`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`
`
`WIRTGEN AMERICA, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 1:17-cv-00770-JDW
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ORDER
`
`AND NOW, this 28th day of August, 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff Wirtgen
`
`
`CATERPILLAR, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.
`
`America, Inc.’s Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings That The ‘538 Patent1 Is Invalid
`
`(D.I. 385) and Defendant Caterpillar, Inc.’s Cross-Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings
`
`On Wirtgen’s Fourth Affirmative Defense (Patent Ineligibility) (D.I. 417), I note as follows.
`
`1.
`
`A motion for judgment on the pleadings is not unique to patent law, so I
`
`apply Third Circuit law. See Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil
`
`Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “After the pleadings are closed—but early
`
`enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ.
`
`P. 12(c). “[J]udgment will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that no
`
`material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 9,975,538 (‘538 Patent).
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 2 of 11 PageID #: 40723
`
`matter of law.” Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation
`
`omitted). To make this determination, I “must view the facts presented in the pleadings
`
`and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
`
`party.” Id. (same).
`
`2.
`
`I may consider materials subject to judicial notice, like patents, without
`
`converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See generally Pension Benefit
`
`Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993);
`
`Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`3.
`
`Once a patent issues, the law presumes its validity, and anyone attacking
`
`that validity carries the burden of proof to show invalidity by clear and convincing
`
`evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1097
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016). Patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law suitable for
`
`resolution on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`4.
`
`An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
`
`machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court
`
`interprets Section 101 to contain an implicit exception: “laws of nature, natural
`
`phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l,
`
`573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quotations omitted). Abstract ideas “are products of the mind,
`
`mental steps, not capable of being controlled by others, regardless what a statute or
`
`
`
` 2
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 3 of 11 PageID #: 40724
`
`patent claim might say.” Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring in denial of
`
`rehearing en banc) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 (1972)).
`
`5.
`
`Courts use the two-step Alice framework to determine whether a patent is
`
`invalid under Section 101. The Alice framework first requires a court determine whether
`
`the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent ineligible concept, such as abstract ideas.
`
`Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
`
`66 (2012)). If they are directed to an ineligible concept, the court considers the elements
`
`of each claim, “both individually and as an ordered combination,” to determine whether
`
`the additional elements amount to “significantly” more than just the abstract idea. Id. at
`
`217-18 (same); see also Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
`
`6.
`
`Step 1 of the Alice framework questions if the claims at issue are directed
`
`“as a whole … to [patent-ineligible] subject matter.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
`
`F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). I “ask[] what the patent asserts to be the focus of the
`
`claimed advance over the prior art” by analyzing the language of the asserted claims
`
`considered in light of the specification. Yu, 1 F.4th at 1043 (citation omitted).
`
`7.
`
`I look for the focus of the claim beginning with the claim language itself.
`
`See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016). At-issue
`
`Claim 13 depends from Claim 6. Claims 6 and 13 have a number of limits. Most identify
`
`components of a generic road milling machine (machine, engine, variable transmission,
`
`rotor, and clutch). (‘538 Patent at 6:55-64; 7:21-24.) These elements aren’t the focus of the
`
`
`
` 3
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 4 of 11 PageID #: 40725
`
`claim. The claim lists these elements with minimal description except to state their
`
`relationship vis-à-vis one another. (See, e.g., id. at 6:55-64 (transmission coupled to an
`
`output of the engine); 7:21-24 (clutch between the engine and the rotor).) Further, the
`
`specification confirms that prior art machines had these components. (See id. at 1:34:40
`
`(describing prior-art patent “Parker” disclosing a road milling machine with variable
`
`transmission, engine, and rotor); 3:30-40 (clutch).) And the patent doesn’t purport to
`
`improve upon these generic machine elements. These are just background actors.
`
`8.
`
`That the patent claims a machine doesn’t save Caterpillar at Alice Step 1.
`
`Whether a patent claims a machine is not the dispositive inquiry. See Alice, 573 U.S. at
`
`224. “[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of
`
`the abstract-idea inquiry.” In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016) (collecting cases); see, e.g., ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759,
`
`770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (patent claiming “a physical machine that is quite tangible—an electric
`
`vehicle charging station” was directed at an abstract idea). To hold otherwise “would make
`
`the determination of patent eligibility depend simply on the draftsman's art, thereby
`
`eviscerating the rule that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
`
`patentable.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224 (internal quotations omitted) (cleaned up).
`
`9.
`
`The claim’s focus is the mechanism that adjusts the machine’s performance
`
`to optimize fuel efficiency. Claim 6 recites a controller “configured to determine an engine
`
`load, adjust an engine speed based on the engine load and one or more predefined
`
`
`
` 4
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 5 of 11 PageID #: 40726
`
`efficiency points being based at least partially on predetermined fuel consumption rates
`
`and providing optimum engine speeds for different engine loads, and adjust a gear ratio
`
`of the variable transmission based on the engine speed to maintain a desired rotor speed.”
`
`(‘538 Patent at 6:55-64 (emphasis added).) Claim 13 recites the machine of Claim 6 with
`
`the controller “being configured to selectively disengage the rotor from the engine
`
`through control of the clutch.” (Id. at 7:21-24.)
`
`10.
`
`In other words, Claim 13 recites two functions of the controller:
`
`1) determining an optimal engine speed and 2) correcting the machine to reach that
`
`speed. “[A]nalyzing information by steps people go through in their minds” is an abstract
`
`idea. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). So, if the
`
`claim stopped at the first function, it would be directed to a mental process safely within
`
`the abstract-idea category. But “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest
`
`upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo Collaborative
`
`Servs., 566 U.S. at 71. As a result, “[a]t [Alice] step one, it is not enough to merely identify
`
`a patent-ineligible concept underlying the claim; we must determine whether that patent-
`
`ineligible concept is what the claim is ‘directed to.’” Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States,
`
`850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
`
`11.
`
`The key here is the second function, when the controller in Claim 13 goes
`
`further; it leverages the information to fulfill its named purpose: controlling the machine’s
`
`speed. The claim is “directed to” that mechanism that adjusts engine speed. For emphasis,
`
`
`
` 5
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 6 of 11 PageID #: 40727
`
`it is not that the controller has some ancillary capability to adjust the engine’s speed or
`
`the variable transmission’s gear ratio. Rather, that capability is the controller’s entire
`
`purpose. Calculating the optimal speed is a necessary precursor. But that calculation is
`
`not the thrust of the claim. The “gist” of Claim 13 is the adjustment of the engine speed
`
`to optimize for fuel conservation while maintaining rotor speed. Ubiquitous Connectivity,
`
`LP v. Cent. Sec. Grp. - Nationwide, Inc., No. 18-CV-368-JED-CDL, 2021 WL 1970664, at *6
`
`(N.D. Okla. May 17, 2021).
`
`12.
`
`The specification confirms this reading of the claim language. See Yu, 1 F.4th
`
`at 1043. I review “the problem facing the inventor and, ultimately, what the patent
`
`describes as the invention.” ChargePoint, Inc., 920 F.3d at 767 (internal quotation omitted).
`
`Prior art machines used variable transmissions to maintain a consistent rotor speed when
`
`the engine’s speed changed. (See ‘538 Patent at 1:32-40 (describing prior-art patent
`
`“Parker”).) But those machines did not take fuel efficiency into account. The ‘538 Patent
`
`presents an “improved solution[]” for maintaining rotor speed while taking fuel
`
`consumption “into consideration.” (Id. at 1:41-43.) The inventive mechanism is a
`
`“controller-implemented method of controlling a machine.” (Id. at 1:52-53 (emphasis
`
`added).)
`
`13. When there’s a discrepancy between the actual and desired engine speed,
`
`the controller “may increase or decrease the engine speed … until the optimum engine
`
`speed is substantially achieved.” (Id. at 5:18-35.) Likewise, the controller may “adjust the
`
`
`
` 6
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 7 of 11 PageID #: 40728
`
`gear ratio … accordingly” to achieve the right rotor speed. (Id. at 5:36-56.) In sum, based
`
`on reading the claim language and the specification, Claim 13’s focus is the controller’s
`
`capability to adjust the engine’s speed while maintaining rotor speed.
`
`14.
`
`The question then becomes whether that focus is “’a specific means or
`
`method that improves the relevant technology or [is] instead directed to a result or effect
`
`that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.’”
`
`CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc, 955 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting McRO, Inc.
`
`v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). “A patent may
`
`issue ‘for the means or method of producing a certain result, or effect, and not for the
`
`result or effect produced.’” McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450
`
`U.S. 175, 182 n.7 (1981)).
`
`15.
`
`Claim 13 is patent eligible because it makes a “non-abstract improvement[]
`
`to [an] existing technological process[].” Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH,
`
`942 F.3d 1143, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224. The controller
`
`physically adjusts the machine’s operation. Modulating the engine’s speed allows the
`
`machine to function more efficiently by using less fuel, which is the abstract concept.
`
`Increasing efficiency is a prototypical example of an improvement to a machine. See
`
`Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
`
`16.
`
`Claim 13 “require[s] doing something to a [machine], not simply doing
`
`something on a [machine]” which is an important difference to the issue of patent
`
`
`
` 7
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 8 of 11 PageID #: 40729
`
`eligibility. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`
`(emphasis in original). The latter is problematic because “such patents ‘would prohibit all
`
`other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.’” McRO, Inc., 837
`
`F.3d at 1314 (citation omitted). In Affinity Labs, the at-issue claim was “directed to a
`
`broadcast system in which a cellular telephone located outside the range of a regional
`
`broadcaster (1) requests and receives network-based content from the broadcaster via a
`
`streaming signal, (2) is configured to wirelessly download an application for performing
`
`those functions, and (3) contains a display that allows the user to select particular
`
`content.” Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1256. The Federal Circuit concluded that the “claims
`
`[were] directed not to an improvement in cellular telephones but simply to the use of
`
`cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a process focused on an abstract idea.” Id. at
`
`1262.
`
`17.
`
`By contrast, Claim 13 does not invoke the road milling machine “merely as
`
`a tool.” Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1336; see also In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d
`
`at 612. This is not “a situation where general-purpose [machine] components are added
`
`post-hoc to a … mathematical equation.” Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d at 1339.
`
`18.
`
`Put another way, Claim 13 doesn’t assume the normal and expected
`
`operation of a prior art milling machine. Instead, it seeks to disrupt that operation by
`
`regulating the engine’s speed in a novel manner. See, e.g., SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`
`930 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding patent-eligibility when claims “prevent[ed]”
`
`
`
` 8
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 9 of 11 PageID #: 40730
`
`the expected operation of a conventional computer network). Claim 13 discloses a
`
`mechanism that acts upon the engine and/or rotor speed of a road milling machine.
`
`19.
`
`The claimed controller, with its ability to manipulate the road milling
`
`machine itself, separates the ‘538 Patent from cases where data processing fails Alice Step
`
`1. Those patents claimed information analysis with little else. See e.g., Elec. Power Grp.,
`
`LLC, 830 F.3d at 1354 (“merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting
`
`and analyzing information, without more … is abstract as an ancillary part of such
`
`collection and analysis”); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344-45 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2018). To use the framework of another abstract-idea test, a human mind can
`
`determine the most fuel-efficient speed with pen and paper. See Immersion Corp. v. Fitbit,
`
`Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (collecting cases). But that mind can’t
`
`adjust a machine’s speed to achieve that fuel efficiency.
`
`20.
`
`Claim 13’s technological improvement is sufficiently specific. The controller
`
`a) finds the engine load and b) cross-references it with a “predefined efficiency point[]” to
`
`determine an optimal engine speed. Then the controller c) adjusts the engine’s speed and
`
`d) changes the gear ratio of the transmission to maintain a steady rotor speed. (See ‘538
`
`Patent at 6:55-64.) These four steps “transform [the] claim from one claiming only a result
`
`to one claiming a way of achieving it.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167
`
`
`
` 9
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 10 of 11 PageID #: 40731
`
`21. Wirtgen argues that Claim 13 isn’t detailed enough. I’m not persuaded. As
`
`the Federal Circuit has explained, even claims that “recite[] general steps … with minimal
`
`detail present in the claim limitations themselves” may still be patent-eligible. See Packet
`
`Intel. LLC v. NetScout Sys., Inc., 965 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing SRI Int'l, Inc.,
`
`930 F.3d at 1303). The dispositive question is whether the steps are only result oriented.
`
`See SAP Am., Inc., 898 F.3d at 1167. They aren’t.
`
`22.
`
`It’s possible that the “implementation details” Wirtgen seeks are “within the
`
`routine knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and ‘a patent need not teach, and
`
`preferably omits, what is well known in the art.’” Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867
`
`F.3d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
`
`802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). That’s a reasonable inference based on the
`
`specification’s teaching that prior-art patent Parker used variable transmission to maintain
`
`a consistent rotor speed when the engine’s speed changed. (See ‘538 Patent at 1:32-40.)
`
`And, at this stage, I draw such inferences in Caterpillar’s favor. See Visual Memory LLC,
`
`867 F.3d at 1261.
`
`23.
`
`Because Claim 13 is “directed to a non-abstract improvement in an existing
`
`technological process[,]” it is patent eligible under Section 101. Koninklijke KPN N.V., 942
`
`F.3d at 1150. And, “[b]ecause the claims are not directed to an abstract idea under step
`
`one of the Alice analysis, [I] do not need to proceed to step two of that analysis.” Enfish,
`
`LLC, 822 F.3d at 1339.
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 450 Filed 08/28/24 Page 11 of 11 PageID #: 40732
`
`Therefore, it is ORDERED that Wirtgen America Inc.’s Motion For Judgment On
`
`The Pleadings That The ‘538 Patent Is Invalid (D.I. 385) is DENIED.
`
`It is FURTHER ORDERED that Caterpillar, Inc.’s Cross-Motion For Judgment On
`
`The Pleadings On Wirtgen’s Fourth Affirmative Defense (Patent Ineligibility) (D.I. 417) is
`
`GRANTED to the extent that Wirtgen’s Fourth Affirmative Defense alleges that the ‘538
`
`Patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BY THE COURT:
`
`/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
`JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`