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Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 46603
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C.A. No. 16-453 (RGA)
`
`)))))))))
`
`
`
`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFF ACCELERATION BAY LLC’S
`SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION FOLLOWING SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING
`
`Philip A. Rovner (#3215)
`Jonathan A. Choa (#5319)
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`Hercules Plaza
`P.O. Box 951
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 984-6000
`provner@potteranderson.com
`jchoa@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Acceleration Bay LLC
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Paul J. Andre
`Lisa Kobialka
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
` & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`(650) 752-1700
`
`Aaron M. Frankel
`Cristina Martinez
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
` & FRANKEL LLP
`1177 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036
`(212) 715-9100
`
`Dated: May 23, 2018
`
`Public version dated: May 30, 2018
`
`PUBLIC VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 46604
`
`Further to the Court’s instructions at the May 17, 2018 hearing on the parties’ motions for
`
`summary judgment, and pursuant to the Court’s oral order (D.I. 557), Plaintiff Acceleration Bay
`
`LLC (“Acceleration Bay”) submits this further submission.
`
`I.
`
`The Court Should Correct the “Obvious Error” in Claim 19 of the ‘634 Patent
`
`Acceleration Bay moved the Court to correct the obvious grammatical error in claim 19
`
`of the ‘634 Patent, by moving the adjective “non-routing table based” to modify “method”
`
`instead of “computer readable medium.” D.I. 438; D.I. 473. During oral argument, Activision
`
`incorrectly stated that the Court’s power to correct errors in claims is limited to “scrivners’
`
`errors” or “typos.” Ex. 1 (5/17/18 Tr.) at 35:23-36:16. To the contrary, the Court’s powers to
`
`correct are not so limited and the controlling test is if “(1) the correction is not subject to
`
`reasonable debate based on consideration of the claim language and the specification and (2) the
`
`prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.” CBT Flint
`
`Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 654 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011), quoting Novo Indus.,
`
`L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court’s
`
`summary judgment of invalidity based on indefiniteness because the court could have corrected
`
`an obvious error within the claim). Moreover, “[a]bsent evidence of culpability or intent to
`
`deceive by delaying formal correction, a patent should not be invalidated based on an obvious
`
`administrative error.” Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`The Court’s ability to correct errors in claims is not limited to fixing “typos.” This
`
`District and others have repeatedly corrected obvious errors in a patent, including those that go
`
`beyond a mere “typo.” See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release
`
`Capsule Patent Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 517, 530 (D. Del. 2011), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
`
`rev'd in part, 676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rearranging words in claim element to correct
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 46605
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`obvious error); Intermec Techs. Corp. v. Palm Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 973, 984-85 (D. Del. 2011)
`
`(removing extraneous phrase that was “nonsensical as written” and correcting five other errors);
`
`Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. AsusTek Computer Inc., C.A. No. 15-1125-GMS, 2017 WL 2957927,
`
`at *4 n.16 (D. Del. July 11, 2017) (“the court notes that it is authorized to add the word ‘means’
`
`to the term ‘gravitation-controlled sensor [means]’ in order to resolve obvious antecedent basis
`
`informalities”), citing H–W Tech. L.C. v. Overstock.com, Inc., 758 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-cv-03999-BLF, 2014 WL 5361976, at *2, 7-8 (N.D.
`
`Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (removing “the method” from preamble to clarify nature of claim);
`
`CheckFree Corp. v. Metavante Corp., No. 3:12-CV-15-J-34JBT, 2013 WL 12156049, at *3
`
`(M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2013) (using logic and review of specification to identify correction for
`
`missing term); Fairfield Indus., Inc. v. Wireless Seismic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2972, 2015 WL
`
`1034275, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) (correcting obvious error by adding antecedent basis
`
`for claim element).
`
`Activision incorrectly contended during oral argument that the Court should not correct
`
`the error in claim 19 because “non-routing table based” could also be moved to modify
`
`“network,” and repeatedly argued that Acceleration Bay previously characterized both the
`
`network and the method as non-routing table based. Ex. 1 at, e.g., 31:24-32:9. As Acceleration
`
`Bay explained, they mean the same thing – the network and the method controlling the network
`
`do not rely on routing-tables to move messages through the network. Id. at 52:19-53:16.
`
`But even if Activision is correct (which it is not), the fact that an error can be corrected in
`
`multiple ways does not preclude the Court from correcting the claim. In CBT Flint
`
`Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that a district court rightly
`
`identified that there were three alternative but reasonable corrections for an error in a claim
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 46606
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`term. 654 F.3d at 1358. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in
`
`finding that it was unauthorized to correct the error. Id. at 1358–59. The Federal Circuit
`
`reiterated the district court’s responsibility to consider the alternatives “from the point of view of
`
`one skilled in the art,” (id. at 1358), and found that “[b]ecause each of the three proposed
`
`reasonable interpretations would result in the same claim scope . . . a person of skill in the art
`
`would readily know that the meaning of the claim requires insertion of the word ‘and’ between
`
`the words ‘detect’ and ‘analyze.’” Id. at 1359; see also, e.g., Fairfield Indus., 2015 WL
`
`1034275, at *21 (“Although Wireless Seismic is correct that the error can be corrected in two
`
`ways, the mere fact that multiple reasonable corrections exist does not prevent the Court from
`
`correcting the term.”); CheckFree Corp., 2013 WL 12156049, at *3 (correcting term
`
`notwithstanding several alternative corrections proposed by defendant).
`
`II.
`
`The Computer-Readable Medium Claims Are Patent Eligible
`
`The computer readable medium (CRM) claims are patent eligible because they are
`
`directed to inventive methods. D.I. 475 at 32-33. Activision ignores this fact and incorrectly
`
`argues that drafting the method in the form of a CRM claim somehow renders a patent eligible
`
`method claim into a patent ineligible CRM claim. However, the Federal Circuit dictates that the
`
`Court’s analysis of the patent eligibility of the CRM claims should be based on the “underlying
`
`invention,” not the formality that the claims were drafted as CRM claims. Cybersource Corp. v.
`
`Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of what statutory
`
`category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 35 U.S.C. §101) a claim’s
`
`language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility
`
`purposes. Here, it is clear that the invention underlying both claims 2 and 3 is a method for
`
`detecting credit card fraud, not a manufacture for storing computer-readable
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 46607
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`information.”)(emphasis added). Activision repeatedly suggested, without citation to any
`
`authority, that Cybersource was directed to an “Alice” inquiry that is somehow different from the
`
`patent eligibility standard of 35 U.S.C. § 101. But there are not two separate inquiries. In the
`
`quote above from Cybersource, the Federal Circuit clearly states that it is addressing the
`
`statutory eligibility test of § 101.
`
` Numerous decisions have followed this mandate and looked to the substance of the
`
`claims for purposes of patent eligibility. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co.
`
`of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“the form of the claims should not
`
`trump basic issues of patentability”), citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522,
`
`57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978) (advising against a rigid reading of § 101 that “would make the
`
`determination of patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman's art”); CLS Bank
`
`Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014) (“under §
`
`101 we must look past drafting formalities and let the true substance of the claim guide our
`
`analysis. Here, although the claim's preamble appears to invoke a physical object, the claim term
`
`‘computer readable storage medium’ is stated in broad and functional terms—incidental to
`
`the claim—and every substantive limitation presented in the body of the claim (as well as in
`
`dependent claims 40 and 41) pertains to the method steps of the program code ‘embodied in
`
`the medium.’”); Crypto Research, LLC v. Assa Abloy, Inc., 236 F.Supp.3d 671, 680 (E.D.N.Y.
`
`2017) (finding claim patent eligible: “while the Patents-in-Suit recite apparatus, computer-
`
`readable medium, and method claims, in practical effect, the claims cover the same concept
`
`related to the efficient computation of hash values in a one-way chain. Consequently, the claims
`
`warrant similar substantive treatment.”); Rovi Guides, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 16-CV-9278
`
`(JPO), 2017 WL 3447989, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017) (“The Federal Circuit has instructed
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 46608
`
`that Beauregard claims, such as claim 17, are treated as method claims.”), citing Digital-Vending
`
`Servs. Int'l, LLC v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1276 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
`
`(Beauregard claims “should be treated as method claims to avoid ‘exalt[ing] form over
`
`substance’” (quoting Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1374)).
`
`III. Confidential Source Code is Not Prior Art Unless it is Used in a Product
`
`Activision failed to come forward with evidence that the version of Activenet it relies on
`
`is available as prior art. Activision concedes that Activenet source code is confidential and was
`
`not available to the public. Nevertheless, it argues that the source code can still be used as prior
`
`art because it was supposedly used in Heavy Gear Demo and Heavy Gear II games (“Heavy
`
`Gear”) that were publicly available. There are two fatal flaws with this theory.
`
`First, Activision does not know which version of Activenet was actually used in Heavy
`
`Gear and, in particular, does not know if the version of Activenet that Dr. Karger relies on for his
`
`invalidity opinion is the same version that was used in Heavy Gear. D.I. 448 (2/2/18 Motion for
`
`Summary Judgment) at 16-17. Multiple versions of software cannot be used as a single prior art
`
`reference, and Activision is limited to the specific version that Dr. Karger analyzed. Kyocera
`
`Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (collection of
`
`technical specifications collectively known as the GSM standard do not function as a single prior
`
`art reference).
`
`Second, for commercial source code to be relevant evidence of prior art, it must actually
`
`be “embodied” in a commercially available product. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 790
`
`F.Supp.2d 435, 453-54 (E. D. VA 2011), citing J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787
`
`F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hilgraeve, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 271 F.Supp.2d 964, 973-
`
`977 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (granting summary judgment that software was not publicly known
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 46609
`
`because there was no evidence that it was sold or used in the U.S.). Because Activision and its
`
`expert do not know what was actually used in Heavy Gear, there is no evidence, much less clear
`
`and convincing evidence, that the source code that Activision selected was ever even allegedly
`
`public. Here, Activision has not come forward with any evidence that the portions of the
`
`Activenet source code that Dr. Karger relies upon were actually compiled into Heavy Gear.
`
`Activision’s failure to provide proof of which portions of the Activenet source code were
`
`actually used in Heavy Gear is critical. As Activision and its experts have repeatedly argued, not
`
`all source code is actually used in the commercial software that is compiled and sold — thus, that
`
`a function is included in Activenet source code is not proof it was included in an actual Heavy
`
`Gear game that was allegedly in public use.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`functionality is found in Activenet source code is not evidence that it was actually used in a
`
`Thus, the fact that alleged
`
`commercial product.
`
`Accordingly, the Court should grant summary judgment that Activision failed to come
`
`forward with evidence that the portions of Activenet it relies upon were ever in public use.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:16-cv-00453-RGA Document 567 Filed 05/30/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 46610
`
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`
`By: /s/ Philip A. Rovner
`Philip A. Rovner (#3215)
`Jonathan A. Choa (#5319)
`Hercules Plaza
`P.O. Box 951
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 984-6000
`provner@potteranderson.com
`jchoa@potteranderson.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Acceleration Bay LLC
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Paul J. Andre
`Lisa Kobialka
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
` & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`(650) 752-1700
`
`Aaron M. Frankel
`Cristina Martinez
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS
` & FRANKEL LLP
`1177 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036
`(212) 715-9100
`
`Dated: May 23, 2018
`
`5819456
`
`7
`
`Public version dated: May 30, 2018
`
`

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