throbber
Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 1978
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`C.A. No. 16-453 (RGA)
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`ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC.
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`Defendant.
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`ELECTRONIC ARTS INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE,
`INC., ROCKSTAR GAMES, INC. and
`2K SPORTS, INC.,
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`C.A. No. 16-455 (RGA)
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`C.A. No. 16-454 (RGA)
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`)))))))))
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Plaintiff,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`v.
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO
`DISMISS REGARDING U.S. PATENT NOS. 6,701,344, 6,714,966, AND 6,829,634
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`Attorneys for Defendants
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 1979
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`David P. Enzminger
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 S. Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`Dan K. Webb
`Kathleen B. Barry
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`Michael M. Murray
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-3510
`
`October 31, 2016
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 1980
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`
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1 
`
`THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARE PROCEDURALLY PROPER ................................3 
`
`III. 
`
`THE BROADCAST CLAIMS ARE NOT PATENT-ELIGIBLE UNDER ALICE ...........3 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`Plaintiff’s Interpretation Of The Claims Should Be Rejected ................................3 
`
`Alice Step 1: Even Under Plaintiff’s Construction, The Broadcast Claims
`Are Directed To An Abstract Idea. .......................................................................4 
`
`Alice Step 2: The Broadcast Claims Contain No “Inventive Concept” ..................7 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`The Broadcast Claims Do Not Recite Concrete Limitations
`Providing Tangible Benefits. ....................................................................7 
`
`The Broadcast Claims Purport To Preempt The Field. ..............................8 
`
`Novelty Is Not Relevant To A Section 101 Analysis. ................................9 
`
`IV. 
`
`AS DEFINED BY PLAINTIFF, THE BROADCAST CLAIMS ARE NOT
`PHYSICAL OR TANGIBLE STRUCTURES AND THUS NOT PATENT-
`ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER. ....................................................................................9 
`
`V. 
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 10 
`
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`i
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 1981
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) .............................................................................................. passim
`
`Allvoice Developments US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`612 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................. 10
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
`788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................... 8
`
`ART+COM Innovationpool GmbH v. Google Inc.,
`2016 WL 1718221 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2016) ......................................................................... 8
`
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`561 U.S. 593 (2010) ........................................................................................................... 2
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................... 5, 6
`
`Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,
`674 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ........................................................................................................... 9
`
`Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. passim
`
`Enfish, LLC. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................... 5, 6
`
`GoDaddy.com LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd.,
`2016 WL 3165536 (D. Ariz. June 7, 2016) ....................................................................... 10
`
`Kenexa BrassRing, Inc. v. HireAbility.com, LLC,
`2015 WL 1943826 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2015) ...................................................................... 3
`
`MAZ Encryption Technologies LLC v. Blackberry Corp.,
`2016 WL 5661981 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) ........................................................................ 6
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`2016 WL 4896481 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2016) ..................................................................... 8
`
`Network Congestion Sols., LLC v. United States Cellular Corp.,
`170 F. Supp. 3d 695 (D. Del. 2016) .................................................................................... 6
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 1982
`
`
`
`Nice Sys. Ltd. v. Clickfox, Inc.,
`2016 WL 4941984 (D. Del. Sept. 15, 2016) ........................................................................ 6
`
`In re Nuijten,
`500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ......................................................................................... 10
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Amazon.com,
`2015 WL 4730906 (D. Del. Aug. 10, 2015) ........................................................................ 8
`
`Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys Telecomm.,
`2015 WL 4128963 (D. Del. July 9, 2015) ........................................................................... 6
`
`Priceplay.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc.,
`83 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Del. 2015) ...................................................................................... 9
`
`Smartflash LLC v. Apple, Inc.,
`2015 WL661174 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2015) ........................................................................ 8
`
`SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`2016 WL 1437655 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2016) ......................................................................... 6
`
`Treehouse Avatar LLC v. Valve Corp.,
`170 F. Supp. 3d 706 (D. Del. 2016) .................................................................................... 6
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’n, LLC,
`2016 WL 4373698 (D. Del. August 15, 2016) .................................................................... 3
`
`Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp.,
`2016 WL 3041847 (D. Del. May 27, 2016) .................................................................... 3, 6
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ............................................................................................................... passim
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ..................................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 1983
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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff’s Answering Brief (D.I. 29)1 argues that the Broadcast Claims are not directed to
`
`an abstract idea under Alice step one because the claims are (1) directed to a “logical overlay” at
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`the “application level,” and (2) limited to a “non-conventional” m-regular structure. Neither
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`argument, even if accepted as true, is sufficient to render the Broadcast Claims patent eligible.
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`Plaintiff’s attempt to import unclaimed concepts of an “application layer” is not
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`supported by the claim language and directly contradicts its own infringement contentions,
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`which it incorporated into its Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the “logical and
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`physical network topologies” of the accused products are m-regular—not application layer
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`topologies. Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation should be rejected.
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`But even accepting Plaintiff’s claim interpretation as correct for this motion only
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`underscores the abstract nature of the Broadcast Claims. By Plaintiff’s own argument, the
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`purported “logical overlay” only provides a conceptual application or field of use for the claimed
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`abstract idea, not any physical improvement to the network. Courts have held repeatedly that
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`such conceptual applications of abstract ideas do not save claims from invalidity under § 101.
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`Such an “overlay” adds no physical or specialized components or connections—it is merely a
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`conceptual application of the abstract idea of forwarding information from one neighbor to
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`another.
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`Further, although Plaintiff repeatedly argues that the claims improve the function and
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`operation of a computer network and therefore are not directed to an abstract idea under Alice
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`step one, Plaintiff admits that the m-regular application-level logical overlay does not actually
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`send or receive information. According to Plaintiff, there are no actual physical connections
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`representing the “logical overlay,” and the claimed applications use a well-known, conventional
`
`1
`All citations to docket entries refer to C.A. No. 16-453 unless otherwise stated.
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`1
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 1984
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`
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`network (the Internet) to actually send messages. Thus, the application-level logical overlay is
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`simply the abstract idea of information and about where to send messages using conventional
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`computer networks. Indeed, phone trees and chain letters are themselves “logical overlays”—
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`phone trees “overlay” the point-to-point telephone network and chain letters “overlay” either the
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`postal network or email networks. Using the decades-old mathematical concept of m-regularity
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`to define this abstract, non-physical, overlay structure does not make the Broadcast Claims less
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`abstract. Worse, Plaintiff argues that connections may be “indirect” (Ans. Br. at 14), further
`
`removing any concrete substance from the alleged overlay.
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`Under Alice step two, nothing in the Broadcast Claims provides any inventive concept to
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`transform the mere idea of knowing where to send information into a patent-eligible invention.
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`Plaintiff claims that traditional computer and Internet network components provide the inventive
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`concept. The Supreme Court, however, has resoundingly rejected ordinary computer
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`components or steps that are performed on an ordinary computer network as being inventive.
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
`
`611 (2010). Thus, the Broadcast Claims should be dismissed under Alice.
`
`Aside from Alice, the claims, at least under Plaintiff’s interpretation, are invalid for the
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`separate and distinct reason that they are not within the four categories of patentable subject
`
`matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Except for method claims, “the eligible subject matter must exist in
`
`some physical or tangible form.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758
`
`F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As Plaintiff explains, the claimed application-level logical
`
`overlay is only information about which applications are considered conceptually “connected” to
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`each other. Such a “logical overlay” at the application level does not fall into any of the four
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`categories, and therefore the claims are not patent-eligible for this separate reason. Id.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 1985
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`
`
`II.
`
`THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARE PROCEDURALLY PROPER
`Neither claim construction nor Plaintiff’s
`improper extrinsic evidence
`
`justifies
`
`postponing resolution of these motions. Even under Plaintiff’s characterization, the Broadcast
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`Claims are invalid. Plaintiff identifies no dispute that prevents resolution of the motions.
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`Plaintiff’s extrinsic and expert evidence also do not warrant converting Defendants’ motions into
`
`Rule 56 motions. Plaintiff’s arguments support the conclusion that the Broadcast Claims are
`
`invalid. Testimony about what the patent specification allegedly discloses that is not reflected in
`
`the claims, and is not relevant to the Section 101 analysis. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Courts have
`
`rejected similar efforts to interject fact issues in a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Two-Way Media
`
`Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’n, LLC, 2016 WL 4373698, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 15, 2016)
`
`(“Conversion to summary judgment” “generally not appropriate where… only the nonmoving
`
`party has introduced evidentiary exhibits”); Kenexa BrassRing, Inc. v. HireAbility.com, LLC,
`
`2015 WL 1943826, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2015) (similar).2 Plaintiff’s argument that these
`
`motions are procedurally improper was addressed in Defendants’ October 13, 2016 letter to the
`
`Court. (D.I. 26).
`
`III. THE BROADCAST CLAIMS ARE NOT PATENT-ELIGIBLE UNDER ALICE
`A.
`Plaintiff’s Interpretation Of The Claims Should Be Rejected
`Plaintiff fails to address Defendants’ Alice analysis, but instead rewrites the abstract
`
`claims to import non-existent limitations. According to Plaintiff, the Broadcast Claims are
`
`directed to an application-level logical overlay. Ans. Br. at 2, 6-7. “That is, pairs of participants
`
`share a connection established in the application layer overlay, while an underlying network
`
`handles the actual transfer of data between the physical network components.” Id. at 7. In other
`
`words, each application includes information about other applications to which it should forward
`
`2
`Plaintiff’s assertion that patent-ineligible subject matter must be shown by “clear and
`convincing evidence” is also incorrect. Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 2016 WL
`3041847, at *5 (D. Del. May 27, 2016).
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 1986
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`
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`messages.
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`Plaintiff’s interpretation is not grounded in the claim language. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
`
`2355 (inquiry is whether claims “are directed to a patent ineligible concept”). Plaintiff relies on
`
`its expert’s supposed understanding of the solution based on the Open System Interconnection or
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`OSI model. Ans. Br. at 2, 7; see also Goodrich Decl. ¶¶ 17, 27. Neither the claims nor the
`
`patents refer to the “OSI” model or “layer,” let alone an “application layer.” Even Plaintiff’s
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`charts refer to “logical and physical network topologies” or “logical, physical, and overlay
`
`layers” to argue m-regular limitations — not application layer topologies. E.g., Lin Decl., Exs.
`
`1A-C.
`
`B.
`
`Alice Step 1: Even Under Plaintiff’s Construction, The Broadcast Claims Are
`Directed To An Abstract Idea.
`Even under Plaintiff’s “logical overlay” interpretation, the Broadcast Claims are still
`
`abstract, like a phone tree or chain letter. Indeed, phone trees and chain letters are themselves
`
`“logical overlays.” They all consist merely of information, or instructions, for the forwarding of
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`information. In the Broadcast Claims, in phone trees, and in chain letters, each participant
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`“knows” (or has information regarding) to which other participants to send data or a message. In
`
`each case, the originating participant sends the data or message to another participant using an
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`“underlying” point-to-point network, such as the postal network, telephone system, email
`
`networks, or Internet. And in each case, if a Participant A has instructions to send information to
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`Participant B, then Participants A and B are “connected,” at least under Plaintiff’s interpretation.
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`Just like a phone tree or chain letter, the “logical overlay” at the “application layer” of the
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`Broadcast Claims is merely information, or instructions, about message forwarding. Plaintiff
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`itself confirms this by describing the incomplete, m-regular graph of the “logical overlay” as a
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`“concept”—which means an “abstract idea” or “a general notion.” Ans. Br. at 9. That’s exactly
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 1987
`
`
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`what the incomplete, m-regular graph concept is in this case—an abstract idea. It is a collection
`
`of information about the applications, and transmission of information is classically an abstract
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`idea. See Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348. Thus, the Broadcast Claims are not patent eligible.
`
`Plaintiff contends that the application-level logical overlay solves a computer network
`
`problem in a specific and concrete way. Ans. Br. at 9-10. The Broadcast Claims, however, do
`
`not have the limitations Plaintiff suggests – they do not claim or require low latency, reliability,
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`scalability, efficiency or the ability to add and drop participants. See, e.g., Ans. Br. at 8, 9, 13
`
`(listing alleged benefits). Moreover, the fundamental nature of the logical overlay is only
`
`information, not any tangible or physical structures. Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys
`
`Telecomm., 2015 WL 4128963, at *5 (D. Del. July 9, 2015) (“Even if Plaintiff were correct that
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`the invention provides a compelling technological solution to the aforementioned problems, the
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`patent is fundamentally directed to the abstract idea of connecting customers to call centers.”).
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`This information in the application-level logical overlay does not improve the underlying
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`computer network. For instance, as explained in Tanenbaum (Goodrich Decl., Ex. B at 4-8), the
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`application layer is not concerned with lower-level tasks such as determining routes between the
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`parties that wish to communicate, separating large messages into distinct packets for delivery,
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`reordering such packets if they arrive out of order, and retransmitting lost or corrupted messages.
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`See also Ans. Br. at 7 (“[P]airs of participants share a connection established in the application
`
`layer overlay, while an underlying network handles the actual transfer of data between the
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`physical network components.”).
`
`Relying on DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014), and Enfish, LLC. v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Plaintiff
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`suggests that the Broadcast Claims address a problem unique to computer networks and are
`
`5
`
`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 1988
`
`
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`therefore patent eligible. Ans. Br. at 9-10. DDR and Enfish do not, however, hold that any claim
`
`rooted in computer technology is necessarily patent eligible. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct at 2358
`
`(“limiting the use of an abstract idea ‘to a particular technological environment’” is not enough
`
`for patent eligibility); see also Pragmatus, 2015 WL 4128963, at *5. Instead, as this Court has
`
`explained, the Federal Circuit in DDR recognized the difficulty of “identifying the precise nature
`
`of the abstract idea” and thus “assumed that the patent-in-suit was directed to an abstract idea,
`
`and then proceeded to Mayo/Alice step two.” Nice Sys. Ltd. v. Clickfox, Inc., 2016 WL 4941984,
`
`at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 15, 2016). Similarly, “Enfish is thus best understood as a case which
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`cautions against oversimplification during step one of Mayo/Alice, rather than a case which
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`exempts from § 101 scrutiny all patents which purport to improve the functioning of a
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`computer.” Visual Memory LLC, 2016 WL 3041847, at *4. Here, there is no such difficulty as
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`Plaintiff’s characterization of the Broadcast Claims is plainly abstract.
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`Enfish also does not support patent-eligibility in this case. The claims in Enfish included
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`a “means-plus-function” element, namely a “means for configuring” that required “a four step
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`algorithm” including the creation of a “self-referential table that stores data.” 822 F.3d at 1337.
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`The “logical overlay” is not created anywhere and does not exist as anything physical, such as
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`the database table in Enfish. At best, just like a phone tree or chain letter, the connections of the
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`“logical overlay” can be only be represented on paper (e.g. Figure 2 in Plaintiff’s Brief) because
`
`the connections in each instance merely consist of instructions regarding message forwarding.3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`Similarly, none of the district court cases cited by Plaintiff involve patents that sought to
`claim information itself as the Broadcast Claims do. Instead, all of these cases involve method
`claims to or for analyzing or processing information. MAZ Encryption Technologies LLC v.
`Blackberry Corp., 2016 WL 5661981, at *8 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016); Treehouse Avatar LLC v.
`Valve Corp., 170 F. Supp. 3d 706, 721 (D. Del. 2016); Network Congestion Sols., LLC v. United
`States Cellular Corp., 170 F. Supp. 3d 695, 705 (D. Del. 2016); SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`2016 WL 1437655, at *6 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2016).
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 1989
`
`
`
`C.
`
`Alice Step 2: The Broadcast Claims Contain No “Inventive Concept”
`1.
`The Broadcast Claims Do Not Recite Concrete Limitations Providing
`Tangible Benefits.
`Plaintiff argues that the Broadcast Claims have allegedly concrete limitations providing
`
`tangible benefits. But, those alleged limitations are not claimed. Even so, the alleged “concrete”
`
`limitations fall within two categories: (1) properties but not structures of a “logical overlay” and
`
`(2) ordinary computer components. Neither of these categories is an actual inventive concept,
`
`and certainly, neither category brings tangible benefits warranting patent eligibility.
`
`Plaintiff’s first category of inventive concept is that the “logical overlay” is an
`
`“incomplete, m-regular network” and for some dependent claims “m-connected.” Ans. Br. at 13-
`
`15. These limitations do not represent actual physical structures, exist only in theory, and are
`
`thus not concrete limitations. Plaintiff’s “logical overlay” structure simply means that each
`
`participating application has instructions to forward messages to its “neighbor” applications, and
`
`the forwarding instructions, if represented on paper like a phone tree, would take the shape of an
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`m-regular incomplete graph. This knowledge is merely information, and information is abstract
`
`and cannot be an inventive concept. Further, the properties of m-regular graphs were known to
`
`provide advantages in network applications. Plaintiff does not dispute that prior art publications
`
`(Baransal, Shoubridge) disclose the same message forwarding technique occurring on an m-
`
`regular incomplete graph as the Broadcast Claims. See Ans. Br. at 18, Goodrich Decl. ¶ 78.
`
`Plaintiff only argues that the Broadcast Claims are different because they operate on a different
`
`layer, but does not explain how that is achieved or why it represents an inventive concept.
`
`Plaintiff’s second category of “concrete” limitations asserts that (1) sending and receiving
`
`of messages from a “neighbor” (2) application, i.e. computer program (3) on computer networks
`
`are inventive concepts. Ans. Br. at 13-14. The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have rejected
`
`ordinary computer components as providing an inventive concept. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 1990
`
`
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`(“mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
`
`patent-eligible invention.”). These allegedly inventive concepts are ordinary functions of a
`
`computer performed on ordinary computer components. Plaintiff points to nothing other than
`
`ordinary computers performing ordinary functions.
`
`Plaintiff’s reliance on Smartflash LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2015 WL661174 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
`
`13, 2015), for the proposition that claims directed to general purpose computers can be patent
`
`eligible is misplaced. That case involved method claims, which recited “specific ways of using
`
`distinct memories, data types, and use rules that amount to significantly more than the underlying
`
`abstract idea.” Id. at *8-9. In contrast, the Broadcast Claims are not method claims.4
`
`2.
`The Broadcast Claims Purport To Preempt The Field.
`Claims that do not preempt the field can still be patent ineligible. See, e.g., Dealertrack,
`
`674 F.3d at 1334; Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2015); Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Amazon.com, 2015 WL 4730906, at *3 (D. Del.
`
`Aug. 10, 2015). Yet, Plaintiff’s interpretation of these claims suggests significant preemption
`
`concerns. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts the Broadcast Patents against at least ten different video
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`games developed independently by at least six different companies. The sweeping allegations of
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`each Complaint confirm Plaintiff’s intent to preempt the field. The allegedly infringing networks
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`can (supposedly) be comprised of any and all “applications” that in any way communicate with
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`each other. E.g., Lin Decl., Exs. 2A-C. Plaintiff broadly argues use of the claimed network can
`
`be inferred simply where a system contains “many servers on many different networking levels,”
`
`has “flexibility,” is “stable,” is “optimally connected” or “are evenly distributed on the logical,
`
`
`4
`For this same reason, Plaintiff’s reliance on the method claims found patentable in
`ART+COM Innovationpool GmbH v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 1718221, at *6 (D. Del. Apr. 28,
`2016), and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 2016 WL 4896481, at *10 (Fed. Cir.
`Sept. 13, 2016), is also misplaced. Moreover, nothing in the Broadcast Claims is comparable to
`the specific procedure and rules which must be performed in ART+COM and McRO.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 1991
`
`
`
`overlay and physical networks.” E.g., Lin Decl., Ex. 3A-C.
`
`Moreover, according to Plaintiff, the Broadcast Claims are agnostic as to physical
`
`hardware, protocol (e.g., non-TCP/IP protocols, such as UDP), and application (e.g., LAN,
`
`WLAN, or the Internet). As a result, at least according to the way they are being asserted, the
`
`Broadcast Claims cast a specter over all complex communication networks.
`
`3.
`Novelty Is Not Relevant To A Section 101 Analysis.
`Plaintiff contends that the Broadcast Claims have inventive concepts because they are
`
`novel. Ans. Br. at 13 and 17. But, an inventive concept for purposes of patent eligibility is not
`
`the same as novelty. As the Supreme Court has said: “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a
`
`process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
`
`matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”
`
`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981); Priceplay.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 83 F.
`
`Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Del. 2015) (“Novelty . . . is not the issue when determining whether a
`
`claimed invention is directed to patentable subject matter.”). The parties’ disagreement as to the
`
`novelty of the Broadcast Claims is simply not relevant to the Section 101 analysis.
`
`IV. AS DEFINED BY PLAINTIFF, THE BROADCAST CLAIMS ARE NOT
`PHYSICAL OR TANGIBLE STRUCTURES AND THUS NOT PATENT-
`ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER.
`
`Plaintiff’s interpretation confirms that the Broadcast Claims are not patent-eligible for the
`
`separate and independent reason that are not in “any of the four statutory categories: process,
`
`machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2007). “If a claim covers material not found in any of the four statutory categories, that claim
`
`falls outside the plainly expressed scope of § 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and
`
`useful.” Id. at 1354. “For all categories except process claims, the eligible subject matter must
`
`exist in some physical or tangible form.” Digitech Image Techs., LLC, 758 F.3d at 1348.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 1992
`
`
`
`In Digitech, the Federal Circuit considered whether claims to a “device profile,” which
`
`included “a collection of intangible color and spatial information” were patent eligible. Id.
`
`Without even addressing the two-step Alice analysis, the court held that the claims were not
`
`within the scope of the four statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter and were
`
`therefore not patent-eligible. Id. Last year, the Federal Circuit affirmed this principle: “Except
`
`for process claims, ‘the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical or tangible form.’”
`
`Allvoice Developments US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 612 F. App’x 1009, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
`
`see also GoDaddy.com LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., 2016 WL 3165536, at *21 (D. Ariz. June
`
`7, 2016) (“[F]ree-standing information is simply not patentable.”).
`
`Plaintiff acknowledges that this application-level logical overlay does not have any
`
`physical or tangible structure or actual physical connections. As Plaintiff’s expert explains, “an
`
`underlying network handles the actual transfer of data between the physical network
`
`components.” See, e.g., Ans. Br. at 7 (“[P]airs of participants share a connection established in
`
`the application layer overlay, while an underlying network handles the actual transfer of data
`
`between the physical network components.”). The network that is purportedly being improved is
`
`merely the application-level logical overlay. See Goodrich Decl., Ex. B at 3. At best, the
`
`application-level logical overlay represents that each application includes information identifying
`
`the applications to forward messages to or receive messages from. If Participant A receives or
`
`forwards to Participant B, then, according to Plaintiff, they are “connected.” This information is
`
`not physical or tangible and is not patent eligible. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their motions and find that the
`
`Broadcast Claims are patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 1993
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`David P. Enzminger
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 S. Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`Dan K. Webb
`Kathleen B. Barry
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`Michael M. Murray
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-3510
`
`October 31, 2016
`
`
`
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`
`
`/s/ Stephen J. Kraftschik
`_____________________________________
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00455-RGA Document 35 Filed 10/31/16 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 1994
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on October 31, 2016, I caused the foregoing to be
`
`electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of
`
`such filing to all registered participants.
`
`
`
`
`
`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
`
`October 31, 2016, upon the following in the manner indicated:
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`/s/ Stephen J. Kraftschik
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`
`
`
`
`
`Philip A. Rovner, Esquire
`Jonathan A. Choa, Esquire
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Paul J. Andre, Esquire
`Lisa Kobialka, Esquire
`James R. Hannah, Esquire
`Hannah Lee, Esquire
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRA

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