneficial owners of copyrights have standing to sue infringers."). Section 106 of
`
`the Act sets forth the six "exclusive rights" that a copyright confers. Five of those
`
`rights apply to computer programs, which Congress made copyrightable in 1980-
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 7 of 11 PageID #: 31135
`
`namely, the rights to reproduce, display, perform, distribute to the public copies of,
`
`and make derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-
`
`(6).
`
`Legal ownership of a copyrighted work "vests initially in the author or
`
`authors of the work." § 201(a). "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
`
`or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author ...
`
`unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise .... " § 201 (b ). Plaintiffs
`
`contend that JJSV was the legal owner of the Asserted Copyrights by virtue of
`
`work performed in and around 2008 by one of its employees. D.I. 422 at 4; D.I.
`
`424 ,r 7; D.I. 427, Ex. 2, ,I 103 n.79. But it is undisputed that in a written transfer
`
`agreement executed by JJSV and AMO Development on August 21, 2020, JJSV
`
`transferred to AMO Development "effective April 2, 2007" "any and all of its
`
`rights, titles and interests in, to and under the [Asserted] Copyright[s]." D.I. 427-1
`
`at 554-55. Thus, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the agreement, JJSV
`
`relinquished all of its legal rights "in, to, and under" the Asserted Copyrights as of
`
`April 2, 2007. 1 Accordingly, as a matter of law, JJSV is not a legal owner of the
`
`Asserted Copyrights. Cf. Intel!. Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2017 WL
`
`1 The transfer agreement is governed by Delaware law. "When interpreting a
`contract, Delaware courts read the agreement as a whole and enforce the plain
`meaning of clear and unambiguous language." Manti Holdings, LLC v. Authentix
`Acquisition Co., Inc., 261 A.3d 1199, 1208 (Del. 2021).
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 8 of 11 PageID #: 31136
`
`3723934, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 29, 2017) (granting summary judgment that
`
`retroactive sublicense exhausted plaintiffs patent rights).
`
`Plaintiffs argue that JJSV is a beneficial owner of the Asserted Copyrights
`
`"based on its corporate relationship with AMO Development and economic
`
`interest in the copyrights." D.I. 422 at 5 n.3. But as Plaintiffs concede, see D.I.
`
`422 at 7, a parent-subsidiary relationship does not by itself confer a parent
`
`company with beneficial ownership of the subsidiaries' copyrights. Cf Hologic,
`
`Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 3d 118, 122 (D. Del. 2016) ("The fact
`
`that a corporate parent's subsidiary owns a patent is not enough to establish that
`
`the parent has a legal ownership interest in the subsidiary's patent." ( emphasis and
`
`citation omitted)). And Plaintiffs do not assert, let alone identify any record
`
`evidence that shows, that JJSV had an economic interest in "an exclusive right
`
`under" the Asserted Copyrights. § 501 (b ).
`
`JJSV states only ( and without citing any record evidence) that it has an
`
`"economic interest in the [Asserted J[C]opyrights." D.I. 422 at 5 n.3 (emphasis
`
`added). But even if that were true, it would not make JJSV a beneficial owner of
`
`"an exclusive right under" the Asserted Copyrights. As the Second Circuit
`
`explained in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. DRK Photo, 882 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2018):
`
`It is ... not enough that a putative beneficial owner
`obtains a mere interest in a copyright, even if that interest
`is valuable. The interest must be one that derives its
`value directly from another person's use of an exclusive
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 9 of 11 PageID #: 31137
`
`right, such that the interest is necessarily "diluted" by
`infringement.
`
`Id. at 415 ( citation omitted). Thus, the paradigmatic example of a beneficial owner
`
`is the author who transfers her legal title in a copyrighted work to another person in
`
`exchange for royalties based on future sales or licensing of the copyrighted work.
`
`See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 159 ("A 'beneficial owner' for th[e] purpose[s] [of
`
`§ 501(b)] would include, for example, an author who had parted with legal title to
`
`the copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or license fees.").
`
`In this case, however, there is no allegation, let alone record evidence that
`
`suggests, that JJSV earns royalty payments or derives any other economic benefit
`
`directly from another person's exercise of one of the five applicable exclusive
`
`rights set forth in § 106.
`
`Plaintiffs quote in their briefing part of a sentence from SBK Catalogue
`
`Partnership v. Orion Pictures Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989), for the
`
`proposition that "[b ]eneficial owners include parties that 'retain[] an economic
`
`interest in the copyright' related to revenue 'derived from its exploitation."' D.I.
`
`422 at 5-6 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting SBK
`
`Catalogue, 723 F. Supp. at 1062). But the entirety of that sentence and the
`
`immediately preceding sentence in SBK Catalogue make clear that the court in
`
`SBK Catalogue did not hold that an economic interest "related to revenue derived
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 10 of 11 PageID #: 31138
`
`from [the copyright's] exploitation," is sufficient to make a party a beneficial
`
`owner of the copyright:
`
`"[B Jeneficial owners" are individuals who have given up
`the exclusive § 106 rights in exchange for a percentage
`fee or royalties derived from use or sale of the copyright
`and, consequently, do not have an independent right to
`use or license others to use the copyright. Id. A
`"beneficial owner" retains an economic interest in the
`copyright, which only extends to the proceeds derived
`from its exploitation.
`
`723 F. Supp. At 1062 (emphasis added).
`
`As noted above, Plaintiffs have not asserted here that JJSV is entitled to
`
`royalty payments or any other share of proceeds derived from another party's
`
`exercise of an exclusive right under the Asserted Copyrights. Accordingly, as a
`
`matter of law, JJSV is not a beneficial owner of the Asserted Copyrights. And
`
`because JJSV is neither a legal nor beneficial owner of the Asserted Copyrights, it
`
`lacks standing to bring an action for infringement of the Asserted Copyrights under
`
`§ 501 (b) and cannot recover damages for infringement of the Asserted Copyrights.
`
`See§ 504(b) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages
`
`suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement .... ").
`
`Plaintiffs do not contend that AMO Manufacturing USA, LLC, AMO Sales
`
`and Service, Inc., or AMO Ireland are legal owners of the Asserted Copyrights.
`
`They imply that these subsidiaries are beneficial owners of the Asserted
`
`Copyrights because they "directly profit from [JJSV's] sale of Catalys." D.I. 422
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-00842-CFC-JLH Document 520 Filed 01/23/23 Page 11 of 11 PageID #: 31139
`
`at 8. But since JJSV is not a beneficial owner of the Asserted Copyrights, the
`
`subsidiaries' sharing in JJSV' s revenues cannot make them beneficial owners of
`
`the Asserted Copyrights.
`
`IV.
`
`For the reasons discussed above, I will grant Alcon's Motion for Summary
`
`Judgment (No. 2) That Only AMO Development, LLC Is Entitled to Actual
`
`Damages (D.I. 360). Plaintiffs having failed to show a genuine dispute of material
`
`fact about whether JJSV, AMO Manufacturing USA, LLC, AMO Sales and
`
`Service, Inc., and AMO Ireland lack legal and beneficial ownership of the Asserted
`
`Copyrights, I will grant Alcon' s request for a declaratory judgment that those four
`
`entities are not entitled to claim lost profits. I will also grant Alcon' s unopposed
`
`request for a declaratory judgment that "AMO Development, LLC is not entitled to
`
`lost profits prior to December 30, 2019, or for any sales of intraocular lenses." D.I.
`
`360-1 at 2.
`
`The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
`
`9
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket