IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION
`
`DOCKET NO.: FBT-CV-23-6120092-S
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`
`
`CONRAD JOHNS and
`ELIZABETH JOHNS
`
`VS.
`
`
`
`ALFA LAVAL, INC., ET AL.
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`SUPERIOR COURT
`
`J.D. OF FAIRFIELD
`AT BRIDGEPORT
`
`February 2, 2023
`
`ANSWER AND SPECIAL DEFENSES OF
`DEFENDANT, FMC CORPORATION ON BEHALF OF ITS FORMER TURBO PUMP
`OPERATION AND ON BEHALF OF ITS FORMER NORTHERN PUMP AND
`JOHN BEAN BUSINESSES, TO PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`
` Defendant, FMC Corporation on behalf of its former Turbo Pump Operation and on behalf
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`of its former Northern Pump and John Bean businesses, improperly sued as “FMC Corporation,
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`individually and as successor in interest to Northern Pump, Coffin and John Bean” (hereinafter
`
`“Defendant”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby answers the Complaint and asserts
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`the following special defenses.
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`COUNT I
`(Product Liability as against all defendants)
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`1.
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`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`2.
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`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 2 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`3.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 3 of Count 1 are directed to this
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 3 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`
`
`DOCKET NO.: FBT-CV-23-6120092-S
`
`
`
`CONRAD JOHNS and
`ELIZABETH JOHNS
`
`VS.
`
`
`
`ALFA LAVAL, INC., ET AL.
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`SUPERIOR COURT
`
`J.D. OF FAIRFIELD
`AT BRIDGEPORT
`
`February 2, 2023
`
`ANSWER AND SPECIAL DEFENSES OF
`DEFENDANT, FMC CORPORATION ON BEHALF OF ITS FORMER TURBO PUMP
`OPERATION AND ON BEHALF OF ITS FORMER NORTHERN PUMP AND
`JOHN BEAN BUSINESSES, TO PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`
` Defendant, FMC Corporation on behalf of its former Turbo Pump Operation and on behalf
`
`of its former Northern Pump and John Bean businesses, improperly sued as “FMC Corporation,
`
`individually and as successor in interest to Northern Pump, Coffin and John Bean” (hereinafter
`
`“Defendant”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby answers the Complaint and asserts
`
`the following special defenses.
`
`COUNT I
`(Product Liability as against all defendants)
`
`1.
`
`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
`
`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of Count I of the Complaint.
`
`2.
`
`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 2 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`3.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 3 of Count 1 are directed to this
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 3 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`
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`4.
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`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 4 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`5.
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`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 5 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`6.
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`Defendant denies that Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos containing products
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`which were contracted for, mined, milled, processed, manufactured, designed, tested, assembled,
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`fashioned, fabricated, packaged, supplied, distributed, delivered, marketed and/or sold by this
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`defendant. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of paragraph 6 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`7.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 7 of Count 1 are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 7 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`8.
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`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 8 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`9.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 9 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 9 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`10.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 10 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 10 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`
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`11.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 11 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 11 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`12.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 12 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 12 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`13.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 13 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 13 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`14.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 14 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
`
`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 14 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`15.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 15 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 15 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`
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`16.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 16 of Count I are directed to
`
`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 16 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`17.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 17 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 17 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`18.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 18 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 18 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`19.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 19 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 19 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`20.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 20 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
`
`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 20 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`
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`21.
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`Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon which to form a
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`belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 21 of Count I of the Complaint.
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`22.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 22 of Count I are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 22 of Count I
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`of the Complaint.
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`23.
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`The allegations of paragraph 23 of Count I of the Complaint are denied, except that
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`Defendant admits that Plaintiff purports to bring this suit pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-240a,
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`52-240b and 52-572m et seq.
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`WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint and for
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`its costs.
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`COUNT II
`(Recklessness as to all Defendants)
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`1-23. Defendant repeats and incorporates by reference its responses to all paragraphs
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`above of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
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`24.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 24 of Count II are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 24 of Count
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`II of the Complaint.
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`25.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 25 of Count II are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 25 of Count
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`II of the Complaint.
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`
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`26.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 26 of Count II are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 26 of Count
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`II of the Complaint.
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`27.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 27 of Count II are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 27 of Count
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`II of the Complaint.
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`28.
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`Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Count II of the
`
`Complaint.
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`WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint and for
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`its costs.
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`COUNT III
`(As to Plaintiff ELIZABETH JOHNS and all Defendants)
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`1-28. Defendant repeats and incorporates by reference its responses to all paragraphs
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`above of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
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`29.
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`To the extent that the allegations of paragraph 29 of Count III are directed to
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`Defendant, they are denied. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge or information upon
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`which to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 29 of Count
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`III of the Complaint.
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`WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ Complaint and for its
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`costs.
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`
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`AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
`
`FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`The Complaint, and each claim asserted therein, is barred by the applicable statute of
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`limitations, including but not limited to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a.
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`SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The Complaint, and each claim asserted therein, must be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine
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`of laches.
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`THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Defendant’s liability has been extinguished to the extent Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s
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`Decedent have executed any releases relieving Defendant from liability.
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`FOURTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s recovery is barred, in whole or in part, as a result of Plaintiff’s Decedent’s
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`comparative and/or contributory negligence.
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`FIFTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are attributable to conditions, pre-existing or otherwise, and
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`said damages are reasonably capable of being apportioned amongst the various conditions and the
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`damages allegedly caused by Defendant pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A,
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`Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572o and/or any other applicable statute or law. Plaintiff’s recovery against
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`Defendant for these other conditions, pre-existing or otherwise, must be denied.
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`SIXTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff's damages, if any, are attributable to causes other than the acts or omissions of
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`Defendant and are capable of being apportioned amongst the causes pursuant to the Restatement
`
`
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`(Second) of Torts § 433A, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572o and/or any other applicable statute or law.
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`Recovery must be denied for injuries not attributable to this Defendant.
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`SEVENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant pleads comment k. of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
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`EIGHTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent used Defendant’s product when he knew or should have known of its
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`dangerous condition and, therefore, his actions are deemed to be the sole proximate cause of injury.
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`NINTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s recovery should be barred, in whole or in part, to the extent Plaintiff’s
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`Decedent’s injuries and/or damages are attributable to his own negligence by smoking cigarette or
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`other tobacco products.
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`TENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
` There can be no liability under any warranty or negligence theory due to lack of privity,
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`because Plaintiff’s Decedent was not a person whom Defendant might reasonably have expected
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`to use, consume or be affected by Defendant’s product.
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`ELEVENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claim is barred due to failure to provide adequate notice and Defendant is
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`prejudiced thereby, including but not limited to the loss of useful evidence.
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`TWELFTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Any and all warranties were appropriately excluded.
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`THIRTEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claims are barred as too remote under any applicable statute of repose, including
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`but not limited to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a.
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`
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`FOURTEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`There is no warranty extended by Defendant for asbestos-containing products because
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`Defendant is not a merchant in goods of the kind.
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`FIFTEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Defendant has no continuing duty to warn persons such as Plaintiff’s Decedent.
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`SIXTEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Defendant's product was not in the same condition at the time of Plaintiff’s Decedent’s
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`alleged exposure as when it left Defendant's control and, therefore, Defendant cannot be liable.
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`SEVENTEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s warranty claim fails for lack of privity.
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`EIGHTEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Defendant’s product was fit for its ordinary purposes for which such goods are used under
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`the state of the art of existing and generally accepted scientific knowledge at the time of its
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`manufacture and sale.
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`NINETEENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`No express warranty was created because there were no statements of fact or promises
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`serving as a basis of any bargain with Plaintiff’s Decedent.
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`TWENTIETH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s recovery is barred, in whole or in part, to the extent she failed to mitigate
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`damages.
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`TWENTY-FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claim for breach of warranty upon which relief may be granted is barred because
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent was not a person reasonably expected to be affected by the product.
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`
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`TWENTY-SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent’s unreasonable acts were the proximate cause of his injury and,
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`therefore, there can be no recovery.
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`TWENTY-THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent was not the purchaser of Defendant’s products, so Defendant owed no
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`duty to warn and/or had no continuing, post-purchase duty to warn of the alleged hazards and risks
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`of the products.
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`TWENTY-FOURTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Defendant is not liable because the risks of its products were not reasonably foreseeable at
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`the time of sale or could not have been discovered by way of reasonable testing prior to marketing
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`of the products.
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`TWENTY-FIFTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Any award of punitive damages is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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`Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause, Article 1, Section 8, of
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`the Connecticut Constitution in that it would be excessive, given the purpose of compensatory
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`damages.
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`TWENTY-SIXTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is barred, because no such damages are available
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`under the circumstances under Connecticut law.
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`TWENTY-SEVENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of release and accord and satisfaction.
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`
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`TWENTY-EIGHTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The Complaint should be dismissed to the extent the process and/or service of process was
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`insufficient.
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`TWENTY-NINTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Any asbestos containing products supplied by Defendant were encapsulated, non-friable
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`and contained only chrysotile asbestos, which does not cause asbestos related diseases at low
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`doses. Any alleged exposure of Plaintiff’s Decedent to an asbestos-containing product supplied
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`by Defendant was not of the type and/or was insufficient to be a proximate cause to Plaintiff’s
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`Decedent’s alleged asbestos disease, if any.
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`THIRTIETH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The Complaint should be dismissed for improper venue and/or pursuant to the doctrine of
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`forum non conveniens.
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`THIRTY- FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The Complaint should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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`THIRTY-SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff’s Decedent voluntarily
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`assumed the risk of injury.
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`THIRTY-THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Any injuries, losses, or damages were caused by acts of others over whom Defendant had
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`no control, and for whose acts Defendant is not legally answerable.
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`THIRTY-FOURTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`At all times and places mentioned in the Complaint, if Plaintiff’s Decedent and/or other
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`persons used products sold by Defendant, which allegations Defendant denies, they did so in an
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`
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`unreasonable manner, not reasonably foreseeable to Defendant, and for the purpose for which the
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`products were not intended, manufactured, or designed. Plaintiff’s Decedent’s injuries and
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`damages, if any, were directly and proximately caused by said misuse and abuse, and Plaintiff’s
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`recovery herein, if any, is barred or must be diminished in proportion to the fault attributable to
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent and/or such other parties and persons.
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`THIRTY-FIFTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant states that if it were liable, negligent or in breach of warranty, all of which it
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`expressly denies, Defendant’s liability in any or all of those events has been terminated by the
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`unforeseeable intervening acts, omissions or negligence of others, including but not limited to
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent’s employer, over whom this Defendant had neither control, nor the right of
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`control and for whose conduct Defendant is not legally responsible.
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`THIRTY-SIXTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`If Plaintiff’s Decedent was injured or harmed, which Defendant denies, the negligence of
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`Plaintiff’s Decedent’s employer proximately caused such injuries or harm, and Plaintiff’s
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`Decedent received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. Therefore, if Plaintiff is
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`entitled to damages, which Defendant denies, Defendant is entitled to a setoff in the amount of
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`said workers’ compensation benefits.
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`THIRTY-SEVENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`If Plaintiff’s Decedent was injured as a result of exposure to asbestos or any asbestos-
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`containing products supplied or distributed by Defendant, which Defendant denies, such products
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`at all times relevant to this action were sold by Defendant in accordance with standards or
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`specifications of the United States Government, which required the use of asbestos, and Defendant
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`was in full compliance with such standards or specifications.
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`
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`THIRTY-EIGHTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent that the exclusive remedy falls under either the
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`Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905, or the Connecticut
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`Workers’ Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-275 et seq.
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`THIRTY-NINTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`If Plaintiff is able to establish any exposure of Plaintiff’s Decedent to products sold by
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`Defendant, said exposure would have been so minimal as to be insufficient to establish to a
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`reasonable degree of probability that its products caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s Decedent’s
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`claimed injuries.
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`FORTIETH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claims are barred and/or limited by the sophisticated user and/or sophisticated
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`purchaser doctrine.
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`FORTY-FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Plaintiff fails to state a claim in express or implied warranty of merchantability and/or
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`fitness for a particular purpose because no particular purpose is alleged as between the buyer and
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`sellers so as to permit a cause of action by Plaintiff.
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`FORTY-SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`No representation, affirmation of fact, or other conduct regarding the alleged sale of
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`Defendant’s products containing asbestos was made or offered with the intent of the parties to such
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`sale or transfer that such conduct constitutes a “basis of the bargain.”
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`FORTY-THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Plaintiff’s claims are barred based upon the learned intermediary doctrine.
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`
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`FORTY-FOURTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`If Plaintiff’s Decedent is barred from recovery, any action filed by or on behalf of
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`Plaintiff's spouse is also barred because it is a derivative action.
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`FORTY-FIFTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The Defendant is not liable because the asbestos fibers used in its product, if any, were
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`encapsulated and non-friable.
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`FORTY-SIXTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant affirmative pleads and hereby gives notice that the law of a foreign state,
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`territory or sovereign may apply to the within action.
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`FORTY-SEVENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Admiralty law may apply to this action.
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`FORTY-EIGHTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`If the plaintiff proves that he became exposed to chrysotile asbestos, then that asbestos
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`did not cause an asbestos-related disease, due to its physical nature, the low dose and/or its
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`transition to fosterite.
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`FORTY-NINTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Plaintiff has failed to join a party or parties necessary for a just adjudication of this matter
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`and have further omitted to state any reasons for such failure.
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`FIFTIETH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The injuries alleged were caused in whole or in part by the Plaintiff's violation, or his
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`servants’ or agents’ violation, of the various statues, ordinances and regulations governing the
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`conduct of the parties at the time said injuries were sustained.
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`
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`FIFTY-FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`This Defendant did not mine, process, manufacture, design, test, fashion, package,
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`distribute, deliver or sell any products which were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s claimed
`
`injuries.
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`FIFTY-SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`This Defendant denies the applicability of the doctrine of strict liability in tort to this
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`litigation.
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`FIFTY-THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`The claims asserted in the Complaint are barred by reason of estoppel and waiver.
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`FIFTY-FOURTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`If Plaintiff was injured by exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products, which
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`this Defendant denies, then such injuries were or may have resulted from exposure to products of
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`one or more other manufacturers not parties to this action, including Johns-Manville
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`Corporation, Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., a/k/a UNARCO Industries, Inc., and Amatex
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`Corporation, and other such manufacturers who have filed bankruptcy.
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`FIFTY-FIFTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Any claims asserted in the Complaint alleging fraud should be stricken because they have
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`not been pled with the requisite particularity.
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`FIFTY-SIXTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`This Defendant breached no warranties, either express or implied, in connection with the
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`sale or distribution of any products which allegedly harmed the Plaintiff.
`
`
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`FIFTY-SEVENTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
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`Any claims against this Defendant for breach of warranty are barred in whole or in part
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`by Plaintiffs’ failure to give timely notice to this Defendant of the alleged breach of warranty.
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`FIFTY-EIGHT SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`There was no negligence, gross negligence, willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct,
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`reckless indifference or reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff, or malice (actual, legal or
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`otherwise) on the part of this Defendant as to the Plaintiff.
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`FIFTY-NINTH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Plaintiff’s claims are governed in whole or in part by The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688.
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`SIXTIETH SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant pleads §5 of the Restatement [Third] of Torts and states that under the
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`circumstances, it had no duty to warn as a component part manufacturer.
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`SIXTY-FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant is not liable for any component parts which may have been subsequently
`
`incorporated into its products, which were not manufactured, sold, or supplied by Defendant.
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`SIXTY-SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant alleges that there has been a Misjoinder/Misnaming of parties to this action in
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`that this Defendant (FMC/Northern) has no legal responsibility for the alleged products or
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`product line alleged after February 9, 1982 by virtue of the ownership/sale/acquisition of the
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`subject products or product line.
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`
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`SIXTY-THIRD SPECIAL DEFENSE
`
`Defendant alleges that there has been a Misjoinder/Misnaming of parties to this action in that this
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`Defendant (FMC/Turbo Pump) has no legal responsibility for the alleged products or product line alleged
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`after November 25, 1986 by virtue of the ownership/sale/acquisition of the subject products or product
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`line.
`
`DEFENDANT,
`FMC Corporation on behalf of its former Turbo
`Pump Operation and on behalf of its former
`Northern Pump and John Bean businesses
`By its Attorneys,
`
`BY /s/ Paul E. Dwyer
`Paul E. Dwyer, Esquire (#434966)
`McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter LLP
`Metro East Office Park
`117 Metro Center Boulevard
`Suite 1004
`Warwick, RI 02886
`Telephone: (401) 298-9010
`Facsimile: (401) 921-2134
`Email: pdwyer@mdmc-law.com
`
`CERTIFICATION
`
`I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2023, the within document was e-filed
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`and a true and accurate copy of same was served upon the following via e-mail with notice of
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`service of same to all counsel of record via CTServList:
`
`Kyle R. Navin, Esquire
`EARLY, LUCARELLI, SWEENEY
` & MEISENKOTHEN, LLC
`One Century Tower, 11th Floor
`265 Church Street, P.O. Box 1866
`New Haven, CT 06508-1866
`knavin@elslaw.com
`kmanely@elslaw.com
`jgirardi@elslaw.com
`
`
`
`John J. Robinson, Esquire
`Gordon & Rees LLP
`95 Glastonbury Blvd. Suite 206
`Glastonbury, CT 06033
`jjrobinson@grsm.com
`cguilmartin@gordonrees.com
`narnold@gordonrees.com
`
`/s/ Pamela A. Roy
`Pamela A. Roy
`
`
`
`
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