Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 1 of 35 PagelD #: 47352
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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`ARENDI S.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintifé,
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`Vv.
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`LG ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICSU.S.A., INC., and
`LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM
`ULS.A., INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`ARENDIS.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Vv.
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`BLACKBERRYLIMITEDand
`BLACKBERRY CORPORATION,
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`Defendants.
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`ARENDIS.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
`
`Vv.
`
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC
`f/ik/a MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`C.A, No, 12-1595-LPS
`
`C.A. No. 12-1597-LPS
`
`C.A. No. 12-1601-LPS
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`
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400
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`Filed 04/08/22 Page 2 of 35 PagelD #: 47353
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`ARENDIS.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Vv.
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`SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
`(USA)INC., f/k/a SONY ERICSSON
`MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS(USA) INC.,
`SONY CORPORATION,and SONY
`CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
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`Defendants.
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`ARENDIS.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vy.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`ARENDIS.A.R.L.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`¥.
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`OATH HOLDINGS INC. and
`OATHINC.,,
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`Defendants.
`
`C.A. No, 12-1602-LPS
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`C.A. No, 13-919-LPS
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`C.A. No, 13-920-LPS
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 3 of 35 PagelD #: 47354
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`Neal C. Belgam and Eve H. Ormerod, SMITH, KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP, Wilmington,
`DE
`Seth Ard, Beatrice Franklin, and Max Straus, SUSMAN GODFREY, LLP, New York, NY
`John Lahad, Ibituroko-Emi Lawson, Robert Travis Korman, and Brenda Adimora, SUSMAN
`GODFREY, LLP, Houston, TX
`Kalpana Srinivasan, SUSMAN GODFREY,LLP, Los Angeles, CA
`Kemper Diehl, SUSMAN GODFREY,LLP,Seattle, WA
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff
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`Jeremy D. Anderson, FISH & RICHARDSONP.C., Wilmington, DE
`Steven R. Katz and Jacob Pecht, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Boston, MA
`R. Andrew Schwentker, FISH & RICHARDSONP.C., Washington DC
`Eda Stark, FISH & RICHARDSONP.C., Atlanta, GA
`
`Attorneysfor Defendants LG Electronics Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and LG
`Electronics Mobilecomm U.S.A., Ine.
`
`Kenneth L. Dorsney and Cortlan S. Hitch, MORRIS JAMES LLP, Wilmington, DE
`Brian C. Riopelle and David E. Finkelson, MCGUIREWOODSLLP, Richmond, VA
`Jason W. Cook, MCGUIREWOODSLLP,Dallas, TX
`
`Attorneysfor Defendants BlackBerry Limited and BlackBerry Corporation
`
`David E. Moore, Bindu A. Palapura, and Stephanie E. O’Byrne, POTTER ANDERSON &
`CORROONLLP, Wilmington, DE
`Robert W. Unikel, Michelle Marek Figueiredo, John Cotiguala, and Matt Lind, PAUL
`HASTINGSLLP, Chicago, IL
`Robert R. Laurenzi, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, New York, NY
`Ariell Bratton, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, San Diego, CA
`Ginger Anders, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, Washington, DC
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`Attorneysfor Defendant Motorola Mobility LLCf’k/a Motorola Mobility, Inc.
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`Rodger D. Smith I, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELLLLP, Wilmington, DE
`Jeffri A. Kaminski, Justin E. Pierce, and Calvin R. Nelson, VENABLE LLP, Washington, DC
`Neha Bhat, VENABLE LLP, New York, NY
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`Attorneysfor Defendants Sony Mobile Communications (USA) Inc. f/k/a Sony Ericsson
`Mobile Communications (USA) Inc., Sony Corporation, and Sony Corporation of USA
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 4 of 35 PagelD #: 47355
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`David E. Moore, Bindu A. Palapura, and Stephanie E. O’Byrne, POTTER ANDERSON &
`CORROONLLP, Wilmington, DE
`Robert W. Unikel, Michelle Marek Figueiredo, John Cotiguala, and Matt Lind, PAUL
`HASTINGSLLP,Chicago, IL
`Robert R. Laurenzi and Chad J. Peterman, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, New York, NY
`Ariell Bratton, PAUL HASTINGSLLP, San Diego, CA
`Ginger Anders, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, Washington, DC
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`Attorneys for Defendant Google LLC
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`Jack B. Blumenfeld, Brian P. Egan, and Anthony D. Raucci, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT &
`TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, DE
`Frank C. Cimino Jr., Megan S. Woodworth, Jeffri A. Kaminski, Calvin R. Nelson, and Neha
`Bhat, VENABLE LLP, Washington, DC
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`Attorneysfor Defendants Oath Holdings Inc. and Oath Inc.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`
`REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION(ISSUED April 8, 2022)
`March 31, 2022
`Wilmington, Delaware
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 5 of 35 PagelD #: 47356
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`Tous P. Des
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`STARK,U.S. Circuit Judge:
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`On November 29, 2012 and May 22, 2013, Plaintiff Arendi S.A.R.L. (“Plaintiff” or
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`“Arendi”) initiated 10 patent infringement cases against a series of defendants (“Defendants”).
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`These cases and the corresponding defendant(s) in each caseare listed below:
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`e C.A.No, 12-1595 (the “LG Action”): LG Electronics Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.,
`and LG Electronics Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, “LG”);
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`* CA. No, 12-1596 (the “Apple Action”): Apple Inc. (“Apple”);
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`« C.A.No., 12-1597 (the “BlackBerry Action”). BlackBerry Limited and BlackBerry
`Corporation (collectively, “BlackBerry”);
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`« C.A.No. 12-1598 (the “Samsung Action”): Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Samsung
`Electronics America Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America LLC (collectively,
`“Samsung”);
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`« CA.No, 12-1599 (the “Microsoft Mobile Action”): Microsoft Mobile, Inc. (“Microsoft
`Mobile”);
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`e CA. No. 12-1600 (the “HTC Action”): HTC Corporation (“HTC”);
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`e C.A. No. 12-1601 (the “Mororola Action”): Motorola Mobility LLC f/k/a Motorola
`Mobility, Inc. (“Motorola”);
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`e C.A.No. 12-1602 (the “Sony Action”): Sony Mobile Communications (USA) Inc.f/k/a
`Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications (USA) Inc., Sony Corporation, and Sony
`Corporation of USA (collectively, “Sony”);
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`e C.A. No.13-919 (the “Google Action”): Google LLC (“Google”);
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`« CA. No. 13-920 (the “Oath Action”): Oath Holdings Inc. and Oath Inc. (collectively,
`“Oath”).
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`Arendi asserted one or more ofthe following five patents against each Defendant: U.S.
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`Patent Nos. 6,323,853 (the “853 patent”), 7,496,854 (the “’854 patent”), 7,917,843 (the “843
`
`patent”), 7,921,356 (the “’356 patent”), and 8,306,993 (the “993 patent”). These patents are
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`entitled “method, system and computer readable medium for addressing handling from”either “a
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`computer program” or “an operating system.”
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 6 of 35 PagelD #: 47357
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`These cases were stayed between 2014 and 2018, as the parties engaged in multiple inter
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`partes review (“IPR”) proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). After
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`these IPR proceedings andthe appeals from them concluded, the only remaining patent asserted
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`in any of the cases is the *843 patent.’
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`The Apple Action, the Samsung Action, and the Microsoft Mobile Action have settled.
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`(See C.A. No. 12-1596 D.L 421; C.A. No. 12-1598 DI. 103; C.A. No. 12-1599 D.I. 204) The
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`HTC Action is stayed pending the outcome of the Google Action. (See C.A, No. 12-1600 DI.
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`195 at 4)
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`Pending before the Court are a total of 36 motionsfiled by the parties in the six
`remaining active cases, consisting of 21 motions to exclude expert testimony (“Daubert
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`motions”); 14 motions for summary judgment; and a motion for leaveto file supplemental
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`infringement contentions, re-open discovery, and file a supplemental brief. (C.A. No. 12-1595
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`D.L. 256, 260, 263, 266, 268, 270, 333; C.A. No. 12-1597 D.I. 190, 193, 195, 200, 203, 207; C.A.
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`No. 12-1601 D.I. 265, 268, 271, 277, 279, 282; C.A. No. 12-1602 DI. 223, 226, 230, 231, 236,
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`C.A. No. 13-919 D.I. 269, 272, 275, 281, 283, 286; C.A. No. 13-920 D.I. 233, 236, 238, 240,
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`241, 246)
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`The Court has considered the voluminous briefs and other materials submitted by the
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`parties in connection with this large number of motions. The Court also held a consolidated
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`hearing on July 29, 2021, in which the Court heard oral argument on the pending motionsin all
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`six cases. (C.A. No. 12-1595 D.L 346; C.A. No. 12-1597 D.I. 271, C.A. No. 12-1601 D.I. 378;
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`C.A. No. 12-1602 D.I. 294; C.A. No. 13-919 DI. 385; C.A. No, 13-920 D.E 319) (Tr.”)
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`1 The details of these IPR proceedings and their respective outcomes are documentedin a joint
`status report filed on August 6, 2018, docketed in each of the cases. (See, e.g., C.A. No. 12-1595
`D.L. 81)
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`|
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 7 of 35 PagelD #: 47358
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`This memorandum opinion will address the following 11 motions:
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`Daubert motions:
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`« Arendi’s motion to exclude portions of Dr. Michael Shamos’ expert report (C.A. No.
`12-1597 D.L 190)
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`» Arendi’s motions to exclude portions of Dr. Martin Rinard’s expert report (C.A. No.
`12-1601 D.L. 265; C.A. No. 13-919 D.I. 269)
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`« Arendi’s motions to exclude portions of Mr. Monty G. Myers’ expert report (C.A.
`No. 12-1602 D.J. 223; C.A. No. 13-920 DI. 233)
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`Motions for summary judgment:
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`+ LG’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement by the Rebel 4 accused
`products (C.A. No. 12-1595 D.I. 263)
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`e BlackBerry’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement (C.A. No. 12-1597
`D.I. 195)
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`¢ Motorola’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement (C.A. No. 12-1601
`D1. 271)
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`«
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`Sony’s motion for summary judgmentof non-infringement(C.A. No. 12-1602 DL.
`231)
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`¢ Google’s motion for summary judgmentof non-infringement (C.A. No. 13-919 D.L.
`275)
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`e Oath’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement (C.A. No. 13-920 D.I.
`240).
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`I.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`A.
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`Daubert And Federal Rule Of Evidence 702
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`In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993), the Supreme Court
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`explained that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 creates “a gatekeeping role for the [trial] judge” in
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`2 Arendi has filed separate Daubert motions challenging Dr. Rinard in the Motorola Action and
`in the Google Action, but the parties’ briefs filed in connection with those two motions are
`essentially identical. Thus, the Court will address these two motions together.
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 8 of 35 PagelD #: 47359
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`otder to “ensurfe] that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to
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`the task at hand.” The rule requires that expert testimony “help the trier of fact to understandthe
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`evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). Expert testimony is admissible
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`only if “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data,” “the testimony is the product of
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`reliable principles and methods,” and “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
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`to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(b)-(d). There are three distinct requirements for
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`admissible expert testimony: (1) the expert must be qualified; (2) the opinion mustbereliable;
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`and (3) the expert’s opinion mustrelate to the facts. See generally Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233
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`F.3d 734, 741-46 (3d Cir. 2000). Rule 702 embodies a “liberal policy of admissibility.” Pineda
`v. FordMotor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir, 2008). Motions to exclude evidence are
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`committed to the Court’s discretion. See In re Paoli R. R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749 Gd
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`Cir. 1994),
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`B.
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`Summary Judgment And Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 56
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`“The court shall grant summary judgmentif the movant showsthatthere is no genuine
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`dispute as to any material fact and the movantis entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
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`R. Civ. P. 56(a), The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
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`issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
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`586 n.10 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be — or, alternatively, is — genuinely disputed
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`must be supported either by citing to “particular parts of materials in the record, including
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`depositions, documents, electronically stored information,affidavits or declarations, stipulations
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`(including those made for the purposesof the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,
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`or other materials,” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
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`ptesence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
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`|
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 9 of 35 PagelD #: 47360
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`support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). ff the moving party has carriedits burden,
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`the nonmovant must then “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
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`for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S, at 587 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The
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`Court will “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovingparty, and it may not make
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`credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
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`530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
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`To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than
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`simply show that there is some metaphysical doubtas to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475
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`U.S, at 586; see also Podohnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating
`party opposing summaryjudgment “must present more thanjust bare assertions, conclusory
`allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue”) (intemal quotation marks
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`omitted). However, the “mere existence of somealleged factual dispute between the parties will
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`not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment,” and a factual dispute
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`is genuine only where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
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`nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “If the
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`evidence is merely colorable,or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
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`granted.” Jd. at 249-50 (internalcitations omitted), see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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`317, 322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgmentis mandated “against a party who fails to
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`make a showing sufficientto establish the existence of an elementessentialto that party’s case,
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`and on which that party will bear the burden ofproofattrial”). Thus, the “mere existence of a
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`scintilla of evidence”in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a
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`motion for summary judgment; there must be “evidence on whichthe jury could reasonably
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`find” for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S, at 252.
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`|
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 10 of 35 PagelD #: 47361
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`I.
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`DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Daubert Motions
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`1.
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`Shamos
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`Arendi seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Shamos’ expert report that are purportedly
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`“imeonsistent with the Court’s claim construction.” (C.A. No. 12-1597 D.I. 191 at 2) The
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`portionsat issue relate to the claim term “to determineif the first informationis at least one of a
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`plurality of types of informationthat can be searched for.” (/d. at 3) The Court has construed
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`this claim term as:
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`to determine if the first information belongs to one or more of
`several predefined categories ofidentifying information(¢.g., a
`name) or contact information(e.g., a phone number,a fax number,
`or an email address) that can be searched forin an information
`source external to the document.
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`(id. D.I. 125 at 13-15) In his report, Dr. Shamos opinesthat the claim term is not met because
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`the Accused Devices “do not perform any analysis to determine whetherthe first information
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`‘can be searched for....”” (/d. DJ. 192 Ex. 1 469; see also id. 4 133 (“[The Accused
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`Applications] do not determine whether any informationatall ‘can be searched for... ."”))
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`The Court agrees with Arendi and will grant its Daubert motion. Under the Court’s
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`construction, an infringingproduct must analyze to determine, while a documentis being
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`displayed, whether thefirst information “belongs to one or more of several predefined categories
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`of identifying information .. . or contact information.” While the eligible “predefined
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`categories” of information must be categories “that can be searched for in an information source
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`external to the document,” the Court’s construction does not require that the searchability
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`determination ofthe first information must be made by the accused infringing products while
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`performing this step of the claimed process. The contrary interpretation of the term would
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 11 of 35 PagelD #: 47362
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`effectively read the word “predefined” out ofthe Court’s construction. In other words,“the
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`phrase ‘that can be searched for’ modifies the allowable “predefined categories’ and does not
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`specify a distinct determination to be made.” (/d. D.L. 191 at 4) It follows that Dr. Shamosis
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`attempting to impose an additionallimitation not in the claims and his opinions on this point
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`must be excluded. See Personalized User Model, L.L.P. v. Google Inc., 2014 WL 807736, at *]
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`(D. Del. Feb. 27, 2014) (excluding expert report for failure to apply Court’s claim constructions).
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`2.
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`Rinard?
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`a.
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`“Determine If The First Information Is At Least One Of A
`Plurality Of Types Of Information That Can Be Searched For”
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`Forthe same reasons provided in connection with Arendi’s Daubert motion regarding Dr.
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`Shamos(see supra ILA. 1), the Court will grant this portion of Arendi’s motion (C.A. No. 12-
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`1601 D.I. 266 at 3-7).4 Dr. Rinard is precluded from testifying that the Accused Devices or
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`Accused Apps do notsatisfy the claim limitation because they do not determine the searchability
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`of the first information.
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`3 Motorola and Google contend that Arendi’s Daubert motion is untimely, prejudicial, and fails
`to address the Pennypack factors. (See C.A. No. 12-1601 D.I. 334 at 16-18; see also Tr. at 64)
`The Court disagrees. Arendi’s Daubert motion was timely filed pursuant to the scheduling
`order. Motorola and Google cite no authority supporting the suggestion that a Daubert motion
`seeking to exclude expert opinions onreliability grounds must address the Pennypack factors.
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`‘ During the claim construction stage of these cases, Arendi “argued that the claim language was
`clear as to where the search can be performed for purposes of the determining step.” (C.A. No.
`12-1601 D.f. 334 at 6-7) (emphasis added) Arendi did not advocate for the position that the
`claimed process requires a searchability determination. Hence, Arendi has not been inconsistent,
`as Motorola and Google unpersuasively contend.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 12 of 35 PagelD #: 47363
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`b.
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`“Analyzing, In A Computer Process,
`First Information In A Document”
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`Arendi seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Rinard’s report in which he opinesthat, to
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`establish infringement, Arendi must show that the “analyzing”step is performed on the alleged
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`“first information” and not on any additional information. (See id. D.L. 266 at 7-9; see also id.
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`D.I. 267 Ex. 1 ff] 395-412) The Court will grant Arendi’s motion.
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`Dr. Rinard has failed to apply the plain and ordinary meaning ofthe claim term, which no
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`party asked the Court to construe. The term does not require analyzing only the first information
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`in a document. Instead, analysis of other information in addition to the first information —
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`including “text that includes first information” or “passages encompassing first information” (id.
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`DL. 334 at 9-10) — does notfall outside of the claim scope. In other words, this claim limitation
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`is satisfied whenthefirst information in a documentis analyzed, regardless of whetherother
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`information is also analyzed.”
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`Dr. Rinard has also impermissibly advanced his own claim construction in his expert
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`report. He attempts to impose his own construction ofthis term by relying on a purported
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`“disclaimer” made during prosecution. (See id. DI. 267 Ex. | [{] 395-97) This is not a task for
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`an expert witness. See generally Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 361 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is improper to argue claim construction to the jury.”).
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`c.
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`“Performing An Action Using
`At Least Part Of The Secend Information”
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`Arendi seeks to exclude a portion of Dr. Rinard’s expert report which opines that actions
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`involving merely display of second information do notsatisfy this claim element. (See C.A. No.
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`5 Contrary to Motorola and Google’s contention (see, e.g., C.A. No. 12-1601 D.1, 334 at 10-11),
`the Court’s construction of“first information” does not suggest the analysis is limited solely to
`the first information.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 13 of 35 PagelD #: 47364 |
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`12-1601 D.L. 266 at 9-11; see also id. D.L. 267 Ex. 1 §f| 327-41) This portion of Arendi’s motion
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`will also be granted.
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`The Court agrees with Arendi that Dr. Rinard has imposed his own construction on this
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`unconstruedclaim term, rather than applying its plain and ordinary meaning. In his expert
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`report, Dr. Rinard purported to apply canons of claim construction(see id. | 333); he also reads
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`limitations from specification embodiments into the claim (see id. {| 334) andcites to the
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`prosecution history (see id. $335). In the end, he adopts a claim construction that impermissibly
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`narrowsthe term’s plain and ordinary meaning. Therefore, Dr. Rinard is precluded from
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`testifying that the Accused Devices and Accused Appsdo notinfringe because they merely
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`display the second information.
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`d.
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`Whether “Performing An Action”
`Must Occur In The “First Computer Program”
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`Arendi seeks to exclude another portion of Dr. Rinard’s expert report, in which he opines
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`that the claim limitation “performing an action usingat least part of the second information”
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`must occur within the first computer program. (See id. D.I. 266 at 12-13; see also id. D.L 267
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`Ex. 1 9352-73) Given Motorola and Google’s clarification and assurancethat Dr. Rinard
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`SS (2.19.1. 334 at 16), this portion of
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`Arendi’s motion will be denied as moot.®
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`6 To the extent Arendi contends that Dr. Rinard hasfailed to disclose in his report his opinion
`that
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`'(C.A. No. 12-1601 D.1. 358 at 9; see aéso id. DI. 334 at 15), this is an issue that
`can be presented in the pretrial order and/orattrial. Itis nota basis for granting a Daubert
`motion.
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 14 of 35 PagelD #: 47365
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`3.
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`Myers
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`For the same reasons provided in connection with Arendi’s Daubert motion regarding Dr.
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`Shamos(see supra ILA.1), the Court will grant this portion of Arendi’s motion (C.A. No. 12-
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`1602 D.I. 224 at 2-5). Mr. Myersis precluded from testifying that the Accused Devicesor
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`Accused Appsdonotsatisfy the claim limitation because they do not determine the searchability
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`of the first information.
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`B.
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`Motions For Summary Judgment
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`1.
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`Google’s Motion For Summary Judgment Of Non-Infringement
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`Google moves for summary judgment of non-infringementon the grounds that its
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`Accused Appsdo notsatisfy several claim limitations: (1) “document”(see C.A. No. 13-919 DL
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`276 at 16-22); (2) “determineif the first informationis at least one of plurality of types of
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`information that can be searched for”(see id, at 23-27); and (3) “providing an input device
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`configured by the first computer program”and “in consequence of receipt by the first computer
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`program of the user commandfrom the input device”(seeid. at 27-40).
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`a.
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`“Document”
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`i,
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`Linkify And Smart Linkify
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`Googlefirst contends that summary judgmentofnon-infringement should be granted
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`with respect to the Accused Apps operating in conjunction with the Linkify and the Smart
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`Linkify functionalities.” (See id. D.I. 276 at 18-19) According to Google, since these
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`functionalities “only operate on text that is aot editable” (id. at 18), the Accused Apps operating
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`7 These Accused Apps include: Google Messages, Calendar, Hangouts, Tasks, Docs, Slides, and
`Sheets. The specific date ranges of these apps operating in conjunction with Linkify and Smart
`Linkify are detailed in an appendix attached to Google’s reply brief. (See C.A. No, 13-919 DL
`276 at 18; id D.I. 370 App’x 1}
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`10
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 15 of 35 PagelD #: 47366
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`in conjunction with them cannot meetthe claim limitation “while the documentis being
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`displayed, analyzing .
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`.
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`. first information from the document.” In Google’s view, under the
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`Court's claim construction, the term “document” must be “a word processing, spreadsheet, or
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`similar file into which text can be entered.” (Id. D.1. 143 at 5) (emphasis added)
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`During the consolidated hearing, Arendi confirmed that there is no dispute that Linkify
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`and Smart Linkify work only in conjunction with non-editable files. (See Tr. at 36) Arendi
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`contends, however, that “document{s]” need not be editable “throughout the entire claim, [and]
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`throughout the entire process.” (Id. at 27) According to Arendi,the files analyzed by the
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`Accused Appsoperating in conjunction with Linkify and Smart Linkify fall within the scope of
`“document[s]” because “text can be entered into each type ofdocumentat issue.” (C.A. No.13-
`919 D.L. 345 at 13-16) The editability requirementis satisfied, in Arendi’s view,“as long as at
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`least at one point in the past, it was a file into which text can be entered.” (Tr. at 32)
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`Arendi’s understandingof the claim scope is incorrect. The Court has construed
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`“document” as “a... file into which text can be entered,” not a file into which text can be
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`entered at somepoint. The “document”ofthe claim limitation must remain a “document” — that
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`is, a “file into which text can be entered” — “while the documentis being displayed.” [t must
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`likewise remain a “document” — again, a “file into which text can be entered” — while the
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`Accused App is “analyzing.. . first information from the document.” These limitations require
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`that the document remain editable at least whenit is displayed and analyzed. Since there is no
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`dispute that Linkify and Smart Linkify do not work on editable files, there is also no dispute that
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`the Accused Apps operating in conjunction with Linkify and Smart Linkifly do not satisfy these
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`claim limitations.
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`|
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 16 of 35 PagelD #: 47367
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`Arendi’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Arendiinsists that the Court should
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`“recognize[] that .. . the characteristics of a claimed element can changeover the course ofa
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`claim.” (Id. at 32) Thus, according to Arendi, “if a document beginsas a file into which text can
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`be entered and then... becomes non-editable or read only, . .. that [does not] negate{] the fact
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`that it is a document.” (/d. at 31) By so arguing, Arendi essentially asks the Court to depart
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`from its construction of a claim term and apply different meanings to the same term throughouta
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`claim based on the purported changes of “characteristics of a claimed element.” Arendi does not
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`cite any authority to support this approach.
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`In a further attempt to support its position, Arendi refers to the opinionofits expert
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`witness, Dr. Smedley, who opines that a person ofordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) “would
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`understand the Court’s construction to refer to classes of documents, as reflected by the Court’s
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`reference to a ‘word processing, spreadsheet, or similar file” and “would notdice this category
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`further” into editable or non-editable files “at a given moment.” (C.A. No. 13-919 D.I. 347 Ex.
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`B 4 163; see also id. DJ. 345 at 15) This portion of Dr. Smediey’s opinion does not create a
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`genuine dispute of material fact as it only accounts for a part ofthe Court’s construction ~ that
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`the “document”is “a word processing, spreadsheet, or similar file” — and ignoresthe part of the
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`construction requiring a documentto be a “file into which text can be entered.”
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`Arendi also points to the Court’s opinion in Arendi S.A.R.L. v. HTC Corp., 2020 WL
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`7360155 (D. Del. Dec. 15, 2020). In that decision, the Court stated that, with respect to the *843
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`patent, it no longer believedthat the asserted claim “require{d] that the second information be
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`used to perform an action ithefirst program.” Id. at *2. In Arendi’s view,that statement
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`negated the requirementthat the “document” must remain editable and allow the user to insert
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`the “second information” into the document. (See C.A. No. 13-919 D.L345 at 15-16; see also
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`12
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`|
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`|
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`Tr. at 27-29) The Court disagrees, The Court’s construction that “[a] ‘document’ as usedhere
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`must be editable” (C.A. No. 13-919 D.L. 143 at 8) is not predicated exclusively on the notion that
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`the user must be able to insert information back into the documentafter the analysis occurs.
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`Instead, the Court explained that “the term ‘document’ must be construed consistent with the
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`patents’ repeated and consistent requirementin the specification that documents be editable,”
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`including that “the patent’sdefinition of theterm — ‘wordprocessors, spreadsheets,etc,’ ~ is
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`necessarily limited to computer programsin which a user can enter data.” (id. at 8-9)
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`In sum, there is no genuine dispute ofmaterial fact that the Accused Appsoperating in
`
`conjunction with Linkify and Smart Linkify cannotinfringe the ’843 patent. Accordingly,
`Google’s motion for summaryjudgment ofnon-infringementwillbe granted withrespectto the
`AccusedApps operating in conjunction with Linkify and Smart Linkify.
`
`ii.
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`ChromeAnd News
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`Google next contends that summary judgment of non-infringement should be granted
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`withrespectto the Chrome and the News apps because “Arendi has no evidence to show the
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`ability of a user to edit Chrome and News webpages.” (/d. D.. 276 at 19-20)
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`There is a genuine dispute of material fact over whether a POSA would understand the
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`items displayed by Chrome and Newsto befiles “into which text can be entered.” With respect
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`to Chrome, Arendi’s expert, Dr. Smedley, provides multiple examples in his report in which the
`content of a webpage displayed by Chromecan be edited. (See id D.I. 347 Ex. A472; Ex. B ff
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`155, 160 0.108; see also id D.I. 345 at 14-15) As to News, Dr. Smedley explained that “textual
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`content of newsarticles is retrieved from a remote server and entered into a news item for
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`| display.” (id. D.1. 347 Ex. A { 102) In his opinion, then, the news item satisfies the editability
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`requirement because a POSA would understand the phrase “into which text can be entered” to
`
`13
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`E
`|
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`-
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 18 of 35 PagelD #: 47369
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`require the “ability to load text into the objects that constitute the electronic document.” (fd, Ex.
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`B ff 153-54) Although Google contends that Dr. Smedley’s opinion would “render the Court’s
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`construction, ‘into which text can be entered,’ meaningless” (idZ D.I. 370 at 7), the Court’s
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`construction does not restrict the manner in which text can be enteredinto a document.
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`Thus, Dr. Smedley’s opinion creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
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`Chrome and Newssatisfy the “document” element. This.portion ofGoogle’s motion will be
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`denied.
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`iii.
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`“Transitory Data Entry Fields”
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`Google also contends that summary judgment of non-infringement is warranted with
`respect toten Accused Apps* and the Accused Devicesusing those:apps because “Arendi
`accuses only transitory dataentry fields .. . ofbeing the ‘document.(/d. D.I. 276 at 20) In
`Google’s view,the transitory interfaces are not documents because “they are not ‘word
`
`processor, spreadsheetor similar file[s].”” Ud. at 21)
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`The Court will deny this portion of Google’s motion. There is a genuine dispute of
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`material fact as to whetherthe data entry interfaces in the AccusedAppsat issuein this motion
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`are “word processor, spreadsheetor similar files.” Arendi’sexpert, Dr. Smedley,opines that a
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`POSA would understand that the data entry interfaces in each of the Accused Appsatissue are
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`“word processor, spreadsheetor similar files.” (fd, D1. 345 at 17-21, see also, e.g., id. D.I. 347
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`Ex. B {f. 176-78)
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`Pointing to Arendi’s statements trying to distinguish prior art during the prosecution and
`the IPR proceeding ofa related patent, Google counters that “Arendi andits experts repeatedly
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`4 The ten Accused Apps are Google Messages, Chrome, Calendar, Contacts, Hangouts, Tasks,
`Does, Slides, Sheets, and News. (C.A. No. 13-919 DL 276 at 20)
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`14
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`Case 1:13-cv-00919-VAC Document 400 Filed 04/08/22 Page 19 of 35 PagelD #: 47370
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`admitted that user interfaces and data entry fields used merely to accept transitory text are not
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`‘document’ within the '843 patent.” (/@, D.I. 276 at 21) However, Dr. Smedley explains that
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`those statements are “irrelevant” to any ofthe data entry interfaces in the Accused Apps because
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`the purported “transitory data entry fields”in the prior art “are not akin to the documents”
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`identified in his expert reports. Ud. D.1. 345 at 21-23; see also id. D.1. 347 Ex. B {ff 167-69)
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`Thus, whether the transitory data entry fields in the Accused Apps constitute “document(s}”
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`presents a genuine dispute of material fact to be resolved by the jury.
`
`b.
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`“Determine If The First Information Is At Least One Of A
`Pluratity Of Types OfInformation That Can Be Searched For”
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`Google contends that the Court should grant summary judgment ofnon-infringement as
`to allAccused Products because none ofthe Accused Products “analyze to determine whether
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`identified information is of a type that ‘can be searched for’ on