`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`VB ASSETS, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`C.A. No. 1:19-cv-01410-MN
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)
`
`Steven J. Balick (#2114)
`sbalick@ashbygeddes.com
`Andrew C. Mayo (#5207)
`amayo@ashbygeddes.com
`ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A.
`500 Delaware Avenue, 8th Floor
`P.O. Box 1150
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 654-1888
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`
`
`
`Of counsel:
`
`J. David Hadden, CSB No. 176148
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`Saina S. Shamilov, CSB No. 215636
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`Ravi R. Ranganath, CSB No. 272981
`rranganath@fenwick.com
`Vigen Salmastlian, CSB No. 276846
`vsalmastlian@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`(650) 988-8500
`
`December 6, 2023
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 2 of 27 PageID #: 11147
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE INFRINGEMENT. .......................................................2
`
`A.
`
`No reasonable jury could find that Amazon infringed claim 13 of the
`’681 patent. ..............................................................................................................4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“generate a response to the utterance, wherein the
`conversational speech engine grammatically or syntactically
`adapted the response based on the intended meaning
`established within the identified context” ....................................................4
`
`“identify a context associated with the utterance, wherein a
`conversational speech engine identifies the context associated
`with the utterance from the short-term shared knowledge and
`the long-term shared knowledge” ................................................................6
`
`3.
`
`“receive an utterance” and steps performed with “the utterance” ..............7
`
`No reasonable jury could find that Amazon infringed claim 40 of the
`’176 patent. ..............................................................................................................9
`
`No reasonable jury could find that Amazon infringed claim 23 of the
`’097 patent. ............................................................................................................10
`
`No reasonable jury could find that Amazon infringed claim 25 of the
`’703 patent. ............................................................................................................ 11
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“provide, without further user input after the receipt of the user
`input, a request for user confirmation to use the payment
`information and the shipping information for a purchase
`transaction for the product or service” ...................................................... 11
`
`“identify, without further user input after the receipt of the user
`input, the product or service to be purchased on behalf of the
`user based at least on the determined context” and “obtain,
`without further user input after the receipt of the user input,
`shipping information with which to deliver the product or
`service, wherein the shipping information specifies a name or
`address of a recipient to which the product or service is to be
`delivered after the product or service is purchased” .................................12
`
`II.
`
`THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE INVALID. ....................................................................13
`
`A.
`
`Claim 23 of the ’097 patent lacks adequate written description under 35
`U.S.C. § 112. ..........................................................................................................13
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 3 of 27 PageID #: 11148
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(Continued)
`
`Page
`
`B.
`
`The asserted claims are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. ....................................16
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The asserted claims of the ’703, ’097, and ’176 patents are
`abstract. ......................................................................................................16
`
`The asserted claims of the ’703, ’097, and ’176 patents recite no
`inventive concept at Alice step 2. ...............................................................17
`
`Claim 13 of the ’681 patent is ineligible under § 101. ...............................19
`
`III.
`
`PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT. ..................................20
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 4 of 27 PageID #: 11149
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`PAGES(S)
`
`
`CASES
`Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC,
`838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................17, 18
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ...........................................................................................................16, 17
`Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................16, 19
`Aqua Connect, Inc. v. TeamViewer US, Inc.,
`No. 18-1572, 2023 WL 6387791 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2023) ........................................................1
`Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..........................................................................................13, 15
`ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc.,
`159 F.3d 534 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ....................................................................................................2
`Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V.,
`730 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2013) ......................................................................................................4
`Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`989 F.3d 964 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................20
`BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc.,
`899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................18, 19
`Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys,
`636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................................14, 15
`Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc.,
`390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..................................................................................................2
`Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., LP,
`262 F. Supp. 3d 118 (E.D. Pa. 2017), vacated in part, No. CV 12-859, 2017 WL
`11575149 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017) ...........................................................................................3
`cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings Inc.,
`986 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................17
`Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC,
`725 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................5
`Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................18
`Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S,
`697 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................................2
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 5 of 27 PageID #: 11150
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co.,
`909 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................................1
`Graboff v. Colleran Firm,
`744 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................................1
`Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Auris Health, Inc.,
`549 F. Supp.3d 362 (D. Del. 2021) ..........................................................................................20
`IPPV Enterprises, LLC v. Echostar Commc’ns, Corp.,
`191 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Del. 2002) ...........................................................................................4
`KOM Software Inc. v. NetApp, Inc.,
`No. 18-CV-00160-WCB, 2023 WL 6460025 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2023) ......................................17
`Lipocine Inc. v. Clarus Therapeutics, Inc.,
`541 F. Supp. 3d 435 (D. Del. 2021) .........................................................................................14
`Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
`543 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................... passim
`Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Newbridge Networks Corp.,
`168 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D. Del. 2001) ...........................................................................................2
`MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A.,
`429 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................12
`MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`780 F.3d 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ..................................................................................................2
`Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS,
`723 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................14, 15
`Pannu v. Iolab Corp.,
`155 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ..................................................................................................1
`Paradox Sec. Sys., Ltd. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc.,
`388 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .............................................................................................9
`PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co.,
`304 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..........................................................................................14, 15
`Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.,
`190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ..................................................................................................8
`Shopify Inc. v. Express Mobile, Inc.,
`No. 19-439-RGA, 2021 WL 4288113 (D. Del. Sep. 21, 2021) ...............................................20
`Smith v. Garlock Equipment Co.,
`658 F. App’x 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................5, 7, 12
`
`iv
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 6 of 27 PageID #: 11151
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals L.P. v. Powder Springs Logistics, LLC,
`624 F. Supp. 3d 473 (D. Del. 2022) ...........................................................................................2
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................16, 17, 19
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................................2
`Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
`358 F.3d 916 (2004) .................................................................................................................14
`Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`2022 WL 2986786 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2022) .......................................................................6, 10
`Wyers v. Master Lock Co.,
`616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..............................................................................................2, 3
`X One, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`440 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .....................................................................................8
`Yoon Ja Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
`465 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................2, 5, 10
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ....................................................................................................................1, 16, 19
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ..............................................................................................................................13
`RULES
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) .........................................................................................................................1
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 7 of 27 PageID #: 11152
`
`
`This is a patent infringement case in which VB Assets accused Amazon’s Alexa technology
`
`of infringing four patents and alleged that infringement was willful. Amazon denied infringement
`
`and asserted invalidity defenses. The Court submitted the case to the jury at 12:25 p.m. on the
`
`fifth day of trial. The jury took lunch and then began deliberations. At 1:23 pm, the jury asked a
`
`question about damages. By 2:02 p.m. it reached a verdict against Amazon on all questions, having
`
`purportedly assessed alleged infringement of 30 limitations across four asserted claims, as well as
`
`written description, obviousness, and section 101 defenses, willfulness, and damages.
`
`Plaintiff’s trial presentation relied heavily—and in some cases exclusively—on pre-rec-
`
`orded video demonstratives in which its technical expert Dr. Polish spoke to an Alexa device and
`
`listened to the responses that the device provided. Dr. Polish then told the jury that he could infer
`
`that Alexa generated those responses in an infringing manner, without analyzing Alexa’s source
`
`code or mapping its back-end operations to the claim limitations at issue. And although Dr. Polish
`
`pointed to a few technical documents during his testimony, for several claim limitations he merely
`
`offered an opinion on infringement without supporting evidence. While this presentation ulti-
`
`mately persuaded the jury, it violated basic tenets of Federal Circuit law and failed to carry plain-
`
`tiff’s burden on infringement. Because of this, and because the asserted claims are also invalid,
`
`Amazon now moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law.1
`
`
`1 The Court grants JMOL under Rule 50(b) where the jury’s findings are not supported by
`substantial evidence or the legal conclusions implied by the verdict are unsupported by those find-
`ings. Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (cleaned up); Graboff v. Colle-
`ran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
`mind might accept as adequate to support the finding under review. See Enplas Display Device
`Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., 909 F.3d 398, 407 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aqua Connect, Inc. v.
`TeamViewer US, Inc., No. 18-1572, 2023 WL 6387791, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2023) (J. Noreika).
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 8 of 27 PageID #: 11153
`
`
`I.
`
`PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE INFRINGEMENT.
`
`The patentee “bears the burden of proof to show the presence of every element” in the
`
`accused technology. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`Where that technology is “complex” and “beyond the comprehension of laypersons,” the patentee
`
`must provide opinion testimony from an expert to carry this burden. Wyers v. Master Lock Co.,
`
`616 F.3d 1231, 1240 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., Inc., 390 F.3d
`
`1361, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The testimony must explain how the evidence about the accused
`
`technology demonstrates infringement of each limitation. See Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William
`
`Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The failure to offer such testimony
`
`as to any claim limitation warrants JMOL of noninfringement. Indeed, “conclusory expert testi-
`
`mony” that the accused technology meets a limitation “does not constitute substantial evidence”
`
`sufficient to support an infringement verdict. Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals L.P. v. Powder
`
`Springs Logistics, LLC, 624 F. Supp. 3d 473, 479 (D. Del. 2022) (citing MobileMedia Ideas LLC
`
`v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).2
`
`Dr. Polish—the technical expert witness for plaintiff in this case—is at the center of a lead-
`
`ing case on this subject. In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710, 723 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit affirmed JMOL of non-infringement where Dr. Polish had testified
`
`that infringement could be inferred even though he had not analyzed the operation of the accused
`
`system. Id. at 722. Specifically, “Lucent’s expert, Dr. Polish, testified that Microsoft’s software
`
`is designed to call the High Quality encoder as a backup to the Fast encoder under specified con-
`
`ditions, and thus it could be inferred that the High Quality encoder actually runs in practice” to
`
`
`2 See also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Newbridge Networks Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 181, 217 (D. Del.
`2001) (citing ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Yoon Ja Kim v.
`ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 9 of 27 PageID #: 11154
`
`
`infringe the asserted method claim. Id. The Federal Circuit ruled that Dr. Polish “did not [] ob-
`
`serve” that the accused High Quality encoder had ever run, thus Lucent “did not provide sufficient
`
`evidence to establish that the High Quality encoder had ever run.” Id. at 722-723. Dr. Polish’s
`
`“speculative” testimony was not evidence that could support a verdict. Id. at 723-24.3
`
`Dr. Polish repeated this deficient approach here. There is no dispute that Alexa is a com-
`
`plex technology beyond a layperson’s understanding, see Wyers, 616 F.3d at 1240, and that its
`
`functionality depends on computer source code.4 Moreover, three of the four asserted claims re-
`
`quire “computer executable instructions” or “computer program instructions” to perform the steps
`
`of the claim.5 Nevertheless, Dr. Polish reviewed no source code and made no attempt to map the
`
`specific claim elements to it. (Tr. Tx. 384:2-9 (“I did not review code”).)6 At trial, Dr. Polish
`
`skipped over certain claim limitations or declared in a conclusory fashion without analysis that
`
`Alexa performed them. And in a reprise of the testimony the Federal Circuit rejected in Gateway,
`
`Dr. Polish spoke to an Alexa device, listened to the device’s responses, and then attempted to “in-
`
`fer” how Alexa generated them. (See, e.g., Tr. Tx. at 406:21-408:14 (attempting to infer that Alexa
`
`
`3 See also Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., LP, 262 F. Supp. 3d 118,
`129, 135-36 (E.D. Pa. 2017), vacated in part, No. CV 12-859, 2017 WL 11575149 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
`17, 2017) (“Dr. Polish’s testimony is not substantial evidence” (1) concerning motivation to com-
`bine two prior art references because he testified only that the references pertained to the same art
`and to the bare conclusion they were directed to the same problem, and (2) that a prior art reference
`disclosed a “response ID” because his opinion was “not supported” by the reference).
`4 For example, Alexa includes an automatic speech recognition system and natural language
`understanding system that enables it to understand and respond to speech. (Trial Transcript (“Tr.
`Tx.”) at 557:3-558:3.) It runs on complex machine learning algorithms and neural networks built
`on millions of lines of source code and is trained using millions of hours of speech. (Id. at 556:24-
`557:2; 569:15-24.)
`5 Claim 13 of the ’681 patent, claim 23 of the ’097 patent, and claim 25 of the ’703 patent.
`6 Similarly, plaintiff’s other technical witness Mr. Peck did not analyze the asserted claims or
`attempt to find any functionality in the code purportedly meeting them. (See Tr. Tx. at 436:3-5
`(Peck).) Instead, Mr. Peck simply reviewed only a fraction of Alexa source code and admitted
`that he was not asked to identify whether that code practices numerous claim limitations. (See Tr.
`Tx. at 445:14-447:25 (Peck); id. at 384:10-23 (Polish).)
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 10 of 27 PageID #: 11155
`
`
`“grammatically or syntactically adapts” a response); 409:14-15 (speculating that “[t]he context
`
`interpreter may well be being used”), 413:10-414:9 (“I think the behavior of the system speaks for
`
`itself”).) This is not substantial evidence from which the jury could find infringement.
`
`A.
`
`No reasonable jury could find that Amazon infringed claim 13 of the ’681 pa-
`tent.
`
`1.
`
`“generate a response to the utterance, wherein the conversational speech
`engine grammatically or syntactically adapted the response based on the
`intended meaning established within the identified context”
`
`Claim 13 of the ’681 patent requires “computer executable instructions operable when ex-
`
`ecuted to” . . . [a] “generate a response to the utterance” that is [b] “grammatically or syntactically
`
`adapted . . . .” (JTX001.0019.) Thus, without more, the mere fact that a device generates a re-
`
`sponse to an utterance does not meet this limitation. But at trial, Dr. Polish testified to this bare
`
`conclusion. On direct examination, he was asked whether this element was “met by Alexa,” to
`
`which he responded: “It is.” (Tr. Tx. at 350:1-10.) Dr. Polish failed to offer anything other than
`
`his conclusions—he did not discuss Alexa source code, technical documents, or testimony from
`
`Amazon witnesses to show that the Alexa system “grammatically or syntactically adapt[s]” a re-
`
`sponse based on the specified information. (See id. at 407:25-408:3.) Instead, when asked for the
`
`basis of his opinion, he responded only that Alexa provides “a voice response that is played back
`
`through the speaker.” (Id. at 350:14-20.) And when pressed, he confirmed that all he had offered
`
`for this element was “the fact that Amazon is responding to a request from a user,” and a demon-
`
`strative slide (that showed nothing about the limitation). (Id. at 408:4-14 (emphasis added).)7 Dr.
`
`Polish never addressed how a response is “grammatically or syntactically adapted” as required.8
`
`
`7 Regardless, demonstratives are “not evidence,” IPPV Enterprises, LLC v. Echostar
`Commc’ns, Corp., 191 F. Supp. 2d 530, 565 (D. Del. 2002). They only have value “to aid the jury
`in its understanding of the evidence that has already be admitted.” Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum
`S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2013); see also (Final Jury Ins. at 4.)
`8 When cross-examined, Dr. Polish offered a new undisclosed opinion that the limitation
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 11 of 27 PageID #: 11156
`
`
`The Federal Circuit has held repeatedly that such conclusory testimony is insufficient to
`
`support a verdict of infringement. In Yoon Ja Kim, for example, the dispute concerned whether
`
`additional unclaimed ingredients would materially affect properties of the accused product and
`
`thus bring it outside the scope of the claims. 465 F.3d at 1319-20. The plaintiff’s expert “offered
`
`conclusory testimony that the additional ingredients would not have materially affected the perti-
`
`nent characteristics,” but “did not support this determination with any examinations or tests of the
`
`actual accused products.” Id. at 1320. The court affirmed JMOL of noninfringement, ruling that
`
`the plaintiff had failed to present testimony showing the actual operation and effects of the ingre-
`
`dients in “the accused products themselves.” Id. In Smith v. Garlock Equipment Co., 658 F. App’x
`
`1017 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the patentee’s technical expert failed to specify how the accused arrestor
`
`assembly included an arm that pivots as claimed and “instead testified that there was some pivoting
`
`motion involved in the arrestor assembly as a whole, and that this motion was sufficient to satisfy
`
`the claim limitation requiring that the arm itself pivot.” Id. at 1025 (emphases added). The Federal
`
`Circuit ruled that the expert’s testimony could not support an infringement verdict and reversed
`
`the district court’s denial of JMOL. Id. at 1026-27. Here, Dr. Polish similarly opined that Alexa
`
`infringes merely because it can generate a response to a user request, without providing supporting
`
`analysis or pointing to evidence that showed that the Alexa system operates by (i.e., contains “com-
`
`puter executed instructions” that) “grammatically or syntactically adapt[]” a response in the
`
`claimed manner. Dr. Polish’s opinions are unsupported and warrant JMOL of noninfringement.
`
`Id.; see also Gateway, 543 F.3d at 723; Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. App’x
`
`
`“simply means that it’s not just a canned response.” (Id. at 407:2-19.) Even so, Dr. Polish did not
`even attempt to apply the actual claim language—the claim specifies that a response be “grammat-
`ically or syntactically adapted” “based on” the specified information, not that the system just gen-
`erate a response that is not “canned.”
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 12 of 27 PageID #: 11157
`
`
`980, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (reversing denial of noninfringement JMOL where the patentee’s expert
`
`“did not cite any particular documents to support his position” that a claim element was present
`
`and where his testimony “does not necessarily show” infringement); Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com,
`
`Inc., 2022 WL 2986786, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2022).
`
`2.
`
`“identify a context associated with the utterance, wherein a conversational
`speech engine identifies the context associated with the utterance from the
`short-term shared knowledge and the long-term shared knowledge”
`
`Claim 13 requires “computer executable instructions operable when executed to” . . . [a]
`
`“identify a context associated with the utterance” . . . [b] “from the short-term shared knowledge
`
`and the long-term shared knowledge.” (JTX001.0019.) Dr. Polish’s demonstrative for this limi-
`
`tation merely displayed claim 13 without evidence or analysis specific to any limitation. (Tr. Tx.
`
`at 346:23-347:10 (counsel directing Dr. Polish to PDX3-10).) His testimony about the limitation
`
`during his direct and redirect examinations was as follows:
`
`Direct (Tr. Tx. at 347:11-22)9
`Q. And is that element met by Alexa?
`A. It is.
`Q. And what’s your basis for your opinion?
`A. Technical documents and my own use of the system.
`Q. Can you explain how the technical documents sup-
`ported your opinion?
`A. Well, what this is talking about is identifying the con-
`text which is, in part anyway, an intent, so the NLU gen-
`erates an intent, or a collection of intents based upon the
`speech of the user, and the long-term information that
`informs it, as well as the short-term information from
`prior utterances within the same conversation.
`
`Redirect (Tr. Tx. at 426:3-9)
`Q. Okay. And so looking at the next
`element, it says identify a context
`associated with the utterance, did
`Alexa do that?
`A. Yes.
`Q. Did it use both the short-term and
`long-term knowledge?
`A. Yes.
`
`While Dr. Polish offered a theory that the “intent” that the Alexa NLU generates is the
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`claimed “context,” he provided no testimony showing that Alexa generates that intent in the
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`9 The Court struck (Tr. Tx. at 346:17-21) Dr. Polish’s testimony at 344:25-345:6 on this limi-
`tation, but regardless that testimony fared no better, referring to an excluded exhibit, PTX-226, but
`offering only conclusions that Alexa infringes without explanation of how it met the limitation.
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`6
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`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 13 of 27 PageID #: 11158
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`claimed manner beyond declaring that information from prior utterances “informs” the “intent.”
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`(Id. at 347:11-22.) In other words, Dr. Polish did not identify the “short-term shared knowledge”
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`and “long-term shared knowledge” and then show how Alexa allegedly uses those together to
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`identify the “context.” And again, he did not identify any technical document, source code, or
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`testimony of Amazon’s engineers to support his conclusion. Indeed, during his cross-examination,
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`he conceded that he had presented no specific example showing Alexa practicing this claim limi-
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`tation. (Id. at 406:1-2.) And when asked to acknowledge that he had not shown “that this required
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`element of the claim is actually done by Alexa” at all, Dr. Polish responded only that “Alexa is in
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`the NLU as we saw from the documents, is -- is disambiguating words that have multiple meanings
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`based upon different pieces of information.” (Id. at 406:3-8.) This testimony is insufficient—at
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`best, it is conclusory opinion testimony that cannot support a verdict. Smith, 658 F. App’x at 1024.
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`3.
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`“receive an utterance” and steps performed with “the utterance”
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`Claim 13 of the ’681 patent requires receiving “an utterance” and then performing four
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`specific steps using that utterance: (1) “accumulate short-term shared knowledge” that includes
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`“knowledge about the utterance,” (2) “identify a context associated with the utterance . . . from
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`the short-term shared knowledge and the long-term shared knowledge,” (3) “establish an intended
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`meaning for the utterance,” and (4) “generate a response to the utterance” that is “grammatically
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`or syntactically adapt[ed]” “based on the intended meaning . . . .” (JTX001.0019.)
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`Demonstrating infringement for this claim requires identifying at least one received utter-
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`ance and explaining how Alexa performs each of the claimed steps for that same utterance. Nu-
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`merous courts have so held with respect to claims employing the same structure. In Convolve, Inc.
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`v. Compaq Computer Corp., for example, the Federal Circuit explained that the claim’s reference
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`to “the processor” was “referring back to the ‘a processor’ recited in the preamble” and therefore
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`“the same processor [must] perform all of the recited steps.” 812 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
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`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 14 of 27 PageID #: 11159
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`see also Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“ʻa
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`discharge rate’ in clause [b] [of the claim] is referring to the same rate as the term “the discharge
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`rate’ in clause [d]”); X One, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1037-38 (N.D. Cal.
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`2020) (granting summary judgment of noninfringement where plaintiff failed to “identify a single
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`‘map’ that satisfies the claim limitations,” where the same “map” was required by three steps of
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`the claim). Here, Dr. Polish admitted that he did not map a single utterance to the claim elements.
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`(Tr. Tx. at 394:22-395:3 (admitting that he “did not prove it [i.e., infringement] by showing one
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`specific utterance.”); see also id. at 674:4-22 (Johnson).) That alone warrants JMOL.
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`Instead, for the “receive an utterance” step, Dr. Polish did not identify any utterance at all.
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`(Id. at 338:16-339:12.) For the next step, “accumulate short-term shared knowledge . . . about the
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`utterance,” Dr. Polish identified the utterances “6:30” and “six.” (Id. at 340:6-10, 341:4-7.) For
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`the step “identify a context associated with the utterance” from the short-term and long-term
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`knowledge, Dr. Polish again did not point to any utterance, nor did he attempt to show that Alexa
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`identified a context for his two prior examples. (Id. at 346:23-347:22.) Then, for the “establish
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`an intended meaning for the utterance” step, Dr. Polish switched to an utterance about the “Hunger
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`Games.” As to this new utterance, he never showed that Alexa establishes an intended meaning
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`“within the identified context,” let alone how the new utterance meets any of the previous steps of
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`the claim. (Id. at 347:24-349:3.) Finally, for the “generate a response” step, Dr. Polish did not
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`explain how Alexa generated a response to any of his example utterances that was “grammatically
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`or syntactically adapt[ed]” “based on the intended meaning,” as required. (Id. at 350:1-20.) Thus,
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`no reasonable jury could have found infringement because Dr. Polish failed to map the require-
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`ments of that claim to an utterance. And again, Dr. Polish never identified source code or evidence
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`8
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`Case 1:19-cv-01410-MN Document 299 Filed 12/06/23 Page 15 of 27 PageID #: 11160
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`of Alexa’s back-end operation that shows that it meets this limitation. He jus