Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 25407
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`
`
`
`ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS, LLC,
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`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`
`v.
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., et al.,
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`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No. 14-cv-1430-LPS
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO
`DECEMBER 4, 2020 ORAL ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (D.I. 382)
`
`Brian E. Farnan (#4089)
`Michael J. Farnan (#5165)
`FARNAN LLP
`919 North Market Street
`12th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 777-0300
`bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`mfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff ELM 3DS
`INNOVATIONS, LLC
`
`
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`Matthew R. Ford
`BARTLIT BECK LLP
`54 W. Hubbard Street, Suite 300
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Tel: (312) 494-4400
`Fax: (312) 494-4440
`matthew.ford@bartlit-beck.com
`
`John M. Hughes
`Katherine L.I. Hacker
`Nosson Knobloch
`Daniel C. Taylor
`BARTLIT BECK LLP
`1801 Wewatta Street, Suite 1200
`Denver, CO 80202
`Tel: (303) 592-3100
`Fax: (303) 592-3140
`john.hughes@bartlit-beck.com
`kat.hacker@bartlit-beck.com
`nosson.knobloch@bartlit-beck.com
`daniel.taylor@bartlit-beck.com
`
`Adam K. Mortara
`125 South Wacker Dr., Suite 300
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Tel: (773) 750-7154
`adam@mortaralaw.com
`
`DATED: January 11, 2021
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 2 of 12 PageID #: 25408
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`In violation of the Local Rules, Samsung’s Objections to Magistrate Judge Hall’s discovery
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`order fail to specify the standard of review. See L.R. 7.1.5(b) & 72.1(b). The standard of review
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`dooms Samsung’s Objections. For the Court to set aside Judge Hall’s order on a non-dispositive
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`discovery matter, Samsung must show that the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
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`28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). Samsung has not even attempted to show that any of
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`Judge Hall’s factual findings were wrong, let alone clearly erroneous. To the contrary, Samsung
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`concedes “[t]he Magistrate Judge’s underlying factual findings are entirely correct.” D.I. 389 at 1
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`(emphasis added). And the only legal argument Samsung develops in its Objections—judicial
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`estoppel—was not fairly presented to Judge Hall and is meritless in any event.
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`Judge Hall properly exercised her discretion to grant Elm’s motion seeking basic sales and
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`technical data for hundreds of accused products that undisputedly fall within the scope of Elm’s
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`asserted patents. “In discovery matters, decisions of the magistrate judge are given great deference
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`and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” Norguard Ins. Co. v. Serveon Inc., C.A. No. 08-
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`900-JBS-AMD, 2011 WL 344076, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 28, 2011). As Judge Hall correctly reasoned,
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`depriving Elm of this discovery would cause significant prejudice. And there is time to conduct the
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`discovery since fact discovery is still open and no trial date has been set. Indeed, the parties recently
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`agreed to extend fact discovery through July 15, 2021—more than enough time for Samsung to
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`produce the necessary information. The Court should overrule Samsung’s Objections because
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`Samsung has not shown that Judge Hall’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
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`II.
`
`Background
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`This case is about three-dimensional stacked semiconductor chips. Each semiconductor chip
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`within a stack contains a substrate (usually made of silicon) and materials on top of the substrate,
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`such as dielectric and metal, comprising the circuitry that makes the chip work. The demonstrative
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`below, which was presented to the Magistrate Judge, illustrates this structure:
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`
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`D.I. 374, Ex. G.
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`Elm’s asserted patents cover products in which the substrate is “substantially flexible.” The
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`Federal Circuit interpreted “a substantially flexible semiconductor substrate” as used in Elm’s
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`patents to cover “a semiconductor substrate that is thinned to 50 [microns] and subsequently
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`polished or smoothed such that it is largely able to bend without breaking.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Elm
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`3DS Innovations, LLC, 925 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019). This Court followed the Federal
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`Circuit’s lead and adopted the following construction of the relevant claim terms: “A semiconductor
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`substrate/semiconductor layer that is thinned to 50 [microns] or less and subsequently polished or
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`smoothed such that it is largely able to bend without breaking.” D.I. 266 at 6.
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`Following the Federal Circuit’s decision, Elm informed Samsung that it intended to accuse
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`all products that fall within the scope of the Federal Circuit’s construction—i.e., all products with a
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`layer in which the substrate (but not the materials on top) is 50 microns or less. In a June 20, 2019
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`email, Elm told Samsung that it intends to accuse “all Samsung semiconductor products that contain
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`more than one circuit layer, . . . and where at least one of the layers has a thickness of 50 microns or
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`less.” D.I. 374, Ex. A. When Samsung expressed “confus[ion]” about Elm’s “use of terms” such as
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`“semiconductor ‘layer’ instead of ‘substrate,’” id. Ex. B, Elm clarified that it was “using the term
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`‘circuit layer’ as a broad term covering any semiconductor layer on which circuits are formed.” Id. Ex. C
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`2
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`at 2 (emphasis added). The Court’s claim construction acknowledges that “semiconductor layer” is
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`synonymous with “semiconductor substrate.” See D.I. 266 at 6.
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`Elm’s discovery requests to Samsung also made clear that Elm was accusing the full scope of
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`infringing products. For example, Elm served interrogatories on Samsung seeking information about
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`the “Relevant Die” in Samsung’s products, which Elm defined to mean “any die with a thickness of
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`50 microns or less.” D.I. 374 at 1. The definition went on to explain that “this thickness
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`measurement refers only to the semiconductor die itself, and not to the dielectric, metal, or other
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`material that may be deposited on the die.” Id.
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`A few months ago, Elm discovered that Samsung had been taking a much narrower view of
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`what qualified as relevant products based on thickness. Elm examined one of Samsung’s products in
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`the lab and discovered that, while information Samsung had produced in discovery stated that the
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`product had a “minimum thickness” of 70 microns, in reality the product had a substrate that was
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`only 57 microns thick. See D.I. 374 at 2. When Elm raised this issue with Samsung, Samsung
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`admitted that its “thickness data sets forth the target thickness of the smallest die in each product,
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`which consists of the silicon substrate, the active layer, and the polyimide layer.” D.I. 374, Ex. L.
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`Samsung also admitted that, following the Federal Circuit’s ruling, Samsung had limited its discovery
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`to products where the entire chip (including the substrate and all the materials on top of the substrate)
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`is 50 microns or less, even though Elm’s patents as construed by the Federal Circuit and this Court
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`undeniably cover products where the substrate alone is 50 microns or less.
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`By withholding discovery on products having a substrate of 50 microns or less but a total
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`chip thickness above 50 microns, Samsung seeks to avoid liability for hundreds of potentially
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`infringing products. Judge Hall concluded that “denying [Elm] this discovery could result in it losing
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`out on [an] opportunity to pursue damages on billions of dollars of product.” D.I. 389, Ex. B at
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`13:11-14. Elm has consistently sought to enforce its patent rights against the full scope of Samsung’s
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`3
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 5 of 12 PageID #: 25411
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`relevant products. Since this case was filed more than six years ago, Elm has repeatedly pressed
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`Samsung to provide discovery about its relevant products. Samsung has often resisted, resulting in
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`multiple discovery disputes before the Court. See, e.g., D.I. 34 (June 2015 letter detailing Samsung’s
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`refusal to identify which of its products were stacked); D.I. 122 (May 2016 letter detailing Samsung’s
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`failure to provide basic technical data for its accused products); D.I. 254 (February 2020 letter
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`detailing Samsung’s failure to produce basic sales information concerning many of its accused
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`products); D.I. 280 (May 2020 letter describing Samsung’s failure to timely identify hundreds of its
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`accused products); D.I. 314 (July 2020 letter identifying deficiencies in Samsung’s identification of
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`basic technical and sales data). Elm’s submissions to the Court are merely the tip of the iceberg; the
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`parties have exchanged hundreds of emails in the course of Elm’s efforts to obtain a complete list of
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`all Samsung products that fall within the scope of the asserted patents. In this context, Samsung’s
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`refusal to produce data on hundreds of relevant products should be viewed for what it is—an
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`attempt to avoid liability by concealing information from discovery.
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`Elm brought this discovery dispute to Magistrate Judge Hall immediately upon discovering
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`Samsung’s attempt to cut out hundreds of accused products from the case. Elm asked Judge Hall to
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`compel Samsung to produce core technical and sales information about all products with a substrate
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`thickness of 50 microns or less. See D.I. 389, Ex. B at 7:22-8:3. After receiving letter briefs with
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`voluminous exhibits (which Judge Hall noted ran to more than 1,400 pages, D.I. 389, Ex. A at 4:15),
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`and hearing lengthy oral argument, Judge Hall granted Elm’s requested discovery in an oral ruling.
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`See D.I. 389, Ex. B at 7:21-15:2. “[M]ost importantly,” according to Judge Hall, “there is time for this
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`discovery to take place” because “fact discovery has not yet closed and a trial date has not been set.”
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`Id. at 13:17-24. Judge Hall also found that “denying [Elm] this discovery could result in it losing out
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`on an opportunity to pursue damages on billions of dollars of product,” and that it “would be
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`prejudicial to Elm to cut out all of those products from the case.” Id. at 13:8-16.
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`4
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`In fairness to Samsung, Judge Hall also found that Samsung’s “provision of the die thickness
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`rather than the substrate thickness was [not] done in bad faith,” and that “Samsung’s interpretation
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`of Elm’s request for products having certain die thickness were reasonable.” Id. at 12:11-19.
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`Although Judge Hall viewed Elm’s current request as the product of a “change of strategy”—a
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`conclusion with which Elm respectfully disagrees—she still allowed the discovery because she could
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`not “conclude that Elm has acted in bad faith.” Id. at 13:2-7. Nevertheless, in order to mitigate the
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`“additional burden on Samsung” of having to compile the requested information now, Judge Hall
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`“order[ed] that Elm must pay for half of the expense of the additional discovery.” Id. at 14:18-24.
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`Since Judge Hall issued her order on December 4, 2020, the parties have agreed to (and the
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`Court has ordered) an extension of the fact discovery deadline by six months, to July 15, 2021, to
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`give Samsung time to produce the information Judge Hall compelled. D.I. 395.
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`III.
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` Argument
`A.
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`Samsung Fails to Identify the Court’s Deferential Standard of Review in
`Violation of the Local Rules
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`This Court’s Local Rules twice state that a party objecting to a Magistrate Judge’s order must
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`identify the appropriate standard of review. See L.R. 7.1.5(b) (“[A] party filing such objections shall
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`identify the appropriate standard of review in presenting such objections.”); 72.1(b) (“Objections to
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`an order, decision or recommendation [sic] disposition made by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to Fed.
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`R. Civ. P. 72 shall identify the appropriate standard of review.”). Despite this unambiguous mandate,
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`Samsung’s Objections do not identify the standard of review.
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`Samsung may have omitted the standard because its Objections clearly fail under the correct
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`standard of review, which is deferential to Judge Hall’s order. “[O]bjections to a Magistrate Judge’s
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`recommendation on a non-dispositive motion are subject to a ‘clearly erroneous and contrary to law’
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`standard of review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).” Magnetar Techs.
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`Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 437, 440 (D. Del. 2014). Under the “clearly
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`5
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`erroneous” standard, the Court “will only set aside factual findings when it is ‘left with the definite
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`and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. at 441 (citation omitted). “A Magistrate
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`Judge’s order is contrary to law when the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or misapplied the
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`applicable law.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Inc.,
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`C.A. No. 16-56-SLR/SRF, 2016 WL 6122927, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2016) (articulating the same
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`standard). “The burden of showing that the magistrate judge’s ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary
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`to law rests with the party filing the appeal.” Norguard, 2011 WL 344076, at *2. The Court does “not
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`consider evidence and materials not before the magistrate judge.” Smith, 2016 WL 6122927, at *1.
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`The headings in Samsung’s brief show that Samsung does not grasp the deference owed to
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`Judge Hall’s discovery decision. See Norguard, 2011 WL 344076, at *2 (“In discovery matters,
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`decisions of the magistrate judge are given great deference and will be reversed only for an abuse of
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`discretion.”). Heading VI in Samsung’s brief—the heading for Samsung’s entire argument section—
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`states “The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion to Deny the Requested Discovery to Elm.”
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`D.I. 389 at 8 (emphasis added). But the Court does not exercise unfettered discretion on discovery
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`matters that were referred to a Magistrate Judge in the first instance. The Magistrate Judge exercises
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`her discretion, and the Court reverses that decision only if the Magistrate Judge abused her
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`discretion by making a decision that was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Norguard, 2011 WL
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`344076, at *2. As explained below, Samsung has not carried its burden of showing that Judge Hall
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`abused her discretion or that her decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
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`B.
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`Samsung Also Fails to Identify that Its Judicial Estoppel Argument Was Not
`Fairly Presented to Judge Hall
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`Samsung devotes just two pages of its ten-page Objections to arguing why the Court should
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`set aside Judge Hall’s order. D.I. 389 at 9-10. Samsung’s principal argument is that judicial estoppel
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`bars Elm from obtaining the discovery Judge Hall granted. Id. Judicial estoppel cannot be a basis to
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`6
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 8 of 12 PageID #: 25414
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`set aside Judge Hall’s order because the argument was not fairly presented to Judge Hall; Judge Hall
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`did not rule on it; and Samsung has not come close to showing that judicial estoppel applies here.
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`In yet another procedural error, Samsung failed to follow the Court’s Standing Order
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`requiring it to identify new arguments not presented to Magistrate Judge Hall. This Court’s October
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`9, 2013 Standing Order for Objections Filed Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 requires a party objecting to a
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`Magistrate Judge’s order to “include, along with the objections, a written statement either certifying
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`that the objections do not raise new legal/factual arguments, or identifying the new arguments and
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`describing the good cause for failing to previously raise the new legal/factual arguments before the
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`Magistrate Judge.” Standing Order ¶ 5. Samsung included a certification that its Objections “raise no
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`new legal or factual arguments that have not been addressed in Samsung’s written submissions or at
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`the hearing (on December 2 and December 4, 2020).” D.I. 390. But that is not accurate.
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`Samsung did not properly raise its judicial estoppel argument before Judge Hall. Samsung
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`made no mention of judicial estoppel in its letter brief or in the over 1,000 pages of exhibits it
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`submitted to Judge Hall. See D.I. 376. During the December 2, 2020 hearing, Judge Hall asked
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`Samsung what legal basis existed to deny Elm’s discovery “if the discovery hasn’t closed yet and
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`we’re still before the deadline for final lists of accused products?” D.I. 389, Ex. A at 44:1-5.
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`Samsung’s counsel responded that this was an issue within Judge Hall’s discretion, and for the first
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`and only time fleetingly mentioned judicial estoppel. See id. at 44:23-45:3 (“Elm came to the Court,
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`said I want products with die thickness 50 microns or less, they win the motion, they get a ruling in
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`their favor, that’s judicial estoppel right there to go above 50 microns or less.”). Samsung did not lay
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`out the required elements for judicial estoppel for Judge Hall, nor did Samsung explain to Judge Hall
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`how the elements of judicial estoppel were met. “It is not enough merely to present an argument in
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`the skimpiest way, and leave the Court to do counsel’s work—framing the argument, and putting
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`flesh on its bones through a discussion of the applicable law and facts.” Hyer v. Colvin, C.A. No. 15-
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`7
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 9 of 12 PageID #: 25415
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`297-GMS, 2016 WL 5719683, at *11 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016). Moreover, even if Samsung had
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`properly laid out its judicial-estoppel argument at the hearing, “[i]t would be unfair to permit
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`[Samsung] to prevail on arguments raised for the first time at oral argument, a method of proceeding
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`that can deprive one’s opponent of any meaningful opportunity to respond.” Tomasko v. Ira H.
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`Weinstock, P.C., 357 F. App’x 472, 479 (3d Cir. 2009).
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`Because Samsung did not fairly present its judicial estoppel argument until now, Judge Hall
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`did not rule on it. Judge Hall did not address judicial estoppel in her order allowing Elm’s requested
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`discovery. See D.I. 389, Ex. B at 13:2-15:2. The “contrary to law” component of the standard of
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`review requires Samsung to show that “the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or misapplied the
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`applicable law.” Magnetar, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 441. But Judge Hall did not offer any interpretation or
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`application of judicial estoppel because Samsung did not adequately raise the argument. This failure
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`is reason enough to deny Samsung’s Objections. See Univ. of Mass. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., C.A. No. 17-
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`868-CFC-SRF, 2020 WL 3048156, at *2 (D. Del. June 8, 2020) (arguments that “were not raised
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`before the Magistrate Judge in the first instance” are “waived”); cf. Align Tech., Inc. v. 3Shape A/S,
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`C.A. No. 17-1646-LPS, 2020 WL 1873026, at *1 (D. Del. April 15, 2020) (objections can be
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`overruled based on insufficient certification regarding arguments raised before Magistrate Judge).
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`C.
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`Under the Correct Standard of Review, Samsung’s Objections Should Be
`Overruled
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`Beyond the procedural deficiencies, Samsung’s judicial-estoppel argument fails on the merits.
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`As Samsung acknowledges, one of the essential elements for judicial estoppel is that the party to be
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`estopped “must have changed its position ‘in bad faith—i.e., with intent to play fast and loose with
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`the court.’” D.I. 389 at 9 (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337
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`F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003)). Judge Hall made a factual finding that Elm did not act in bad faith.
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`D.I. 389, Ex. B at 13:6-7 (“I cannot conclude that Elm has acted in bad faith.”). Samsung admits
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`that it is not challenging Judge Hall’s “underlying factual findings,” which Samsung says are “entirely
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`8
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 10 of 12 PageID #: 25416
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`correct.” D.I. 389 at 1. That should be the end of the matter. Although Samsung “respectfully
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`submits that this Court can” find bad faith where Judge Hall did not, Samsung makes no effort to
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`explain how Judge Hall’s finding of no bad faith is clearly erroneous. Samsung has not shown that
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`Judge Hall’s finding is “completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support” or that it “bears no
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`relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” Magnetar, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 441. To the contrary,
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`Judge Hall’s finding of no bad faith is obviously correct because Elm never intended to voluntarily
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`cut hundreds of potentially infringing products out of the case. Samsung has not identified any
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`reason to conclude that Elm played “fast and loose” with the Court or obtained some unfair
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`advantage by not raising this issue earlier.
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`Judicial estoppel does not apply for other reasons as well. Elm did not take “two positions
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`that are irreconcilably inconsistent.” Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319. Samsung relies on a prior discovery
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`dispute in which Elm sought to compel discovery regarding Samsung products that have a “die”
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`thickness of 50 microns or less. D.I. 389 at 9 (citing D.I. 280). Even if Samsung believed that Elm’s
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`previous motion only sought information about stacked products for which the entire chip
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`(including the substrate and the materials on top) was 50 microns thick or less, there is nothing
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`“irreconcilably inconsistent” about Elm’s present motion specifically seeking discovery about
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`products for which the substrate alone is 50 microns thick or less—products that are unambiguously
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`within the scope of the Federal Circuit’s and this Court’s claim constructions.
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`Further, Samsung’s requested remedy—arbitrarily excluding hundreds of potentially
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`infringing products from the case—is not the minimum sanction necessary to “adequately remedy”
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`the alleged change in positions. Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319. Elm has already agreed to extend the case
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`schedule by six months to permit Samsung to conduct this additional discovery. And to further cure
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`any potential prejudice to Samsung, Judge Hall ordered Elm to pay half the expenses of the
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`additional discovery. D.I. 389, Ex. B at 14:22-24. Samsung ignores that judicial estoppel “should
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`9
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`only be applied to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319. There is no miscarriage of
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`justice by allowing Elm to obtain discovery into products that infringe its patents. As Judge Hall
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`found, “denying [Elm] this discovery could result in it losing out on opportunity to pursue damages
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`on billions of dollars of product. It would be prejudicial to Elm to cut out all of those products from
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`the case.” D.I. 389, Ex. B at 13:11-16. The only miscarriage of justice would be in denying Elm the
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`requested discovery about a significant quantity of infringing products.
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`Besides judicial estoppel, Samsung’s only other argument for setting aside Judge Hall’s order
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`is a conclusory assertion that “Elm’s request is untimely, unwarranted, and not proportional to the
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`needs of the case, even though the discovery deadline can be extended.” D.I. 389 at 10. To the
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`extent this single unsupported sentence can be considered an argument, it provides no basis to set
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`aside Judge Hall’s order. Judge Hall found that Elm’s requested discovery is timely because
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`discovery is still open. D.I. 389, Ex. B at 13:17-14:2; see also id. Ex. A at 44:3-5 (noting that
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`“discovery hasn’t closed yet and we’re still before the deadline for final lists of accused products”).
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`The Court has since extended discovery by six months, and final infringement contentions are not
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`due until August 2021. D.I. 395. Judge Hall also found that Elm’s requested discovery is warranted
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`and proportional because it would be “prejudicial to Elm to cut out all of those products” which
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`could amount to “billions of dollars.” D.I. 389, Ex. B at 13:11-16.
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`Samsung has not explained how Judge Hall’s conclusions are clearly erroneous or contrary to
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`law, and they are not. Judge Hall allowed Elm, while fact discovery is still open, to obtain discovery
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`about accused products that everyone agrees fall within the Federal Circuit’s and the Court’s claim
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`constructions. There is nothing clearly erroneous or contrary to law about that.
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`IV.
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`Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons, Elm respectfully requests that the Court overrule Samsung’s
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`Objections.
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`10
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 397 Filed 01/11/21 Page 12 of 12 PageID #: 25418
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`Dated: January 11, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`FARNAN LLP
`
`/s/ Brian E. Farnan
`Brian E. Farnan (#4089)
`Michael J. Farnan (#5165)
`919 North Market Street
`12th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Tel: (302) 777-0300
`Fax: (302) 777-0301
`bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`mfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`
`Matthew R. Ford (pro hac vice)
`matthew.ford@bartlit-beck.com
`BARTLIT BECK LLP
`54 W. Hubbard Street, Suite 300
`Chicago, IL 60654
`Tel: (312) 494-4400
`Fax: (312) 494-4440
`
`John M. Hughes (pro hac vice)
`john.hughes@bartlit-beck.com
`Katherine L.I. Hacker (pro hac vice)
`kat.hacker@bartlit-beck.com
`Nosson Knobloch (pro hac vice)
`nosson.knobloch@bartlit-beck.com
`Daniel C. Taylor (pro hac vice)
`daniel.taylor@bartlit-beck.com
`BARTLIT BECK LLP
`1801 Wewatta Street, Suite 1200
`Denver, CO 80202
`Tel: (303) 592-3100
`Fax: (303) 592-3140
`
`Adam K. Mortara (pro hac vice)
`adam@mortaralaw.com
`125 South Wacker Dr., Suite 300
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Tel: (773) 750-7154
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff
`ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS, LLC
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