throbber
Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 1 of 106 PageID #: 51593
`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 1 of 106 PagelD #: 51593
`
`EXHIBIT 1
`EXHIBIT 1
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 2 of 106 PageID #: 51594
` 1
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`)
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,,
` )
` Plaintiff, )
` ) C.A. No. 12-1601-JLH
`v. )
` )
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
`)
`(f/k/a MOTOROLA MOBILITY, )
`INC.),
`)
` )
` Defendant. )
` )
`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
`)
` )
` Plaintiff, )
` ) C.A. No. 13-919-JLH
`v. )
` )
`GOOGLE LLC,
`)
` )
` Defendant. )
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Thursday, April 6, 2023
`3:00 p.m.
`Pretrial Conference
`
`844 King Street
`Wilmington, Delaware
`
`BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. HALL
`United States Magistrate Judge
`
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`
` SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 3 of 106 PageID #: 51595
` 2
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
` BY: NEAL C. BELGAM, ESQ.
`
` BY: DANIEL TAYLOR, ESQ.
`
` -and-
`
`
` SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP
` BY: JOHN LAHAD, ESQ.
` BY: KEMPER DIEHL, ESQ,
` BY: MAX STRAUS, ESQ.
` BY: SETH ARD, ESQ.
` BY: KALPANA SRINIVASAN, ESQ.
`
` Counsel for the Plaintiff
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
`
`
`
` POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON
` BY: DAVID ELLIS MOORE, ESQ.
`
`
`-and-
`
`
` PAUL HASTINGS
` BY: ROBERT W. UNIKEL, ESQ.
` BY: CHAD J. PETERMAN, ESQ.
` BY: MATTHIAS A. KAMBER, ESQ.
` BY: ANDREA ROBERTS, ESQ.
` Counsel for the Defendants
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
`
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 4 of 106 PageID #: 51596
` 3
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`
`
`(Proceedings commenced in the courtroom beginning at
`
`3:00 p.m.)
`
`
`
`THE COURT: Please have a seat. Let's get
`
`situated. I have this paper here. They are still
`
`building my courtroom, so I rotate around the building to
`
`different places.
`
`Good to see everybody. Let's have appearances
`
`please.
`
`MR. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
`
`Daniel Taylor, Smith Katzenstein & Jenkins for Arendi.
`
`With me are cocounsel from Susman Godfrey, John Lahad,
`
`Kemper Diehl, Seth Ard, and Max Straus.
`
`THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone.
`
`MR. TAYLOR: On the phone we have Kalpana
`
`Srinivasan, also from Susman Godfrey, and my colleague
`
`Neal Belgam from Smith Katzenstein is here in the back.
`
`THE COURT: Great. Good afternoon, everybody.
`
`MR. MOORE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
`
`THE COURT: Hi.
`
`MR. MOORE: David Moore from Potter Anderson on
`
`behalf of Google. I'm joined by Rob Unikel, Chad
`
`Peterman, and also Andrea Roberts is on the phone.
`
`They're all from Paul Hastings. We are also joined by
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 5 of 106 PageID #: 51597
` 4
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`Vinny Ling, from Munger, Tolles, and Marisa Williams from
`
`Google.
`
`THE COURT: Fantastic. Good to see everybody.
`
`Please have a seat.
`
`All right. So we're here for the pretrial
`
`conference today. This case, when it was filed, predates
`
`my time on the court. It's been going on for a while. I
`
`know there's a lot of history here, and we tried our best
`
`to get up to speed in terms of how we got to where we are
`
`sitting today, but I may have some questions as we go
`
`through some of the disputes today about what exactly
`
`we're talking about. Clearly, you all know this case
`
`better than we do.
`
`So let me first, if we could, talk about the
`
`outstanding motions. One of them I'm ready to rule on. I
`
`don't need to hear argument. The other, I have some
`
`questions about. So let's start with Google's Motion to
`
`Strike Portions of Mr. Weinstein's supplemental expert
`
`report regarding damages.
`
`I reviewed the parties' submissions on that.
`
`The Court's ruling is that Google's motion is going to be
`
`denied. I disagree with Google that the dispute was
`
`properly brought as a motion to strike.
`
`I agree with Arendi that what Google
`
`essentially seeks is a pretrial ruling that infringement
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 6 of 106 PageID #: 51598
` 5
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`is licensed when the accused apps are on Samsung devices
`
`and that's an issue that, in my view, should have been
`
`appropriately raised as a motion for partial summary
`
`judgment. And, of course, the deadline for filing those
`
`motions has long passed.
`
`And on the record that's before the Court,
`
`there is no reason to think that that motion couldn't have
`
`been filed before that deadline.
`
`Arendi contends that Google didn't dispute in
`
`its papers that Google had that Samsung agreement on which
`
`it basis its license in its possession since July 2019.
`
`That's two years before the summary judgment motion
`
`deadline in March 2021, and the record establishes that
`
`Mr. Weinstein offered a total damages calculation in his
`
`reply report three months before the dispositive motions
`
`deadline that included Google apps on Samsung devices and
`
`a different figure that didn't, just as he did in his
`
`supplemental report.
`
`So I'm not persuaded that it expected -- that
`
`Google expected Mr. Weinstein and Arendi would withdraw
`
`damages calculations for accused apps on Samsung devices.
`
`So I guess one question I have, which we can discuss maybe
`
`later on in the case, do we need some sort of a -- to the
`
`extent that Google wants to raise that issue in post-trial
`
`briefing, do we need to have a special verdict form where
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 7 of 106 PageID #: 51599
` 6
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`we get damages with or without Samsung devices or anything
`
`like that? Or is that what you essentially proposed?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Well, Your Honor, I guess it begs
`
`the question, given that you are not granting the motion,
`
`now, we're going to be able to present that to the jury as
`
`part of the trial, I assume, correct? Whether or not the
`
`license covers the accused devices or not.
`
`THE COURT: Let's hear from the other side.
`
`MR. DIEHL: Well, Your Honor, we don't think it
`
`should be presented to the jury, both because the contract
`
`is clear that there's no license to Google and because
`
`they haven't raised an affirmative defense in their
`
`pleadings. It's too late to do that.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: We have raised it as part of our
`
`pleadings. And if it's, in fact, true that the agreement
`
`is clear on its face one way or the other, then that would
`
`be an issue for the Court to decide. If it's not, the
`
`mere fact that we didn't bring it as a summary judgment
`
`doesn't mean that we somehow forfeited it for trial.
`
`THE COURT: Well, I agree that it hasn't been
`
`forfeited as an issue. I guess my inclination on it is
`
`this: If there is a dispute about contract interpretation
`
`that one or the other of you feels that is an issue that
`
`the Court needs to resolve, that's something that maybe
`
`should go into the jury instructions.
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 8 of 106 PageID #: 51600
` 7
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`So why don't you work together and decide what
`
`your competing proposals are on that if there needs to be
`
`a jury instruction on that. The Court is not going to
`
`decide as a matter of law whether or not the product is or
`
`isn't licensed before the trial. That's something that
`
`can be raised after the trial, to the extent -- to the
`
`extent that it was properly raised in the pleadings. And,
`
`of course, your objection on that basis is preserved. We
`
`will deal with all of that later.
`
`If there's a reason to think that the jury
`
`should be interpreting contracts, that's fine, then we
`
`will have a jury instruction on that. So talk to each
`
`other and raise it.
`
`MR. DIEHL: That's fine with me.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
`
`THE COURT: Very good. All right.
`
`So Defendant's Motion for Clarification of
`
`Claim Construction. I have some thoughts on this. Let's
`
`hear from Google on this one, if you are ready to discuss
`
`it. It's okay if you want to rely on the papers, too.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Oh, that's okay. I'm ready to
`
`discuss it, Your Honor.
`
`Briefly, I assume that you don't want me to
`
`just recover what's in the papers.
`
`THE COURT: No. I understand. Yeah. I guess
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 9 of 106 PageID #: 51601
` 8
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`my question is, the Court, in my view, when the case was
`
`assigned to Judge Stark, very clearly ruled that there
`
`doesn't have to be a determination of searchability as
`
`part of performance of the claimed method. That's what I
`
`think he said.
`
`Your motion says that there does have to be
`
`determination at some point in time. I am not really sure
`
`what you mean by that. Do you mean as part of performance
`
`of the claim method or do you mean there has to be
`
`something built into the software, and it says that a
`
`predefined category has to be searchable?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Well, part of the difficulty comes
`
`with the language that you just quoted from Judge Stark,
`
`which is that we're dealing with two types of claims here.
`
`We have method claims, and we have computer readable
`
`medium claims; 1 and 8 are method claims; 23 and 30 are
`
`computer readable medium claims.
`
`Part of the difficulty here is that the
`
`claim -- first of all, the claim terms themselves provide
`
`that a determination has to be made. And the only
`
`criteria in the claim language itself -- if you'd like me
`
`to put it up, I can -- is that the information can be
`
`searched for.
`
`Judge Stark issued a construction that expanded
`
`on the types of information and said predefined categories
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 10 of 106 PageID #: 51602
` 9
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`of information. But his construction also includes the
`
`criteria that can be searched for in an information source
`
`external to the document.
`
`On summary judgment, we had raised the point
`
`that at the time of analyzing the text, that the Google
`
`products don't do that. So on summary judgment, we were
`
`seeking summary judgment that we did not infringe that, at
`
`that element of the method claims or the computer readable
`
`medium claims.
`
`THE COURT: Because there wasn't a
`
`searchability determination as part of the performance of
`
`the method, right?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: No. When the text was being
`
`analyzed. What was not an issue at that point, because it
`
`appeared from Judge Stark's actual construction, and it
`
`still appears from Judge Stark's actual construction that
`
`a determination must be made about whether the information
`
`can be searched for while the document is being
`
`displayed -- may I just put the claim for one moment, Your
`
`Honor?
`
`abstract.
`
`THE COURT: Yeah. That's a great idea.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: It's hard to look at it in the
`
`So here's Claim 1. You can see this element
`
`right here, the second element -- are you able to see
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 11 of 106 PageID #: 51603
` 10
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`that, Your Honor?
`
`THE COURT: Yeah. And I've got a copy myself
`
`that has that part highlighted. Yep.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: I made it a little bigger, if
`
`that's helpful.
`
`THE COURT: Sure.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: So this is one of the method
`
`claims, Claim 1. And the second element is while the
`
`document is being displayed, analyzing a computer process
`
`first information from the document to determine if the
`
`first information is at least one of a plurality of types
`
`of information that can be searched for.
`
`So there has to be a determination, according
`
`to this element, and the only criteria is whether it
`
`belongs to a type of information that can be searched for.
`
`Now, when we presented this on summary
`
`judgment, we were focused on the -- during the analyzing.
`
`Because this claim talks about analyzing. Judge Stark, we
`
`understood his ruling to say at the time of analyzing, the
`
`determination does not need to be made.
`
`The part that we think was not dealt with and
`
`is unclear now from both the construction and the rulings
`
`is: But there still has to be a determination that this
`
`information can be searched for at some point, otherwise
`
`the only criteria is now gone.
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 12 of 106 PageID #: 51604
` 11
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`And our understanding was so that determination
`
`would be made at the time you're predefining the
`
`categories. If it is not happening during the analyzing,
`
`then it would be happening when you said: What kinds of
`
`information should we be looking for?
`
`THE COURT: But let me ask you, though, so what
`
`do you mean by "at the time of predefining the category"?
`
`So the method doesn't have a step of predefining
`
`categories; right?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Only the construction does, Your
`
`Honor. So all of this is only made confusing by the
`
`construction itself. If you actually just look at the
`
`language of the claim, it's clear that the determination
`
`has to be made while the document is being displayed as
`
`part of the analyzing step. And the only criteria for it
`
`is that can be searched for.
`
`The confusion came up because of the
`
`construction. In the construction, Judge Stark added this
`
`notion of predefined categories that can be searched for.
`
`So if we're sicking with the construction, then the
`
`question becomes: When you're predefining the categories,
`
`presumably you can decide what categories are you
`
`choosing. And the criteria is: That can be searched for.
`
`So you might say I can pick place names. I can
`
`pick phone numbers. I can pick e-mail addresses. But if
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 13 of 106 PageID #: 51605
` 12
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`the criteria you are applying to predefine them is "pick
`
`categories that can be searched for," then that might work
`
`with the construction.
`
`But if you don't have -- ever have a
`
`determination that this type of information can be
`
`searched for, then this part of the determination that's
`
`expressly in the claims means nothing. It would just be
`
`determine if the first information is at least one of a
`
`plurality of types of information, period.
`
`THE COURT: As a matter of fact, the
`
`software -- and this is going to start to demonstrate that
`
`I have less knowledge about what the evidence is going to
`
`be in this case than you all do, but is there -- you keep
`
`saying there has to be this determination.
`
`Couldn't that be built into the architecture of
`
`the software? I mean, isn't that sort of -- you are free
`
`to argue: It's not built into our software that our
`
`predefined categories are categories that can be searched
`
`for. You want to be able to argue that; right?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Correct. We want to be able to
`
`argue that we don't make such a determination at any
`
`point, from the predetermination to the architecture to
`
`the analyzing. It's never made, period, in our products.
`
`THE COURT: Right. Well, Judge Stark has said
`
`you don't get to say you don't infringe because we don't
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 14 of 106 PageID #: 51606
` 13
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`make that -- because we don't make that determination as
`
`part of our performance of this outline. You can't say
`
`that. But you can still say: I don't infringe because
`
`our predefined categories are not, as a matter of fact,
`
`categories that can be searched for.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Your Honor, I think we can still
`
`make that argument, yes, but that's a different argument.
`
`Because there's a separate requirement that you perform a
`
`search. So if you couldn't perform the search, you
`
`wouldn't need that separate element of this claim. But in
`
`this element of the claim -- and, frankly, Your Honor,
`
`part of the difficulty is the existing construction that
`
`we're working with from Judge Stark -- still contains this
`
`language about determine that it can be searched for.
`
`One of our concerns, and the reason for the
`
`motion, is with this language, the actual claim language,
`
`the construction, the jury is going to be left with a
`
`question: Well, how do I know if it's determined that it
`
`can be searched for or not. And what we were asking for
`
`as part of the clarification is the existing construction
`
`leaves open that question that's going to be unanswered by
`
`anybody to the jury at the trial. We believe the current
`
`construction is, thus, confusing.
`
`If the ruling is that the determination does
`
`not ever have to include whether the information can be
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 15 of 106 PageID #: 51607
` 14
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`searched for or not, then I think the construction would
`
`have to be altered in some way so that it's not confusing.
`
`That was our concern, Your Honor, because,
`
`honestly, we thought that what was being dealt with in
`
`summary judgment was only the question of when you are
`
`doing the analyzing, are you determining at that moment in
`
`time that the information can be searched for or not.
`
`THE COURT: What element, in your view,
`
`requires a determination that it can be searched for? The
`
`same element is what you are saying?
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Yes. But at a different time,
`
`given the Court's construction. The Court added
`
`predefined categories does not exist in the claim
`
`language.
`
`THE COURT: Right.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Predefined categories was added as
`
`construction by Judge Stark. So then the question is that
`
`under the assumption that the information is not being
`
`determined to be searchable at the time of analyzing,
`
`because now you have these predefined categories, now
`
`there's a next question of: Well, then, did you make the
`
`determination to predefine the categories so that they can
`
`be searched for.
`
`In other words, you might be able to search for
`
`a telephone number and so you might say: I'm going to
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 16 of 106 PageID #: 51608
` 15
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`choose telephone numbers because I've determined I can
`
`search for those in a contact database. And you might not
`
`include URLs, for example, because you say: I don't want
`
`those to be searched for in a contact database or my
`
`contact data doesn't support that.
`
`So the point is, what has made it confusing is
`
`two things: The Court's addition of predefined categories
`
`on the construction and then the ruling itself, which, as
`
`we understood it, focused on when you're doing the
`
`analyzing, do you need to make the determination at that
`
`point in time. And if there are predefined categories
`
`where you've already made the determination, then that
`
`would make sense that it wouldn't have to be at the time
`
`of the analyzing.
`
`THE COURT: Right.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: But if it's never, not even at the
`
`predefinition standpoint, then that would no meaning at
`
`all.
`
`THE COURT: All right. Thanks very much. Let
`
`me hear from the other side on this.
`
`MR. LAHAD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John
`
`Lahad for plaintiff, Arendi.
`
`The motion should be denied. In our briefing,
`
`we lodged several procedural grounds. I think those
`
`procedural grounds undermine Google's substantive
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 17 of 106 PageID #: 51609
` 16
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`arguments.
`
`Your Honor, claim construction was done in
`
`2019. That's when Judge Stark included this predefined
`
`categories language in his construction. There was no
`
`confusion then. There was no motion for reconsideration.
`
`We litigated for three years plus based on that
`
`construction.
`
`Judge Stark issued his summary judgment ruling
`
`a year ago. Google said nothing for eight months until
`
`this -- until we were before this Court.
`
`So, bottom line is that the claim language
`
`controls. Judge Stark recognized that. There is nothing
`
`in the claim language that requires an actual
`
`determination to be made as to whether or not the
`
`information can be searched for. It's not in the claims.
`
`It's not in his construction. He didn't add that to
`
`anything. And he rejected all of Google's arguments on
`
`this point a year ago. And Google is -- sorry, Your
`
`Honor.
`
`that.
`
`THE COURT: Let me just -- yeah. No, and I get
`
`MR. LAHAD: Yeah.
`
`THE COURT: Putting that aside. Say I agree
`
`with you that I'm not going to revisit whether or not they
`
`can say that the claim limitation isn't met because there
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 18 of 106 PageID #: 51610
` 17
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`doesn't have to be a searchability determination as part
`
`of that step of the claim method. Assume I agree with you
`
`we're not going to revisit that. They are still free to
`
`argue, aren't they, that they don't infringe because as a
`
`matter of fact, they don't have predefined categories
`
`because they don't have software that's built to have --
`
`into the architecture that predefined categories can be
`
`searched for.
`
`MR. LAHAD: I think that's fair game, Your
`
`Honor. That's the claim language -- that's the Court's
`
`construction. So they can argue we don't have predefined
`
`categories, and so we don't infringe. What they can't
`
`argue --
`
`THE COURT: Predefined categories that can be
`
`searched for, they can argue. They don't have predefined
`
`categories that can be searched for.
`
`MR. LAHAD: Correct. They can't argue -- and
`
`then Judge Stark said this, that we don't infringe because
`
`there isn't an actual determination as to whether the
`
`information can be searched for.
`
`THE COURT: As part of the claimed method --
`
`MR. LAHAD: Correct.
`
`THE COURT: -- performance of the claimed
`
`method.
`
`MR. LAHAD: It's not the claim, and it's not in
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 19 of 106 PageID #: 51611
` 18
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`the Court's construction.
`
`THE COURT: He mentioned, opposing counsel,
`
`that there's a difference between the method claims and
`
`the apparatus claims. I actually looked at apparatus
`
`claims. It looks like sort of a weird amalgamation of an
`
`apparatus claim and a method claim.
`
`I didn't see that as a distinction in terms of
`
`arguing this motion, did you?
`
`MR. LAHAD: I did not either. I think they're
`
`essentially similar, similar for this purpose.
`
`THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you wanted to
`
`say?
`
`MR. LAHAD: Unless the Court has questions.
`
`I've got, you know, as much argument as the Court wants,
`
`but I'm happy --
`
`THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and have a
`
`seat. We have a lot to get through.
`
`So here's what my thinking is on this. I
`
`understand that defendants want to add or clarify the
`
`Court's construction to add a requirement or a
`
`clarification that there has to be a determination about
`
`searchability at some point in time.
`
`So just for the record, Judge Stark provided a
`
`claim construction of this element back in August of 2019.
`
`When I say "element," I mean this step of the claimed
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 20 of 106 PageID #: 51612
` 19
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`method in Claim 1. That is Docket Number 143 and 144.
`
`Then in March 2022 in his opinions, ruling on
`
`Daubert and summary judgment -- and that's at Docket 393,
`
`he said the following, and I will just put it on the
`
`record, so we're all clear. At page 6 and 7, in part, he
`
`says:
`
`"Arendi seeks to exclude portions of
`
`Dr. Shamos's expert report that are purportedly
`
`inconsistent with the Court's claim construction. The
`
`portions at issue relate to the claim term 'to determine
`
`if the first information is at least one plurality of text
`
`or information that can be searched for. The Court has
`
`construed this claim term as to determine if the first
`
`information belongs to one or more of several predefined
`
`categories of identifying information; e.g., a name,
`
`contact information, e.g., a phone number, a fax number,
`
`or an e-mail address that can be searched for in an
`
`information source external to the document.
`
`"In his report, Dr. Shamos opines that the
`
`claim term is not met because the accused devices do not
`
`perform any analysis to determine whether the first
`
`information can be searched for.
`
`"The Court agrees with Arendi, will grant its
`
`Daubert motion under the Court's construction an
`
`infringing product must analyze to determine while a
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 21 of 106 PageID #: 51613
` 20
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`document is being displayed whether the first information
`
`belongs to one or more of several predefined categories of
`
`identifying information or contact information.
`
`"While the eligible predefined categories of
`
`information must be categories that can be searched for in
`
`an information source external to the document, the
`
`Court's construction does not require that the
`
`searchability determination of the first information must
`
`be made by the accused infringing products while
`
`performing this step of the claimed process.
`
`"The counter interpretation of the term would
`
`effectively leave the word "predefined" out on the Court's
`
`construction. In other words, the phrase 'that can be
`
`searched for' modifies the allowable predefined categories
`
`and does not specify a distinct determination to be made."
`
`And then similarly, at Page 15, Judge Stark
`
`points out that Google argued that the Court's
`
`construction on the claim term does not require the
`
`accused -- sorry -- "Arendi argues that the Court's
`
`construction of this claim term does not require the
`
`accused products to perform an additional analyzing step
`
`to determine the searchability of the first information
`
`for the reasons explained in connection with the Court's
`
`grant of Arendi's Daubert motion, the Court finds the
`
`asserted claim does not require that the searchability of
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 22 of 106 PageID #: 51614
` 21
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`determination of the first information be made by the
`
`accused products while performing this step of the claimed
`
`process."
`
`So in other words, I understood Judge Stark's
`
`ruling to say that the step requires a determination as to
`
`whether the information is part of the predefined
`
`category. There's no requirement that the step of the
`
`claimed method also requires a determination that that
`
`category is searchable, but it does have to be searchable
`
`as a matter of fact.
`
`So to the extent that Google's motion is taking
`
`issue with Judge Stark's ruling, I agree with Arendi that
`
`its motion is essentially a motion for reargument and is
`
`procedurally inappropriate, especially coming eight months
`
`after Judge Stark's motion on summary judgment and
`
`Daubert.
`
`And I agree with Arendi that 02 Micro doesn't
`
`stand for the proposition that you can reargue a claim
`
`construction dispute that's already been settled.
`
`So to that extent, I deny the motion.
`
`So just to be clear for the record, Google's
`
`motion requested that the Court order that it may argue at
`
`trial that the accused products don't infringe because
`
`they do not make searchability determination.
`
`Judge Stark has ruled that Google may not argue
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 23 of 106 PageID #: 51615
` 22
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`that, that there is no requirement for searchability
`
`determination at that step of the claimed method.
`
`If there's some other dispute about what some
`
`other claim language means, we'll take that up at the jury
`
`charge conference. And we're not going to let the jury
`
`construe any terms. We will get it resolved at that point
`
`in time.
`
`So we can reraise an issue on claim
`
`construction at the jury charge conference, if there is
`
`one, but we're not going to revisit old arguments.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: May I just ask, Your Honor --
`
`THE COURT: Yes.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: You said there is something that
`
`we can argue. I just wanted to make sure -- I don't want
`
`to violate any court order.
`
`THE COURT: At this point in time, I think we
`
`are going to go just based on what the transcript said
`
`rather than further confuse things. Because I think we
`
`heard some concessions from the other side about what they
`
`don't oppose you arguing as well. So we'll go with that.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Understand. Thank you, Your
`
`Honor.
`
`THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about the
`
`motions in limine.
`
`Let's hear Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Number
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 24 of 106 PageID #: 51616
` 23
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`1, which has to do with argument about the Apple license
`
`and the prior report regarding the Apple reasonable
`
`royalty.
`
`Max --
`
`question.
`
`MR. STRAUS: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: I apologize. I do have one quick
`
`THE COURT: Yes.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: There may be discussion of
`
`specific numbers with regard to this, and Google's
`
`in-house counsel is in the room. I believe those might be
`
`subject to the protective order. And so --
`
`THE COURT: I think let's just leave numbers
`
`out of this. I think we can argue this portion -- I
`
`think -- I think we can probably do this without referring
`
`to specific numbers.
`
`MR. UNIKEL: Okay.
`
`THE COURT: Yep.
`
`MR. STRAUS: I think that's right, Your Honor.
`
`THE COURT: Okay. Great.
`
`MR. STRAUS: Max Straus from Susman Godfrey for
`
`Arendi. This Court should preclude Google's proposed use
`
`of Mr. Weinstein's reasonable royalty projection from the
`
`Apple case, separate lawsuit. That projection has no
`
`probative value in this case, and it will greatly
`
`

`

`Case 1:13-cv-00919-JLH Document 503-1 Filed 04/28/23 Page 25 of 106 PageID #: 51617
` 24
`
` 1
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
` 4
`
` 5
`
` 6
`
` 7
`
` 8
`
` 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`prejudice the jury against Mr. Weinstein or Arendi, and
`
`furthermore, it's going to require a time-consuming trial
`
`within a trial.
`
`So introducing Mr. Weinstein's damages model
`
`is, as I said, going to have an overwhelmingly prejudicial
`
`effect. And once the jury hears -- and I will leave
`
`numbers out of this -- once the jury hears the headline
`
`charge that Mr. Weinstein was off by a very large
`
`percentage in their view, the jury is not going to hear
`
`anything else, and they're going to be left with the false
`
`impression that Mr. Weinstein failed to do what he was
`
`never asked to do, which was to project the amount that
`
`Arendi settled -- I

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket