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`EXHIBIT 1
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`)
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,,
` )
` Plaintiff, )
` ) C.A. No. 12-1601-JLH
`v. )
` )
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
`)
`(f/k/a MOTOROLA MOBILITY, )
`INC.),
`)
` )
` Defendant. )
` )
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`)
` )
` Plaintiff, )
` ) C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
`v. )
` )
`GOOGLE LLC,
`)
` )
` Defendant. )
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Thursday, April 6, 2023
`3:00 p.m.
`Pretrial Conference
`
`844 King Street
`Wilmington, Delaware
`
`BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. HALL
`United States Magistrate Judge
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`
` SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`
`
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` BY: NEAL C. BELGAM, ESQ.
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` BY: DANIEL TAYLOR, ESQ.
`
` -and-
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` SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
` BY: JOHN LAHAD, ESQ.
` BY: KEMPER DIEHL, ESQ,
` BY: MAX STRAUS, ESQ.
` BY: SETH ARD, ESQ.
` BY: KALPANA SRINIVASAN, ESQ.
`
` Counsel for the Plaintiff
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`APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
`
`
`
` POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON
` BY: DAVID ELLIS MOORE, ESQ.
`
`
`-and-
`
`
` PAUL HASTINGS
` BY: ROBERT W. UNIKEL, ESQ.
` BY: CHAD J. PETERMAN, ESQ.
` BY: MATTHIAS A. KAMBER, ESQ.
` BY: ANDREA ROBERTS, ESQ.
` Counsel for the Defendants
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`
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`
`_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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`
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`P R O C E E D I N G S
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`(Proceedings commenced in the courtroom beginning at
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`3:00 p.m.)
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`THE COURT: Please have a seat. Let's get
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`situated. I have this paper here. They are still
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`building my courtroom, so I rotate around the building to
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`different places.
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`Good to see everybody. Let's have appearances
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`please.
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`MR. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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`Daniel Taylor, Smith Katzenstein & Jenkins for Arendi.
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`With me are cocounsel from Susman Godfrey, John Lahad,
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`Kemper Diehl, Seth Ard, and Max Straus.
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`THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone.
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`MR. TAYLOR: On the phone we have Kalpana
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`Srinivasan, also from Susman Godfrey, and my colleague
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`Neal Belgam from Smith Katzenstein is here in the back.
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`THE COURT: Great. Good afternoon, everybody.
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`MR. MOORE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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`THE COURT: Hi.
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`MR. MOORE: David Moore from Potter Anderson on
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`behalf of Google. I'm joined by Rob Unikel, Chad
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`Peterman, and also Andrea Roberts is on the phone.
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`They're all from Paul Hastings. We are also joined by
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`Vinny Ling, from Munger, Tolles, and Marisa Williams from
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`Google.
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`THE COURT: Fantastic. Good to see everybody.
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`Please have a seat.
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`All right. So we're here for the pretrial
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`conference today. This case, when it was filed, predates
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`my time on the court. It's been going on for a while. I
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`know there's a lot of history here, and we tried our best
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`to get up to speed in terms of how we got to where we are
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`sitting today, but I may have some questions as we go
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`through some of the disputes today about what exactly
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`we're talking about. Clearly, you all know this case
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`better than we do.
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`So let me first, if we could, talk about the
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`outstanding motions. One of them I'm ready to rule on. I
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`don't need to hear argument. The other, I have some
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`questions about. So let's start with Google's Motion to
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`Strike Portions of Mr. Weinstein's supplemental expert
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`report regarding damages.
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`I reviewed the parties' submissions on that.
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`The Court's ruling is that Google's motion is going to be
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`denied. I disagree with Google that the dispute was
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`properly brought as a motion to strike.
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`I agree with Arendi that what Google
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`essentially seeks is a pretrial ruling that infringement
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`is licensed when the accused apps are on Samsung devices
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`and that's an issue that, in my view, should have been
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`appropriately raised as a motion for partial summary
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`judgment. And, of course, the deadline for filing those
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`motions has long passed.
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`And on the record that's before the Court,
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`there is no reason to think that that motion couldn't have
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`been filed before that deadline.
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`Arendi contends that Google didn't dispute in
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`its papers that Google had that Samsung agreement on which
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`it basis its license in its possession since July 2019.
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`That's two years before the summary judgment motion
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`deadline in March 2021, and the record establishes that
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`Mr. Weinstein offered a total damages calculation in his
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`reply report three months before the dispositive motions
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`deadline that included Google apps on Samsung devices and
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`a different figure that didn't, just as he did in his
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`supplemental report.
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`So I'm not persuaded that it expected -- that
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`Google expected Mr. Weinstein and Arendi would withdraw
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`damages calculations for accused apps on Samsung devices.
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`So I guess one question I have, which we can discuss maybe
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`later on in the case, do we need some sort of a -- to the
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`extent that Google wants to raise that issue in post-trial
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`briefing, do we need to have a special verdict form where
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`we get damages with or without Samsung devices or anything
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`like that? Or is that what you essentially proposed?
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`MR. UNIKEL: Well, Your Honor, I guess it begs
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`the question, given that you are not granting the motion,
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`now, we're going to be able to present that to the jury as
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`part of the trial, I assume, correct? Whether or not the
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`license covers the accused devices or not.
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`THE COURT: Let's hear from the other side.
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`MR. DIEHL: Well, Your Honor, we don't think it
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`should be presented to the jury, both because the contract
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`is clear that there's no license to Google and because
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`they haven't raised an affirmative defense in their
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`pleadings. It's too late to do that.
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`MR. UNIKEL: We have raised it as part of our
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`pleadings. And if it's, in fact, true that the agreement
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`is clear on its face one way or the other, then that would
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`be an issue for the Court to decide. If it's not, the
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`mere fact that we didn't bring it as a summary judgment
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`doesn't mean that we somehow forfeited it for trial.
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`THE COURT: Well, I agree that it hasn't been
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`forfeited as an issue. I guess my inclination on it is
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`this: If there is a dispute about contract interpretation
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`that one or the other of you feels that is an issue that
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`the Court needs to resolve, that's something that maybe
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`should go into the jury instructions.
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`So why don't you work together and decide what
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`your competing proposals are on that if there needs to be
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`a jury instruction on that. The Court is not going to
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`decide as a matter of law whether or not the product is or
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`isn't licensed before the trial. That's something that
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`can be raised after the trial, to the extent -- to the
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`extent that it was properly raised in the pleadings. And,
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`of course, your objection on that basis is preserved. We
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`will deal with all of that later.
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`If there's a reason to think that the jury
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`should be interpreting contracts, that's fine, then we
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`will have a jury instruction on that. So talk to each
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`other and raise it.
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`MR. DIEHL: That's fine with me.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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`THE COURT: Very good. All right.
`
`So Defendant's Motion for Clarification of
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`Claim Construction. I have some thoughts on this. Let's
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`hear from Google on this one, if you are ready to discuss
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`it. It's okay if you want to rely on the papers, too.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Oh, that's okay. I'm ready to
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`discuss it, Your Honor.
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`Briefly, I assume that you don't want me to
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`just recover what's in the papers.
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`THE COURT: No. I understand. Yeah. I guess
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`
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`my question is, the Court, in my view, when the case was
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`assigned to Judge Stark, very clearly ruled that there
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`doesn't have to be a determination of searchability as
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`part of performance of the claimed method. That's what I
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`think he said.
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`Your motion says that there does have to be
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`determination at some point in time. I am not really sure
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`what you mean by that. Do you mean as part of performance
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`of the claim method or do you mean there has to be
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`something built into the software, and it says that a
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`predefined category has to be searchable?
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`MR. UNIKEL: Well, part of the difficulty comes
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`with the language that you just quoted from Judge Stark,
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`which is that we're dealing with two types of claims here.
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`We have method claims, and we have computer readable
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`medium claims; 1 and 8 are method claims; 23 and 30 are
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`computer readable medium claims.
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`Part of the difficulty here is that the
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`claim -- first of all, the claim terms themselves provide
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`that a determination has to be made. And the only
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`criteria in the claim language itself -- if you'd like me
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`to put it up, I can -- is that the information can be
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`searched for.
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`Judge Stark issued a construction that expanded
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`on the types of information and said predefined categories
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`of information. But his construction also includes the
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`criteria that can be searched for in an information source
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`external to the document.
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`On summary judgment, we had raised the point
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`that at the time of analyzing the text, that the Google
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`products don't do that. So on summary judgment, we were
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`seeking summary judgment that we did not infringe that, at
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`that element of the method claims or the computer readable
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`medium claims.
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`THE COURT: Because there wasn't a
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`searchability determination as part of the performance of
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`the method, right?
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`MR. UNIKEL: No. When the text was being
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`analyzed. What was not an issue at that point, because it
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`appeared from Judge Stark's actual construction, and it
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`still appears from Judge Stark's actual construction that
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`a determination must be made about whether the information
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`can be searched for while the document is being
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`displayed -- may I just put the claim for one moment, Your
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`Honor?
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`abstract.
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`THE COURT: Yeah. That's a great idea.
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`MR. UNIKEL: It's hard to look at it in the
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`So here's Claim 1. You can see this element
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`right here, the second element -- are you able to see
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`that, Your Honor?
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`THE COURT: Yeah. And I've got a copy myself
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`that has that part highlighted. Yep.
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`MR. UNIKEL: I made it a little bigger, if
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`that's helpful.
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`THE COURT: Sure.
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`MR. UNIKEL: So this is one of the method
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`claims, Claim 1. And the second element is while the
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`document is being displayed, analyzing a computer process
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`first information from the document to determine if the
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`first information is at least one of a plurality of types
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`of information that can be searched for.
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`So there has to be a determination, according
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`to this element, and the only criteria is whether it
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`belongs to a type of information that can be searched for.
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`Now, when we presented this on summary
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`judgment, we were focused on the -- during the analyzing.
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`Because this claim talks about analyzing. Judge Stark, we
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`understood his ruling to say at the time of analyzing, the
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`determination does not need to be made.
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`The part that we think was not dealt with and
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`is unclear now from both the construction and the rulings
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`is: But there still has to be a determination that this
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`information can be searched for at some point, otherwise
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`the only criteria is now gone.
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`And our understanding was so that determination
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`would be made at the time you're predefining the
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`categories. If it is not happening during the analyzing,
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`then it would be happening when you said: What kinds of
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`information should we be looking for?
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`THE COURT: But let me ask you, though, so what
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`do you mean by "at the time of predefining the category"?
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`So the method doesn't have a step of predefining
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`categories; right?
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`MR. UNIKEL: Only the construction does, Your
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`Honor. So all of this is only made confusing by the
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`construction itself. If you actually just look at the
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`language of the claim, it's clear that the determination
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`has to be made while the document is being displayed as
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`part of the analyzing step. And the only criteria for it
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`is that can be searched for.
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`The confusion came up because of the
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`construction. In the construction, Judge Stark added this
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`notion of predefined categories that can be searched for.
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`So if we're sicking with the construction, then the
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`question becomes: When you're predefining the categories,
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`presumably you can decide what categories are you
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`choosing. And the criteria is: That can be searched for.
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`So you might say I can pick place names. I can
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`pick phone numbers. I can pick e-mail addresses. But if
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`the criteria you are applying to predefine them is "pick
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`categories that can be searched for," then that might work
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`with the construction.
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`But if you don't have -- ever have a
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`determination that this type of information can be
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`searched for, then this part of the determination that's
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`expressly in the claims means nothing. It would just be
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`determine if the first information is at least one of a
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`plurality of types of information, period.
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`THE COURT: As a matter of fact, the
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`software -- and this is going to start to demonstrate that
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`I have less knowledge about what the evidence is going to
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`be in this case than you all do, but is there -- you keep
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`saying there has to be this determination.
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`Couldn't that be built into the architecture of
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`the software? I mean, isn't that sort of -- you are free
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`to argue: It's not built into our software that our
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`predefined categories are categories that can be searched
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`for. You want to be able to argue that; right?
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`MR. UNIKEL: Correct. We want to be able to
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`argue that we don't make such a determination at any
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`point, from the predetermination to the architecture to
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`the analyzing. It's never made, period, in our products.
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`THE COURT: Right. Well, Judge Stark has said
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`you don't get to say you don't infringe because we don't
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`make that -- because we don't make that determination as
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`part of our performance of this outline. You can't say
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`that. But you can still say: I don't infringe because
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`our predefined categories are not, as a matter of fact,
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`categories that can be searched for.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Your Honor, I think we can still
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`make that argument, yes, but that's a different argument.
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`Because there's a separate requirement that you perform a
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`search. So if you couldn't perform the search, you
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`wouldn't need that separate element of this claim. But in
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`this element of the claim -- and, frankly, Your Honor,
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`part of the difficulty is the existing construction that
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`we're working with from Judge Stark -- still contains this
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`language about determine that it can be searched for.
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`One of our concerns, and the reason for the
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`motion, is with this language, the actual claim language,
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`the construction, the jury is going to be left with a
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`question: Well, how do I know if it's determined that it
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`can be searched for or not. And what we were asking for
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`as part of the clarification is the existing construction
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`leaves open that question that's going to be unanswered by
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`anybody to the jury at the trial. We believe the current
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`construction is, thus, confusing.
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`If the ruling is that the determination does
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`not ever have to include whether the information can be
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 15 of 106 PageID #: 51607
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`searched for or not, then I think the construction would
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`have to be altered in some way so that it's not confusing.
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`That was our concern, Your Honor, because,
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`honestly, we thought that what was being dealt with in
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`summary judgment was only the question of when you are
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`doing the analyzing, are you determining at that moment in
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`time that the information can be searched for or not.
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`THE COURT: What element, in your view,
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`requires a determination that it can be searched for? The
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`same element is what you are saying?
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`MR. UNIKEL: Yes. But at a different time,
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`given the Court's construction. The Court added
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`predefined categories does not exist in the claim
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`language.
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`THE COURT: Right.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Predefined categories was added as
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`construction by Judge Stark. So then the question is that
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`under the assumption that the information is not being
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`determined to be searchable at the time of analyzing,
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`because now you have these predefined categories, now
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`there's a next question of: Well, then, did you make the
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`determination to predefine the categories so that they can
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`be searched for.
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`In other words, you might be able to search for
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`a telephone number and so you might say: I'm going to
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 16 of 106 PageID #: 51608
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`choose telephone numbers because I've determined I can
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`search for those in a contact database. And you might not
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`include URLs, for example, because you say: I don't want
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`those to be searched for in a contact database or my
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`contact data doesn't support that.
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`So the point is, what has made it confusing is
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`two things: The Court's addition of predefined categories
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`on the construction and then the ruling itself, which, as
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`we understood it, focused on when you're doing the
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`analyzing, do you need to make the determination at that
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`point in time. And if there are predefined categories
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`where you've already made the determination, then that
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`would make sense that it wouldn't have to be at the time
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`of the analyzing.
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`THE COURT: Right.
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`MR. UNIKEL: But if it's never, not even at the
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`predefinition standpoint, then that would no meaning at
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`all.
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`THE COURT: All right. Thanks very much. Let
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`me hear from the other side on this.
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`MR. LAHAD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John
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`Lahad for plaintiff, Arendi.
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`The motion should be denied. In our briefing,
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`we lodged several procedural grounds. I think those
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`procedural grounds undermine Google's substantive
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 17 of 106 PageID #: 51609
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`arguments.
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`Your Honor, claim construction was done in
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`2019. That's when Judge Stark included this predefined
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`categories language in his construction. There was no
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`confusion then. There was no motion for reconsideration.
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`We litigated for three years plus based on that
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`construction.
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`Judge Stark issued his summary judgment ruling
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`a year ago. Google said nothing for eight months until
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`this -- until we were before this Court.
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`So, bottom line is that the claim language
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`controls. Judge Stark recognized that. There is nothing
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`in the claim language that requires an actual
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`determination to be made as to whether or not the
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`information can be searched for. It's not in the claims.
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`It's not in his construction. He didn't add that to
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`anything. And he rejected all of Google's arguments on
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`this point a year ago. And Google is -- sorry, Your
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`Honor.
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`that.
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`THE COURT: Let me just -- yeah. No, and I get
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`MR. LAHAD: Yeah.
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`THE COURT: Putting that aside. Say I agree
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`with you that I'm not going to revisit whether or not they
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`can say that the claim limitation isn't met because there
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 18 of 106 PageID #: 51610
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`doesn't have to be a searchability determination as part
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`of that step of the claim method. Assume I agree with you
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`we're not going to revisit that. They are still free to
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`argue, aren't they, that they don't infringe because as a
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`matter of fact, they don't have predefined categories
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`because they don't have software that's built to have --
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`into the architecture that predefined categories can be
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`searched for.
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`MR. LAHAD: I think that's fair game, Your
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`Honor. That's the claim language -- that's the Court's
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`construction. So they can argue we don't have predefined
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`categories, and so we don't infringe. What they can't
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`argue --
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`THE COURT: Predefined categories that can be
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`searched for, they can argue. They don't have predefined
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`categories that can be searched for.
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`MR. LAHAD: Correct. They can't argue -- and
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`then Judge Stark said this, that we don't infringe because
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`there isn't an actual determination as to whether the
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`information can be searched for.
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`THE COURT: As part of the claimed method --
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`MR. LAHAD: Correct.
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`THE COURT: -- performance of the claimed
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`method.
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`MR. LAHAD: It's not the claim, and it's not in
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 19 of 106 PageID #: 51611
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`the Court's construction.
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`THE COURT: He mentioned, opposing counsel,
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`that there's a difference between the method claims and
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`the apparatus claims. I actually looked at apparatus
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`claims. It looks like sort of a weird amalgamation of an
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`apparatus claim and a method claim.
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`I didn't see that as a distinction in terms of
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`arguing this motion, did you?
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`MR. LAHAD: I did not either. I think they're
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`essentially similar, similar for this purpose.
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`THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you wanted to
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`say?
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`MR. LAHAD: Unless the Court has questions.
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`I've got, you know, as much argument as the Court wants,
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`but I'm happy --
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`THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and have a
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`seat. We have a lot to get through.
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`So here's what my thinking is on this. I
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`understand that defendants want to add or clarify the
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`Court's construction to add a requirement or a
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`clarification that there has to be a determination about
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`searchability at some point in time.
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`So just for the record, Judge Stark provided a
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`claim construction of this element back in August of 2019.
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`When I say "element," I mean this step of the claimed
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 20 of 106 PageID #: 51612
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`method in Claim 1. That is Docket Number 143 and 144.
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`Then in March 2022 in his opinions, ruling on
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`Daubert and summary judgment -- and that's at Docket 393,
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`he said the following, and I will just put it on the
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`record, so we're all clear. At page 6 and 7, in part, he
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`says:
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`"Arendi seeks to exclude portions of
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`Dr. Shamos's expert report that are purportedly
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`inconsistent with the Court's claim construction. The
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`portions at issue relate to the claim term 'to determine
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`if the first information is at least one plurality of text
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`or information that can be searched for. The Court has
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`construed this claim term as to determine if the first
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`information belongs to one or more of several predefined
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`categories of identifying information; e.g., a name,
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`contact information, e.g., a phone number, a fax number,
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`or an e-mail address that can be searched for in an
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`information source external to the document.
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`"In his report, Dr. Shamos opines that the
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`claim term is not met because the accused devices do not
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`perform any analysis to determine whether the first
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`information can be searched for.
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`"The Court agrees with Arendi, will grant its
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`Daubert motion under the Court's construction an
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`infringing product must analyze to determine while a
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 21 of 106 PageID #: 51613
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`document is being displayed whether the first information
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`belongs to one or more of several predefined categories of
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`identifying information or contact information.
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`"While the eligible predefined categories of
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`information must be categories that can be searched for in
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`an information source external to the document, the
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`Court's construction does not require that the
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`searchability determination of the first information must
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`be made by the accused infringing products while
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`performing this step of the claimed process.
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`"The counter interpretation of the term would
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`effectively leave the word "predefined" out on the Court's
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`construction. In other words, the phrase 'that can be
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`searched for' modifies the allowable predefined categories
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`and does not specify a distinct determination to be made."
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`And then similarly, at Page 15, Judge Stark
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`points out that Google argued that the Court's
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`construction on the claim term does not require the
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`accused -- sorry -- "Arendi argues that the Court's
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`construction of this claim term does not require the
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`accused products to perform an additional analyzing step
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`to determine the searchability of the first information
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`for the reasons explained in connection with the Court's
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`grant of Arendi's Daubert motion, the Court finds the
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`asserted claim does not require that the searchability of
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`determination of the first information be made by the
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`accused products while performing this step of the claimed
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`process."
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`So in other words, I understood Judge Stark's
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`ruling to say that the step requires a determination as to
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`whether the information is part of the predefined
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`category. There's no requirement that the step of the
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`claimed method also requires a determination that that
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`category is searchable, but it does have to be searchable
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`as a matter of fact.
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`So to the extent that Google's motion is taking
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`issue with Judge Stark's ruling, I agree with Arendi that
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`its motion is essentially a motion for reargument and is
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`procedurally inappropriate, especially coming eight months
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`after Judge Stark's motion on summary judgment and
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`Daubert.
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`And I agree with Arendi that 02 Micro doesn't
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`stand for the proposition that you can reargue a claim
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`construction dispute that's already been settled.
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`So to that extent, I deny the motion.
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`So just to be clear for the record, Google's
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`motion requested that the Court order that it may argue at
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`trial that the accused products don't infringe because
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`they do not make searchability determination.
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`Judge Stark has ruled that Google may not argue
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 23 of 106 PageID #: 51615
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`that, that there is no requirement for searchability
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`determination at that step of the claimed method.
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`If there's some other dispute about what some
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`other claim language means, we'll take that up at the jury
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`charge conference. And we're not going to let the jury
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`construe any terms. We will get it resolved at that point
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`in time.
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`So we can reraise an issue on claim
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`construction at the jury charge conference, if there is
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`one, but we're not going to revisit old arguments.
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`MR. UNIKEL: May I just ask, Your Honor --
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`THE COURT: Yes.
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`MR. UNIKEL: You said there is something that
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`we can argue. I just wanted to make sure -- I don't want
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`to violate any court order.
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`THE COURT: At this point in time, I think we
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`are going to go just based on what the transcript said
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`rather than further confuse things. Because I think we
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`heard some concessions from the other side about what they
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`don't oppose you arguing as well. So we'll go with that.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Understand. Thank you, Your
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`Honor.
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`THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about the
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`motions in limine.
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`Let's hear Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Number
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 24 of 106 PageID #: 51616
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`1, which has to do with argument about the Apple license
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`and the prior report regarding the Apple reasonable
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`royalty.
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`Max --
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`question.
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`MR. STRAUS: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
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`MR. UNIKEL: I apologize. I do have one quick
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`THE COURT: Yes.
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`MR. UNIKEL: There may be discussion of
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`specific numbers with regard to this, and Google's
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`in-house counsel is in the room. I believe those might be
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`subject to the protective order. And so --
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`THE COURT: I think let's just leave numbers
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`out of this. I think we can argue this portion -- I
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`think -- I think we can probably do this without referring
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`to specific numbers.
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`MR. UNIKEL: Okay.
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`THE COURT: Yep.
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`MR. STRAUS: I think that's right, Your Honor.
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`THE COURT: Okay. Great.
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`MR. STRAUS: Max Straus from Susman Godfrey for
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`Arendi. This Court should preclude Google's proposed use
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`of Mr. Weinstein's reasonable royalty projection from the
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`Apple case, separate lawsuit. That projection has no
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`probative value in this case, and it will greatly
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`prejudice the jury against Mr. Weinstein or Arendi, and
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`furthermore, it's going to require a time-consuming trial
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`within a trial.
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`So introducing Mr. Weinstein's damages model
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`is, as I said, going to have an overwhelmingly prejudicial
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`effect. And once the jury hears -- and I will leave
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`numbers out of this -- once the jury hears the headline
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`charge that Mr. Weinstein was off by a very large
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`percentage in their view, the jury is not going to hear
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`anything else, and they're going to be left with the false
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`impression that Mr. Weinstein failed to do what he was
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`never asked to do, which was to project the amount that
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`Arendi settled -- I