Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 3829
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
`MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF STANDING
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`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants
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`C.A. No. 15-228 (RGA)
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`C.A. No. 15-282 (RGA)
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`C.A. No. 15-311 (RGA)
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, INC.
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`Defendant.
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ELECTRONIC ARTS INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`ACCELERATION BAY LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE,
`INC., ROCKSTAR GAMES, INC. and
`2K SPORTS, INC.,
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 3830
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`
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`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`David P. Enzminger
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
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`
`
`Daniel K. Webb
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
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`March 30, 2016
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 3831
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... ii
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`I.
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`AB LACKS PRUDENTIAL STANDING ....................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`AB does not own the patents. ............................................................................... 1
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`AB does not have all substantial rights to the patents. ......................................... 3
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`II.
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`AB LACKS CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING ............................................................. 9
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`III.
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`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 10
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`i
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 3832
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`
`CASES
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Abbott Labs v. Diamedix Corp.,
`47 F.3d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ............................................................................................... 6, 8
`
`Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp.,
`604 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................. 6, 8
`
`Bluestone Innovations LLC v. Nichia Corp.,
`No. C 12-00059 SI, 2013 WL 1729814 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) .......................................... 5
`
`Canon Inc. v. Tesseron Ltd.,
`No. 14CV5462(DLC), 2015 WL 7308663 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2015) ................................... 10
`
`Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc.,
`61 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (D. Del. 2014) ................................................................................ 1, 2
`
`Crown Die & Tool v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works,
`261 U.S. 24, 42 (1923) .............................................................................................................. 5
`
`Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
`No. 8:13-CV-01480-MRP, 2015 WL 2088892 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) ................................. 2
`
`Enhanced Security Research, LLC, v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`2010 WL 2898298 (D. Del. 2010) ............................................................................................. 8
`
`Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................................... 10
`
`Fieldturf v. Sw. Recreational Indus.,
`357 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................. 3
`
`Grant Cty. Constructors v. E. V. Lane Corp.,
`459 P.2d 947 (Wash. 1969) ....................................................................................................... 2
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`Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.,
`115 P.3d 262 (Wash. 2005) ....................................................................................................... 3
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`High Point SARL v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 2015-1235, 2016 WL 670402 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2016) .................................................. 10
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`Int’l Gamco Inc. v. Multimedia Games,
`504 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................. 4, 5
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`Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co.,
`No. 2015-CV-1671, 2016 WL 797925 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 29, 2016) ......................................... 7, 8
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 3833
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`MobileMedia Ideas, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`885 F. Supp. 2d 700 (D. Del. 2012) .......................................................................................... 8
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`Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.,
`499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ......................................................................................... 5, 7, 8
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`Pfizer, Inc. v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp.,
`812 F. Supp. 1352, 1373 (D. Del. 1993) .................................................................................. 7
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`Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co.,
`222 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................. 5
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`Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard,
`No. 12 CIV. 6973 RJS, 2013 WL 1454945 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013)................................. 4, 5
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`Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc.,
`473 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................. 2, 8
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`Rite–Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc.,
`56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ................................................................................... 1
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`Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc.,
`427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................... 8
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`Stasch v. Underwater Works,
`158 A.2d 809, 812 (Del. Super. 1960)....................................................................................... 6
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`Walker Digital, LLC v. Expedia, Inc.,
`950 F. Supp. 2d 729 (D. Del. 2013) ...................................................................................... 3, 6
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`Waterman v. Mackenzie,
`138 U.S. 252 (1891) .............................................................................................................. 1, 3
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`WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc.,
`631 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................... 10
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`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 3834
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`AB’s brief ignores or mischaracterizes the facts and the law. There is no question that
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` The Agreement between Boeing and AB
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`does not transfer sufficient rights for AB to enforce the patents alone. In addition, the undisputed
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`rights
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` renders any injury to AB illusory and so
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`deprives it of constitutional standing. These cases should be dismissed.
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`I.
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`AB LACKS PRUDENTIAL STANDING
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`A.
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`AB does not own the patents.
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`AB plainly does not own the patents. “A conveyance of legal title by the patentee can be
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`made only of [i] the entire patent, [ii] an undivided part or share of the entire patent, or [iii] all
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`rights under the patent in a specified geographical region of the United States.” Rite–Hite Corp.
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`v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138
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`U.S. 252 (1891)). The Agreement between Boeing and AB did not convey those rights.
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`AB does not argue otherwise; it simply ignores Rite-Hite and Waterman.
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`Contrary to AB’s selective quotations of the Agreement, Boeing plainly did not transfer
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`“all right, title, and interest” in the patents. D.I. 109, “Opp. Br.” at 4.1 As Judge Stark held in
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`Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 421, 432 (D. Del. 2014), a transfer of “all right,
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`title, an interest” made “subject to” the reservation of substantial rights “d[oes] not convey any
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`entire patent, an undivided part or share of any entire patent, or all rights under any patent in a
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`specified geographical region of the United States.” Just as in Clouding, Boeing reserved for
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`1 All D.I. citations refer to C.A. No. 15-228 unless otherwise noted.
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`1
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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 3835
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`itself substantial rights inconsistent with a transfer of title. See Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v.
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`Hyundai Motor Am., 2015 WL 2088892, at *4 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015). Indeed, in Walker
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`Digital, LLC v. Expedia, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 2d 729 (D. Del. 2013), which AB cites, the assignor
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`retained no interest, license or otherwise, in the assigned patents. Here, the transfer to AB was
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` D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, §§ 4.1,
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`“subject to” reserved rights,
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`4.3. AB cannot “support[] its contention that ‘all rights, title, and interest’ were conveyed only
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`by quoting a snippet without the entire context.” Clouding, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 432.
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`.
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`AB’s mischaracterizes other provisions of the Agreement.
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` Opp. Br. at 5.
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`D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 3.4. AB’s description of the Agreement’s terms is also incomplete, omitting
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`discussion of Boeing’s retained rights. The Agreement cannot be analyzed by examining only
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`the rights granted to AB; the Court must “analyze the respective rights allocated to each party
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`under that agreement.” Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`AB also resorts to a declaration by a Boeing employee, Natasha Radovsky. As an initial
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`matter, under Washington law, which governs the contract, extrinsic evidence is not permitted
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`unless the contract is ambiguous. Grant Cty. Constructors v. E. V. Lane Corp., 459 P.2d 947,
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`954 (Wash. 1969). Moreover, the Agreement itself includes an incorporation provision which
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`specifically states that “[n]o oral explanation . . . shall alter the meaning or interpretation of this
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`2
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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 3836
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`Agreement.” D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 9.5. AB’s reliance on the affidavit is further suspect given
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`that AB and Boeing have withheld as “irrelevant” all communications between the parties.
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`Exs. A & B (Emails between counsel). Having done so, AB cannot now resort to parol evidence.
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`But even if the contract were ambiguous about whether title was conveyed—it was not—
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`Ms. Radovsky’s declaration does not show otherwise.2 Walker Digital, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 737
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`(discounting a declaration from a transferee disclaiming ownership). Courts “determine the
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`parties’ intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on the
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`unexpressed subjective intent of the parties.” Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.,
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`115 P.3d 262, 267 (Wash. 2005). Boeing’s intent is thus irrelevant, except as expressed by the
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`Agreement. After all, “[w]hether a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent is an
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`assignment or a license” depends “upon the legal effect of its provisions,” not a litigation-
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`inspired declaration. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 256. Because the court “must examine the
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`licensing agreement to determine whether the parties intended to effect a transfer,” a “patentee’s
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`later second thoughts are irrelevant.” Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026,
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`1032 Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Walker Digital, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 737 (“[T]he court relies on the
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`unambiguous granting language rather than the equivocal parol evidence[.]”). This was a
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`contract between two sophisticated parties; the Court should trust that the Agreement means
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`what it says. It was plainly not a transfer of the entire patent or an undivided share of the entire
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`patent under Waterman.
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`B.
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`AB does not have all substantial rights to the patents.
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`2 Nowhere in Ms. Radovsky’s affidavit does she purport to speak on Boeing’s behalf. She did
`not sign the Agreement. While AB criticizes Defendants for not filing similar affidavits, extrin-
`sic evidence is not necessary to interpret a contract’s plain language, and in any event, it is AB
`that bears the burden of establishing its standing. Fieldturf v. Sw. Recreational Indus., 357 F.3d
`1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 3837
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`
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` When a transferor retains the right to pursue infringers in any field of use, the
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`transferee does not “hold all substantial rights in the full scope of the [] patent” and thus lacks
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`standing. Int’l Gamco Inc. v. Multimedia Games, 504 F.3d 1273, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
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`(emphasis added). An exclusive field of use license “has split the patented subject matter
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`amongst various parties” and so “subjects an infringer to suit by multiple parties.” Id. at 1279.
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`
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`AB’s attempt to distinguish Int’l Gamco is unavailing.
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` D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 4.3. The Federal Circuit’s hypothetical is illustrative:
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`In this case, Gamco’s exclusive enterprise license limits its rights to lottery
`games, but the ‘035 patent extends beyond that limitation. For example, a single
`infringing game system at an NYSL-authorized site could offer blackjack, keno,
`mahjong, and lottery games. Thus, the single infringing act of offering NYSL
`games might subject the infringer to suit by Gamco for the lottery games, and
`separately by IGT or some other game-specific licensee for the other games. This
`example also shows the potential of suits among licensees or between the licensee
`and licensor. For example, the hypothetical infringer’s keno game could
`conceivably lead to a squabble over whether keno was a “lottery game” under
`Gamco’s license. Divvying up the rights in the ‘035 patent along subject matter
`rather than geographic lines would “permit several monopolies to be made out of
`one” in a manner not specifically sanctioned by the Patent Act.
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`Int’l Gamco, 504 F.3d at 1279–80 (footnote omitted). A licensor and licensee may dispute the
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`boundaries of the licensee’s field of use and so risk duplicative suits. AB rejects the Federal Cir-
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`cuit’s reasoning as “outlandish,” Opp. Br. at 8. It is not, and moreover, it is the law.
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`In arguing an “assignee has standing to assert patent despite assignor’s retention of
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`exclusive license in a field of use,” Opp. Br. at 9, AB misrepresents the holding of Princeton
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`Digital Image Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard, 2013 WL 1454945 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013). The
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`case holds no such thing. The court emphasized that assignor GE did not “retain” any rights; GE
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`assigned the patents in toto, and was then granted back a “non-exclusive license” and an
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`4
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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 3838
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`“illusory” right to sue. Id. at *4, *6. GE did not “retain” an “exclusive license” in a field of use
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`as Boeing did here. AB’s summary of the holding is simply incorrect.
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`AB’s cites to Bluestone Innovations LLC v. Nichia Corp., 2013 WL 1729814 (N.D. Cal.
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`Apr. 22, 2013). Bluestone is plainly distinguishable. In Bluestone, the plaintiff owned the
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`patent, unlike here. The exclusive field of use licensee was never an owner of the patent, never
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`had any rights beyond its field of use, and never received sufficient rights to sue on its own. Id.
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`at *3. And finally, the plaintiff-assignee, had “covenanted not to sue under any Patent” for
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`products within the exclusive licensee’s field, diminishing the risk of duplicative suits. Id. Here,
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`Boeing is the original owner of the patent
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`illustrates the compelling logic of the Federal Circuit’s Int’l Gamco decision: the Bluestone
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`plaintiff abandoned its claims against products that fell in the twilight between its patent rights
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` Indeed, Bluestone also
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`and those of the exclusive field-of-use licensee. Id. at *4 n.1.
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`AB also asserts that it has the “exclusive right to assert the Patents”
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` Opp. Br. at 7. But standing “depends entirely on the
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`putative plaintiff’s proprietary interest in the patent, not on any contractual arrangements among
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`the parties about who may sue.” Prima Tek II v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
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`
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`2000). The Agreement makes clear that Boeing retained and never relinquished “
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` D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 4.3 (emphasis added).
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`. Crown Die & Tool v. Nye Tool &
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`5
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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 3839
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`Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 42 (1923); Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1341–42
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`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (no standing where party had exclusive right to sue, but no exclusionary rights).
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`Even if that were not the law, the provisions would be inconsistent, and “[w]here there is an in-
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`consistency between general provisions and specific provisions, the specific provisions ordinari-
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`ly qualify the meaning of the general provisions.” Stasch v. Underwater Works, 158 A.2d 809,
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`812 (Del. Super. 1960). Thus, the
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` Walker Digital, 950
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`F. Supp. 2d at 736–37. (“[W]hen irreconcilable differences between contract clauses arise, the
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`court is to enforce the clause relatively more important or principal to the contract.”).
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` means that AB
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`does not own all substantial rights. When “the licensor retains a right to sue accused infringers,
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`that right often precludes a finding that all substantial rights were transferred to the licensee.”
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`Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2010). Indeed, “the nature and scope of the licensor’s retained right to sue accused infring-
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`ers is the most important factor in determining whether an exclusive license transfers sufficient
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`rights to render the licensee the owner of the patent.” Id.; see also Abbott Labs v. Diamedix
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`Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding the plaintiff lacked standing where the pa-
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`tent owner retained its right to “bring such suit against … infringer[s]”). Here,
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` D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 4.3(b).
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`AB baldly asserts that Boeing “cannot proceed without joining Acceleration Bay.” Opp.
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`Br. at 8. But the Agreement says exactly the opposite and gives Boeing
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` D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 4.3. Indeed, the
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`6
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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 3840
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`parties knew how to obligate AB to join its suits—
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` Even if AB were correct, this would simply mean
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`that neither party holds sufficient rights to proceed alone. See, e.g., Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1341
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`(holding that the patent rights had been divided such that neither part could sue alone).
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`AB also lacks the exclusive right to practice the patents.
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`. AB is silent about these rights. In
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`Pfizer, Inc. v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing
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`where the transferor retained, inter alia, the right to market patented products commercially in
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`the United States,
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` 812 F. Supp. 1352, 1373 (D. Del. 1993).
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`Ignoring these rights, AB asserts that Boeing’s rights are “relatively insubstantial.” Opp.
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`Br. at 10. AB misrepresents Luminara Worldwide v. Liown Elecs., 2016 WL 797925 (Fed. Cir.
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`Feb. 29, 2016). Contrary to AB’s representation, the Federal Circuit specifically found that the
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`assignor “did not retain the broad licensing rights proposed by [Defendant].” Id. at *4.
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 3841
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`right to sue or any right to sublicense. Id. at *4–5.
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` Id. at *5. AB’s citation to MobileMedia Ideas v. Apple, 885 F. Supp.
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`2d 700 (D. Del. 2012), fails too. MobileMedia involved an unusual situation where multiple
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`companies had formed the plaintiff and held a mix of rights under multiple agreements. Id. at
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`702–03.
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`
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`see id. at 708, which the Federal Circuit has treated as a substantial right, see Sicom Sys. v.
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`Agilent Techs., 427 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs, 47 F.3d at 1132.
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`. D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, §§ 3.4(c), 4.5. This factor under-
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`mines AB’s position on standing. See, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp., 473 F.3d at 1191–92 (power to
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`reclaim all patent rights “is yet another indication that Authentix retains a significant ownership
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`interest in the patent”); Alfred E. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360.
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`. Abbott Labs, 47 F.3d at 1132 (“[T]he right to in-
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`dulge infringements . . . normally accompanies a complete conveyance of the right to sue.”).
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`AB’s ability to indulge infringement is further limited by
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` Opp. Br. at 14, but the precedent of this district says otherwise. Enhanced Security Re-
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`search, LLC, v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 2010 WL 2898298 (D. Del. 2010) (plaintiff lacked stand-
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`ing where litigation finance company had, inter alia, veto rights over settlements).
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`Ex. C, § 5.3; see Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1340 n.6 (describing the “right to assign” as an “important
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`incidental right” in the substantial rights analysis).
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`. D.I. 102-1,
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`8
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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 3842
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` Opp. Br. at 13.
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`II.
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`AB LACKS CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
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`AB raises two arguments regarding constitutional standing that:
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`AB appears to concede that the accused games are
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` AB is wrong on both points.
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`redefine the contractual terms, which is prohibited by the Agreement. D.I. 102-1, Ex. A, § 9.5.
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` but it relies on extrinsic evidence, including Wikipedia, to
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`This evidence cannot undo
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`110, ¶ 6. Nothing prevents Boeing from seeking to enforce its rights against the Defendants.
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` D.I.
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`9
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: 3843
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`use, AB cannot suffer a legal injury with respect to products in those fields. “[T]he touchstone
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`of constitutional standing in a patent infringement suit is whether a party can establish that it has
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`an exclusionary right in a patent that, if violated by another, would cause the party holding the
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`exclusionary right to suffer legal injury.” WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257,
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`1265 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Where the defendant “has the ability to obtain . . . a license from another
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`party,” the plaintiff “does not have an exclusionary right with respect to the alleged infringer and
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`thus is not injured by that alleged infringer.” Id. at 1266. AB characterizes this portion of WiAV
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`as dicta, but the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is necessary to the result and part of the holding.
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`. AB
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`cites Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998), but Ethicon is
`
`limited to the situation of co-owners of the entire patent, such as joint inventors or spouses. See
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`Canon Inc. v. Tesseron Ltd., 2015 WL 7308663, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2015) (“[T]he argu-
`
`ments against retroactive patent licensing have real force only in the context of co-ownership.”).
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`The holding of Ethicon is narrow: “Absent agreement to the contrary, a co-owner cannot grant a
`
`
`
` See,
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`release of another co-owner’s right to accrued damages.” 135 F.3d at 1467.
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`e.g., Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1467 (noting “retroactive licenses” of patent rights have been enforced
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`by the courts without specifically referring to them in this way.”); High Point SARL v. T-Mobile
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`USA, Inc., 2016 WL 670402, at *9 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2016); Canon, 2015 WL 7308663, at *4.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing should be granted.
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`10
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 3844
`
`MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
`
`
`
`/s/ Stephen J. Kraftschik
`Jack B. Blumenfeld (#1014)
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)
`1201 North Market Street
`P.O. Box 1347
`Wilmington, DE 19899
`(302) 658-9200
`jblumenfeld@mnat.com
`skraftschik@mnat.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
`
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Michael A. Tomasulo
`David P. Enzminger
`Gino Cheng
`David K. Lin
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue, 38th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 615-1700
`
`Daniel K. Webb
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`35 West Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60601
`(312) 558-5600
`
`March 30, 2016
`9936937
`
`11
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`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 3845
`Case 1:15—cv—OO311—RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 17 of 18 Page|D #: 3845
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`
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`EXHIBITS A—B
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`EXHIBITS A-B
`REDACTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY
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`REDACTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY
`
`

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`Case 1:15-cv-00311-RGA Document 120 Filed 04/11/16 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 3846
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`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on April 11, 2016, I caused the foregoing to be electronically
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`
`
`
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`filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF, which will send notification of such filing to all
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`registered participants.
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`
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`
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`I further certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served on
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`April 11, 2016, upon the following in the manner indicated:
`
`Philip A. Rovner, Esquire
`Jonathan A. Choa, Esquire
`POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
`1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Paul J. Andre, Esquire
`Lisa Kobialka, Esquire
`James R. Hannah, Esquire
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`990 Marsh Road
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`Aaron M. Frankel, Esquire
`KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
`1177 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
`
`/s/ Stephen J. Kraftschik
`Stephen J. Kraftschik (#5623)