Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 12 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 19 PageID #: 512
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`Civ. No. 1: 16-cv-00830-RGA
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`SIPCO, LLC, and IP CO., LLC (d/b/a
`INTUS IQ),
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`Plaintiffs,
` v.
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`STREETLINE, INC., and KAPSCH
`TRAFFICCOM HOLDING CORP.,
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`Defendants.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’
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`MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
`
`Dated: December 5, 2016
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`
`
`
`
`George Pazuniak DE (No. 478)
`Sean T. O’Kelly (DE No. 4349)
`Daniel P. Murray (DE No. 5785)
`O’Kelly & Ernst, LLC
`901 N. Market Street, Suite 1000
`Wilmington, Delaware 19801
`(302) 478-4230 / 778-4000
`(302) 295-2873 (facsimile)
`gp@del-iplaw.com
`sokelly@oeblegal.com
`dmurray@oeblegal.com
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`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 12 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 19 PageID #: 513
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. 
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`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ......................................................... 1 
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`II. 
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`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 1 
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`III. 
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`STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 2 
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`IV. 
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`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4 
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`A. 
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`Legal Standard .......................................................................................................... 4 
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`B. 
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`Rule 8 Does Not Require Pleading Each Limitation of a Patent Claim. .................. 6 
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`C.  Defendants’ Products Are Adequately Pled ........................................................... 10 
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`D. 
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`Plaintiffs Properly Pled Direct Infringement in Counts 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9 ................. 11 
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`E. 
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`Plaintiffs Properly Pled Infringement by Streetline and Kapsch ............................ 13 
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`V. 
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 14 
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases 
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ............................................................................... 4, 5
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`Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp., 2016 WL 2866134 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2016) ................................ 6
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`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ............................................................ 4, 5, 6
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`Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. U-Line Corp., 2013 WL 5503672 (D.N.J. Oct. 1,
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`2013) ......................................................................................................................................... 13
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`CG Tech. Development, LLC v. FanDuel, Inc., 2016 WL 6089693 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2016) ........ 6
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`Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....... 6
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`DermaFocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc., 2016 WL 4263122 (D. Del. Aug. 11, 2016) ................... 5, 6, 8
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`DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................... 5
`
`Eidos Commc’ns, LLC v. Skype Techs. SA, 686 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. Del. 2010) ......................... 10
`
`Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) ............................................................. 4
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2012) ........................................................................................................................................... 5
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`K-Tech Telecommunications, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .. 9
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`Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................. 6, 7
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`M2M Sols. LLC v. Telit Commc'ns PLC, 2015 WL 4640400 (D. Del. 2015) .............................. 13
`
`Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 450 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
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`................................................................................................................................................... 14
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`Philips v. ASUSTeK Computer Inc., 2016 WL 6246763 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2016) .................. 4, 5, 9
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`Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) .................................................... 4, 6
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`Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc., 2016 WL 927143 (D. Del. Mar. 3, 2016) ............ 9
`ii
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`Scientific Telecommc’ns LLC v. ADTRAN Inc., 2016 WL 4037004 (D. Del. Jul. 25, 2016) ......... 4
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`Sheeran v. Blyth Shipholding S.A., 2015 WL 9048979 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2015) ........................... 13
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`United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011) ................ 4
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`Statutes 
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`35 U.S.C. § 271(a) .......................................................................................................................... 5
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`35 U.S.C. § 271(b) .......................................................................................................................... 5
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`35 U.S.C. § 271(c) .......................................................................................................................... 6
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`Rules 
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`D. Del. Default Std. § 4................................................................................................................... 9
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) .................................................................................................................. 6
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 8 ...................................................................................................................... 4, 5, 8
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`Case 1:16-cv-00830-RGA Document 12 Filed 12/05/16 Page 5 of 19 PageID #: 516
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`Plaintiffs SIPCO, LLC and IP CO, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) hereby submit this
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`Memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) of
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`Defendants Streetline, Inc. (“Streetline”) and Kapsch TrafficCom Holding Corp. (“Kapsch”)
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`(collectively “Defendants”).
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`I. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
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`Plaintiffs SIPCO, LLC and IP CO, LLC filed this patent infringement action against
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`Defendants on September 19, 2016, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,908,842 (“the
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`‘842 patent”), 8,625,496 (“the ‘496 patent”), 8,233,471 (“the ‘47l patent”), 8,223,010 (“the ‘010
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`patent”), 7,697,492 (“the ‘492 patent”), 7,468,661 (“the ‘66l patent”), 7,103,511 (“the ‘51l
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`patent”), 6,914,893 (“the ‘893 patent”), 6,437,692 (“the ‘692 patent”) and 6,249,516 (“the ‘516
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`patent”) (collectively, “the Patents-in-Suit”). (D.I. 1). On November 18, 2016, Defendants
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`moved to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). (D.I. 7, 8). This is Plaintiffs’ opposition to
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
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`II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
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`Defendants attempt to fashion a new and highly restrictive requirement that complaints
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`must include claim charts or otherwise demonstrate infringement claim-limitation-by-claim-
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`limitation. Defendants cite no governing authority to support the requirement, and their
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`argument is contrary to FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 8’s prescription of a “short plain statement,” as well
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`as the law set forth in Twombly/Iqbal. The Complaint in this case gives Defendants fair notice of
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`the claims against them, and is as specific as the government contracts that Streetline has entered
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`into that are the accused infringements and of which the Court can take judicial notice as public
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`records.
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`1
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`Defendants’ argument that the Complaint does not adequately identify an accused
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`product is again severely undercut by the fact that the Defendants sell only one equipment or
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`hardware system, and the Complaint is as specific as Streetline’s government contracts. Plaintiffs
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`have identified the infringements as best as can be determined on the public record, and Rule 8
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`does not require more.
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`Defendant Kapsch acquired a controlling interest in Streetline on or about April 16, 2015.
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`Since then, Kapsch appears to have controlled the activities of Streetline. In any event, Kapsch
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`is independently liable for infringement, because it markets a “Multi-Application Suite” that
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`appears to incorporate Streetline’s accused systems.
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`III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`The Patents-in-Suit cover networking technology referred to as “wireless mesh
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`networks.” Such networks are useful for, among other things, collecting and monitoring data
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`produced by multiple geographically dispersed sensors. Pertinent to this case, mesh networks
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`find utility in real-time monitoring of automobile parking space availability, where, for example,
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`wirelessly networked sensors spread over multiple city blocks feed parking space occupancy data
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`to a centrally located computer for analysis and tracking.
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`Defendant Streetline describes itself as “the most experienced provider of smart parking
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`solutions in the industry with 10 years of expertise and nearly 28,000 instrumented spaces across
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`North America and Europe.” STREETLINE , INC., https://www.streetline.com/why-us.
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`The Court can take judicial notice of government contracts whereby Streetline has
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`offered for sale or lease, and sold or leased:
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`2
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`A.
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`“Equipment” which the contracts identified as “parking sensors,” “repeaters” and
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`a “gateway,” which Streetline defined as “a low power wireless mesh network, which enables
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`transmission of data from the sensors to gateways.” (Exhibit A at A-2)
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`B.
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`“Equipment” which was identified as “sensors, which detect potential parking
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`activity in the deployment area,” and “Network equipment [which] is comprised of repeaters and
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`gateways.” (Exhibit B at p. 4). The government contract then provided that “[c]ollectively,
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`sensors and networking equipment provide a low power wireless mesh network, which enables
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`transmission of data from the sensors to gateways.” (Id.)
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`C.
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`“The comprehensive Streetline solution includes sensors, networking equipment
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`and a suite of hosted web and mobile applications, analytics and reporting.” (Exhibit C at p. 4;
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`see also p. 6).
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`Streetline does not offer or describe the availability of more than one version of its
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`hardware or “equipment.” Extending from this core equipment solution is a suite of mobile
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`device- and web-based applications which are deployed to manage automobile parking assets
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`using analytics developed from the core sensor data and, optionally, other data sources.
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`STREETLINE , INC., https://www.streetline.com/why-us. The applications include the Parker
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`app, available for iPhone and Android mobile devices, which guides users to open parking
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`spaces; ParkerMap, a service sold to merchants which displays parking availability in the
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`merchant’s proximity to the public through the merchant’s website; ParkEdge, a tool that
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`enables public and private off-street parking vendors to publish their parking garage and lot
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`locations, space inventory, rates, hours, and availability in real-time; Enforcement, a mobile
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`application for use by municipal parking enforcers in monitoring compliance; and ParkSight
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`Analytics and ParkingData, which provide access to real time and static parking space-
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`availability data, respectively. STREETLINE , INC., https://www.streetline.com/our-solutions.
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A. Legal Standard
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`FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint must contain a “short and plain
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`statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Philips v. ASUSTeK Computer Inc., 2016 WL 6246763 at
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`*2 (D. Del. 2016). “The court’s determination is not whether the non-moving party ‘will
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`ultimately prevail’ but whether that party is ‘entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’”
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`Scientific Telecommc’ns LLC v. ADTRAN Inc., 2016 WL 4037004 at *1 (D. Del. 2016) (quoting
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`United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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`When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
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`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must take the facts alleged as true and view those facts
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`in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
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`(3d Cir. 2008); Philips, 2016 WL 6246763, at *2. The court may consider “the pleadings, public
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`record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents incorporated into the complaint
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`by reference.” Scientific Telecommc’ns, at *1.
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`Detailed factual allegations are not required, but facts must be pled that, when accepted
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`as true, state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Twombly, at 570; see also Ashcroft
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`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must decide whether facts pled in a Complaint
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`state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
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`210 (3d Cir. 2009); Philips, 2016 WL 6246763, at *2. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
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`pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
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`liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, at 678. As the Supreme Court noted, the plausibility
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`requirement is not akin to a “probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
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`enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal” that the defendant is
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`liable for the alleged misconduct. Twombly, at 556.
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`In the patent context, a patentee need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged
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`infringer on notice as to what he must defend. See Philips, 2016 WL 6246763 , at *3 (citing
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`Twombly, at 555). To state a claim for direct infringement, a plaintiff must explicitly plead facts
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`to plausibly support the assertion that a defendant “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
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`or sells any patented invention during the term of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`8(a); see also DermaFocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc., 2016 WL 4263122 at *3 (D. Del. 2016).
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`To state a claim for induced infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly
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`support the assertion that the defendant specifically intended a third party to directly infringe the
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`plaintiff's patent and knew that the third party's acts constituted infringement. 35 U.S.C. §
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`271(b); In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339
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`(Fed. Cir. 2012). “The requirement that the alleged infringer knew or should have known his
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`actions would induce actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement that he or she
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`knew of the patent.” DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`Knowledge of infringement alone, however, is not enough. “Inducement requires evidence of
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`culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not merely that the inducer had
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`knowledge of the direct infringer's activities.” Id. at 1306.
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`To state a claim for contributory infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly
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`support the assertion that there was: (1) an act of direct infringement; (2) that the defendant knew
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`that the combination for which its components were especially made was both patented and
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`infringed; and (3) the components have no substantial non-infringing use. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c);
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`Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005); DermaFocus, at *4.
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`B. Rule 8 Does Not Require Pleading Each Limitation of a Patent Claim.
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`Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
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`entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
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`grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly at 555; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. A complaint, to
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`survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “does not need detailed factual allegations.”
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`Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231.
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`Despite the clear language of the governing law, Defendants demand that a complaint
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`must specifically plead how an accused product or method meets each and every limitation of a
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`claim (D.I. 8 at 7).1 Defendants assert that a complaint must include claim charts or otherwise
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`show infringement of every limitation of every asserted claim of every asserted patent against
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`every accused product or method. In effect, Defendants demand that the complaint include the
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`
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`1 Defendants argue: “The heightened pleading standard of Twombly/Iqbal plays a meaningful
`role in patent infringement cases, ‘[b]ecause the failure to practice even a single element is all
`that separates [lawful] innovation from infringement,’” and “Twombly and Iqbal ‘require[]
`pleading facts sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that all steps of the claimed method,’ or
`all elements of the claimed device, are present.” (D.I. 8 at 7-8) (quoting Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon
`Corp., 2016 WL 2866134 at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2016) and Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
`2016) (reviewing requirements for pleading joint infringement)). Defendants also argue that a
`decision from another district essentially applied the infringement contentions disclosure
`requirement from the local discovery rules to the pleadings in a patent case. CG Tech.
`Development, LLC v. FanDuel, Inc., 2016 WL 6089693, at *3-9 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2016) (D.I. 5
`at p. 5 n. 2, p. 8).
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`infringement contentions that this court normally requires be exchanged only after Defendants
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`have produced their core technical documents.2
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`Defendants are in error. No decision of this Court or any governing jurisdiction has
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`required that a complaint plead information that is required in infringement contentions.
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`Defendants cite, and then badly distort, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lyda v. CBS Corp, 838
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`F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (D.I. 7-8). Contrary to Defendants’ misrepresentation, the Court did
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`not create a new requirement that a complaint must plead “all steps of the claimed method” or
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`“all elements of the claimed device.” In full context, the Court held only that to plead joint
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`infringement, the complaint must create a reasonable inference that each claim step was
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`performed by, or should be attributed to, the defendant:
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`A claim of joint infringement thus requires pleading facts sufficient to allow a
`reasonable inference that all steps of the claimed method are performed and either
`(1) one party exercises the requisite “direction or control” over the others’
`performance or (2) the actors form a joint enterprise such that performance of
`every step is attributable to the controlling party.
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`Lyda v. CBS Corp. Thus, the Court required only that a complaint plead that a given Defendant
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`has attributed to it all the steps of a process, not that every limitation be separately pled in the
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`complaint.
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`2 The scheduling orders in this District (as well as in other courts) generally require that, absent
`agreement among the parties, the following steps are followed:
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`1. Plaintiff shall identify the accused product(s), including accused methods and
`systems, as well as the asserted patent(s) that the accused product(s) allegedly
`infringe(s).
`2. Defendant shall produce core technical documents related to the accused product(s),
`sufficient to show how the accused product(s) work(s), including but not limited to
`non-publicly available operation manuals, product literature, schematics, and
`specifications.
`3. Plaintiff shall produce an initial claim chart relating each known accused product to
`the asserted claims each such product allegedly infringes.
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`The complaint is a start of a structured process geared to determining whether a
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`Defendant has infringed a patent claim. The complaint is not a motion for judgment on the
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`pleadings or for summary judgment, and does not take the place of the disclosures otherwise set
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`forth in the Federal Rules, such as Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 26. Defendant’s demand that a complaint
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`contain infringement contention claim charts is not consistent with F.R.C.P. 8’s call for a “short
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`and plain statement of the claim.”
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`Recent opinions from this Court do not reflect Defendants’ enthusiasm for a requirement
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`of element-by-element pleading of patent infringement. In DermaFocus LLC v. Ulthera, Inc.,
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`2016 WL 4263122 (D. Del. 2016), the Court clearly identified a distinction between proof and
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`pleading of infringement: “To prove direct infringement, the patent owner must establish that
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`one or more claims of the patent . . . read on the accused method either literally or under the
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`doctrine of equivalents,” whereas “[a] plaintiff may have a plausible claim for direct
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`infringement ‘sufficient to withstand Iqbal/Twombly scrutiny’ by ‘specifically identifying . . .
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`products’ which ‘perform the same unique function as [the] patented system.’” DermaFocus at
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`*3 (citation omitted). The Court acknowledged problems associated with requiring highly
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`detailed pleadings: “[I]t may not be possible for a plaintiff to describe its case-in-chief with
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`particularity at the outset of litigation, without access to the accused method, the accused
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`apparatus for reverse engineering, or confidential data such as source code.” Id. at *3 n.7.
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`Finally, the Court declined to “front-load the litigation process by requiring a detailed complaint
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`in every instance” without specific guidance from the Federal Circuit. Id. at *2.
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`In Philips v. ASUSTeK Computer Inc., 2016 WL 6246763 (D. Del. 2016), the Court
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`permitted the pleading of “exemplary–rather than exhaustive–lists of products and claims,” and
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`pointed to the disclosure of infringement contentions after the Rule 16 conference, provided for
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`in the Local Rules, as the proper place for more detailed infringement allegations. (Philips, 2016
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`WL 6246763 at *3; D. Del. Default Std. § 4.a). Finally, in Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X
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`Genomics, Inc., 2016 WL 927143 (D. Del. 2016), this Court discussed Rule 8’s requirement for
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`pleading patent infringement without requiring that infringement allegations be pleaded element-
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`by-element. Raindance Techs., Inc. v. 10X Genomics, Inc., 2016 WL 927143 at *2-3 (D. Del.
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`2016).
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`Defendants’ demand is highly problematic. Requiring claim charts in a complaint would
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`create larger, more complex complaints in an area of litigation already beset by large, complex
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`complaints. Defendants’ rule would also require pleading of claim charts without the benefit of
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`Defendants’ technical core documents, and this would then be followed by motions to dismiss on
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`the grounds that particular claim limitations were not sufficiently pled. In effect, the complaint –
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`bereft of critical information in Defendants’ possession – would become the basis for dismissal
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`for inadequate pleading. Such ruling would be directly contrary to the Federal Circuit’s
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`recognition that it is often impossible for a complaint to plead all the claim elements, because
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`they are hidden in Defendants’ files:
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`That K–Tech cannot point to the specific device or product within [defendants’]
`systems . . . when the operation of those systems is not ascertainable without
`discovery—should not bar K–Tech's filing of a complaint. A defendant cannot
`shield itself from a complaint . . . by operating in such secrecy that the filing of a
`complaint itself is impossible.
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`K-Tech Telecommunications, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1286 (Fed. Cir.
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`2013).
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`The complaint provides fair notice to Defendants, because the accused product is
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`identified to the best of Plaintiffs’ abilities.
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`C. Defendants’ Products Are Adequately Pled
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`Defendants assert that Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 of the Complaint allege “Streetline smart
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`parking monitoring hardware,” without naming the hardware. (D.I. 8 at 9). Defendants cite
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`Eidos Commc’ns, LLC v. Skype Techs. SA, 686 F. Supp. 2d 465, 467 (D. Del. 2010) for the
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`proposition that a complaint must identify at least “a general class of [allegedly-infringing]
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`products or a general identification of the alleged infringing methods.” In fact, the Court in
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`Eidos noted that “Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ ‘communication system products and/or
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`methodologies’ infringe its patents, without settling conclusively on whether they are targeting
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`either a product or a method. Plaintiffs were obligated to specify, at a minimum, a general class
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`of products or a general identification of the alleged infringing methods.” Id. (emphasis added).
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`The Complaint here, in contrast to that in Eidos, refers unambiguously in every Count
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`(not only Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10) to “smart parking monitoring hardware,” or in other words, a
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`product–not a method.
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`In any event, Defendants’ arguments fail because Defendants fail to argue, much less
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`support an argument, that their products have names or other identifiers such that it is even
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`possible for the claims to be more specific. Defendants offer only one system, which includes
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`sensors installed in pavements and gateway transceivers (including repeaters) for transmission of
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`the sensor data. The public record demonstrates that Defendants have consistently sold their
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`systems to customers, including municipal governments, where the contract specified only
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`“equipment” which was merely defined, in turn, as “gateways, repeaters, parking sensors.”
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`(Exhibits A, B and C). The Streetline system does not have model names or other descriptors.
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`Defendants market their “equipment” or “hardware,” which necessarily must include sensors and
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`gateways, and may include repeaters in given installations. If the term “equipment” is sufficient
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`to specify the products included in a contract for sale, it is sufficient for pleading infringement by
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`that “equipment” or “hardware.”
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`Counts 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 of the Complaint referred to “Streetline smart parking monitoring
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`hardware,” because the “hardware” – sensors and gateways – comprised the infringement. In the
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`case of other patents referenced in the other Counts, which required distribution of the sensor
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`data to users, Plaintiffs specified not only the “smart parking monitoring hardware” but also
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`identified Streetline’ solutions for hosted web and mobile applications, analytics and reporting,
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`for which Defendants did provide a name. See, for example, Count I, which specifies the
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`Streetline “ParkerMap,” “ParkEdge,” “ParkSightAnalytics™” and “ParkingData.”
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`By Defendants’ logic, a system without a name cannot be alleged to infringe. That is not
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`the law. Plaintiffs have named the infringing system to the best of their ability based on publicly
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`available information, and cannot fairly be expected to be more specific than Streetline’s own
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`descriptions of its product in marketing materials and in government contracts permit.
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`D. Plaintiffs Properly Pled Direct Infringement in Counts 1, 4, 6, 7 and 9
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`In Argument (B)(2) (D.I. 8 at 9-12), Defendants continue their meritless proposed
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`extension of pleading requirements beyond anything ever required by any court, and even further
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`beyond their already problematic construction of Rule 8. Defendants demand that a complaint
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`must specify “how [Streetline’s systems] actually work, or how they are actually structured.”
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`(D.I 8 at 11). No authority for the proposition is cited, and none exists. A technical tutorial on
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`how systems work is not a required part of a “short and plain statement” as required by Rule 8.
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`Defendants complain that
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`“The Complaint contains no allegations from which the Court could infer that the
`Accused Systems include a “network of addressable low-power transceivers,” a
`“central location,” or any of the other physical components recited in the claim.
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`Similarly, the Complaint contains no allegations from which the Court could infer
`that the Accused Systems “wirelessly transmit a signal comprising instruction
`data,” “establish a communication link between at least one low-power
`transceiver in the network of addressable low-power transceivers and a central
`location,” or perform any of the other functions recited in the claim.
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`(D.I. 8 at p. 12).
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`Yet, again, the above language is indistinguishable from specification of Defendants’
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`systems found in government procurement contracts. See, for example:
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`The Streetline Equipment package consists of an integrated set of components.
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`Sensors, which detect potential parking activity in the deployment area, are
`installed and communicate information to the Streetline private cloud. Sensors
`are self-powered and sealed within the sensor package.
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`Network equipment is comprised of repeaters and gateways. Collectively, sensors
`and networking equipment provide a low power wireless mesh network, which
`enables transmission of data from the sensors to gateways. Gateways (i) manage
`the sensor network,(ii) maintain the data network connection to the Internet, and(
`iii) manage data transmission from the sensors to Streetline' s private cloud.
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`Repeaters are typically mounted on streetlamps or other common fixtures and do
`not require line power. …Gateways are mounted on streetlamps and require a
`continuous line power source (120 or 240v, 50 or 60 Hz) that must be provided by
`the Customer.
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`(Exhibit B at p. 4).
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`To the best of Plaintiffs’ knowledge, and from what appears in Defendants’ submission,
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`Defendants have only one “equipment” or “hardware” solution that consists of sensors, gateways
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`and, in some cases, “repeaters.” The sensor data is communicated to information systems
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`described as “ParkerMap,” “ParkEdge,” “ParkSightAnalytics™” and “ParkingData.” That is
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`what Defendants market, and that is what is included in the Complaint. Plaintiffs cannot be
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`expected to identify with greater detail the infringements in Defendants’ contracts than the
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`contracts themselves permit.
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`E. Plaintiffs Properly Pled Infringement by Streetline and Kapsch
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`Defendants object to “lumping” Streetline and Kapsch as Defendants in this action (D.I. 8
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`at 13). No governing authority is cited, and, instead, Defendants cite only inapposite product
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`liability and negligence cases: Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. U-Line Corp., 2013
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`WL 5503672 at *6 (D.N.J. 2013); Sheeran v. Blyth Shipholding S.A., 2015 WL 9048979 at *4
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`(D.N.J. 2015).
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`Uline involved an underwriter’s claims against two defendants under the New Jersey
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`Product Liability Act and breach of warranty theory, relating to property damage caused by an
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`allegedly defective refrigerator/freezer: “The primary deficiency in Underwriters’ pleading is
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`that Underwriters does not identify U–Line’s or Nidec’s relationship to the refrigerator/freezer.”
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`U-Line at *5-6.
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`Sheeran was a negligence action by an injured dockworker against eight different
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`business entities, alleging 24 widely varying instances of negligence, without specifying which
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`defendant was associated with any negligence allegation in particular. Sheeran at *3-4. Sheeran
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`bears no useful relationship to the case now before the Court.