throbber
Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 25315
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`
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`ELM 3DS INNOVATIONS, LLC, a
`Delaware limited liability company,
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`
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`v.
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., a
`Korean business entity,
`SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., a
`California corporation,
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
`INC., a New York corporation, and
`SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,
`LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`OBJECTIONS TO DECEMBER 4, 2020 ORAL ORDER OF
`MAGISTRATE JUDGE (D.I. 382)
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`C.A. No. 14-1430-LPS
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`YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT &
`TAYLOR, LLP
`
`Adam W. Poff (No. 3990)
`Pilar G. Kraman (No. 5199)
`Rodney Square
`1000 North King Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 571-6600
`apoff@ycst.com
`pkraman@ycst.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Samsung Electronics
`Co., Ltd., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.,
`Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and
`Samsung Austin Semiconductor, LLC
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`Dated: December 18, 2020
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Allan M. Soobert
`Naveen Modi
`Phillip W. Citroën
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`875 15th Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`(202) 551-1700
`(202) 551-1705 (fax)
`allansoobert@paulhastings.com
`naveenmodi@paulhastings.com
`phillipcitroen@paulhastings.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`27367153.1
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`

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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 25316
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Defendants (“Samsung”) respectfully object to the Magistrate Judge’s December 4, 2020
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`ruling granting Plaintiff’s (“Elm”) motion to add hundreds of products to the case less than two
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`months before the close of discovery. Elm’s motion misleadingly recasts a clear record that
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`demonstrates that Elm deliberately targeted a narrowed set of products about seventeen months
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`ago (as the Magistrate Judge correctly found), and creates a false narrative that accuses Samsung
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`of knowingly excluding discovery on the products it now seeks to add. The Magistrate Judge
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`correctly found that Elm (not Samsung) selected the accused products to date following the
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`Federal Circuit’s June 12, 2019 decision, and that Elm (not Samsung) sought discovery limited
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`to those products—finding that “it is clear to [the Magistrate Judge] that Elm knew what it was
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`getting from Samsung.” The Magistrate Judge was rightfully left “with a definite and firm
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`conviction that the situation that the parties are now in resulted from a change in strategy on the
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`part of Elm.” The Magistrate Judge nevertheless concluded that, despite this late strategic
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`change, Elm is entitled to the requested discovery but must pay Samsung for half of its expenses.
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`The Magistrate Judge’s underlying factual findings are entirely correct, but compel the
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`different conclusion that Elm should be precluded from obtaining this discovery. Samsung
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`respectfully objects to only that portion of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling granting the discovery.
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`II.
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`The Meaning of the “Circuit Layer” / “Die” and “Substrate” Terms Is Indisputable
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`This case has been pending for six years, and already involves over 1,400 products.
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`Throughout the entire case, the parties’ discovery efforts have been focused on products with
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`stacked “circuit layers” or “dies.” Until Elm filed the instant motion, there could have been no
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`dispute about the meaning of the “circuit layer” and “die” claim terms, on the one hand, and the
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`“substrate” claim term, on the other, as the record clearly reflects an absence of any ambiguity.
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`1
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 25317
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`At the outset of this case, Elm itself served infringement contentions on Samsung’s
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`stacked memory products that consistently pointed to (i) the die or chip in Samsung’s products
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`as meeting the “circuit layer” terms, and (ii) the substrate within each die or chip as meeting the
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`“semiconductor substrate” term. D.I. 377, Ex. 44 at 1-2, 5, 13-14, 17, 33, 40, 42-43, 51.
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`Throughout the IPR proceedings of the asserted patents, Elm used the terms “die” and
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`“chip” to refer to an integrated circuit, explaining that an integrated circuit includes a substrate,
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`circuitry and a passivation layer. D.I. 377, Ex. 45 at 6; Ex. 46 at 14; Ex. 47 at 18-19.
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`On appeal from the IPRs, Elm unequivocally explained to the Federal Circuit that “circuit
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`layer” refers to a “die.” Id., Ex. 49 at 15. Elm likewise made clear (as everyone agreed) that a
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`“circuit layer” and “substrate” are not the same thing, and that a “circuit layer” itself includes a
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`“substrate,” circuity and dielectric materials, among other things. Id.
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`On June 12, 2019, the Federal Circuit issued its decision, construing the terms at issue.
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`See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC, 925 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The
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`Federal Circuit’s construction differed depending on whether the “substantially flexible” term
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`modified the (i) “substrate,” or (ii) “circuit layer” and similar terms (i.e., “die,” “integrated
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`circuit,” and “integrated circuit layer”). D.I. 377, Ex. 6 at 5-6. The Federal Circuit clearly held
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`that it is the “substrate” that must be thinned to 50 microns or less, in order to meet the
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`“substantially flexible” term (among other requirements), and that the “circuit layer” must
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`include such a “substrate” (among other requirements). Samsung, 925 F.3d at 1380.
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`During claim construction before this Court, Elm confirmed that it understood that
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`“circuit layer” refers to an integrated circuit that includes a substrate, circuitry and dielectrics,
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`D.I. 236 at 25, 49, explaining in its “Statement of Facts” that a “die” or “chip” is made by
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`combining a “substrate,” “conductive materials,” and “dielectric materials,” id. at 4-5.
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 25318
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`This Court adopted the Federal Circuit’s constructions. D.I. 266 at 7 (construing
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`“integrated circuit / integrated circuit layer / circuit layer / circuit structure / circuit / structure”
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`together); D.I. 299 at 2 (clarifying that “dice,” “die,” “integrated circuit,” and similar terms are
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`construed the same). Thus, it is indisputable that “circuit layer” and “die” have the same
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`meaning, and are distinct from a “substrate”—which is included within a “circuit layer” or “die.”
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`III. Elm Clearly Sought Discovery on Products Based on “Circuit Layer” Thickness
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`On June 20, 2019, Elm informed Samsung that, “[i]n light of the Federal Circuit’s recent
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`decision,” it “intends to accuse” stacked memory products based on circuit layer thickness—not
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`substrate thickness: “where at least one circuit layer is stacked above or below another circuit
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`layer, and where at least one of the layers has a thickness of 50 microns or less.” D.I. 377, Ex. 7.
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`On June 25, 2019, Elm selected the products that it believed satisfied this criterion from a
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`spreadsheet that Samsung produced on March 14, 2019, listing all stacked memory products
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`identified to date. D.I. 377, Exs. 8-9. That spreadsheet listed products with “chip” or “die”
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`thickness—not “substrate” thickness—from less than 50 microns to over 700 microns, and Elm
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`selected only those products with a “CHIP THICK” of 50 microns or less. Id., Ex. 2; Ex. 9.
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`Over the next sixteen months, Elm repeatedly demanded discovery on products with a “circuit
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`layer” or “die” thickness that is 50 microns or less. Id., ¶¶ 10-51. For example:
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`• On July 29, 2019, Elm stated: “I sent you a list of the Samsung products we’re aware of
`that contain at least one die at 50µm or less . . .” Id., Ex. 56 (emphasis added).
`• On December 15, 2019, Elm demanded that Samsung “produce worldwide sales data for
`all relevant products (including all stacked semiconductor products that include at least
`one die that is 50 microns or less) . . .” Id., Ex. 29 at 1 (emphasis added).
`• On March 14, 2020, Elm emailed Samsung stating that the “‘relevant components’ are
`semiconductor products with more than one die in a vertical stack, where at least one die
`in the stack is 50 microns or less in thickness.” Id., Ex. 30 at 1 (emphasis added).
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`On May 19, 2020, Elm filed a letter seeking discovery on products with “stacked circuit
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`layers ‘where at least one of the layers has a thickness of 50 microns or less.’” D.I. 280 at 1.
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`3
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 25319
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`Elm attached to its letter a chart that listed “minimum thickness of the die” and products with 50
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`microns or less die thickness, referring to “die,” “chips” and “circuit layer” interchangeably. D.I.
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`281, ¶ 51 (seeking “the minimum thickness of the die in the product”), Ex. 30.
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`On May 22, 2020, Samsung agreed to complete Elm’s chart (D.I. 286 at 1), and filed a
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`declaration of its engineer, Youngok Hyung, explaining that “Samsung was unable to locate
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`‘substrate’ thickness data for its stacked memory products, as that information is not tracked in
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`documents maintained in the ordinary course of Samsung’s business operations.” D.I. 286, Ex.
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`M, ¶¶ 9-10 (emphasis added). Ms. Hyung also explained the time-consuming and complex steps
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`that Samsung undertook to ultimately compile die thickness data. Id., ¶¶ 11-23.
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`The Court ordered Samsung to complete Elm’s chart, and on June 19, 2020, Samsung
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`produced a chart that “mirrors . . . Ex. 30 to Elm’s May 19 letter to the Court” and lists the “Min.
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`Die Thickness.” D.I. 377, Ex. 33–34. Samsung updated the chart “to bold nodes that correspond
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`to a die that has a thickness of 50 microns or less.” Id., Ex. 35. On September 10, 2020, Elm
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`sent Samsung a draft representative products agreement based on that chart that identified “Die
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`Thickness” as one of the “characteristics” for grouping products. Id., Ex. 42-43.
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`The record clearly shows that Elm repeatedly accused and sought discovery on products
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`based on their “die” or “circuit layer” thickness—not “substrate” thickness—for sixteen months.
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`IV.
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`Elm’s Discovery Requests Using the Term “Semiconductor Layer” Are Immaterial
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`Despite this record to the contrary, Elm now alleges that its discovery requests were more
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`broadly directed to products having a “semiconductor layer”—such as a substrate—with the
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`required thickness, and that it repeatedly asked for discovery on such products. D.I. 374 at 1-2.
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`Elm cites two examples in support of this contention, but inflates their significance.
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`4
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 25320
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`First, Elm relies on the parties’ correspondence on V-NAND products (which at one
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`point Elm stated should be accused) and mischaracterizes this exchange as evidencing
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`Samsung’s purported “confusion” over the meaning of “circuit layer.” Id. There was, however,
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`no confusion over the meaning of “circuit layer”; the confusion was over Elm’s attempt to apply
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`the term to non-stacked (single-die) products, which do not include more than one “circuit
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`layer” or “die,” as required. D.I. 377, Ex. 17; Ex. 19; Ex. 21. Samsung questioned Elm’s
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`incorrect use of the defined term and requested a more detailed theory of infringement for V-
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`NAND products. Id., Ex. 21 at 1. But Elm never produced that explanation and abandoned the
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`“confusing” contention altogether. Instead, Elm served a claim chart for a different set of
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`products (image sensor products), and mapped the “circuit layer” to an entire image sensor die—
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`consistent with the established meaning of these terms. Id., Ex. 25 at 3-4. Elm never again
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`attempted to apply the “circuit layer” term to anything other than a die/integrated circuit.
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`Second, Elm points to its interrogatories, in which Elm claims it sought discovery on
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`“any Product” that “contains a semiconductor layer that is 50 microns or less.” See, e.g., id., Ex.
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`50 at 3. But Samsung properly objected to the definition of “Product” as “not reasonably tied to
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`Elm’s infringement allegations,” “seeking information not relevant to any party’s claim or
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`defense and not proportional,” and “undefined and capable of different interpretations.” Id., Ex.
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`51 at 7-10. Samsung similarly objected to Elm’s other interrogatories. Id., Ex. 52 at 1; Ex. 53 at
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`8; Ex. 54 at 1-2; Ex. 55 at 7-18. The parties met and conferred many times over Elm’s discovery
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`requests, but Elm continued to expressly and repeatedly target only stacked products based on
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`“circuit layer” and “die thickness”—not “substrate” thickness. Id., ¶¶ 12-51.
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`5
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 7 of 14 PageID #: 25321
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`V.
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`Elm Created a False Narrative in Accusing Samsung of Excluding Discovery
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`On October 28, 2020, Elm informed Samsung that it measured one of the previously
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`accused products that Samsung identified as having a die thickness of 70 microns, and alleged
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`surprise to discover that “the thinnest substrate in that product was actually 57 microns, 13
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`microns below what Samsung had reported.” D.I. 374, Ex. K (emphasis added). Elm then filed
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`a discovery letter seeking “discovery regarding relevant products with a substrate thickness of 50
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`microns or less.” Id. at 1. But rather than own up to the truth, and admit that it deliberately
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`targeted stacked products based on “circuit layer” thickness only, Elm created a false narrative
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`that accuses Samsung of knowingly misinterpreting and unilaterally narrowing Elm’s requests
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`to exclude this discovery and then staying silent, hoping not to get caught. See, e.g., Id. at 1-3
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`(falsely accusing Samsung of unilaterally narrowing Elm’s discovery requests, and withholding
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`broader discovery). The record clearly demonstrates that Elm (not Samsung) defined, accused
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`and targeted products based on “circuit layer” and “die” thickness—not substrate thickness—and
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`repeatedly sought discovery on only those products for over a year. D.I. 377 at ¶¶ 7-51.
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`Nevertheless, Elm misleadingly states that, “[i]mmediately upon discovering this
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`discrepancy, Elm brought this issue to Samsung’s attention.” D.I. 374 at 2. Elm, however, knew
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`about the issue sixteen months earlier when Samsung explained in its interrogatory responses
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`that it had produced die thickness data, and when Elm first selected products based on that data.
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`D.I 377, Ex. 8-9. Samsung repeatedly explained in subsequent interrogatory responses that it
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`had produced die thickness data, and likewise informed the Court (and Elm) through the filing of
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`Ms. Hyung’s declaration—five months before Elm now claims that it first discovered the issue.
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`D.I. 281 at 1. Elm could have discovered the purported issue even earlier had it been diligent, as
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`it had samples of Samsung products since 2016, and additional samples since March of 2019.
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`6
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 8 of 14 PageID #: 25322
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`During the hearing on its motion, Elm continued to perpetuate such false assertions, even
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`after it had the chance to review the record that Samsung comprehensively catalogued. D.I. 377.
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`Ignoring the clear record, and its own prior representations to the PTAB, Federal Circuit and this
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`Court, Elm doubled-down on its narrative and advanced inexplicable positions that “substrate”
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`and “circuit layer” are interchangeable; that “die” and “circuit layer” did not have a definite
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`meaning; that it had no idea that Samsung understood these terms just as the Federal Circuit, this
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`Court and Elm itself defined them; and that Samsung concealed its interpretation of these terms:
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`•
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` In response to the Magistrate Judge’s question whether “substrate” and “circuit layer”
`are different claim terms: “They are, though they are used somewhat interchangeably.”
`Ex. A (12/2/2020 Hearing Tr.) at 19:20-21 (emphasis added).
`• “So the term we used in the email back then was circuit layer, and throughout this case
`have used a number of terms interchangeably.” Id. at 19:10-13 (emphasis added).
`• “Well, we had no indication earlier that Samsung had a different definition of these
`terms. They just sat quiet about it.” Id. at 21:23–22:2 (emphasis added).
`• “May was our first indication that Samsung was defining die differently than what Elm
`understood the parties to be talking about all along . . .” Id. at 23:7-12 (emphasis added).
`• “And the declaration in May didn’t actually define the terms, it just separated the term
`‘die’ out and put it in quotes, but it didn’t actually indicate what Samsung was defining
`as a die.” Id. at 23:12-16 (emphasis added).
`• “And they never explicitly said, when we say die, we are using that different ways than
`Elm has defined in its discovery or asked us for.” Id. at 21:3-6 (emphasis added).
`• “If Samsung’s own employee did not understand [what the term ‘die’ meant], it’s hard to
`understand how Elm could have. But now somehow Samsung says it was obvious that
`substrate was something different from a circuit layer or a die. That is not just
`consistent with how this dispute held.” Id. at 8:22–9:4 (emphasis added).
`• “But instead of coming to Elm to discuss the issue, Samsung just sat silent about what it
`discovered for the next 18 months.” Id. at 12:5-8 (emphasis added).
`• “As the Federal Circuit issued its ruling, as Elm sent emails explaining what it meant by
`circuit layer, as Elm issued discovery specifically targeted to the thickness of that
`semiconductor substrate . . . Samsung said nothing about the fact that it believed that it
`did not have this information.” Id. at 12:8-16 (emphasis added).
`• On Samsung’s chart of products with die thickness: “I think this is a situation where they
`did not explicitly say what they gave us. They stayed silent about it.” Id. at 10:17-20.
`• “But Samsung should not be allowed to just sit quietly while it knows there’s a problem,
`and Elm is asking for one type of information. Samsung provides another type of
`information without explaining to Elm that there is a difference in what it’s giving to it,
`and then reaps the benefit of hiding that for two years.” Id. at 24:3-10 (emphasis added).
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 9 of 14 PageID #: 25323
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`The record plainly contradicts these claims. See, e.g., D.I. 377, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 7-11, 14-21 (Elm
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`accused products with stacked “circuit layers”); ¶¶ 8, 12, 23 (Elm selected products based on
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`their “chip” thickness from the spreadsheet Samsung produced); ¶¶ 8, 12, 20, 23, 35-37, 41-43
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`(Elm requested discovery based on “die” thickness); ¶¶ 52-58 (Elm equated “circuit layers” with
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`“dies” and “chips” throughout its infringement contentions, the IPR, Federal Circuit and this
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`Court’s claim construction proceedings); ¶¶ 3-4, 24-25, 34, 37-38, 44-48 (Samsung explicitly
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`informed Elm that the thickness data produced was on the “die”/“chip”/“circuit layer”).
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`VI.
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`The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion to Deny the Requested Discovery to Elm
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`The Magistrate Judge agreed with Samsung’s positions and made the following findings:
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`• “I agree with Samsung that Elm was not asking for a list of products with a substrate of
`50 µm or less.” Ex. B (12/4/2020 Hearing Tr.) at 9:20-23.
`• “I find that there existed reasons why Elm might have restricted its infringement theory to
`products with a circuit layer and/or die with 50 µm or less.” Id. at 10:1-4.
`• “Meanwhile, Elm . . . discovered that one product that had a minimum die thickness of 70
`microns had a substrate thickness of 56 microns . . . . This result should have come as a
`surprise to no one, including Elm.” Id. at 11:7-5 (emphasis added).
`• “Having listened to the lengthy argument, having reviewed the entirety of the record, I
`am left with a definite and firm conviction that the situation that the parties are now in
`resulted from a change in strategy on the part of Elm.” Id. at 12:3-8 (emphasis added).
`• “It is very clear to me what Elm had agreed to accept from Samsung, and it is clear to
`me that Elm knew what it was getting from Samsung.” Id. at 12:8-11 (emphasis added).
`• “I cannot conclude that Samsung’s provision of the die thickness rather than the substrate
`thickness was done in bad faith.” Id. at 12:11-14.
`• “Samsung’s interpretation of Elm’s request for products having certain die thickness
`were reasonable.” Id. at 12:17-19.
`• “In sum, the record does not support any finding of intentional discovery abuse or even a
`misunderstanding between the parties. The record demonstrates and I find that Samsung
`provided the information requested from Elm.” Id. at 12:20–13:1.
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`The Magistrate Judge nevertheless granted Elm the requested discovery, but ordered Elm to pay
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`for half of the expense. Id. at 13:2-4. Samsung agrees that the findings above are correct, but
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`respectfully objects to the ultimate grant of discovery.
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`8
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 10 of 14 PageID #: 25324
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`First, the Magistrate Judge’s findings compel the conclusion that Elm should be estopped
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`from obtaining this discovery here. Judicial estoppel requires that (1) the party must have taken
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`two irreconcilably inconsistent positions; (2) the party must have changed its position “in bad
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`faith—i.e., with intent to play fast and loose with the court”; (3) no lesser sanction would
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`adequately remedy the damage done by the misconduct. Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC
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`Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, Elm sought and
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`obtained an order for discovery on products having a die thickness of 50 microns or less. D.I.
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`280. Elm now reverses course and seeks discovery on products above 50 microns, alleging that
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`the same discovery requests previously litigated now mean something different. Rather than
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`own up to its change in strategy, as the Magistrate Judge correctly found, Elm elected to spin a
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`tale that Samsung narrowed the case unilaterally. The record clearly demonstrates otherwise.
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`The Magistrate Judge also found that, while Elm’s motion was driven by its own strategic
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`considerations, she “[could not] conclude that Elm has acted in bad faith.” Ex. B at 13:6-7.
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`While the Magistrate Judge was unwilling to make any affirmative conclusion of bad faith,
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`Samsung respectfully submits that this Court can do so, and specifically find that Elm’s
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`deliberate contradictions of its own repeated representations throughout this case amounts to
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`conduct that is at least sufficient for judicial estoppel to apply. See Scarano v. Central R. Co. of
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`N.J., 203 F.2d 510, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1953) (finding an “affront to judicial dignity . . . intentional
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`self-contradiction . . . being used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage in a forum provided
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`for suitors seeking justice”); Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods. Inc. v. Groupe Procycle, Inc., 25 F.
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`Supp. 2d 270, 280 (D. Del. July 29, 1998) (prohibiting “play[ing] fast and loose with the Court”
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`by “a diametrically opposed position on the same claim language,” which “must be regarded as
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`being made in bad faith”). Indeed, the Magistrate Judge acknowledged the prejudice to Samsung
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`9
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 11 of 14 PageID #: 25325
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`and attempted to remedy the damage by requiring Elm to pay for half the discovery. Ex. B at
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`14:21-24. But that remedy does not address the full cost of the discovery and disruptions to
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`Samsung’s operations, let alone the additional burdens that will be placed on the parties and the
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`Court by adding hundreds of products to an already-unwieldly case with over 1,400 products at
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`issue. These circumstances here compel a conclusion that judicial estoppel should apply.
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`Second, the Magistrate Judge’s findings, coupled with Elm’s unexplained and unjustified
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`sixteen-month delay in seeking this discovery, compel the conclusion that Elm’s request is
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`untimely, unwarranted, and not proportional to the needs of the case, even though the discovery
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`deadline can be extended. EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. FLO TV Inc., No. 10-812 (RGA),
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`2013 WL 5890571, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2013) (disallowing new products 4 months before
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`close of discovery); Invensas Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00670, 2018 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 189260, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2018); Fenster Fam. Pat. Holdings, Inc. v. Siemens
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`Med. Sols. USA, Inc., No. 04-0038 JJF, 2005 WL 2304190, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 20, 2005)
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`(reducing products where plaintiff expanded case 5 weeks before close of discovery).
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`VII. Conclusion
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`For the forgoing reasons, Samsung respectfully objects to the Magistrate Judge’s grant of
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`discovery to Elm, and respectfully requests any additional or alternative relief the Court sees fit.
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`10
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`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 12 of 14 PageID #: 25326
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT &
`TAYLOR, LLP
`
`
`/s/ Adam W. Poff
`Adam W. Poff (No. 3990)
`Pilar G. Kraman (No. 5199)
`Rodney Square
`1000 North King Street
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 571-6600
`apoff@ycst.com
`pkraman@ycst.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Samsung
`Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung
`Semiconductor, Inc., Samsung Electronics
`America, Inc., and Samsung Austin
`Semiconductor, LLC
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:14-cv-01430-LPS Document 389 Filed 12/18/20 Page 13 of 14 PageID #: 25327
`
`(cid:3)
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`(cid:58)(cid:76)(cid:79)(cid:80)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:74)(cid:87)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:39)(cid:40)(cid:3)(cid:20)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:20)(cid:3)
`farnan@farnanlaw.com
`bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`mfarnan@farnanlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`(cid:80)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:87)(cid:75)(ci

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