Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 46905
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
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`ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
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`)
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`)
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`)
`
`C.A. No. 16-453 (RGA)
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`REDACTED - PUBLIC VERSION
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`DEFENDANT ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC.’S SUPPLEMENTAL
`REPLY BRIEF ON TESTING, WHETHER THE SALE OF SOFTWARE
`WAS THE SALE OF A NETWORK, AND CENTILLION’S IMPACT
`WHEN THE PARTICIPANTS INCLUDE COMPUTER PROCESSES
`
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`Joe S. Netikosol
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`David P. Enzminger
`Louis L. Campbell
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`275 Middlefield Road, Suite 205
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`(650) 858-6500
`
`Dan K. Webb
`Kathleen B. Barry
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 46906
`
`Krista M. Enns
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`101 California Street, 35th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 591-1000
`
`Michael M. Murray
`Anup K. Misra
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue,
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-6700
`
`Andrew R. Sommer
`Thomas M. Dunham
`Michael Woods
`Paul N. Harold
`Joseph C. Masullo
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`1700 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 282-5000
`
`B. Trent Webb
`Aaron E. Hankel
`Jordan T. Bergsten
`Maxwell C. McGraw
`SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
`2555 Grand Boulevard
`Kansas City, Missouri 64108
`(816) 474-6550
`
`Originally Filed: June 6, 2018
`Redacted Version Filed: June 13, 2018
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 46907
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`
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`Acceleration has failed to distinguish Centillion, which requires summary
`judgment. ............................................................................................................................ 2
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`Activision does not sell the claimed networks, participants or connections. ...................... 4
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`Activision does not make the claimed Call of Duty or Destiny networks. ......................... 5
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`Activision does not use the claimed networks. ................................................................... 7
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`A.
`
`B.
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`Acceleration has no evidence that any testing by Activision infringed. ................. 7
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`Acceleration cannot attribute players’ use to Activision. ....................................... 9
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`Activision does not infringe the ’497 patent. .................................................................... 10
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 46908
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Aatrix Software v. Green Shades Software,
`882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................5
`
`Acantha LLC v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc.,
`2018 WL 1951228 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 25, 2018) ...........................................................................8
`
`Allvoice Developments US v. Microsoft Corp.,
`612 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ..........................................................................................5
`
`Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`2014 WL 5040317 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2014) ...........................................................................6, 7
`
`Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc.,
`631 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Centrak, Inc. v. Sonitor Techs., Inc.,
`2017 WL 3730617 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2017) ..........................................................................7, 9
`
`Cross Med. Prod., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................6
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................5
`
`Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. For Imaging,
`758. F.3d 1344, 139–50 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................5
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................5
`
`Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................9
`
`High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc.,
`49 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................................7
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,
`870 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................10
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
`550 U.S. 437 (2007) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 46909
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`Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,
`745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984)......................................................................................................7
`
`Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`2017 WL 1045912 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017) ...............................................................................8
`
`Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc.,
`550 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................8
`
`Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,
`215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..................................................................................................6
`
`Segan LLC v. Zynga Inc.,
`131 F.Supp.3d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .........................................................................................9
`
`Segan LLC v. Zynga Inc.,
`2013 WL 12156529 (D. Del. May 2, 2013) ...............................................................................9
`
`Travel Sentry v. Tropp,
`877 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................7
`
`Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A. v. eCinicalWorks, LLC,
`991 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2013) .....................................................................................9
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. §271(a) ......................................................................................................................6, 10
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`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 6 of 17 PageID #: 46910
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`Acceleration’s opposition presents no evidence that Activision “makes, uses, or sells” any of
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`the networks or broadcast channels claimed by the ’344 and ’966 patents, or even the participants
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`and connections that compose those networks. Nor does Acceleration present evidence that
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`Activision makes, uses or sells the ‘479 patent’s hardware component. Acceleration cannot
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`distinguish the Federal Circuit’s Centillion decision from the facts of this case. And Acceleration
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`provides no evidence that Activision has tested the accused products in the United States on an
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`accused platform in a manner that allegedly infringes during the damages period.
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`Acceleration’s opposition depends on the incorrect and unsupported assertion that there is no
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`difference between a “computer process” and software. As Activision has explained by citations to
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`Acceleration’s own allegations and evidence, there is well-understood distinction between inert
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`software and a computer process, which is an instance of software executing on a computer.
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`D.I. 565 at 10–12. Acceleration never responds to this evidence, and instead relies on pure attorney
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`argument—on an issue on which it bears the burden of proof—that a “participant” can be a process,
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`“i.e., software,” that “nothing” requires a process to “execute on a computer,” and that “no hardware
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`is necessary.” D.I. 570 at 1, 4. Not only are these arguments unsupported, they contradict
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`Acceleration’s infringement contentions, Acceleration’s expert testimony, Centillion, this Court’s
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`claim constructions, and all facts of record.
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`Acceleration’s infringement contentions from the outset of this case accused application
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`programs “running on a computer or console” as the participants of the accused networks. D.I. 571,
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`Plf’s Ex. 113 at 4–5; D.I. 184, Ex. B at 8 (saying that “the application running on a customer’s
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`computer to play a multiplayer game … is as specific as Acceleration Bay can be” to identify the
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`accused participants). The Court adopted the parties’ agreed construction that a “participant” is “a
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`computer and/or computer process that participates in a network.” Acceleration’s experts both
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`1
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 46911
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`confirm that a participant, under this construction, is not just software, but software applications
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`executing (actually running) on a Microsoft Xbox or a player’s computer. See D.I. 443 (Ex. A-1)
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`(Med.Rep’t.) ¶2; D.I. 443 (Ex. A-2) (Mitz.Rep’t.) ¶2; D.I. 569 (Ex. E-30) (Med. Tr.) at 104:14–21
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`Moreover, the Court expressly construed claims 13-15 of the ‘344 patent and claim 13 of the ‘966
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`patent to require hardware: “processor[s] programmed to perform” claimed algorithms. “[I]t is
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`entirely the decision of the customer[s] whether to install [the software on their own computers] and
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`operate” their own computers in a way that would make them “participants” (i.e., processes that are
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`executing on a computer in the accused modes); thus Activision cannot directly infringe by selling
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`software. Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
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`2011). And Acceleration still has no evidence of infringement by product testing.
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`In response to this Court’s request for its best evidence of testing, Acceleration has only cited
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`(1) the same deficient testimony it referenced at the hearing, which does not show the platform, time,
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`or details of those tests, (2) deposition testimony relating to World of Warcraft, not CoD or Destiny,
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`(3) new evidence that Bungie (not Activision) hired QA testers for Destiny, and (4) new evidence
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`that the accused products receive update patches. None of this creates a material dispute of fact
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`sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Summary judgment of non-infringement should be entered.
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`I.
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`Acceleration has failed to distinguish Centillion, which requires summary judgment.
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`Acceleration’s shifting-sands approach to distinguishing Centillion has failed to raise any
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`genuine issue of material fact. At the summary judgment hearing, the Court asked Acceleration to
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`distinguish Centillion, and it responded that in Centillion, the customers “controlled the processes,”
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`whereas here, the customers have “zero input … [because] once they agree and put it on the
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 8 of 17 PageID #: 46912
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`computer, they have no control over those processes.” D.I. 560 at 116–117. This distinction had no
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`basis in the record. Acceleration presents no evidence rebutting that, here “the customer must install
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`Activision’s software, execute it, and choose an online, multiplayer game mode with more than 5
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`other participants to make and use the accused networks.” D.I. 565 at 4; see also id. at 6.
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`Acceleration merely states that “Destiny has no off-line mode” and “the multiplayer version of Call
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`of Duty always infringes.” D.I. 570 at 17 n.5. These footnoted arguments, even if true, do not
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`distinguish Centillion. For both games, Acceleration nowhere disputes that a customer, even once in
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`online mode, has several non-accused game modes available, and must choose a multiplayer game
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`with six or more players to form an accused network.
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`Acceleration’s remaining attempts to distinguish Centillion mischaracterize the law, and are
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`simply repackaged versions of the same failed argument. First, Acceleration argues that “[i]n
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`Centillion, the defendant ‘manufacture[d] only part of the claimed system.’” D.I. 570 at 8. But the
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`passage cited by Acceleration goes on to explain that this is because “[t]he customer, not [the
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`software provider], completes the system by providing the ‘personal computer data processing
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`means’ [hardware] and installing the client software.” 631 F.3d at 1288. Here, it is undisputed that
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`no alleged infringement occurs until customers provide their own hardware and install Activision’s
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`software. Second, Acceleration argues that in Centillion, the plaintiff conceded that the claimed
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`“personal computer data processing means” were “owned, maintained by, and controlled by
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`customer users.” D.I. 570 at 15. But the passage Acceleration cites does not support its argument,
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`and merely says the plaintiff “concedes that the claim includes . . . a ‘front-end’ system maintained
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`by an end user.” 631 F.3d at 1281 (emphasis added). Thus, this passage merely discusses the degree
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`of control by the user, which, as explained above, was the same in Centillion as it is here. Activision
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`does not own, maintain, or control its customer’s Xboxes. Third, Acceleration misses the point
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`3
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 9 of 17 PageID #: 46913
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`when it argues that “Centillion does not replace the High Tech / Paper Converting standard where,
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`as is the case here, no actions by other parties are required to make the component claim
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`limitations.” D.I. 570 at 9 (emphasis added). This argument relies on the incorrect and factually
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`unsupported claims that software is a process and Activision’s customers have “zero input” over
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`installation of software, whether to execute it, or what game mode to play. Acceleration’s
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`infringement theories are not triggered unless customers acquire an Xbox from Microsoft, install
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`software, execute Activision’s software, and choose to play a 6-participant multiplayer game (rather
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`than single-player or other games with fewer participants).
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`Because no genuine issue of material fact distinguishes this case from Centillion, this Court
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`should grant summary judgment of no direct infringement for the Destiny and Call of Duty games.
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`II.
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`Activision does not sell the claimed networks, participants or connections.
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`The asserted claims of the ’344 and ’966 patents require “computer networks” and/or
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`“broadcast channels,” which both require at least six “participants” and “connections” among those
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`“participants.” D.I. 387 at 15 (“broadcast channel” is a “communications network consisting of
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`interconnected participants” (emphasis added)). Acceleration has no evidence that the software discs
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`that Activision sells are networks, or even the participants and connections that compose networks.
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`Even Acceleration’s experts agree that the “participants” they accuse are “application programs that
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`are executing on the client computers.” D.I. 443 (Ex. A-1) (Med.Rep’t.) ¶2 (emphasis added); (Ex.
`
`A-2) (Mitz.Rep’t.) ¶2; see also Ex. A-1 (Med.Rep’t.) ¶ 84 (“When a player running a CoD
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`application program on a computer or console wants to participate in an online game…” (emphasis
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`added)); Ex. A-2 (Mitz.Rep’t.) ¶ 76 (“To participate in a multiplayer online Destiny game and utilize
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`the Destiny Network, game applications are executed on client computers and Bungie servers.”
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`(emphasis added)). Software discs merely contain a set of instructions. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
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`Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 447 (2007). They are not “computer processes,” “application programs that are
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`4
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 46914
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`executing on the client computers,” or networks.
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`Moreover, in accusing the sale of inert software discs (rather than computers running
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`software applications), Acceleration is accusing pure software. If the claims cover software alone,
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`they are invalid for claiming non-statutory subject matter. Allvoice Developments US v. Microsoft
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`Corp., 612 F. App’x 1009, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Software is patent ineligible as an apparatus
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`because it lacks a tangible embodiment. Digitech Image Techs. v. Elecs. For Imaging, 758. F.3d
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`1344, 139–50 (Fed. Cir. 2014); D.I. 565 at 11–12; D.I. 442 at 36–37. No case cited by Acceleration
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`holds to the contrary. In Aatrix, the Federal Circuit confirmed that “claims to pure data … are
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`directed to ineligible subject matter” and upheld “data processing system” claims because they
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`“clearly require[d] a computer operating software” such as a “client computer.” Aatrix Software v.
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`Green Shades Software, 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).1
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`III. Activision does not make the claimed Call of Duty or Destiny networks.
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`Acceleration has no evidence that Activision itself makes the accused networks. The acts of
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`making and using networks that Acceleration identifies in its brief are all performed by “players”
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`and “customers” after they purchase the software. There is no dispute that the customers, not
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`Activision, must install and execute the software on their own Xbox or computers, and must further
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`choose to play a game mode with at least five other participants. See D.I. 570 at 7. This is confirmed
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`by Acceleration’s own experts, who explain that the software is installed and executed by players,
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`not by Activision. D.I. 443 (Ex. A-1) (Med.Rep’t.) ¶¶ 2, 84; D.I. 443 (Ex. A-2) (Mitz.Rep’t.) ¶¶ 2,
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`76. Its expert also confirms that the accused networks do not exist unless the players perform certain
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`voluntary acts, such as combining together into “FireTeams” and then spreading across different
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`1 The only claim upheld in Finjan as patent eligible—a case argued by Plaintiff’s counsel—was
`“directed to a method.” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303–1304 (Fed. Cir.
`2018). And the claim upheld in DDR Holdings recited “a computer server”—not pure software.
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1249–50 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 46915
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`“bubbles.” D.I. 443 (Ex. A-2) (Mitz.Rep’t.) ¶¶ 78–81 (“
`
`
`
`
`
`.” (emphasis
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`added)). Whether Activision owns the software is irrelevant because owning is not an infringing act,
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`i.e., making, using, selling, or offering to sell, and Acceleration cites no case in support of its theory
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`of infringement-by-owning. See 35 U.S.C. §271(a).
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`Acceleration argues that “making the components” is enough (D.I. 570 at 8), but that
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`misstates the law and the undisputed facts. For infringement, “the device must meet all of the
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`structural limitations.” Cross Med. Prod., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
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`1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2000). Firstly, as explained above, Activision’s software is not a “component” of the claimed
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`inventions, and Activision does not make the at-least-six participants and a plurality of connections
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`among them that are required to form the accused networks. Second, just as in Cross Medical, the
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`participants and connections are structural requirements and no infringing system exists until the
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`participants are formed and interconnected. 424 F.3d at 1311. Acceleration’s experts acknowledge
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`that if customers do not supply Xboxes, install software, and choose to run (execute) software in an
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`accused mode, there is no network. D.I. 569 (Ex. E-30) (Med. Tr.) 64:11–66:10; 80:9–12. Centillion
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`compels the same conclusion where the accused infringer made only part of the claimed system (the
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`software) and its customers combined the software with other components (computers) to arrive at
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`the claimed invention. 631 F.3d at 1288.
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`None of Acceleration’s cases support its argument. The claims in Atlas IP were directed to “a
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`communicator,” which was a single element that the court found did not need to be “combined into a
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`system and/or turned on to infringe.” Atlas IP, LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 5040317, at *7
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`6
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 12 of 17 PageID #: 46916
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`(S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2014). There was no direct infringement in High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc.
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`v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995). And in Paper Converting, the
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`accused infringer made, used, sold, and tested all components of the patented invention. See Paper
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`Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (accused
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`infringer sold, tested, and delivered a “completed machine” in two parts).
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`And, finally, Acceleration cannot attribute the conduct of players to Activision. The
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`“attribution” line of cases only apply to method claims; “system claims are different from method
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`claims and are still treated under the Centillion standard for infringement.” See Centrak, Inc. v.
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`Sonitor Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 3730617, at *6 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2017). Under Centillion, Activision
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`is not vicariously liable because “it is entirely the decision of the customer whether to install and
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`operate this software.” Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1287. Indeed, the license agreement confirms this. See
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`D.I. 482, Plf’s Ex. 74 at AB-AB 009812 (granting a “
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`”). Acceleration’s citation of Travel Sentry is inapposite because that case concerned
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`method claims. Travel Sentry v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017).2
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`IV. Activision does not use the claimed networks.
`A.
`
`Acceleration has no evidence that any testing by Activision infringed.
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`Acceleration never disputes that to show infringement by testing it must show that the
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`claimed networks from the accused products were tested in the United States, in “real world”
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`conditions,3 on an Xbox or PC, with at least six participants after March 2015. Ricoh Co. v. Quanta
`
`
`2 Vicarious liability does not apply even to the asserted method claims. Vicarious liability under
`Akamai still requires the accused infringer to perform at least one step of the method, and it is
`undisputed that Activision itself performs no steps of the accused methods. See D.I. 442 at 7–9.
`3 Indeed, in criticizing testing conducted by Activision’s expert, Acceleration’s experts argue that
`Dr. Kelly’s testing was “fundamentally flawed” because it “d[id] not reflect a normal networked
`environment,” which would require him to “set up his test environment so that each of his Xboxes
`
`
`7
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 13 of 17 PageID #: 46917
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`Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming summary judgment for lack of
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`“specific evidence that [Defendant] tested [the products] in a way that would constitute
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`infringement”). Nor does it contest that its purportedly “best” testing evidence cannot show
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`infringement, now relying instead on different evidence that suffers from the same deficiencies.
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`Even the new evidence does not come close to showing an infringing use, as it fails to
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`mention most if not all of the necessary conditions. In fact, most of the new citations have nothing to
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`do with Call of Duty and Destiny or nothing to do with Activision. Acceleration repeatedly cites
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`evidence about World of Warcraft, which is not at issue for this direct infringement argument. See,
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`e.g., Plf’s Ex. 117 (asking about World of Warcraft); Plf’s Ex. 119 (same); Plf’s Ex. 118 (2009
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`article entitled “Blizzard outlines massive effort behind World of Warcraft”).4 As for Destiny,
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`Acceleration cites a job advertisement posted by non-party Bungie. See D.I. 570 at 13.
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`Acceleration argues, based on evidence like Activision’s SEC filings, that Activision
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`conducts quality assurance testing, but this is not evidence that Activision “tested the accused
`
`products in an infringing manner.” Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.,
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`2017 WL 1045912, at *4–5 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017) (finding that general evidence of testing did not
`
`establish that specific claim limitations were met during testing) (emphasis added); Acantha LLC v.
`
`DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., 2018 WL 1951228, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 25, 2018) (same). Likewise,
`
`Acceleration cites to portions of Robert Kostitch’s deposition (D.I. 570 at 12), but he merely testified
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`that Activision
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`
`
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`would not share a public IP address, behind their own firewall, and [to] configure[] the network to
`game specifications [to] simulat[e] a single person playing at home with an Xbox.” D.I. 443 (Ex. A-
`3) (Med.Reply) ¶¶ 522–23, 269; D.I. 443 (Ex. A-4) (Mitz.Reply) ¶¶ 339–40, 271. In other words,
`according to Acceleration, only specific types of testing would constitute infringement.
`4 World of Warcraft does not infringe because it is undisputed that the only accused network, the
`“WoW Server-to-Server network,” is never configured to be m-regular. See D.I. 442 at 10–12.
`
`8
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 46918
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`, with no details about the timing, place, and parameters of
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`the test. Plf’s Ex. 120 at 30:6–22, 158:1–17.
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`Acceleration cites Segan LLC v. Zynga Inc., 2013 WL 12156529, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. May 2,
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`2013), suggesting that “accessing games” alone can infringe, but Segan was a motion to dismiss
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`decision where the plaintiff had expressly alleged use. At summary judgment, Acceleration cannot
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`rely on mere allegations; it must provide “specific evidence.”5 Centrak, 2017 WL 3730617 at *7.
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`In short, Acceleration “ha[s] missed at least one analytical phase—[it] fail[s] to identify
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`evidence tending to show that testing the accused software actually meant practicing … the
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`[Asserted] Patent[s].” Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A. v. eCinicalWorks, LLC, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103
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`(C.D. Cal. 2013). And lastly, Acceleration’s brand-new argument–that the Court may infer
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`infringement from Activision’s updating its products–is merely a variation on the groundless theory
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`“that if the system was sold, Defendant must necessarily have tested it.” Centrak, 2017 WL 3730617
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`at *7. That “inference does not substitute for substantial evidence.” Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc.,
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`417 F.3d 1241, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument that a “large volume of sales …
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`constituted circumstantial evidence from which we should infer [infringement] by testing”)
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`(reversing denial of accused infringer’s JMOL).
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`B.
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`Acceleration cannot attribute players’ use to Activision.
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`“Use” under Centillion requires that the accused infringer both control every element of the
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`system and “obtain[] ‘benefit’ from each and every element of the claimed system.” Intellectual
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`Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 870 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Here, Activision
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`5 In Segan, the allegations turned out to be baseless; the patent was fou nd not infringed, the
`defendant was awarded attorneys’ fees, and the court sanctioned the plaintiff’s attorneys for filing a
`frivolous complaint. See Segan LLC v. Zynga Inc., 131 F.Supp.3d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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`9
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 46919
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`does not control the networks, because it does not execute application programs on client computers.
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`Activision also does not control the networks because it does not receive a benefit from each and
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`every element of the systems. Acceleration does not even attempt to identify a benefit element by
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`element, and the benefits Acceleration identifies are not “tethered” to using a network (id.), the
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`purpose of which is to “distribute information.” D.I. 1, Ex. 1 at 1:41–42.
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`V.
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`Activision does not infringe the ’497 patent.
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`The asserted claims of the ’497 patent also require hardware. Acceleration’s claims must fail
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`for all the reasons given above. Activision cannot “sell” any product that infringes because
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`Activision does not sell hardware. Activision does not “make” any product that infringes because it
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`does not install software on its customers’ hardware. And Activision does not use its customers’
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`hardware for “locating a call-in port of a portal computer.” Acceleration asserts that Activision
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`infringes this patent during testing, but it presents no evidence.
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`Activision does not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Acceleration’s DOE argument
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`fails for the (unrebutted) reasons given in the opening brief. DOE applies only to particular claim
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`limitations, not to acts of infringement under §271(a), and Acceleration presents no authority to the
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`contrary. Acceleration seeks to fashion new DOE law out of whole cloth.
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`But even assuming that hardware were not required, Activision would not infringe because it
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`is not executing the software and attempting to “locat[e] a call-in port of a portal computer.” See D.I.
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`443 (Ex. A-1) (Med. Rep’t) ¶ 542 (“
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`
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`” (emphasis added)); Ex. A-2 (Mitz. Rep’t) ¶ 401 (same).
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`Activision respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion for summary judgment of no
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`direct infringement for the Call of Duty and Destiny products.
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`10
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 46920
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`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`Joe S. Netikosol
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`David P. Enzminger
`Louis L. Campbell
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`275 Middlefield Road, Suite 205
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`(650) 858-6500
`
`Dan K. Webb
`Kathleen B. Barry
`Sean H. Suber
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`Krista M. Enns
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`101 California Street, 35th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`(415) 591-1000
`
`Michael M. Murray
`Anup K. Misra
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue,
`New York, NY 10166
`(212) 294-6700
`
`June 6, 2018
`
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`
`/s/ Jack B. Blumenfeld
`__________________________________
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
`
`
`
`
`Andrew R. Sommer
`Thomas M. Dunham
`Michael Woods
`Joseph C. Masullo
`Paul N. Harold
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`1700 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 282-5000
`
`B. Trent Webb
`Aaron E. Hankel
`Jordan T. Bergsten
`Maxwell C. McGraw
`SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
`2555 Grand Boulevard
`Kansas City, Missouri 64108
`(816) 474-6550
`
`
`
`11
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`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 575 Filed 06/13/18 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 46921
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on June 13, 2018, I caused the foregoing to be electronically
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`
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`filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`
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`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
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`June 13, 2018, upon the following in the manner indicated:
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`Philip A. Rovner, Esquire
`Jonathan A. Choa, Esquire
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Paul J. Andre, Esquire
`Lisa Kobialka, Esquire
`James R. Hannah, Esquire
`Hannah Lee, Esquire
`Yuridia Caire, Esquire
`Greg Proctor, Esquire
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Aaron M. Frankel, Esquire
`Marcus A. Colucci, Esquire
`Cristina Martinez, Esquire
`