throbber
Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 49454
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC.,
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
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`DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
`TO PRECLUDE THE NEW DAMAGES THEORIES PLAINTIFF RAISED AT THE
`PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
`
`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 16-453 (RGA)
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`
`
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
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`
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`
`
`
`
`
`v.
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`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`Joe S. Netikosol
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`David P. Enzminger
`Louis L. Campbell
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`275 Middlefield Road, Suite 205
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`(650) 858-6500
`
`Dan K. Webb
`Kathleen B. Barry
`Sean H. Suber
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`-1--1-
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`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 49455
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`
`Krista M. Enns
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`101 California Street, 35th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 591-1000
`
`Michael M. Murray
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue,
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-6700
`
`Andrew R. Sommer
`Thomas M. Dunham
`Joseph C. Masullo
`Paul N. Harold
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`1700 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 282-5000
`
`B. Trent Webb
`Aaron E. Hankel
`Jordan T. Bergsten
`Maxwell C. McGraw
`SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
`2555 Grand Boulevard
`Kansas City, MO 64108
`(816) 474-6550
`
`October 24, 2018
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`
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`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 49456
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`Acceleration’s plan to ask the jury to determine a lump-sum royalty based on a series of ten-
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`figure numbers not tied to any royalty analysis or calculation is inadmissible. No witness has
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`testified that a royalty award would be derived from Dr. Valerdi’s figures or Activision’s revenues
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`and profits, how such an award would be calculated, or what it would be. A plaintiff may not ask a
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`jury to provide a damages award based on raw data, speculation or guesswork, and a plaintiff cannot
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`offer damages evidence that is not carefully tied to an admissible royalty analysis. Damages must be
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`based on sound economic principles and there is no authority for Acceleration’s plan.
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`Moreover, the royalty bases Acceleration advances are themselves inadmissible. They are
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`completely untethered to the alleged use of the patented inventions and Acceleration admittedly has
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`no witness to tie these bases to a hypothetical negotiation between Activision and Boeing.
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`Dr. Valerdi’s whole “analysis” turns on a fallacy—that he can reliably quantify the costs of
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`something that Acceleration’s experts claim does not exist. Even in the current opposition,
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`Acceleration claims a non-infringing alternative may not exist. Because he was asked to quantify
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`something that does not exist, Dr. Valerdi used a proxy. He speculates that an alternative game
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`would have the same number of lines of relevant code as the existing game. He then used his
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`computer model to predict the cost of writing that volume of code. But, according to Dr. Valerdi,
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`that volume of code is the same in both the speculative alternative and the accused games. Thus, his
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`estimates for the alternative and the existing code would always be identical, because his computer
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`model produces the same output for any given input. The assumption he used to “quantify” some
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`undisclosed alternative “that may not even exist” ensures that there can never be cost savings
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`because he assumed they are the same. And what probative value can there be in asking the jury to
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`assume that a non-existent alternative would cost billions, if it existed? That is pure speculation.
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`-1--1-
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 49457
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`Acceleration proposes to compare Dr. Valerdi’s numbers quantifying a speculative
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`alternative to numbers reported by Dr. Meyer regarding the actual cost of development. But none of
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`Acceleration’s witnesses made this comparison previously and they should not be allowed to present
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`a new analysis on the eve of trial. Further, since Valerdi’s estimate assumes that the alternative has
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`the same volume of relevant code as the allegedly infringing original, comparing his estimate to the
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`development costs contained in Dr. Meyer’s report does not represent a ‘cost savings’ – it represents
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`only the difference between the computer-generated estimated cost of developing the existing
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`products and Meyer’s calculation of the actual development. That difference is not probative of true
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`“cost savings,” but rather is a measure of how bloated Dr. Valerdi’s estimate is compared to the
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`actual development costs. Similarly, Dr. Meyer’s purported “apportionment” is based exclusively on
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`her equating the use of the term “multiplayer” in an Activision customer survey with the patented
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`technology.1
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`I. Acceleration ignores that a reasonable royalty must be tethered to the patented
`technology and based on sound economic principles.
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`Acceleration identifies three cases that supposedly support its position “that a royalty rate is
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`[not] necessary to sustain a damages award.” Opp. 1. But in each case, the expert offered both a
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`specific, reliable calculation supported by reliable evidence and methodology.
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`In Powell, the expert conducted a Georgia Pacific analysis and arrived at a range of per-unit
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`royalty rates. The Federal Circuit found the range and the jury’s ultimate determination were both
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`supported by substantial evidence. Powell v. Home Depot USA Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1239-41 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2011). The court did not authorize a finding of damages derived from a royalty base with no
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`rate. In EMC, Plaintiff’s expert “presented a range of appropriate damages,” the defendant did “not
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`1 Acceleration admits there is no apportionment to WoW. Opp. 15 & n.2. Now, it says it will
`apply the CoD apportionment to WoW. But no testimony supports that. Dr. Meyer provided no
`apportionment.
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`2
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 49458
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`take issue with the methodology,” and the Court found “no reason” to consider them unreliable.
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`EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 81, 119 (D. Del. 2016). In Summit, the plaintiff’s
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`expert calculated a specific rate of $0.28 per phone, which the Federal Circuit found “was based on
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`reliable principles and was sufficiently tied to the facts of the case.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung
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`Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1296–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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`Acceleration’s attempts to distinguish Exmark fail. A royalty may be a lump sum or a rate
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`multiplied by a base. Regardless, the royalty must be “carefully tied” to the alleged infringement.
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`Having found that expert testimony must be tied to a specific proposed royalty rate, 879 F.3d at
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`1349–51, Exmark prohibits an expert offering Georgia Pacific analysis that is not tied to any royalty.
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`Acceleration’s plan to offer a base but no rate does not “sufficiently tie” the alleged infringement to
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`a royalty. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`Similarly, Acceleration still has not taken a position or presented any evidence as to the
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`hypothetical negotiation date. “[T]he correct determination of the hypothetical negotiation date is
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`essential for properly assessing damages.” LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 75, 76 (emphasis added).
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`But Dr. Meyer has no opinion, and Acceleration’s technical experts never considered the issue.
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`Without evidence to support the hypothetical negotiation date, Acceleration cannot meet its burden
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`to prove damages. Acceleration’s position is essentially that it can make its damages presentation fit
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`whatever hypothetical negotiation Activision or the Court chooses.
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`Plaintiff has identified no case where a jury was presented merely with a royalty base but no
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`rate or damages calculation. And this is not surprising. The patentee bears the burden of proving
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`damages with reasonable (though not mathematical) certainty. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
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`580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s plan to present merely a royalty base and invite the
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`3
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 49459
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`jury to calculate a reasonable royalty based on the numbers that is provided is impermissible and can
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`only lead to an award based on “speculation or guesswork.” Id. at 1309.
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`II. Dr. Valerdi’s estimates are not a cost savings analysis, and there is no evidence
`they would have been considered in a hypothetical negotiation.
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`A cost savings analysis determines how much the alleged infringer saved by using the
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`infringing functionality rather than a non-infringing alternative. When the Federal Circuit has
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`approved a cost savings analysis as a measure of damages, it has done so only when the patentee
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`offered admissible evidence showing (1) a reliable method for calculating cost savings from use of
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`the patented invention compared to a non-infringing alternative; and (2) reliable evidence that the
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`parties would have agreed that a specific portion of those cost savings would form the royalty.
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`Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Applying [Georgia -
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`Pacific] … the magistrate concluded that the reasonable royalty in this case must be based upon a
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`portion of the annual cost savings attributable to use of the Hanson patent.”); Prism Techs. LLC v.
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`Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`Plaintiff has no admissible evidence on either point. As to the first point, neither Dr. Valerdi
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`nor Dr. Meyer calculate a cost savings, and no Acceleration expert has testified why it would have
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`cost any more at all to build a non-infringing alternative. Dr. Valerdi assumed they are the same.
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`Second, unlike Prism, where the damages expert “testified that the parties would have valued the []
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`patents based on Sprint’s expected cost savings” (849 F.3d at 1378), Dr. Meyer admits that the
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`speculated alternative is not “economically viable” and that the parties would not have relied on Dr.
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`Valerdi’s estimates to value the patents. Meyer Rpt. (D.I. 444, Ex. C-3) at ¶57.
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`A “cost savings” analysis in a patent case must be based on a simple formula: The cost of
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`using non-infringing functionality minus the cost of using the patented functionality equals cost
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`savings. But Acceleration does not identify any non-infringing alternative, let alone explain why the
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`4
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 49460
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`non-infringing alternative would cost more than the accused products. In fact, according to
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`Acceleration, “there are no viable non-infringing alternatives.” D.I. 444, Ex. C-2 (“Valerdi Rpt.”) at
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`3. Unlike the two cost-savings cases on which Acceleration relies, here the purported cost savings
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`expert has not identified any specific, available non-infringing alternative, let alone the cost for
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`implementing such a technology. Prism Techs., 849 F.3d at 1377 (cost of alternatives such as a
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`“premium ‘Cadillac’ backhaul” and “a less-expensive ‘Chevy’ backhaul”); Powell, 663 F.3d at 1239
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`(cost of “replac[ing] radial saws”). Dr. Valerdi’s calculation of an alternative that he speculates
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`would have the same volume of code as accused games is inadmissible.
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`Having failed to identify the supposed non-infringing alternative, Acceleration speculates
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`that it might be possible to get around the patents by re-writing the entire game. But even if that were
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`true, Acceleration has no opinion as why it would cost any more to write the new code. In fact,
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`Acceleration speculates that the redesigned games would have the exact same lines of code as the
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`original games (Opp. 5), so there would have been no additional costs at all. Dr. Valerdi himself
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`confirms this. Acceleration does not dispute that by using Dr. Valerdi’s software, “the same inputs
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`(project characteristics) w[ill] generate the same outputs (cost and schedule).” Valerdi Report (D.I.
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`444, Ex. C-2) at 4; Ex. 3, Valerdi Dep. Tr. 68:25–69:13. Yet Dr. Valerdi took the numbers of the
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`lines of code for “the entire game” and sought to estimate “the cost of developing the software as is.”
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`See Ex. 3, Valerdi Dep. Tr. 100:6–11, 152:18. That is the basic fallacy of Dr. Valerdi’s approach.
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`There is no evidence at all that the supposedly redesigned games would cost any more than the
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`original development costs.
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`Acceleration also has not made any effort to show that the speculative non-infringing
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`alternative is an any way tied to the patented features. Acceleration contends “the scope of his cost-
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`estimate was ‘just the networking code.’” Opp. 5. This is incorrect. Dr. Valerdi never inspected the
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`5
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 49461
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`actual source code computer, but instead relied on conversations with Dr. Medvidovic.2 Dr.
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`Medvidovic counted the total files and communicated those total file numbers to Dr. Valerdi, and
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`Dr. Valerdi used those exact numbers, without reduction, for his estimates. At his deposition, Dr.
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`Valerdi confirmed he made no reduction from these numbers because Dr. Medvidovic told him to
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`include “a hundred percent” of the code in his estimate because “a hundred percent” met some vague
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`standard of being “related to … or impacted by network functionality.” Ex. 3, Valerdi Dep. Tr.
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`109:9–12. Neither Dr. Valerdi nor any other Acceleration witness provides any explanation for why
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`the graphics, game engine, animation, third party tools or other source code files unrelated to
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`networking functions would be “impacted by networking functionality.” Thus, his billion-dollar
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`estimates are not an estimate of rewriting the accused infringing networking code; they are an
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`estimate for rewriting the entire code of the accused products from scratch.3
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`Further, most claims “dropped out,” and Dr. Valerdi’s estimate did not change—“suggesting
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`that [it] was never tied to the specific patents at issue.” Apple, 757 F.3d at 1325 n.5.
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`That Dr. Valerdi included millions of lines of code having nothing to do with networking is
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`clear from his analysis. Acceleration’s technical experts printed and cite to less than five thousand
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`pages of code containing less than one hundred thousand lines of code across all of the accused
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`products. Acceleration’s infringement contentions are based only on the printed and cited code.
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`Though Acceleration contends that Dr. Valerdi based his analysis on “the source code print outs
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`2 Dr. Valerdi did not know what features are associated with the patented technology, see, e.g.,
`Ex. 3, Valerdi Dep. Tr. 119:3–9, 133:3–16, and he did not know and “was not interested in how
`[the developers] would re-architect or what part of the game would need to be re-architected,” id.
`at 97:19–98:15. Dr. Valerdi did not offer an analysis of the costs saved related to the accused
`functionality or a patent-by-patent apportionment.
`3 Tellingly, Dr. Valerdi’s cost estimates for re-writing what Acceleration purports to be only the
`networking code are multiples higher than the actual costs for the development and marketing of the
`accused games.
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`6
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 49462
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`available to him,” his analysis estimates the cost of rewriting millions of lines of code. Valerdi
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`Report (D.I. 444, Ex. C-2) at 12–13.
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`Because Dr. Valerdi never compared costs, Acceleration now plans to offer “guidance” from
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`Dr. Meyer comparing “the development costs” listed in a “table” in her report and “Dr. Valerdi’s
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`cost-savings calculations to rebuild the infringing network.” Opp. 8 (citing D.I. 480, Ex. 69 at
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`Exhibits 4E, 5). Not only was this not in either expert report, but Dr. Meyer admitted in deposition
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`that is not “a valid comparison.” Ex. 6, Meyer Dep. Tr. at 31:6–32:3. She testified that her numbers
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`do not reflect all the development costs incurred by Activision. Id.
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`Fourth, Acceleration advances no evidence that Dr. Valerdi’s estimates would have been the
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`basis for a reasonable royalty. Dr. Meyer disclaimed reliance on them as a basis to value the patents
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`and merely used them to argue that non-infringing alternatives would not be “economically viable.”
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`Meyer Report (D.I. 444, Ex. C-3) at ¶57. An alternative that is not “economically viable” is no
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`alternative at all, and it is irrelevant because “[t]he economic relationship between the patented
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`method and non-infringing alternative methods, of necessity, would limit the hypothetical
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`negotiation.” Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Acceleration also has no evidence how the parties to a hypothetical negotiation would have
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`considered Dr. Valerdi’s estimates, or how they would have arrived at a royalty based on Dr.
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`Valerdi’s estimates. Acceleration claims that the Federal Circuit “approv[ed] a cost-savings based
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`verdict that was not based on a royalty rate” in Powell. Opp. 1. Not so. In Powell, the patentee’s
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`expert conducted a Georgia Pacific analysis that was in part based on cost savings and arrived at a
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`reliable range of “per unit” royalty rates. 663 F.3d at 1239. Plaintiff has no expert opinion or
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`admissible evidence on a range of per unit royalty rates.
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`Neither Dr. Valerdi nor Dr. Meyer can provide any opinion sufficient to tie these estimates to
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 49463
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`a hypothetical negotiation, because neither provides any opinion in their report as to the appropriate
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`date of the negotiation or the appropriate parties to the negotiation. Without such evidence, his
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`estimates are irrelevant. This is not merely academic; it has significant consequences in view of
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`Acceleration’s most recent position that Activision would only have to rearchitect its code once. If
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`the supposed rearchitecting took place on the eve of alleged infringement in 2004 (as a proper
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`analysis requires), Dr. Valerdi’s cost estimates would be apportioned over the next 15 years and
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`across dozens of products not at issue in this litigation. The rearchitecting costs attributable to the
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`games at issue here would therefor shrink by orders of magnitude.
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`Finally, Acceleration argues that Activision should not “get multiple bites at the apple” over
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`the admissibility of Dr. Valerdi’s estimates. Opp. 7. During the Daubert briefing, Activision
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`challenged the reliability of Dr. Valerdi’s model because Dr. Valerdi does not know how the model
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`compares to the actual games. Here, we point out that Dr. Valerdi’s opinion are inadmissible
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`regardless of the reliability of his model. Further, Acceleration was not offering Dr. Valerdi’s
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`estimates as a cost savings opinion or as a measure of damages. It is Acceleration that is serially
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`presenting “new damages theories” as each successive theory is found inadmissible. Ex. 1 (Pretrial
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`Conf. Tr.) at 109:7–11. The issue here is the admissibility of a new “fact-based” damages theory
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`that was not challenged at Daubert because it was not advanced until the Pretrial Conference. This
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`is Activision’s first opportunity to challenge the admissibility of Acceleration’s latest theory.
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`III. Acceleration has failed to show that any of its royalty bases have been properly
`apportioned.
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`Acceleration’s opposition demonstrates that it failed to apportion do a proper apportionment
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`even though the Federal Circuit has held that “only theories comporting with settled principles of
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`apportionment” should be allowed to reach the jury. Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308,
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`1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Recognizing that it has no apportionment for World of Warcraft at all,
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`8
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 49464
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`Acceleration now states it will “apportion World of Warcraft in the same manner [as the other
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`products], as the apportionment of the other games are appropriate proxy for the value of the
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`technology.” Opp. 15 & n.2. There is no expert report on that. WoW and CoD involve different
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`patents and different products.
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`And, Dr. Meyer’s purported user or unit apportionment for Call of Duty and Destiny based
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`on a Call of Duty survey is itself not proper. Moreover, this new apportionment is based on a single
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`consumer survey about a completely different game: Call of Duty. See Mot. 12. No witness,
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`documents, or evidence supports using Call of Duty as a basis to apportion World of Warcraft.
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`Certainly, nothing in the Call of Duty survey shows supports that the accused functionality in World
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`of Warcraft is “the sole driver of customer demand.” Power Integrations, 904 F.3d at 979. The
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`games are different, the asserted patents are different, and Dr. Meyer herself has not offered any
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`supplemental expert report. Now is too late. In its opening brief, Activision identified errors with
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`the apportionment, including: (1) the reduction of asserted patents from six to two with no change to
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`the apportioned value; (2) Dr. Meyer’s use of a single Call of Duty survey as the basis for her
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`apportionment; and (3) the lack of evidence that the Call of Duty survey results apply to Destiny
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`(and now World of Warcraft). Tellingly, Acceleration fails to respond to these errors.
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`At most, Acceleration responds to the argument “multiplayer” cannot be used as proxy for
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`the patented functionality. Opp. 15–16. But Dr. Meyer’s use of the term “multiplayer” is not the
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`issue. What matters is how Activision’s survey used the term “multiplayer” and how survey
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`respondents understood the term “multiplayer.” Acceleration has no evidence that Activision used
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`the term “multiplayer” to refer to the patents in a product survey that predated Activision’s
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`knowledge of the patents. Even more implausible is that the respondents to the survey somehow
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`associated the term “multiplayer” with the patents. Needless to say, nothing in Activision’s survey
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`9
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 49465
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`referred to the patents-in-suit or the specific features they allegedly cover.
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`Next, Acceleration provides no citations to Dr. Meyer’s report where she allegedly
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`apportioned revenue. Acceleration cannot provide any such citations because, while Dr. Meyer
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`apportioned users or units, she did not apportion revenue. Acceleration now seeks to graft this
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`apportionment of users and units to revenues and profits without any supporting analysis or opinion
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`in Dr. Meyer’s report. Acceleration cannot present new opinions on the eve of trial.
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`Procedurally, the Court has not rejected Activision’s apportionment arguments; it found them
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`moot after it struck Dr. Meyer’s sole reasonable royalty calculation. D.I. 578 at 30. Nevertheless,
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`the Court added that any royalty base presented would have to be “properly apportioned.” Id.
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`Acceleration has failed to do so.
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`IV. The prejudice to Activision warrants exclusion.
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`Acceleration claims that these “fact-based” damages theories were disclosed long ago, but at
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`no time during discovery did it disclose a damages theory whereby multi-billion dollar royalty bases
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`disassociated from any royalty calculation would be presented to the jury. Every theory
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`Acceleration has offered has been excluded and Acceleration admits that it intends to keep offering
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`“new theories” up to and, presumably, during trial. Ex. 1 (Pretrial Conf. Tr.) at 109:7–11. The
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`Court should not permit federal litigation to become a game of whack-a-mole.
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`As demonstrated above, Acceleration’s latest damages theories are inadmissible but even if
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`they were admissible, Fed. R. Evid. 403 would preclude them. There is no greater prejudice to a
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`patent defendant than allowing a plaintiff to throw billion dollar figures in front of a jury. Whatever
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`theoretical probative value that these unbound billion dollar figures could provide is far outweighed
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`by the extreme prejudice to Activision and the undeniable skew that would result.
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`10
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 49466
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`OF COUNSEL:
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`Joe S. Netikosol
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`David P. Enzminger
`Louis L. Campbell
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`275 Middlefield Road, Suite 205
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`(650) 858-6500
`
`Dan K. Webb
`Kathleen B. Barry
`Sean H. Suber
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`Krista M. Enns
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`101 California Street, 35th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 591-1000
`
`Michael M. Murray
`Anup K. Misra
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue,
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-6700
`
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`
`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
`__________________________________
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 49467
`
`
`
`
`Andrew R. Sommer
`Thomas M. Dunham
`Joseph C. Masullo
`Paul N. Harold
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`1700 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 282-5000
`
`B. Trent Webb
`Aaron E. Hankel
`Jordan T. Bergsten
`Maxwell C. McGraw
`SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
`2555 Grand Boulevard
`Kansas City, MO 64108
`(816) 474-6550
`
`October 24, 2018
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 609 Filed 10/24/18 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 49468
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on October 24, 2018, I caused the foregoing to be electronically filed
`
`with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
`
`registered participants.
`
`
`
`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on October 24,
`
`2018, upon the following in the manner indicated:
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
`________________________________
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`
`Philip A. Rovner, Esquire
`Jonathan A. Choa, Esquire
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Paul J. Andre, Esquire
`Lisa Kobialka, Esquire
`James R. Hannah, Esquire
`Hannah Lee, Esquire
`Yuridia Caire, Esquire
`Greg Proctor, Esquire
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Aaron M. Frankel, Esquire
`Marcus A. Colucci, Esquire
`Cristina Martinez, Esquire
`Shannon H. Hedvat, Esquire
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`1177 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`
`
`

`
`-1--1-
`
`

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