Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 1 of 16 PageID #: 2184
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` Plaintiff,
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`C.A. No. 17-1519 (VAC) (MPT)
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`REALTIME ADAPTIVE STREAMING
`LLC,
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`BRIGHTCOVE INC., and BRIGHTCOVE
`HOLDINGS, INC.,
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS BRIGHTCOVE INC.
`AND BRIGHTCOVE HOLDINGS, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
`TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6)
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Sonali D. Maitra
`Timothy C. Saulsbury
`DURIE TANGRI LLP
`217 Leidesdorff Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 362-6666
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`February 16, 2018
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`

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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 2 of 16 PageID #: 2185
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I. 
`II. 
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`REALTIME HAS NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT ................................1 
`THE FALLON PATENTS ARE INVALID UNDER SECTION 101 ..................................6 
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`i
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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 3 of 16 PageID #: 2186
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`
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp.,
`189 F. Supp. 3d 768 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Atlas IP, LLC v.
`Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..........................................4, 5
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .......................................................................................................2, 3, 4, 6
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`No. 2017-1437, 2018 WL 774096 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2018) ....................................................10
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. Cellco P’ships,
`885 F. Supp. 2d 710 (D. Del. 2012), aff’d, Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN
`Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ........................................................8
`
`Finjan v. BlueCoat Systems, Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2018) ....................................................................................8
`
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc.,
`620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)..................................................................................................2
`
`Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc.,
`869 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................2
`
`Prowire LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`No. 17-223, 2017 WL 3444689 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2017) ............................................................2
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`RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co.,
`855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................7
`
`Return Mail, Inc. v. USPS,
`868 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................9
`
`Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
`No. 6:16-cv-446-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 2821697 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) ...........................2
`
`TQP Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc.,
`No. 2:12-CV-180-WCB, 2014 WL 651935 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014) ....................................9
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................10
`
`ii
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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 4 of 16 PageID #: 2187
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, cont’d
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`U.S. Gypsum Co. v. New NGC, Inc.,
`No. 1:17CV130, 2017 WL 5187845 (D. Del. Aug. 18, 2017)...............................................2, 3
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................................................................6, 7, 8, 10
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`Rules
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 .............................................................................................................................6
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`iii
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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 5 of 16 PageID #: 2188
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`I.
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`REALTIME HAS NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT
`Realtime admits that it has not matched any component of Brightcove’s products to any
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`claim of any patent. It also admits that its sole basis for infringement is that Brightcove products
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`are compliant with the H.264 and H.265 standards. So there is only one way that compliance
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`with the standards creates a plausible basis for infringement: if compliance necessarily requires
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`practicing every element of at least one claim of each asserted patent. If the standard doesn’t
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`require infringement, there is no plausible basis to infer infringement. That is a matter of basic
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`logic and common sense, and the case law agrees.
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`In our opening brief, we showed that the H.264 and H.265 standards do not require any
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`specific type of compression—much less the specific type of compression required by the Fallon
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`Patents and the ’462 patent—or the stereoscopic processing of the ’298 patent. The standards are
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`black and white on these core facts, and not subject to interpretation. D.I. 16 at 6, 8. And in fact,
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`Realtime does not address or refute Brightcove’s citation to the standards. Nor can it; again, they
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`are expressly clear on these points. Thus, complying with the standard does not create a plausible
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`basis for infringement.
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`Instead, Realtime’s primary approach is to claim that Brightcove argues something it
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`does not, and attack that argument instead—a classic straw man. Realtime claims that
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`Brightcove’s argument is that “the standard cannot be relied upon purportedly because it is about
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`‘decoding’ only.” See D.I. 21 at 5; see also id. at 4 (“Brightcove’s argument that the standard is
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`solely about decoding is factually and legally flawed.”). It goes on to refute this claim by
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`pointing out that the standards “provide details regarding compression” and, in the alternative,
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`that encoding is implicit in decoding. Id. at 3–4.
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`Brightcove’s actual argument is that the H.264 and H.265 standards do not require what
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`the claims do—that the standards expressly say that the compression scheme and stereoscopic
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`1
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`processing are discretionary. Of course the standards may “provide details” about compression,
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`and of course decoding implies some sort of encoding. But the point is that compliance with the
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`standards does not plausibly translate to practicing the type of compression or stereoscopic
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`processing required by the claims.
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`Realtime’s remaining attempts to defend its infringement allegations also fail.
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`First, Realtime argues, without citation, that if one alleges compliance with a standard,
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`and then maps portions of the standard to an exemplary claim, that is enough. D.I. 21 at 3. That
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`is not the law. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (the fact of
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`standard-compliance alone is not sufficient to show infringement where “the relevant section of
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`the standard is optional, and standards compliance alone would not establish that the accused
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`infringer chooses to implement [the section].”); Stragent, LLC v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No.
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`6:16-cv-446-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 2821697, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2017) (“[A] patentee may
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`rely on standard compliance to show infringement only if the patent covers every possible
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`implementation of the standard.”). Indeed, the case for dismissal is stronger here than in Fujitsu
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`because the H.264 standard does not even provide an optional compression process—it expressly
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`states that an “encoding process” is “not specified” by the standard. D.I. 16 at 6.
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`Second, Realtime monkeys around with the legal framework for patent cases under Iqbal
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`and Twombly, claiming that as long as a plaintiff makes allegations beyond “labels and
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`conclusions,” “above a speculative level,” or gives “notice” of the infringing activity, it wins at
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`the motion to dismiss stage—citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. New NGC, Inc., No. 1:17CV130, 2017
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`WL 5187845 (D. Del. Aug. 18, 2017), Prowire LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-223, 2017 WL
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`3444689, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2017), and Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d
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`1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017). This is a wild misrepresentation of these cases. These cases say that
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`2
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`such allegations are necessary but not sufficient—that is, of course one must include allegations
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`that are beyond “labels and conclusions,” “above [a] speculative level” and give “notice” of
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`infringing activity. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (collecting cases
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`and treatises for these background principles). But under Iqbal and Twombly, a patent plaintiff
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`must also provide a plausible basis of infringement, “conducting a limitation-by-limitation
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`analysis, comparing the asserted claim to the factual allegations in the complaint,” and ensuring
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`that the court may “infer that the accused product infringes each element of at least one claim.”
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`See D.I. 16 at 4–5 (citing Atlas, Raindance, Modern Telecom, and Exelon). Realtime dismisses
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`these cases in a footnote as “inapposite” without actually addressing the proposition for which
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`Brightcove cited and quoted them throughout the opening brief. D.I. 21 at 2 n.4.1
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`Third, Realtime implies that it should move past the pleadings stage because “a defendant
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`has greater access to . . . more information about its accused method[.]” D.I. 21 at 2 (quoting
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`U.S. Gypsum, 2017 WL 5187845, at *3). But this does not eliminate the requirement to show a
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`plausible basis for infringement, on an element-by-element basis. And Realtime has not even
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`tried to map Brightcove’s actual product components to any asserted claim.
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`Fourth, Realtime levels two contradictory arguments in response to Brightcove’s
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`additional argument for why Realtime has not created a plausible basis for infringement of Claim
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`15. To recap, Claim 15 requires “determining a parameter of . . . a data block” and “selecting one
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`or more asymmetric compressors . . . based upon the determined parameter or attribute.” D.I.
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`8-1, Claim 15. But Realtime’s only allegation in support of this limitation is that the standard
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`allows one to set “bitrate” and “resolution” for an already compressed file. See D.I. 8 ¶ 11.
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`1 Realtime also asserts that it need not “prove” infringement at the pleadings stage. D.I. 21 at
`2. On this, we agree. But, again, Realtime is legally required to provide a plausible basis for
`infringement for each element of a single claim—and this it cannot do by simply stating that
`Brightcove is H.264/H.265 compliant.
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`3
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`In response, Realtime first argues that “bitrate” and “resolution” “can be” parameters of
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`uncompressed data. D.I. 21 at 4. That very well may be true, but this is not what Realtime
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`identifies in its complaint; its allegations expressly cite a selection from the standard identifying
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`bitrate and resolution parameters for H.264-encoded video. See D.I. 8 ¶ 11. Thus, Realtime
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`points to nothing that meets the requirement of determining a parameter of data pre-compression.
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`Then, Realtime flips and says that the claim can be read as determining parameters of an
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`already-compressed file anyway—and that this is a claim construction dispute that cannot be
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`resolved at this stage. D.I. 21 at 4 & n.6. First, claim construction is proper at the pleadings
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`stage. See Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp., 189 F. Supp. 3d 768, 774–75 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d sub
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`nom. Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
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`(construing the claims at the pleading stage and dismissing the case under Iqbal and Twombly).
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`And on the face of the claim, the system selects a compression scheme “based on” the
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`“determined parameter block”; thus, this determination must happen pre-compression.
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`Fifth, in another straw man, Realtime says that Brightcove’s argument is that Realtime
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`provides only summary conclusions of infringement—and then refutes this “argument” by
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`pointing to its 75-page complaint. D.I. 21 at 2. But Brightcove does not argue that the complaint
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`contains summary conclusions only. Rather, Brightcove’s argument is that Realtime summarily
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`concludes that compliance with the standard translates to a plausible basis of infringement, as
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`opposed to actually showing how Brightcove’s instrumentalities infringe. Id. at 5–6. And this is
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`precisely what Realtime admits in opposition and is plain on the face of the complaint.
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`Sixth, Realtime says that any dispute over what the H.264 standard requires is a “factual
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`issue,” inappropriate for the motion to dismiss stage. As support, Realtime points to paragraph
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`13 of its complaint, in which it alleges that the standard requires selection between different
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`4
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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 9 of 16 PageID #: 2192
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`compression schemes. D.I. 8 ¶ 13. But this allegation is contradicted by the H.264 standard itself,
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`which unambiguously states that the compression methods aren’t specified in the standard. D.I.
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`17-1 at § 3.49. The Federal Circuit has expressly held that where papers referenced in the
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`complaint contradict a plaintiff’s allegations, dismissal is proper. In re Bill of Lading
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`Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This is not
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`a “disputed interpretation” of the standard to be resolved in Realtime’s favor; instead, this is a
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`direct contradiction of Realtime’s allegations by the same papers referenced—and relied upon—
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`in the complaint. Realtime does not address, much less distinguish, this controlling authority.
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`Seventh, Realtime responds to Brightcove’s argument that it simply recycled allegations
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`for Claim 15 for the remaining Fallon Patents by saying that the allegations for Claim 15 are
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`“related” to concepts addressed in those other patents. D.I. 21 at 4. That is not enough to meet
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`the plausibility standard. The fact stands that each of the other Fallon Patents contains additional
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`claim elements that, by virtue of Realtime’s recycling of its ’535 allegations, are left entirely
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`unaddressed, requiring dismissal. See Exelon, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 775.
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`Eighth, on the ’462 patent, the first of the non-Fallon Patents, Realtime does not even
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`bother to claim that it has plausibly alleged infringement of the elements of the claim. Instead, it
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`falls back on the illogical argument that the standard “provide[s] details” on encoding and,
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`alternatively, that encoding is implicit in a discussion of decoding. Id. at 3. That, of course, says
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`nothing about whether the complaint contains factual allegations supporting a plausible inference
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`that each of the very specific limitations of Claim 1 of the ’462 patent are met. It does not.
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`Ninth, on the ’298 patent, the second of the non-Fallon Patents, Realtime says that
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`whether stereoscopic processing is required is an issue of fact and that the FAC alleges
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`infringement—without actually identifying anything about its allegations that create a plausible
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`5
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`basis for infringement. Id. at 5–6. But again, under In re Bill of Lading, because Brightcove has
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`contradicted Realtime’s allegations with direct evidence from the standard, Realtime’s allegation
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`fails. 681 F.3d at 1338.
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`Finally, the very facts of this case show that compliance does not translate to
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`infringement: Brightcove just doesn’t do what the patents claim, even though its products may be
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`H.264 and H.265 compliant. It does not choose a compression routine based on the bandwidth of
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`a communications channel. It does not choose a compression routine based on a data
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`characteristic. And it does not do stereoscopic processing whatsoever. Brightcove should not be
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`dragged into an expensive, time-consuming, and baseless suit by a plaintiff who failed to actually
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`analyze Brightcove’s products, and mistakenly asserted that compliance with the standard
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`translates to infringement. For these reasons, Brightcove brings this Iqbal and Twombly motion
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`and intends to file a Rule 11 motion if Realtime refuses to drop this suit.
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`II.
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`THE FALLON PATENTS ARE INVALID UNDER SECTION 101
`The claims of the Fallon Patents are directed to the abstract idea of selecting a
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`compression scheme based on a characteristic of data or its communication medium. The claims
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`add nothing more than conventional computer implementations—such as a CPU, the Internet,
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`data gathering, storing, and well-known compression schemes. Thus, they are invalid under
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`Section 101. Nothing in Realtime’s opposition affects this conclusion.
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`First, Realtime’s lead argument is that the entire field of digital data compression is not
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`abstract. See D.I. 21 at 1 (“the non-abstract realm of digital data compression”); id. at 7
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`(“Realtime’s claims are directed to digital data compression, which plainly is not abstract.”).
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`This is perhaps Realtime’s moonshot—hoping that a court will find any and all patents directed
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`to the general field of digital data compression will survive Section 101, and its entire portfolio
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`will be immune. But this flies in the face of RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322,
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`6
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`1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and numerous other cases addressed in Brightcove’s opening brief that
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`have held that a “process that starts with data, adds an algorithm, and ends with a new form of
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`data” is patent ineligible. D.I. 16 at 13.
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`Realtime attempts to distinguish RecogniCorp on the basis that the “case involved a
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`patent [that] was not about digital data compression.” D.I. 21 at 12. This is baffling. The
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`RecogniCorp court expressly said that the patent at issue “sought to solve [the problem of
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`sending large image files] by encoding the image at one end through a variety of image classes
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`that required less memory and bandwidth, and at the other end decoding the images.”
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`RecogniCorp., 855 F.3d at 1324. And the claims purportedly increased efficiency by describing a
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`non-specific process of compressing digital images. Id. This is near-identical to the issues at play
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`here: the specification describes the problem of bandwidth and storage constraints, and selecting
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`from among unspecified compression schemes in response to increase efficiency. See, e.g., D.I.
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`8-1 at 1:21–60, 9:53–59. In fact, the exemplary claim in RecogniCorp was arguably stronger,
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`since it actually described a compression scheme in the claim itself. See D.I. 16 at 13–14.
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`Realtime is correct that the RecogniCorp court mentioned that exemplary claim 1 did
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`“not even require a computer,” but the court did so in further support of its conclusion that
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`“RecogniCorp has not alleged a particularized application of encoding and decoding image
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`data.” RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1328. Moreover, Realtime ignores the very next line of the
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`holding, which stated “[i]ndependent claim 36 claims the use of a computer, but it does exactly
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`what we have warned it may not: tell a user to take an abstract idea and apply it with a
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`computer.” Id. Thus, RecogniCorp absolutely did involve compression of digital data, and the
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`claims there were found invalid under Section 101 notwithstanding.
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`Second, Realtime principally relies on Finjan v. BlueCoat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299
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`7
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`(Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2018), to argue that its claims “improve an existing technological process” in
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`a particularized manner. D.I. 21 at 7–8. Specifically, it relies on Finjan for the proposition that it
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`need not actually explain how to implement the idea of selecting a compression routine based on
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`a communications channel or a data characteristic. Id. This is a mischaracterization of Finjan. In
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`response to defendant’s argument that the claim did not specify how to implement the claimed
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`abstract idea of behavior-based virus scanning, the court expressly held that the claim did in fact
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`do so, holding that the claim “recite[d] specific steps—generating a security profile that
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`identifies suspicious code and linking it to a downloadable.” Furthermore, the Federal Circuit
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`adopted the district court’s claim constructions, including one requiring that the security profile
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`include “details about the suspicious code in the received downloadable such as . . . ‘all
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`potentially hostile or suspicious code operations that may be attempted by the Downloadable.’”
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`Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1304. This, said the court, went directly to the claimed innovation—
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`analyzing the behavior of incoming files as opposed to filtering recognized viruses only. Id.
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`Realtime, by contrast, proposes no claim construction that will particularize or explain how to
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`implement the abstract idea of the claims. Dismissal is thus appropriate. Cyberfone Sys., LLC v.
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`Cellco P’ships, 885 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (D. Del. 2012), aff’d, Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN
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`Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (because “plaintiff did not explain how
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`claim construction might alter [the court’s § 101] analysis . . . the court concludes that it may
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`proceed without the benefit of claim construction”).
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`More fundamentally, Realtime does not explain what is “particularized” or “novel” about
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`the claimed solution of the Fallon Patents. It offers no rebuttal to the five-plus pages of analysis
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`in our opening brief demonstrating that the elements of every exemplary claim identified in the
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`complaint (1) merely recite routine and conventional technology; (2) are directed to immaterial
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`8
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`steps, like data-gathering; or (3) are directed to the abstract idea itself. See D.I. 16 at 15–20.
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`Although Realtime continues to rely on claim elements such as “asymmetric compressors” and a
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`“plurality of compressors” (e.g., D.I. 21 at 15), it does not (because it cannot) refute the fact that,
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`according to the Fallon Patents’ own specification, these elements represent routine and
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`conventional technology—and thus cannot render the Fallon Patents non-abstract. See D.I. 8-1 at
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`1:31–38 (asymmetric compressors); 5:33–35 (plurality of compressors).
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`Third, in response to our demonstration that the claims are abstract because they can be
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`performed “in a human’s mind,” Realtime relies on TQP Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc., No. 2:12-CV-
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`180-WCB, 2014 WL 651935, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014) for the proposition that “courts
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`have held [] ‘human brain’ arguments inapplicable and unhelpful.” D.I. 21 at 15 n.21. At the
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`outset, TQP held no such thing—but, rather, concluded that the plaintiff had provided “evidence
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`to the contrary,” which demonstrated that the claims could not be performed in one’s mind. TQP,
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`2014 WL 651935, *5.2 Here, in stark contrast, Realtime does not deny that Federal Circuit
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`personnel perform the claimed step of “selecting one or more asymmetric compressors . . . based
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`upon the determined parameter or attribute” entirely in the human mind when, for example,
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`compressing oral argument recordings for distribution via its website. D.I. 16 at 16.
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`Fourth, Realtime attempts to rely on Eastern District of Texas cases addressing unrelated
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`patents owned by its parent company, Realtime Data. Realtime tries to create the pretense that
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`the patents in the Texas cases are related to those asserted here by noting that a family member
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`of the patents asserted in Texas was incorporated by reference in the Fallon Patents. In reality,
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`however, it is undisputed that the Fallon Patents claim priority to an entirely distinct patent
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`2 Realtime is also wrong in suggesting that the “human mind” test is not the law. The Federal
`Circuit routinely applies “human mind” analysis in finding claims abstract. See, e.g., Return
`Mail, Inc. v. USPS, 868 F.3d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`9
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`family than those asserted in Texas, are thus unrelated, and involve entirely different claims.
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`Thus, even if the Texas courts had applied the proper claims-based approach to the § 101 inquiry
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`(as explained in our opening brief, they did not, see D.I. 16 at 17 n.5), nothing about the Texas
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`decisions dictate that the unrelated Fallon claims are themselves directed to a “technological
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`improvement” or are otherwise non-abstract.
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`Fifth and finally, Realtime alleges that the claims recite “unconventional” components or
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`components arranged in an “unconventional” way. But Realtime never explains what is
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`unconventional about any specific elements (or combination of elements) in the claims. Instead,
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`Realtime cites portions of the specification discussing the prior art and issues with random access
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`and disk fragmentation. D.I. 21 at 18. To support its reliance on the specification, Realtime cites
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`Berkheimer for the proposition that “[t]he improvements in the specification . . . create a factual
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`dispute regarding whether the invention describes well-understood, routine, and conventional
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`activities.” D.I. 21 at 19 n.25 (quoting Berkheimer v. HP Inc., No. 2017-1437, 2018 WL 774096,
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`at *6 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2018)). But, the full quotation (without Realtime’s strategic ellipsis)
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`expressly qualifies that such “improvements in the specification” matter only “to the extent they
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`are captured in the claims.” Berkheimer, 2018 WL 774096, at *6. The full Berkheimer quotation
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`confirms that dismissal is proper here because Realtime fails to point to any language in the
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`claims that captures the purported “improvements in the specification” on which it relies.3 Two-
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`Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
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`(affirming dismissal because “[w]hile the specification may describe a purported innovative
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`‘scalable architecture,’ claim 1 . . . does not”).
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`3 At best, Realtime asserts that “[t]o solve these [problems], the asserted patents teach
`unconventional combinations of elements,” but offers no citation—much less one to claim
`language—supporting this bare assertion of unconventionality, confirming that the Fallon
`specification (unlike that in Berkheimer) raises no factual issue warranting denial of this motion.
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`10
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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 15 of 16 PageID #: 2198
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
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`/s/ Stephen J. Kraftschik
`__________________________________________
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Sonali D. Maitra
`Timothy C. Saulsbury
`DURIE TANGRI LLP
`217 Leidesdorff Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 362-6666
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`February 16, 2018
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`11
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`Case 1:17-cv-01519-JFB-SRF Document 22 Filed 02/16/18 Page 16 of 16 PageID #: 2199
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on February 16, 2018, I caused the foregoing to be electronically
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`filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
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`February 16, 2018, upon the following in the manner indicated:
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
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`/s/ Stephen J. Kraftschik
`___________________________
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
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`Stephen B. Brauerman, Esquire
`Sara E. Bussiere, Esquire
`BAYARD, P.A.
`600 North King Street, Suite 400
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`Mark A. Fenster, Esquire
`Reza Mirzaie, Esquire
`Brian D. Ledahl, Esquire
`C. Jay Chung, Esquire
`Philip X. Wang, Esquire
`Timothy T. Hsieh, Esquire
`RUSS, AUGUST & KABAT
`12424 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90025-1031
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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