Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 1 of 27 PageID #: 38700
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C.A. No. 17-770-JDW
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`)))))))))
`
`WIRTGEN AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`CATERPILLAR INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`COMBINED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND
`IN SUPPORT OF CATERPILLAR’S CROSS-MOTION UNDER FED. R. CIV P. 12(c)
`
`Bindu A. Palapura (#5370)
`Andrew L. Brown (#6766)
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
`1313 N. Market Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 984-6000
`bpalapura@potteranderson.com
`abrown@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Caterpillar Inc.
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`James C. Yoon
`Ryan R. Smith
`Christopher D. Mays
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`650 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Tel: (650) 493-9300
`
`Lucy Yen
`Cassie Leigh Black
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
`New York, NY 10019
`Tel: (212) 999-5800
`
`Matthew A. Macdonald
`Neil N. Desai
`Naoya Son
`Alex J. Turner
`WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`953 E. 3rd St., #100
`Los Angeles, California 90013
`Tel: (323) 210-2900
`
`Dated: June 18, 2024
`11569211/11898.00005
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 2 of 27 PageID #: 38701
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`PAGE
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`The ’538 Patent ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`Relevant Portions of the ’538 Patent’s File History ............................................... 4
`
`Wirtgen’s Inter Partes Review Challenge .............................................................. 5
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 6
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Legal Standards for Rule 12(c) Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings ............... 6
`
`Standards for Subject Matter Eligibility Under Section 101 .................................. 7
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 8
`
`A.
`
`Claim 13 is Directed to a Machine (Alice Step One) .............................................. 9
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Claim 13 Is Directed to a Machine with Mechanical Components. ........... 9
`
`Claim 13’s Mechanical Components Are Not Generic Structures. .......... 10
`
`Claim 13’s Controller Does Not Render the Claim Abstract. .................. 13
`
`Wirtgen’s Abstract Idea Is Untethered to Claim 13’s Language. ............. 15
`
`B.
`
`Claim 13 Has an Inventive Concept (Alice Step Two) ......................................... 16
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Machine-or-Transformation Test Demonstrates that Claim 13
`Has an Inventive Concept. ........................................................................ 16
`
`Claim 13’s Inventive Concept Includes an Unconventional
`Arrangement. ............................................................................................ 18
`
`Alternatively, the Court Should Deny the Motion as Premature .......................... 19
`
`If the Court Grants Wirtgen’s Motion, It Should Give Caterpillar Leave to
`Amend its Counterclaim ....................................................................................... 20
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 21
`
`-i-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 3 of 27 PageID #: 38702
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Affinity Labs of Tex. v. DIRECTV, LLC,
`838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................12
`
`CASES
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ................................................................................................... passim
`
`Allergan USA, Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd.,
`C.A. No. 19-1727-RGA, 2022 WL 16921800 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2022)..............................6
`
`Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,
`967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................12
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..........................................................................................18
`
`BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)....................................................................................18, 19
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)......................................................................................8, 20
`
`Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc.,
`C.A No. 18-1679-RGA, 2019 WL 1517089 (D. Del. Apr. 8, 2019) .................................14
`
`BoardActive Corp. v. Foursquare Labs, Inc.,
`C.A No. 22-00597-JDW, 2023 WL 2587688 (D. Del. Mar. 21, 2023) .............................12
`
`C. R. Bard, Inc. v. Angiodynamics, Inc.,
`156 F. Supp. 3d 540 (D. Del. 2016) ...................................................................................20
`
`Cap Exp., LLC v. Zinus, Inc.,
`No. 216-cv-00371-SVW-MRW, 2019 WL 982883
`(C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2019) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Coop. Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc.,
`50 F.4th 127 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................20
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................18
`
`Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
`447 U.S. 303 (1980) .......................................................................................................7, 13
`
`-ii-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 4 of 27 PageID #: 38703
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ................................................................................................... passim
`
`Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................10
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).................................................................................. passim
`
`Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc.,
`708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013)............................................................................................7
`
`Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,
`968 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2020) ...............................................................................................6
`
`Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus.,
`9 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1993)..................................................................................................6
`
`Immersion Corp. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
`313 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .............................................................9, 11, 14, 19
`
`In re Bilski,
`545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................................16
`
`In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
`114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997)...............................................................................................6
`
`Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
`863 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1988).................................................................................................6
`
`Lumitech Intellectual Prop. LLC v. Ikea Supply AG,
`No. 2:20-CV-04399-JDW, 2021 WL 4499407 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2021) .......10, 11, 12, 16
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) .........................................................................................................7, 18
`
`Netgear, Inc. v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc.,
`5 F. Supp. 3d 592 (D. Del. 2013) .......................................................................................16
`
`Parker v. Flook,
`437 U.S. 584 (1978) .............................................................................................................8
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................13
`
`PM Holdings, LLC v. Heart of Texas Surgery Ctr., PLLC, & Heart of Texas Cath
`Lab, PLLC,
`No. 6:21-CV-00644-ADA, 2022 WL 1004644 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2022) .......................11
`
`-iii-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 5 of 27 PageID #: 38704
`
`Polaris Innovations Ltd. V. Kingston Tech. Co.,
`223 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (C.D. Cal. 2016) .............................................................................11
`
`POWERbahn, LLC v. Found. Fitness LLC,
`No. 3:15-cv-00327-MMD-WGC, 2016 WL 4318978 (D. Nev. Aug. 11,
`2016) ..................................................................................................................................11
`
`RICPI Commc’ns LLC v. JPS Interoperability Sols., Inc.,
`C.A. No. 18-1507-RGA, 2019 WL 1244077 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2019) ....................2, 12, 14
`
`Rosenau v. Unifund Corp.,
`539 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008).................................................................................................6
`
`SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010).................................................................................. passim
`
`Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996)............................................................................................19
`
`Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States,
`850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017)......................................................................................9, 14
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..........................................................................................13
`
`Turbe v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands,
`938 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1991).................................................................................................6
`
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................7, 16
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, LLC,
`772 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ......................................................................................6
`
`Yanbin Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................12
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ..............................................................................................................................19
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ..............................................................................................................................19
`
`-iv-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 6 of 27 PageID #: 38705
`
`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`CAFC
`’538 Patent
`Br.
`
`Wirtgen
`
`Word or Phrase
`Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`U.S. Patent No. 9,975,538
`Plaintiff’s Opening Brief in Support of
`Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings that
`the ’538 Patent is Invalid [D.I. 386]
`Wirtgen Group (including Wirtgen America
`and Wirtgen GmbH working in concert in
`connection with enforcement activities
`directed towards the asserted patents)
`* All emphasis herein is added, and all internal citations and quotations are omitted unless noted.
`
`Abbreviation
`
`-v-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 7 of 27 PageID #: 38706
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Wirtgen’s motion is refuted by the plain words of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Section 101”). It says
`
`that a person may obtain a patent on any new and useful “machine, manufacture, or composition
`
`of matter.” Like the other patents in this case, the ’538 Patent pertains to milling machines.1
`
`Caterpillar is asserting Claim 13, which is explicitly directed to “a machine” and qualifies
`
`as such under Section 101: Claim 13 recites multiple mechanical components, including an engine,
`
`a variable transmission, a rotor, and clutch. It recites a specific arrangement for these mechanical
`
`components: the variable transmission must be coupled to the output of the engine; the rotor must
`
`be coupled to the output of the variable transmission; and the clutch must be disposed between the
`
`engine and the rotor. And, it recites specific physical state changes that the mechanical
`
`components undergo in conjunction with a claimed electronic controller: the engine adjusts its
`
`speed; the variable transmission changes gear ratios; and the clutch disengages the rotor from the
`
`engine. This results in optimized fuel efficiency and maintaining a desired rotor speed. In short,
`
`Claim 13 is a “concrete thing, consisting of parts” and qualifies as a patent-eligible machine under
`
`Section 101. See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
`
`(“We have defined a ‘machine’ as ‘a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
`
`combination of devices.’ This includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical
`
`powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.”).
`
`Wirtgen’s argument that Claim 13 is an abstract idea (Alice step one) improperly reduces
`
`the claim solely to the controller’s functional limitations while ignoring the claim’s mechanical
`
`structures, their arrangement, and their physical operations. That is contrary to Supreme Court
`
`and Federal Circuit precedent, which both warn against “overgeneralizing claims” and seeking to
`
`1 The ’538 Patent is attached to Caterpillar’s First Amended Answer. D.I. 62-1, Ex. 3.
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 8 of 27 PageID #: 38707
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`identify abstract ideas that are “untethered from the language of the claims” to attempt to reduce
`
`otherwise patentable subject matter to “underlying principles of nature” that exist in “all
`
`inventions.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also
`
`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981). Importantly, the controller is merely “one claim
`
`element of a concrete system”; it is not the claim itself, as the Patent Office noted during the ’538
`
`Patent’s application. See RICPI Commc’ns LLC v. JPS Interoperability Sols., Inc., C.A. No. 18-
`
`1507-RGA, 2019 WL 1244077, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2019).
`
`Nor do Wirtgen’s arguments regarding an inventive concept (Alice step two) withstand
`
`scrutiny. While Wirtgen contends that Claim 13 is merely conventional, the Patent Office recently
`
`found differently: in an inter partes review brought by Wirtgen, the Patent Office found that
`
`Wirtgen’s cited prior art failed to disclose the arrangement of Claim 13, and specifically found that
`
`Wirtgen failed to show that the prior art teaches or suggests Claim 13’s clutch and operation. Since
`
`Claim 13’s solution is not obvious, it can hardly be conventional. Indeed, Claim 13 “solve[s] a
`
`technological problem in conventional industry practice,” by maintaining stable rotor speeds and
`
`improving fuel efficiency by determining the engine’s load and adjusting the engine’s speed and
`
`transmission’s gear ratio based on calculated efficiency points. This renders it eligible under step
`
`two. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223 (2014) (“Alice”).
`
`For these reasons, discussed in more detail below, Claim 13’s machine is patent eligible
`
`under Section 101; it is not an abstract idea (Alice step one) and has an inventive concept (Alice
`
`step two). The Court should deny Wirtgen’s Motion and grant Caterpillar’s Cross-Motion.
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The ’538 Patent
`
`As evidenced by the intrinsic record, Claim 13 is directed to a patent eligible machine and
`
`not an abstract idea. The ’538 Patent relates to the limited field of “milling machines, and more
`
`-2-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 9 of 27 PageID #: 38708
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`particularly, to methods and systems for controlling the rotor speeds of cold planers and rotary
`
`mixers with optimized performance and fuel efficiency.” 1:6-10.2 Its claims, specification, and
`
`figures each depict the claimed invention as being directed towards a concrete machine with
`
`specific, physical components.
`
`Claim 13 recites a “machine” having an “engine,” “variable transmission,” “rotor,” and
`
`“clutch.” ’538 Patent, Claims 6 and 13. The claim physically arranges these mechanical
`
`components in a prescribed manner:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`The variable transmission is “operatively coupled to an output of the engine”;
`
`The rotor is “operatively coupled to an output of the variable transmission”; and
`
`The clutch is “disposed between the engine and the rotor.”
`
`Id. Figures 1 and 2 (annotated below) depict this exemplary machine and arrangement of its
`
`components:
`
`Claim 13 also discloses that the mechanical components can undergo physical state
`
`changes during operation. For example, the claim recites a “controller” that helps adjust “engine
`
`speed,” helps adjust the variable transmission’s “gear ratio,” and helps control the clutch to
`
`“selectively disengage the rotor from the engine.” Id. This allows for dynamic control of the rotor
`
`2 Citations to X:YY refer to column and line number citations to the ’538 Patent.
`
`-3-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 10 of 27 PageID #: 38709
`
`and improves reliability of the machine’s operation by maintaining desired and consistent rotor
`
`speed operation while milling. 4:54-63. Further, it can accomplish this while operating at better
`
`fuel economy than prior art attempts to solve the problem. Id.
`
`The specification explains why improved reliability and fuel economy were important
`
`problems to be solved. As the specification explains, it was a known problem in the industry that
`
`in conventional milling machines, changes in engine speed and load caused unwanted variations
`
`in the rotor speed. 1:32-34. Previous attempts to solve this problem sacrificed fuel efficiency to
`
`maintain a desired rotor speed. 1:37-40. Thus, the ’538 Patent advantageously “maintains[] a
`
`desired rotor speed of a milling machine” while considering fuel efficiency. 1:41-44.
`
`The specification also discusses various non-abstract embodiments and operations for each
`
`part of the claimed machine. For example, it describes the engine as “a power source” that “may
`
`drive the rotor” and identifies embodiments including “diesel,” “gasoline,” and/or “a natural gas”
`
`engines. 2:63-3:2. The variable transmission has embodiments such as a “hydrostatic, mechanical,
`
`or hydromechanical drive arrangement[s].” Id. The rotor is a device “adapted to scarify, remove,
`
`mix or reclaim material from the surface of bituminous or concrete roadways and similar surfaces”
`
`such as “cutter” or “planing” rotor. 2:39-46. Typical applications of the rotor include “cold
`
`planers,” “pavement profilers,” “road milling machines,” “roadway planers,” and “rotary mixers.”
`
`Id. Finally, the specification discusses the clutch as selectively coupling the engine output and
`
`components of the variable transmission. 3:30-37. This disengages the rotor from the engine.
`
`’538 Patent at Claim 13.
`
`B.
`
`Relevant Portions of the ’538 Patent’s File History
`
`Caterpillar filed the application that issued as the ’538 Patent—U.S. Application Number
`
`14/715,204 (“the ’204 Application”)—in May 2015. See Ex. 1 (CAT-770_000544-678) at
`
`000636. Relevant here, in March 2017 the Patent Office Examiner issued a restriction requirement
`
`-4-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 11 of 27 PageID #: 38710
`
`in the ’204 Application. The Examiner observed that the ’204 Application at the time had two
`
`distinct groups of claims: (1) a group of claims directed to a machine and method of controlling
`
`the machine; and (2) “a control system” (directed to the operations of the claimed controller) Id.
`
`at 000618. The Examiner noted that the two groups were different inventions. Specifically, the
`
`group of claims directed to the machine/operation do not “require the particulars” of the control
`
`system claims, the latter of which the Examiner stated more closely pertained to the specific
`
`algorithms. Id.; compare id. at 000660 (control system claim 6) with id. at 000661 (machine claim
`
`13). Moreover—and recognizing the difference between the machine and control system claims—
`
`the Examiner stated that the machine claims had “separate utility” from the control system
`
`claims.” Id. at 000618.
`
`C.
`
`Wirtgen’s Inter Partes Review Challenge
`
`In August 2022, Wirtgen filed a request for inter partes review seeking to invalidate, inter
`
`alia, Claims 6 and 13 of the ’538 Patent. See Ex. 2 at 2. The results of this inter partes review
`
`demonstrate that, at a minimum, Claim 13 as a whole is not conventional. Wirtgen challenged the
`
`patentability of, inter alia, Claim 13 as obvious in view of the prior art references Willis, Xing,
`
`and Laux. See id. at 9. The PTAB instituted inter partes review in March 2023. Id. In March
`
`2024, the PTAB issued its final written decision finding, inter alia, that Wirtgen “has not shown,
`
`by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 13 is unpatentable.” Id. at 2. At issue was whether
`
`the prior art of record showed Claim 13’s requirement that the clutch can “selectively disengage
`
`the rotor from the engine.” According to the Patent Office, Wirtgen’s cited prior art merely
`
`disengaged “the power flowing through the clutch, rather than disengagement of the rotor from the
`
`engine.” Id. at 52-53. The Patent Office also determined that the prior art’s parking brake does
`
`not constitute the claimed clutch because the brake cannot “selectively disengage the rotor from
`
`the engine.” Id. at 54. Given these differences, the Patent Office determined that the prior art did
`
`-5-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 12 of 27 PageID #: 38711
`
`not teach or suggest each limitation of Claim 13, concluding that Wirtgen failed to show the claim
`
`was obvious. See id. (“Xing’s directional clutches 52, 54 fail to ‘disengage the rotor from the
`
`engine’ because the rotor would remain engaged to the engine via the hydrostatic branch, as
`
`evidenced by its ability to still transmit power to the rotor.”); id. at 55 (“[Wirtgen] has failed to
`
`provide sufficient evidence to establish that Xing’s parking brake [ ] teaches or suggests the subject
`
`matter of claim 13.”).
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standards for Rule 12(c) Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
`
`When evaluating a 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must “view the
`
`facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
`
`favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008)
`
`(quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). “The
`
`issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
`
`evidence to support the claims.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420
`
`(3d Cir. 1997). A motion for judgment on the pleadings can be granted only if the movant
`
`establishes that “no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved.” Turbe v.
`
`Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). Additionally, Rule 12(c) is an
`
`“appropriate vehicle” for resolving affirmative defenses. See Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d
`
`802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020); Allergan USA, Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd., C.A. No. 19-1727-RGA,
`
`2022 WL 16921800, at *6 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2022) (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings
`
`of an affirmative defense).
`
`In analyzing a Rule 12 motion, the Court may consider materials subject to judicial notice
`
`under FED. R. EVID. 201 without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, LLC, 772 F. App’x 890, 898 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (patent file histories
`
`-6-
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 13 of 27 PageID #: 38712
`
`may be judicially noticed); Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1316 n.4 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2013) (taking judicial notice of Patent Office reexamination); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus.,
`
`9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (taking judicial notice of patent).
`
`B.
`
`Standards for Subject Matter Eligibility Under Section 101
`
`“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
`
`composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
`
`subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. A Section 101 analysis
`
`“begins by identifying whether an invention fits within one of the four statutorily provided
`
`categories of patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions
`
`of matter.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 713–14 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The text of
`
`Section 101 should be given its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” with the
`
`understanding that “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
`
`scope.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
`
`In Alice, the Supreme Court set forth a two-step framework for distinguishing patents that
`
`claim unpatentable laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
`
`patent-eligible applications of those concepts:
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`First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-
`ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “what else is there in the claims before us?”
`To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually
`and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements
`“transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. We have
`described step two of this analysis as a search for an “inventive concept”—i.e., an
`element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in
`practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept
`itself.
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`Alice, at 573 U.S. at 217-18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
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`U.S. 66, 71, 75-80 (2012)). Thus, step one of the Alice inquiry considers whether the claim is
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`directed to an abstract concept as opposed to (for example) a machine with physical components
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 14 of 27 PageID #: 38713
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`arranged in a particular configuration and limitations describing how those physical components
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`interact with each other. If step one reveals that the claim is directed to an abstract concept, then
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`step two considers whether there is an “inventive concept” that nevertheless renders the claim to
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`be something more than merely abstract. See id. A party seeking to invalidate a claim under
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`Section 101 bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence to prove both steps of the Alice
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`inquiry. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Any fact, such as this
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`one, that is pertinent to the invalidity conclusion must be proven by clear and convincing
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`evidence.”).
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`Further, in performing this inquiry, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have
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`repeatedly warned against describing a patent’s claims at too high a level of abstraction as doing
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`so “all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337; see
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`also Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it
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`swallow all of patent law.”); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12 (“To accept the analysis proffered by the
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`petitioner would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions
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`can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation
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`obvious.”). Importantly, “ [a] process is not unpatentable simply because it contains” algorithms
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`or equations. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
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`Wirtgen cannot reach the high bar of showing patent ineligibility of Claim 13 by clear and
`
`convincing evidence. Claim 13 states that it is directed to a machine, one of the expressly
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`enumerated categories of patentable subject matter. Also, as discussed in detail below, Wirtgen
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`fails to show Claim 13 is ineligible under a judicial exception to patentability under either step of
`
`the Alice test.
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`-8-
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 15 of 27 PageID #: 38714
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`A.
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`Claim 13 is Directed to a Machine (Alice Step One)
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`At step one of Alice, claims are “considered in light of the specification, based on whether
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`their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter” – here, a machine or (as Wirtgen
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`argues) an abstract idea. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335.
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`The Federal Circuit has defined a patent-eligible “machine” as “a concrete thing, consisting
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`of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.” SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1332. A
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`machine claim does not lose its eligibility merely because a party can “identify a patent-ineligible
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`concept underlying the claim.” Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2017). Rather, eligibility is lost only if the claim as a whole is “directed to” a patent-ineligible
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`concept. Id. It is not sufficient to prove ineligibility of a machine claim to point to an algorithm
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`or equation that is merely one part of a claim “otherwise directed to patentable subject matter.”
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`Immersion Corp. v. Fitbit, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“[S]imply
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`incorporating an abstract idea in part of a claim that is otherwise directed to patentable subject
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`matter does not necessarily render the entire claim ineligible.”). Critically, in evaluating whether
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`a claim is directed to a machine or abstract ides, “the Court is careful not to express the claim’s
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`focus at an unduly high level of abstraction . . . untethered from the language of the claims, but
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`rather at a level consonant with the level of generality or abstraction expressed in the claims
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`themselves.” Id. (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337); see also Thales Visionix, 850 F.3d at 1347
`
`(“We must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with
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`enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful.”).
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`1.
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`Claim 13 Is Directed to a Machine with Mechanical Components.
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`Wirtgen argues that Claim 13 is directed to “the abstract idea of selecting operating
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`conditions of a machine—namely, engine speed and gear ratio—to optimize fuel efficiency while
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`maintaining a constant rotor speed.” See Br. at 6-7. But this argument ignores the physical
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`-9-
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`Case 1:17-cv-00770-JDW Document 418 Filed 06/18/24 Page 16 of 27 PageID #: 38715
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`structures and arrangement of Claim 13. Claim 13 recites mechanical and physical components in
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`a specific arrangement:
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`See ’538 Patent, Fig. 2 (annotated above), Claim 13; discussion supra at Section II.A. In addition
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`to the mechanical components, Claim 13 also recites a controller that is used to facilitate physical
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`changes to the machine components by adjusting engine speed, changing transmission gear ratios,
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`and disengaging the clutch from the rotor.
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`The components together with their claimed arrangement demonstrate that Claim 13’s
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`machine is a “concrete thing, consisting of parts” that easily satisfies Section 101’s requirements
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`for machine-based eligibility. See SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1332 (“We have defined a machine as
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`a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.”); Digitech
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`Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging,