Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 1 of 38 PageID #: 3588
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`YODLEE, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`V.
`
`C.A. No. 14-1445-LPS
`
`PLAID TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Robert M. Oakes and Christopher A. Winter, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Wilmington, DE
`
`David M. Barkan and James Huguenin-Love, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Redwood City, CA
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Yodlee, Inc.
`
`Frederick L. Cottrell, III and Arjun J. Mohan, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A.,
`Wilmington, DE
`
`Brian M. Buroker, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, Washington, DC
`
`Neema Jalali and Alexander N. Harris, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, San Francisco, CA
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Plaid Technologies, Inc.
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`
`January 15, 2016
`Wilmington, Delaware
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 2 of 38 PageID #: 3589
`
`~~~- ~
`
`STARK, U.S. District Judge:
`
`On December 1, 2014, PlaintiffYodlee, Inc. ("Yodlee" or "Plaintiff') filed suit against
`
`Defendant Plaid Technologies, Inc. ("Plaid" or "Defendant") alleging infringement of U.S. Patent
`
`Nos. 6,199,077 (the "' 077 patent"), 6,317,783 (the "' 783 patent"), 6,510,451 (the "'451 patent"),
`
`7,263,548 (the '" 548 patent"), 7,424,520 (the "' 520 patent"), 7,752,535 (the "'535 patent"), and
`
`8,266,515 (the "'515 patent"). (D.I. 1) The patents-in-suit relate to methods and apparatuses for
`
`gathering and aggregating information from web sites.
`
`The parties submitted technology tutorials (D.I. 72, 73) and claim construction briefing
`
`(D.I. 84, 85). The Court held a claim construction hearing on November 17, 2015 . (D.I. 339
`
`("Tr."))
`
`I.
`
`LEGAL ST AND ARDS
`
`The ultimate question of the proper construction of a patent is a question of law. See Teva
`
`Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 , 837 (2015) (citingMarA.wan v. Westview
`
`Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996)). "It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the
`
`claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude."
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`" [T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction." Id. at 1324.
`
`Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources "in light of the
`
`statutes and policies that inform patent law." Id.
`
`" [T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning ...
`
`[which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
`
`question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application."
`
`1
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 3 of 38 PageID #: 3590
`
`Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of a
`
`claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321
`
`(internal quotation marks omitted). The patent specification "is always highly relevant to the
`
`claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of
`
`a disputed term." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`
`While "the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular
`
`claim terms," the context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Furthermore, " [o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted
`
`and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment . . . [b ]ecause claim terms are
`
`normally used consistently throughout the patent ... . " Id. (internal citation omitted).
`
`It is likewise true that"[ d]ifferences among claims can also be a useful guide . ... For
`
`example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a
`
`presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim." Id. at 1314-
`
`15 (internal citation omitted). This "presumption is especially strong when the limitation in
`
`dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one
`
`party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent
`
`claim." SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp. , 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`It is also possible that "the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim
`
`term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the
`
`inventor' s lexicography governs." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. It bears emphasis that " [e]ven
`
`when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be
`
`read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope
`
`2
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 4 of 38 PageID #: 3591
`
`using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction." Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker
`
`Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. , 358
`
`F.3d 898 , 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`In addition to the specification, a court "should also consider the patent' s prosecution
`
`history, if it is in evidence." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1995), aff'd, 517 U. S. 370 (1996). The prosecution history, which is "intrinsic evidence,"
`
`"consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO [Patent and Trademark
`
`Office] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent." Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1317. " [T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by
`
`demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the
`
`invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise
`
`be." Id.
`
`In some cases, "the district court will need to look beyond the patent' s intrinsic evidence
`
`and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or
`
`the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period." Teva, 135 S. Ct. at
`
`841. Extrinsic evidence "consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history,
`
`including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises." Markman, 52 F.3d
`
`at 980. For instance, technical dictionaries can assist the court in determining the meaning of a
`
`term to those of skill in the relevant art because such dictionaries "endeavor to collect the
`
`accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology." Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1318. In addition, expert testimony can be useful "to ensure that the court' s understanding of
`
`the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to
`
`3
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 5 of 38 PageID #: 3592
`
`establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the
`
`pertinent field." Id. Nonetheless, courts must not lose sight of the fact that "expert reports and
`
`testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from
`
`bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence." Id. Overall, while extrinsic evidence "may be
`
`useful" to the court, it is "less reliable" than intrinsic evidence, and its consideration "is unlikely
`
`to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the
`
`intrinsic evidence." Id. at 1318-19. Where the intrinsic record unambiguously describes the
`
`scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper. See Pitney
`
`Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Vitronics, 90
`
`F.3d at 1583).
`
`Finally, "[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns
`
`with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction."
`
`RenishawPLCv. MarpossSocieta ' perAzioni, 158F.3d1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows
`
`that "a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor' s device is rarely the correct
`
`interpretation." Osram GmbH v. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 505 F.3d 1351 , 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
`
`(quoting Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
`
`II.
`
`ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF PRIOR CONSTRUCTIONS
`
`A preliminary matter disputed by the parties is the extent to which, if at all, the Court is
`
`bound by another court's constructions of certain disputed claims. In an earlier case in the
`
`Northern District of California, Plaintiff Yodlee asserted some of the patents-in-suit against a
`
`different defendant. See Yodlee, Inc. v. CashEdge, Inc., 2006 WL 183342 (N.D. Cal. July 7,
`
`2006). The CashEdge Court held a claim construction hearing and issued a claim construction
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 6 of 38 PageID #: 3593
`
`order, which construed some terms that are identical to those in dispute here and construed others
`
`that overlap with terms in dispute here. Defendant Plaid asserts that both collateral estoppel and
`
`judicial estoppel should prevent Y odlee from advancing constructions in this case that differ
`
`from those it advanced in the CashEdge case.
`
`Regional circuit law governs the estoppel effect of prior decisions. See e.Digital Corp. v.
`
`Futurewei Technologies, Inc., 772 F.3d 723 , 726 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As explained below, the
`
`Court concludes that neither collateral nor judicial estoppel compels it to adopt particular
`
`constructions.
`
`A.
`
`Collateral Estoppel
`
`In the Third Circuit, collateral estoppel applies where: "(1 ) the issue sought to be
`
`precluded is the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue was actually litigated;
`
`(3 ) it was determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination was essential to
`
`the prior judgment." Burlington N. R.R. v. Hy undai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32
`
`(3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Federal Circuit has not addressed whether
`
`claim construction decisions have collateral estoppel effect under the law of the Third Circuit.
`
`However, in interpreting the Ninth Circuit' s similar collateral estoppel standard, the Federal
`
`Circuit held that a district court' s claim construction decision is not necessarily binding on future
`
`courts. See e.Digital. , 772 F.3d at 727. Rather, the preclusive effect of a prior district court's
`
`claim construction ruling depends on the specific facts of the case, requiring the later court to
`
`analyze whether "each of the requirements of collateral estoppel are met." Id.
`
`The parties here dispute (among other things) whether the CashEdge constructions
`
`constitute a final and valid judgment. In the CashEdge litigation, Y odlee requested that the case
`
`5
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 7 of 38 PageID #: 3594
`
`be dismissed after the claim construction order issued - and the CashEdge Court granted this
`
`request. (D.I. 75-1 at 54-55) Yodlee asserts that this voluntary dismissal did not "finalize" the
`
`interlocutory claim construction order. (Tr. 6 at 3-5) Plaid contends that the CashEdge Court' s
`
`claim construction order should be treated as final because Y odlee did not move to vacate it.
`
`(Id.)
`
`The Court agrees with Yodlee that the CashEdge Court's claim construction order is not a
`
`"final judgment" for collateral estoppel purposes. A district court may engage in "rolling" claim
`
`construction, updating its constructions as the record develops. See, e.g., Jack Guttman, Inc. v.
`
`Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. , 302 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc. v.
`
`DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 1 Given that the CashEdge court
`
`would have had the opportunity to update its constructions if the case had proceeded to trial
`
`rather than being dismissed shortly after the claim construction order was entered, the Court
`
`concludes that the CashEdge claim construction order was not a final and valid judgment for
`
`collateral estoppel purposes.
`
`Additionally, most of the CashEdge constructions resolved disputes that were somewhat
`
`different than those presented here. The Federal Circuit has stated that collateral estoppel effect
`
`can be given to a claim construction order when an earlier court undertook an "identical claim
`
`construction inquiry." e.Digital, 772 F.3d at 726. Claim construction inquiries differ when a
`
`court considers, or opts not to consider, limitations that might have "modifie[ d], clarifie[ d], or
`
`'Judges in the Northern District of California-where the CashEdge case was litigated(cid:173)
`have expressly recognized this possibility. See, e.g., Altera Corp. v. PACT XPP Techs. , AG,
`2015 WL 4999952, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21 , 2015); MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor,
`Inc., 2013 WL 3778314, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013).
`
`6
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 8 of 38 PageID #: 3595
`
`even inform[ ed] the construction" of another court. Id. Here, many of the terms in dispute are
`
`different from those construed by the CashEdge Court. For this reason, as well, collateral
`
`estoppel does not apply.
`
`B.
`
`Judicial Estoppel
`
`"Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a litigant from 'perverting' the
`
`judicial process by, after urging and prevailing on a particular position in one litigation, urging a
`
`contrary position in a subsequent proceeding - or at a later phase of the same proceeding -
`
`against one who relied on the earlier position." SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Products, Inc., 415
`
`F.3d 1278, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While "[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may
`
`appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle," the
`
`Supreme Court has outlined several factors that may "inform the decision whether to apply the
`
`doctrine in a particular case." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001 ) (internal
`
`quotation marks omitted). In the Third Circuit, courts consider three factors when determining
`
`whether to apply judicial estoppel: (1 ) whether a party's position is "irreconcilably inconsistent"
`
`with a position it took earlier; (2) whether the party adopted the position in bad faith; and
`
`(3) whether judicial estoppel is tailored to address the harm caused by the party' s inconsistent
`
`positions, and "no lesser sanction [is] sufficient." G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. , 586
`
`F.3d 247, 262 (3d. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, judicial estoppel is
`
`not appropriate unless the party convinced an earlier court to adopt its prior position. See United
`
`States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-
`
`51 ).
`
`Having considered these factors , the Court concludes that Y odlee is not judicially
`
`7
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 9 of 38 PageID #: 3596
`
`estopped from advocating the claim construction positions it is taking in this Court. The Court
`
`finds that none of the positions presented here are "irreconcilably inconsistent with" Y odlee' s
`
`positions in the CashEdge case. Nor does the Court perceive a risk of conflicting decisions, for
`
`reasons including that in most instances the issue before this Court is not identical to the issue
`
`that was before the CashEdge Court.
`
`Accordingly, the Court will apply the ordinary claim construction principles to resolving
`
`the parties' disputes, on a term-by-term basis.
`
`III. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS2
`
`1.
`
`"Internet Portal" 3 "Internet Portal system"4
`
`Yodlee
`"A website, requiring user authentication, used to connect with Internet destination[ s] on
`behalf of end users and retrieve personal information," or, in the alternative, "an Internet
`connected server that provides data retrieved from one or more Internet sites"
`
`Plaid
`"A website (a set of content to be rendered by a web browser to generate human-readable web
`pages served by a Web server in a World Wide Web format such as HTML), requiring user
`authentication, used to connect with Internet destination[ s] on behalf of end users and retrieve
`personal information"
`
`Court
`"an Internet-connected server that provides data retrieved from one or more Internet sites"
`
`The CashEdge court construed the term "Internet Portal," adopting the construction
`
`Y odlee proposed there: "a website, requiring a username and password entered by the users for
`
`2 The parties have agreed to certain constructions, all of which the Court will adopt.
`
`3 This term appears in claim 1 of the ' 077 patent.
`
`4 This term appears in claim 7 of the '077 patent.
`
`8
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 10 of 38 PageID #: 3597
`
`access, utilized as an entry point for other web sites." CashEdge, 2006 WL 1883342 at *8. Both
`
`parties would accept this construction here. However, they disagree about what that construction
`
`means, principally because the parties here dispute what the word "website" means in the
`
`CashEdge Court' s construction. Having already concluded that neither collateral nor judicial
`
`estoppel applies, and finding that the parties to the instant case dispute the meaning of "website"
`
`in a manner that was not put directly at issue in the CashEdge case, the Court must resolve the
`
`dispute now presented here.
`
`The terms "Internet Portal" and "Internet Portal system" appear in the preambles of claims
`
`1 and 7 of the '077 patent, respectively. Claim 1 describes an "Internet Portal" as comprising
`
`exclusively the apparatus necessary to access and extract information from Internet sites. For this
`
`reason, the Court concludes that the plain and ordinary meaning of "Internet Portal" is "an
`
`Internet connected server that provides data retrieved from one or more Internet sites."
`
`The text of the claim does not refer to a "web site" or other interface, and the specification
`
`does not explicitly or implicitly require one. The specification explains that "many users will
`
`access their [information] through a WEB page ... however, this is not required in order to
`
`practice the present invention." ' 077 patent col. 14:19-29. Rather, the specification discloses
`
`embodiments of the Internet Portal that do not directly connect to an interface at all. See ' 077
`
`patent col. 15:22-37 (describing how claimed system can be implemented at different locations in
`
`data network). Further, claims 2 and 8, which depend from claims 1 and 7, add the sole
`
`limitation of a user interface. See, e.g., ' 077 patent col. 1 18:16-18 (claiming "the Portal of claim
`
`1 further comprising a configuration and initiation interface" to allow user to direct portal to
`
`gather information) (emphasis added). Hence, the doctrine of claim differentiation further
`
`9
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 11 of 38 PageID #: 3598
`
`supports the Court' s construction. See SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co. , Inc., 695 F.3d
`
`1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Where .. . the sole difference between the independent claim and
`
`the dependent claims is the limitation that one party is trying to read into the independent claim,
`
`the doctrine of claim differentiation is at its strongest.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Additionally, even when the '077 patent discloses or claims an Internet Portal that includes an
`
`interface for delivering information directly to a subscriber, the specification does not require that
`
`the interface be a web site. See '077 patent col. 8:58-61 ; id. col. 16:56-60 (stating that
`
`information may be delivered "in a form other than a WEB page"); id. col. 14: 19-29 (explaining
`
`that invention includes embodiments in which "information [is] formatted and delivered to one
`
`of a variety of Internet-capable appliances," some of which cannot be used to load web pages).
`
`For all of these reasons, the Court adopts Y odlee' s alternative proposed construction.
`
`2.
`
`"In an Internet Portal system, a method for gathering data specific to a
`person from a plurality of Internet sites storing data specific to that person,
`the method comprising the steps of:"5
`
`Yodlee
`"In an Internet Portal system" is not limiting.
`
`For the rest of the preamble Yodlee proposes "[a method for gathering] data specific to a
`person from more than one internet destination"
`
`Plaid
`"For a specific natural person, a system maintains an entry for that person, associates at least
`two entries of user-selectable addresses of Internet sites to that person-specific entry, and
`enables the person to select where each of the at least two entries of addresses of Internet sites
`stores personal information relating to that person"
`
`5 This term appears in claim 7 of the ' 077 patent.
`
`10
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 12 of 38 PageID #: 3599
`
`Court
`"In an Internet Portal system": "Using an Internet portal"
`
`The term "Internet Portal" is as previously construed as "an Internet connected server that
`provides data retrieved from one or more Internet sites"
`
`The parties disagree about whether the term "Internet Portal System," as used in the
`
`preamble of claim 7 of the ' 077 patent, is limiting. A preamble of a claim is limiting if it "recites
`
`essential structure." NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. , 418 F.3d 1282, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2005). Here, the words "Internet Portal system" do provide essential structure. Dependent
`
`claims 8, 9, and 11 each add limitations that derive antecedent basis from the Internet Portal
`
`System. Based on the text of the claims, therefore, the Court finds that "Internet Portal system"
`
`is limiting.6 "Internet Portal" has the meaning already identified by the Court in resolving the
`
`parties' first dispute.
`
`The Court finds no need to construe the remaining language in the preamble, as it is used
`
`in the patent consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g. , Biotec Biologische
`
`Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
`
`(finding no error in non-construction of "melting"); Mentor HIS, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance,
`
`Inc. , 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no error in Court's refusal to construe
`
`"irrigating" and "frictional heat").
`
`6 The Court disagrees with Yodlee that the Federal Circuit's decision in Storage Tech.
`Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. , 329 F.3d 823 (Fed. Cir. 2003), precludes the Court from finding
`this claim language to be a limitation. In that case, the court found that a preamble term was not
`limiting because the specification consistently used a different term for the structure that was
`essential to carrying out the claims. Id. at 831 . Here, the term "Internet Portal system" refers to a
`system that includes an Internet Portal, which is essential to carrying out the method of claim 7.
`
`11
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 13 of 38 PageID #: 3600
`
`3.
`
`"list of addresses of Internet sites [associated with a specific person, which
`sites store information specific to the person ]"7
`
`Yodlee
`"one or more addresses of Internet sites"
`
`Plaid
`"For a specific natural person, a system maintains an entry for that person, associates at least
`two entries of user-selectable addresses of Internet sites to that person-specific entry, and
`enables the person to select those addresses to visit the associated destinations, where each of
`the at least two entries of addresses of Internet sites stores personal information relating to that
`person"
`
`Court
`"list of addresses oflnternet sites" means "one or more addresses oflnternet sites"
`
`The "list of addresses" in the disputed term is the set of addresses oflnternet sites from
`
`which the claimed apparatus might extract user information. Y odlee argues that this "list" may
`
`contain only one entry, pointing to language in the specification that contemplates using the
`
`claimed apparatus to navigate to a single Internet site. (See D.I. 76) Plaid responds that the
`
`patentee' s use of the plural forms "addresses" and "Internet sites" makes clear that a list must
`
`contain "at least two" addresses. (D.I. 74 at 6 (emphasis added))
`
`Plaid is correct that the concept of a "list" generally connotes a set of more than one
`
`element. Further, as Plaid observes, Yodlee' s technology was specifically designed to create a
`
`shortcut for accessing multiple web sites, and the invention does not provide this benefit where
`
`the "list" contains only a single web site address. (D.I. 74 at 7) Yodlee concedes that the word
`
`"list" is not the best way to describe a set of one or more items. (Tr. at 34)
`
`Nonetheless, the Court's task is to apply claim construction principles to the disputed
`
`claim term. Beginning with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim term, the Court finds
`
`7 This term appears in claim 1 of the '077 patent.
`
`12
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 14 of 38 PageID #: 3601
`
`that a "list" is not limited to sets including multiple elements, but rather refers to the set of
`
`elements associated with the topic of the list, which may be just one. The patent provides no
`
`basis (e.g., lexicography or disclaimer) to further limit the claim scope to embodiments that
`
`involve two or more Internet sites. Indeed, the specification discloses examples in which the
`
`invention is used to navigate to a single Internet site. See ' 077 patent col. 2:40-46; id. col. 15:53-
`
`56. For this reason, the Court finds that both the intrinsic and extrinsic record support Y odlee' s
`
`proposed construction.
`
`The Court finds no need to construe the remaining language in this claim term, as it is
`
`used in the patent consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`4.
`
`"gatherer"8 "gather[ing] agent"9 "gathering spitware agent" 10 "path agents""
`
`Yodlee
`"software component that uses the logic and/or structure of a given Internet site to extract data
`values"
`
`Plaid
`Phrase "spitware agents" is indefinite .
`
`For all other terms and for the "spitware agents" term if a construction is offered, the
`interpretation should be: "Software that collects a natural person' s information by parsing a
`web page rendered by a browser after the web page is retrieved from a website. A website is a
`set of human-readable web pages served by a Web server in a World Wide Web format such
`as HTML."
`
`8 This term appears in claim 1 of the ' 077 patent.
`
`9 This term appears in claims 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 of the ' 077 patent.
`
`10 This term appears in claim 1 of the '077 patent.
`
`11 This term appears in claim 4 of the ' 077 patent.
`
`13
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 15 of 38 PageID #: 3602
`
`Court
`"spitwire agents" is not indefinite
`
`"software component that uses a site-specific script and/or site-specific data to extract data
`values from an Internet site based on the site' s logic and structure"
`
`As an initial matter, the Court rejects Plaid's contention that the term "gathering spitware
`
`agent" is indefinite. The Court agrees with Plaid that '" spitware' is a nonsense term without
`
`meaning to those in the art and [is] used nowhere else in the patent." (D.I. 74 at 8) However, the
`
`Court also agrees with Y odlee that "spitware" is a printing error by the United States Patent and
`
`Trademark Office ("PTO"); the prosecution history shows that the most recent amendment to the
`
`claim referred to "software" rather than "spitware." (D.I. 76 at 9) For its part, Plaid does not
`
`disagree that "spitware" is a typographical error for "software." (D.I. 61 at 25 ; D.I. 74 at 8)
`
`Rather, Plaid' s contention is that Yodlee has not asked the PTO to correct this error and the
`
`Court is powerless to do so. (D.I. 76 at 9)
`
`A court may correct an error in a patent if (1) the error is evident on the face of the patent,
`
`such that the "the correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on consideration of the
`
`claim language and the specification," and (2) the prosecution history does not suggest that a
`
`different construction is appropriate. Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.,
`
`587 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). If these two conditions are
`
`satisfied, then the patent should not be invalidated based on the error unless there is "evidence of
`
`culpability or intent to deceive by delaying formal correction." Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp. , 405
`
`F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`Here, it is evident from the face of the patent that "spitware agent" is a typographical
`
`error. Other than its sole use in claim 1, the term "spitware" does not appear in the specification.
`
`14
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 16 of 38 PageID #: 3603
`
`That the patentee intended the claim to read "software agent" is not subject to reasonable debate,
`
`for reasons that include that "software" and "software agent" do appear repeatedly throughout the
`
`patent. Rather than suggesting a different construction than "software agent," the prosecution
`
`history confirms that "software agent" is exactly what the patentee claimed. That is, the
`
`prosecution history demonstrates that the change from the claimed "software" to "spitware" was
`
`solely the result of a PTO printing error. (D.I. 66-4 at 6) Finally, there is no evidence that
`
`Y odlee was culpable or intended to deceive anyone by neglecting to seek formal correction from
`
`the PTO. Accordingly, the Court can and will correct "spitware agent" to read "software agent"
`
`and will not deem claims containing this term to be indefinite.
`
`This takes the Court to the parties' disputes as to the proper construction of the terms
`
`"gatherer," "gather[ing] agent," "gathering software agent," and "path agent." Each of these
`
`refers to the means by which the claimed apparatus retrieves information from web sites. The
`
`specification explains that the "gatherer" uses a site-specific script or template to identify desired
`
`information based on the logic and structure of an Internet site. See ' 077 patent col. 11 :35-55 ; id.
`
`col. 9:54-64. The parties disagree about three things: (1) whether the gatherer necessarily
`
`operates by "parsing a web page;" (2) whether that web page must be "rendered by a browser;"
`
`and (3) whether the data extraction occurs "after the web page is retrieved from a web site."
`
`The Court agrees with Yodlee that the gatherer does not necessarily operate by "parsing."
`
`The doctrine of claim differentiation supports this conclusion. Independent claims 1 and 6 recite
`
`a gatherer, while dependent claims 7 and 12 add the sole additional limitation that the gatherer
`
`operates by parsing. (D.I. 76 at 8) " [T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular
`
`limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent
`
`15
`
`

`
`Case 1:14-cv-01445-LPS Document 96 Filed 01/15/16 Page 17 of 38 PageID #: 3604
`
`claim." Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004). "This
`
`presumption is especially strong where the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference
`
`between an independent and dependent claim." Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp. , 755 F.3d
`
`1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 719 (2014). While claim differentiation is not
`
`dispositive, and a party may overcome the presumption by demonstrating that the specification or
`
`prosecution history requires a contrary construction, see Seachange Int'!, Inc. v. C- COR, Inc.,
`
`413 F.3d 1361 , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005), Plaid has not done so here.
`
`Turning to the "rendering" and "retrieving" limitations Plaid has proposed, the Court is
`
`not persuaded that these should be read into the claims. Plaid asserts that "rendering" and
`
`"retrieving" are necessary limitations of the claims because, as a technical matter, a web page
`
`cannot be "parsed" until it is first "rendered by a browser" and "retrieved" from a web site. (D.I.
`
`84 6-7) Plaid has not, however, identified record evidence to support this position. Further,
`
`Y odlee points to claim language that appears to be inconsistent with the supposed technical
`
`requirements asserted by Plaid. (