Case 1:23-cv-01655-RAH Document 17 Filed 12/20/23 Page 1 of 4
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`In the United States Court of Federal Claims
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`No. 23-1655
`Filed: December 20, 2023
`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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`MELVIN LOUIS HUGES,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`UNITED STATES,
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`Defendant.
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`HERTLING, Judge
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Melvin Louis Huges, proceeding pro se, brought this action on September 25, 2023. The
`complaint alleges that the federal government infringed the plaintiff’s copyright when “IRS
`special agents intentionally used copyright properties in [a] civil case and refused to use [the]
`legal name of [the] plaintiff since the beginning of [the] case.” To remedy the alleged
`infringement, the plaintiff asks that the referenced civil case—a civil forfeiture case—be
`dismissed, and that all seized properties be returned to their legal owner. Because the Court of
`Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, the complaint must be
`dismissed.
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`The factual allegations in the complaint are sparse. In full, the complaint’s “statement of
`the claim” reads:
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`IRS Special Agents intentionally use copyright properties MELVIN
`HUGHES, BANDELE TRUST MELVIN LOUIS HUGES in civil
`case 2:21-cv-04569-JAK-(KLSx) and refused to use my legal name
`and address huges, melvin louis last 4 of ss# [****], legal address
`1014 S Westlake Blvd 14-318, Westlake Village CA, 91361.
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`The plaintiff attached several exhibits to the complaint, which he labeled in two sets of Exhibits
`A through C. The first set of exhibits consists of three Certificates of Existence and Registration
`from the Minnesota Secretary of State. Those certificates seem to establish that entities named
`“Melvin Hughes,” “Bandele Trust,” and “Melvin Louis Huges” exist. The second set of exhibits
`consists of annotated copies of emails exchanged between Mr. Huges and an IRS Special Agent
`between September 2021 and August 2023. In each of the emails, the IRS agent addressed the
`plaintiff as “Mr. Hughes,” despite a September 2021, request from the plaintiff that he be
`addressed “in [his] proper name: melvin louis huges.” On each copy of the printed email
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`addressed to “Mr. Hughes,” the plaintiff annotated the document with the words “Intentional
`misrepresentation of Information.” The complaint closes by requesting that the Court of Federal
`Claims, pursuant to the Copyright Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, dismiss the civil
`forfeiture case against the plaintiff and return the seized properties to their legal owner.1
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`The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of
`the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) on three grounds. First, the defendant argues that the
`Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s claim for equitable
`relief. Second, the defendant argues that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction
`over the complaint’s copyright and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Third, the defendant argues
`that the complaint does not allege nonfrivolous violations of the Copyright Act for which the
`plaintiff can recover under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, because the plaintiff did not allege that he owns a
`valid patent or copyright.2 (Id.) Even if the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction, the
`defendant argues the complaint should be dismissed because it is factually deficient and fails to
`state a claim upon which relief can be granted under RCFC 12(b)(6).
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`The plaintiff briefly responded to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff argues
`that the defendant used the name “Melvin Hughes” in its correspondence and filings, and that is
`not the plaintiff’s legal name. As a result, the defendant has negligently misrepresented the
`plaintiff’s legal identity in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 931.
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`The plaintiff is proceeding pro se. As a result, his pleadings are entitled to a more liberal
`construction than they would be given if prepared by a lawyer. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
`519, 520-21 (1972). Giving a pro se litigant’s pleadings a liberal construction, however, does
`not divest the pro se plaintiff of the responsibility of demonstrating that the complaint satisfies
`the jurisdictional requirements that limit the types of claims the Court of Federal Claims may
`entertain. See Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In
`construing a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, a court does not become an advocate for that
`litigant. Rather, a court ensures that a pro se litigant’s pleadings are construed in a manner that
`gives the litigant every opportunity to make out a claim for relief.
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`The Tucker Act sets forth the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. This court may
`entertain “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
`of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
`contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
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`1 The case cited by the plaintiff appears to refer to United States v. Real Property Located in
`Malibu, California, No. 2:21-cv-04569-JAK-(KLSx) (C.D. Cal.), in which the plaintiff is the
`claimant.
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`2 While the first line of the complaint alleges “patent and copyright infringement,” the word
`“patent” is never mentioned again in any of Mr. Huges’s filings. The complaint’s allegations for
`infringement of intellectual property rights otherwise relate to copyright infringement, and
`nowhere in the complaint does the plaintiff request relief for patent infringement.
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`2
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`in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act “does not create any substantive right
`enforceable against the United States for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
`392, 398 (1976).
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`Because the Tucker Act is only a jurisdictional statute and does not create a substantive
`right to relief, to maintain a suit in the Court of Federal Claims, a plaintiff must not only rely on
`the Tucker Act but must also identify a “separate source of substantive law that creates the right
`to money damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in
`relevant part)). Such a money-mandating source of law must give the plaintiff the right to
`recover damages against the federal government. United States v. White Mountain Apache
`Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003). If a plaintiff does not raise a constitutional, statutory, or
`regulatory money-mandating claim or a breach of contract claim against the United States, and
`the plaintiff’s claim does not otherwise fall within the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
`Claims, the claim must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(h)(3).
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`The defendant argues that the Court of Federal Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
`over the complaint because the Court of Federal Claims cannot grant equitable relief absent a
`claim for money damages, and the plaintiff’s claim is not tied to a money-mandating source of
`law. Although the defendant does not raise the issue, the complaint also requests the Court of
`Federal Claims to review the actions of a district court in a civil forfeiture proceeding involving
`the plaintiff.
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`The complaint does not explain how the IRS’s alleged refusal to use the name “melvin
`louis huges” is connected to a claim for copyright infringement or a claim under the Fourteenth
`Amendment. Aside from this failure, the plaintiff is asking the Court of Federal Claims to
`review the action of a district court. The plaintiff notes that he “want[s] the court to dismiss the
`[forfeiture] case and return all seized properties to [the] legal owner.” The Court of Federal
`Claims lacks jurisdiction to review the acts and decisions of a district court. See Innovair
`Aviation Ltd. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up) (“[T]he Court
`of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decision of district courts and cannot .
`. . scrutinize the actions of another tribunal.”) The plaintiff’s sole avenue for relief from the
`alleged errors by the district court in the forfeiture case is an appeal to the Court of Appeals for
`the Ninth Circuit.
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`Dismissal is also required because the plaintiff has not based on his claim on a money-
`mandating source of law. Neither section 106 of the Copyright Act nor the Fourteenth
`Amendment, the two provisions on which the complaint relies, is a money-mandating source of
`law. Section 106 of the Copyright Act merely provides the exclusive rights of a copyright
`holder; it does not create a cause of action or authorize an award of money damages. See
`17 U.S.C. § 106. The Fourteenth Amendment is similarly not money-mandating. LeBlanc v.
`United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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`In his response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that by allegedly refusing to
`address the plaintiff by his legal name, the defendant negligently misrepresented the plaintiff’s
`legal identity in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 931. This provision of the United States Code,
`however, pertains to knowing and willful misrepresentations in seeking benefits under the
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`3
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`Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Act. The statute is not relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and,
`even if it were, contains no provision that could be construed as being money-mandating.
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`The complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under RCFC
`12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).
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`Even if the Court of Federal Claims could exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
`copyright claim, the defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
`claim upon which relief can be granted. Under RCFC 12(b)(6), dismissal for failure to state a
`claim upon which relief can be granted “is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do
`not entitle [the claimant] to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257
`(Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s copyright claim fails to state a claim on which
`relief can be granted because a plaintiff cannot maintain an action for copyright infringement
`absent a valid copyright registration. While copyright in an author’s work vests from the
`moment of fixation in a tangible medium (17 U.S.C. § 102), an author cannot bring a suit to
`enforce a copyright without first registering it (17 U.S.C. § 411(a)). The plaintiff has provided
`no evidence that he has registered a copyright in the name “Melvin Hughes,” “melvin louis
`huges,” or any other name. The absence of such evidence is not surprising, because personal
`names cannot be copyrighted. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (“Materials not subject to copyright . . . (a)
`[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans”). The Certificates of Existence and
`Registration from the Minnesota Secretary of State attached to the plaintiff’s complaint make no
`mention of the word “copyright”; even if they did, Minnesota has no authority to grant a federal
`copyright to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has not offered any evidence that he holds a valid
`copyright registration over any of his names, and he therefore cannot state a claim for copyright
`infringement upon which relief can be granted.
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`Accordingly, the portion of the plaintiff’s complaint that seeks relief under the Copyright
`Act fails to state a claim and must be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6).
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`The complaint does not allege a claim over which the Court of Federal Claims can
`exercise jurisdiction and fails to state a claim for copyright infringement. The defendant’s
`motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1)
`and 12(h)(3) and to RCFC 12(b)(6). The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
`No costs are awarded.
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`It is so ORDERED.
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`s/ Richard A. Hertling
`Richard A. Hertling
`Judge
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