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`DEFENDANT’S POSITION REGARDING
`PROPOSED PERMANENT INJUNCTION
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`Pursuant to the Court’s Order (D.I. 457). Caterpillar has attached its proposed language for
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`a permanent injunction as Exhibit A and presents here its argument in favor of its proposal.
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`I.
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`THE INJUNCTION MAY NOT INCLUDE MACHINES INCLUDED IN THE
`JURY AWARD OR SUPPLEMENTAL DAMAGES CALCULATION
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`Wirtgen seeks a double recovery. Wirtgen rejected a provision addressing whether the
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`injunction covers post-sale activities relating to infringing machines that have already been sold
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`and are accounted for in the damages award or supplemental damages. See Ex. B (Wirtgen deleting
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`Caterpillar proposal that “[n]othing in this order shall enjoin Caterpillar Inc.’s activity or shall
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`require Caterpillar to breach contractual obligations (including service agreements) regarding
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`products reflected in Exhibit 3322 or Caterpillar Inc.’s supplemental accounting, including . . .”).
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`A patent owner that has been “awarded full compensation” in damages for infringing products “is
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`not entitled to enjoin their use.” Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir.
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`1987). Wirtgen recognized that damages are an “alternative” to an injunction, conceding that an
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`injunction cannot apply to products for which it is fully compensated through damages. See D.I.
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`456 at 62; D.I. 372 at 21-23.
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`The jury award and supplemental damages fully compensate Wirtgen. Wirtgen
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`C.A. No. 17-770-JDW
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`)))))))))
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`WIRTGEN AMERICA, INC.,
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`CATERPILLAR INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendant.
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 458 Filed 09/24/24 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: 40816
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`received full compensation when it was awarded what it asked for: “a lump sum royalty”
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`(representing what “Caterpillar would have paid when the hypothetical negotiation concluded and
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`Caterpillar obtained the license”) and supplemental damages to “cover sales . . . through the date
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`of the entry of judgment.” D.I. 456 at 63-64; see Amstar, 823 F.2d at 1549. Wirtgen now believes
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`that the prohibition on double recovery “applies only after a patentee has actually collected on a
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`damages award.” Ex. C. Wirtgen cites Glenayre Electronics, Inc. v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 851, 873
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`(Fed. Cir. 2006), in which the court denied a patent owner damages for indirect infringement in a
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`second suit after it already received the damages it requested for direct infringement in a first suit.
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`While payment of damages might be a sufficient condition for an implied license to arise, it is not
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`a necessary one. Wirtgen also cites Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Commission, 474
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`F.3d 1281, 1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2007), which is a non-analogous case about reconstruction.
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`The damages award need not be paid to preclude double recovery. See Amstar, 823 F.2d at
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`1549 (an award of “full compensation” was sufficient to preclude an injunction on the same
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`products) (citing Wagner Sign Serv. v. Midwest News Reel Theatres, 119 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir.)
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`(despite the plaintiff having “received no compensation,” the “decree in its favor for an accounting
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`of all profits and damages” and a bond prevented an injunction)); Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech.
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`Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 800 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (despite the
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`plaintiff’s contention that it had “not been fully compensated” because the defendant had “not yet
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`paid the judgment,” an implied license arose when “the jury required [the defendant] to pay
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`damages,” and any uncertainty regarding payment could be solved by requiring the defendant “to
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`post a bond or provide some other satisfactory guarantee of payment”). There is no uncertainty
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`here. Caterpillar is prepared to pay the damages award. Caterpillar intends to post a bond for the
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`full amount of the assessed damages pending any appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b).
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`2
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 458 Filed 09/24/24 Page 3 of 6 PageID #: 40817
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`The injunction necessarily excludes machines accounted for in the jury’s award of
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`damages. The injunction should exclude Caterpillar’s activity regarding the machines listed in
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`Exhibit 3322 for which the jury “awarded a lump sum royalty”—i.e., full compensation. See D.I.
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`346; Trial Ex. 3322. Wirtgen’s request to enjoin these products is a double recovery.
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`Caterpillar is not seeking to sell new infringing machines. Rather, it is seeking to provide
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`support and services to third parties who previously purchased machines. Products for which
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`damages have been awarded should be treated as licensed products subject to no restrictions,
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`including on shipping or distributing, re-sale, or on providing sales support to dealers (including
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`rebates to dealers upon re-sale of machines to the end user), financing, servicing (including
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`technical support and repair services), replacement parts, or training relating to such products. See,
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`e.g., Aero Products Int'l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 2004 WL 2091996, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
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`16, 2004) (where plaintiff is entitled to “damages calculated by an accounting of infringing sales .
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`. . through the entry of an injunction,” the injunction “will not preclude the resale of infringing
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`products for which [defendant] has already paid damages, as well as infringing products which are
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`disclosed in an accounting to determine additional damages”); Odetics, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (a
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`jury’s award of damages “for the sale of . . . thirty systems” gave rise to “implied license as to
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`them,” and the defendant was “permitted to continue routine service and repair of all systems
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`owned by its customers”); King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
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`1987) (vacating an injunction that extended to repair parts where the court ordered damages as to
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`past infringing machine sales, providing “an implied license on those sales”).
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`The injunction should exclude machines accounted for in Caterpillar’s supplemental
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`accounting. The products excluded from the injunction include both the machine sales addressed
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`at trial and the sales that occurred afterwards but before the entry of an injunction. For this purpose,
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`3
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 458 Filed 09/24/24 Page 4 of 6 PageID #: 40818
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`the Court contemplates supplemental damages covering the period through September 30, 2024.
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`See D.I. 457 at 1. All products sold and accounted for are licensed (by payment of damages), and,
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`for the same reasons noted above, Wirtgen may not obtain a double recovery by also obtaining an
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`injunction. See supra; see, e.g., Aero Products, 2004 WL 2091996, at *1 (exempting from an
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`injunction “infringing products which are disclosed in an accounting); Accentra Inc. v. Staples,
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`Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds
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`and remanded, 500 F. App’x 922 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (exempting from an injunction post-verdict
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`inventory reflected in an accounting).
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`Wirtgen has been fully compensated by damages for the machines that have already been
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`sold. Principles of law and equity weigh against requiring Caterpillar to violate its obligations to
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`third parties who were not involved in this lawsuit.
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`II.
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`THE INJUNCTION SHOULD CLARIFY SCOPE REGARDING RM MACHINES
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`The injunction should clarify how the RM machines infringe claim 22 of the ’530 patent.
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`Injunctions must define the enjoined acts that “relate to particular, adjudicated infringing
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`products.” Macom Tech. Sols. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 881 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018). During the jury trial on claim 22 of the ’530 patent, the jury saw evidence of two
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`different display features on the RM machines. Feature A was illustrated in Trial Exhibit 2996A,
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`showing an average lifting position of the rear two legs. Feature B was illustrated in Trial Exhibits
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`4656 and 4657, showing the individual lifting positions (by percent) of the left and right rear legs.
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`4
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 458 Filed 09/24/24 Page 5 of 6 PageID #: 40819
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`Feature A (Ex. 2996A): average
`value for two rear legs
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`Feature B (Ex. 4656):
`one value for each leg
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`One value for each leg
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`Trial Exs. 2996A and 4656 (annotated).
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` In its briefing for JMOL, Caterpillar argued that Feature A could not infringe claim 22 of
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`the ’530 patent, because a screen showing an average of both legs is not “display[ing] the lifting
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`positions of each of the lifting columns,” as required by claim 22. D.I. 381 at 18-19; D.I. 429 at
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`10-11. When addressing a prior-art road-milling machine design having multiple sensors that was
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`asserted against the ’530 patent in a prior proceeding, Wirtgen contended that “[d]isplaying an
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`average of multiple signals is not the same as displaying the signal associated with [a] single
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`sensor.” See Ex. D. But here, Wirtgen argued the opposite—i.e., a display showing an average
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`between two sensors (Feature A) is the same as displaying a signal associated with a single sensor.
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`D.I. 406 at 17. The Court ruled that Feature B provided substantial evidence for the jury’s verdict.
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`D.I.456 at 22-23 (citing trial testimony discussing Trial Exhibits 4656 and 4657, illustrating
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`Feature B). But the Court never stated that 2996A—illustrating Feature A —infringed. Because
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`this Court relied only on evidence that Feature B was substantial evidence supporting the verdict
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`as to claim 22, the injunction should not apply to RM machines that have Feature A but had Feature
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`B removed.
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`5
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 458 Filed 09/24/24 Page 6 of 6 PageID #: 40820
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`Respectfully submitted,
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
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`By: /s/ Bindu A. Palapura
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Andrew L. Brown (#6766)
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 984-6000
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
`abrown@potteranderson.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant Caterpillar Inc.
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Daniel C. Cooley
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
`& DUNNER, LLP
`1875 Explorer Street, Suite 800
`Reston, VA 20190
`Tel: (571) 203-2778
`
`James R. Barney
`David K. Mroz
`Jason L. Romrell
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
`& DUNNER LLP
`901 New York Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20001-4413
`(202) 408-4412
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`James C. Yoon
`Ryan R. Smith
`Christopher D. Mays
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Tel: (650) 493-9300
`
`Lucy Yen
`Cassie Leigh Black
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`Tel: (212) 999-5800
`
`Matthew A. Macdonald
`Neil N. Desai
`Naoya Son
`Alex J. Turner
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`953 E. 3rd St., #100
`Los Angeles, California 90013
`Tel: (323) 210-2900
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`Jennifer (Celine) Liu
`Randal C. Miller
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`701 5th Avenue #5100
`Seattle, WA 98104
`Tel: (206) 883-2500
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`
`Dated: September 24, 2024
`11753424 /11898.00005
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`6
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