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`CONRAD JOHNS and ELIZABETH JOHNS
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`ASB-FBT-CV-23-6120092-S
`__________________________________________
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`Defendants
`__________________________________________)
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`Plaintiffs
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`v.
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`ALFA LAVAL, INC., et al.
`
`
`
`SUPERIOR COURT
`
`JUDICIAL DISTRICT
` OF FAIRFIELD
`
`AT BRIDGEPORT
`
`February 2, 2023
`
`ANSWER, SPECIAL DEFENSES, AND CROSS-CLAIM OF
`DEFENDANT EATON CORPORATION,
`AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO CUTLER-HAMMER, INC.
`(IMPROPERLY NAMED AS “EATON CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
`SUCCESSOR TO CUTLER HAMMER AND VICKERS PUMP”)
`
`Defendant Eaton Corporation, as successor-in-interest
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`to Cutler-Hammer,
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`Inc.
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`(improperly named as “Eaton Corporation, individually and as successor to Cutler Hammer and
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`Vickers Pump”) (hereinafter “Eaton” or “Defendant”) hereby responds to Plaintiffs’ Complaint
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`as follows:
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`COUNT I
`(Product liability against all defendants)
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`1.
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`Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the Complaint, and accordingly, leaves
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`Plaintiff to his proofs.
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`2.
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`Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, and accordingly, leaves
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`Plaintiff to her proofs.
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`DPR/PAR
`#4736244v1
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`3.
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`Except to admit that Defendant has conducted business in the State of
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`Connecticut, Defendant denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint
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`to the extent they are directed towards it.
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`4.
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`Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint, and accordingly, leaves
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`Plaintiffs to their proofs.
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`5.
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`Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, and accordingly, leaves
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`Plaintiff to his proofs.
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`6-23. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations of these paragraphs that are not directed towards it. Defendant denies the
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`allegations that are indeed directed towards it. Further, to the extent that these allegations call
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`for a conclusion of law, no response is required and Defendant refers them to the Court.
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`COUNT II
`(Recklessness as to all Defendants)
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`1-23. Defendant repeats and realleges each and every response to Paragraphs 1 through
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`23 of the Complaint as if more fully set forth herein.
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`24-28. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations of these paragraphs that are not directed towards it. Defendant denies the
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`allegations that are indeed directed towards it. Further, to the extent that these allegations call
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`for a conclusion of law, no response is required and Defendant refers them to the Court.
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`2
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`COUNT III
`(As to Plaintiff Elizabeth Johns and all Defendants)
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`1-28. Defendant repeats and realleges each and every response to Paragraphs 1 through
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`28 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
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`24.
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`Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
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`truth of the allegations of these paragraphs that are not directed towards it. Defendant denies the
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`allegations that are indeed directed towards it. Further, to the extent that these allegations call
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`for a conclusion of law, no response is required and Defendant refers them to the Court.
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`AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
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`FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant is free of any and all negligence.
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`SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant neither owes nor owed a legal duty of care to the Plaintiffs.
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`THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`With respect to the Plaintiffs’ claim of a duty owed, the answering Defendant denies
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`breaching any duty which it may have owed to the Plaintiffs.
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`FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`None of the alleged injury or damage was foreseeable at the time of the acts or omissions
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`complained of in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
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`FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any damage or injury that may have been suffered by the Plaintiffs was not proximately
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`caused by the conduct of the answering Defendant.
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`SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`No acts or omissions of the answering Defendant proximately caused any damages.
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`3
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`SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The doctrine of strict liability in tort does not apply to the answering Defendant.
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`EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant never manufactured, sold, or distributed any asbestos-
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`containing material which caused the Plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos.
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`NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant had no knowledge or reason to know of any alleged risks
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`associated with asbestos and/or asbestos-containing products at any time during the periods
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`complained of.
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`TENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`At all times material hereto, the state of the medical and industrial art was such that there
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`was no generally accepted or recognized knowledge of any avoidable, unsafe, inherently
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`dangerous, or hazardous character or nature of products containing asbestos when used in the
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`manner and purpose described by the Plaintiff and, therefore, there was no duty for the
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`answering Defendant to know of any such character or nature or to warn the Plaintiff or others
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`similarly situated.
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`ELEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the answering Defendant conformed to the scientific knowledge and
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`research data available through the industry and scientific community, the answering Defendant
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`has fulfilled its obligations, if any, herein and the Plaintiffs’ claims should be barred, in whole or
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`in part.
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`4
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`TWELFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant complied with the state-of-the-art and is, therefore, immune
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`from suit.
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`THIRTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Exposure to asbestos fibers attributable to the answering Defendant is so minimal so as to
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`be insufficient to establish to a reasonable degree of probability that the products are capable of
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`causing injury or damages and must be considered speculative as a matter of law.
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`FOURTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any asbestos or asbestos-containing products which the answering Defendant may have
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`supplied were de minimis in light of the total sales by all sources and, therefore, the Plaintiffs fail
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`to state a claim against the answering Defendant.
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`FIFTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`At all times relevant to this litigation, the agents, servants and/or employees of the
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`answering Defendant utilized proper methods in the conduct of their operations, in conformity
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`with the available knowledge and research of the scientific and industrial communities.
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`SIXTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Finished asbestos-containing products are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law.
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`SEVENTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant purchased or obtained a product from a reputable
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`manufacturer, and any defect therein was latent and not ascertainable by or upon a reasonable
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`inspection.
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`5
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`EIGHTEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any product which may have been supplied by the answering Defendant was sold
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`without significant modification, change, or alteration of any kind.
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`NINETEENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred because any product allegedly associated with the
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`answering Defendant was substantially altered after it left the manufacturer’s possession and
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`control.
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`TWENTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The incident and injury alleged in the Complaint were caused by the unauthorized,
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`unintended, and improper use of the product complained of and as a result, there can be no
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`recovery.
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`TWENTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant did not make, nor did it breach any warranty to the Plaintiff.
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`TWENTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the Plaintiffs allege claims based upon oral warranties or
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`representations, the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Statute of Frauds.
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`TWENTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`All implied warranties, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
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`particular purpose, were excluded at the time of the sale, if any, of the answering Defendant’s
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`product.
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`6
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`TWENTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`No implied warranties, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
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`particular purpose, became part of the basis of the bargain in the sale, if any, of the answering
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`Defendant’s product.
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`TWENTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant is not liable to the Plaintiffs for any damages alleged in the
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`Complaint because such damages are excluded and not recoverable under express warranty.
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`TWENTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff did not directly or indirectly purchase any asbestos-containing products or
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`materials from the answering Defendant and the Plaintiff did not either receive or rely upon any
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`representation or warranty allegedly made by the answering Defendant.
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`TWENTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ claims for alleged beaches of warranties against the answering Defendant
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`fail for lack of privity of contract, pursuant to § 42a-2-607 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
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`TWENTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs failed to give the answering Defendant notice of alleged breach of warranty
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`and damage as required by law.
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`TWENTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the causes of action pleaded by the Plaintiffs fail to accord with the
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`Uniform Commercial Code (as codified at § 42a-1-101 et seq. of the Connecticut General
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`Statutes), including but not limited to § 2-725 (§ 42a-2-275 of the Connecticut General Statutes)
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`thereof, the Plaintiffs’ Complaint is time-barred.
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`7
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`THIRTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The action of the Plaintiffs is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
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`THIRTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Statute of Limitations in this case is not tolled by the discovery rule and the Plaintiffs
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`are therefore barred from maintaining the within suit.
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`THIRTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ damages, if any, were the result of the sole negligence of the Plaintiffs.
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`THIRTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff was aware of the facts, circumstances, and conditions existing at the time
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`and place set forth in the Complaint and voluntarily assumed all risk arising therefrom.
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`THIRTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff was warned of the risk of exposure to use of asbestos-containing materials.
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`THIRTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff is barred from any recovery against the answering Defendant by the
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`doctrine of assumption of the risk.
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`THIRTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff contributed to his illness, either in whole or in part, by exposure to or the
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`use of tobacco products and/or other substances, products, medications, or drugs.
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`THIRTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Damages, if any, which may have been sustained by the Plaintiff, and for which the
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`answering Defendant may become liable, were the result of the actions of third-parties over
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`whom the answering Defendant exercised no control and, therefore, the Plaintiff is barred from
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`any recovery against the answering Defendant.
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`8
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`THIRTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any damages or injuries which may have been sustained by the Plaintiff were the result
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`of the sole negligence of the remaining defendants and/or third-party defendants.
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`THIRTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any liability which might otherwise be imposed upon the answering Defendant is subject
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`to reduction or barred by virtue of the doctrine of comparative negligence, as set forth in § 52-
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`572o and/or § 52-572h of the Connecticut General Statutes.
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`FORTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s employer and employers of others are primarily, solely, and exclusively
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`liable for the within claims.
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`FORTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant cannot be liable to the Plaintiff as alleged in the Complaint by
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`operation of the doctrines of superseding and/or intervening cause.
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`FORTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant was under no duty to warn purchasers, those who performed
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`work, or those under their control who were in a better position to warn; if warning was required,
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`their failure to do so was a superseding proximate cause of injury.
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`FORTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s employer(s) were sophisticated purchasers and/or users of the products
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`referred to in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint and upon who devolved all responsibility for such use.
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`FORTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff, his co-workers, and employees misused, abused, mistreated, and
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`misapplied the product(s) designated as asbestos materials as alleged in the Complaint and
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`9
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`therefore liability found against the answering Defendant, if any, should be diminished in the
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`proportion which the misuse, abuse, mistreatment and/or misapplication attributed to the Plaintiff
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`and/or his co-workers and/or employees bears to the conduct which caused the alleged injuries or
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`damages.
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`FORTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any asbestos-containing product of the answering Defendant that may have been present
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`at the Plaintiff’s job locations were placed in any such buildings upon specification, approval, or
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`at the instruction of governmental or legislative agencies or bodies.
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`FORTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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` If it should be proved at the time of trial that any of the answering Defendant’s
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`product(s) were furnished to the Plaintiff’s employer(s) and/or to the United States Government,
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`and that the Plaintiff came into contact with said product(s), which the answering Defendant
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`specifically denies, then any product(s) processed, manufactured, produced, constructed,
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`designed, tested, fashioned, packaged, sold, distributed, delivered, supplied, advertised and/or
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`otherwise placed in the stream of commerce by the answering Defendant which was or may have
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`been furnished to the Plaintiff’s employer(s) and/or to the United States Government, and with
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`which the Plaintiff alleges he came or may have come into contact was processed, manufactured,
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`produced, constructed, designed, tested, fashioned, packaged, sold, distributed, delivered,
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`supplied, advertised and/or otherwise placed in the stream of commerce were in strict conformity
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`to the conditions specified, or to specifications furnished by the Plaintiff’s employer(s) and/or the
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`United States Government.
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`10
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`FORTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`If, at the time of trial, it is shown that the Plaintiff used products manufactured, supplied,
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`distributed, or sold by the answering Defendant, said products or a portion thereof were supplied
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`to, by, or on behalf of the United States Government, or if those products were supplied or sold
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`by the United States Government, the answering Defendant raises any immunity from suit or
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`from liability as conferred by the United States Government, and specifically pleads the
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`government contract and/or government specification defenses.
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`FORTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`In the event of a finding of any liability in favor of the Plaintiff, or settlement, or judgment
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`against any defendant, then the answering Defendant should be held liable, if at all, only for the
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`proportion of damages sustained by the Plaintiff, if any, as is determined by the jury to be the
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`result of the allocable percentage of fault or negligence on the part of the answering Defendant.
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`FORTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`In the event that the Plaintiff recovers a verdict or judgment against the answering
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`Defendant, then said verdict or judgment must be reduced by those amounts which have been
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`paid or indemnified or will, with reasonable certainty, be paid or indemnified to any Plaintiff, in
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`whole or in part, for any past or future claimed economic loss, from any collateral source
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`including insurance, social security, workers compensation or employees benefit programs.
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`FIFTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the Plaintiff’s claims against the answering Defendant were discharged
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`in bankruptcy, the answering Defendant has no liability.
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`FIFTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`In the event that the Plaintiff was employed by the answering Defendant, the Plaintiff’s
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`11
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`sole remedy is under the workers’ compensation law and the Plaintiff cannot recover from the
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`answering Defendant in this action.
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`FIFTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Upon information and belief, any alleged injuries were caused by a pre-existing or
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`unrelated medical condition, disease, or illness of the Plaintiff.
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`FIFTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, to the extent that the Plaintiff failed
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`to mitigate damages.
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`FIFTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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` The answering Defendant reserves the right to amend its answer and to assert additional
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`crossclaims and/or counterclaims as to any party named herein, who may have, is, or will be
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`declared bankrupt or otherwise files a petition under the Bankruptcy Code.
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`FIFTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`No enterprise liability lies against the answering Defendant herein.
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`FIFTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff-spouse’s loss of consortium claim(s) is/are barred as a matter of law
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`because the alleged asbestos exposure by the Plaintiff predates the date of the Plaintiff’s and the
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`Plaintiff-spouse’s marriage.
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`FIFTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted to the
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`extent that the Plaintiff is unable to identify the manufacturer(s) of the substance allegedly
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`12
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`causing injury, and relief granted would deprive the answering Defendant of its right to
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`substantive and procedural due process of law and equal protection under the law pursuant to the
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`Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
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`FIFTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted to the
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`extent that the Plaintiff is unable to identify the manufacturer(s) of the substance allegedly
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`causing injury in that, if relief were granted, it would constitute a taking of private property for
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`public use, without just compensation. Such a taking would contravene the answering
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`Defendant’s constitutional rights as preserved for it by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
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`Constitution of the United States.
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`FIFTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`These actions and the causes pleaded by the Plaintiff herein are barred by virtue of
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`Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.
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`SIXTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks exemplary or punitive damages, those claims are
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`barred because such damages are not recoverable or warranted in this action.
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`SIXTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks exemplary or punitive damages, their demand for
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`punitive damages is barred by the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
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`United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.
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`SIXTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks exemplary or punitive damages, the Plaintiffs’
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`demand is barred by the proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
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`13
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`as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitution of the State of
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`Connecticut.
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`SIXTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks exemplary or punitive damages, the Plaintiffs’
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`demand is barred by the “double jeopardy” clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
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`Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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`SIXTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages is barred by the “ex post facto” clause of the
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`United States Constitution.
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`SIXTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant did not act with recklessness, malice, or wantonness, and
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`accordingly, the Plaintiff may not recover herein any exemplary or punitive damages against the
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`answering Defendant.
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`SIXTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for attorneys’ fees, prejudgment interest,
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`and costs.
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`SIXTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`To the extent any Plaintiff herein brings suit in a representative capacity, such Plaintiff
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`has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate legal capacity to sue.
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`SIXTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as against the
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`answering Defendant.
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`14
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`SIXTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Defendant affirmative pleads and hereby gives notice that the law of a foreign state,
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`territory or sovereign may apply to the within action.
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`SEVENTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The court lacks personal jurisdiction over the answering Defendant.
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`SEVENTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The purported service upon the answering Defendant was not proper, and as a result, this
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`Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the answering Defendant.
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`SEVENTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant is an improper party in this litigation.
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`SEVENTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`This action is barred pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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`SEVENTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrines of laches, waiver, and/or estoppel.
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`SEVENTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs have improperly joined claims of multiple parties and all improperly joined
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`or misjoined parties and/or claims must be severed and tried separately.
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`SEVENTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred because of the Plaintiffs’ failure to join necessary and
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`indispensable parties.
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`SEVENTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Upon information and belief, some or all of the causes of action may not be maintained
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`because of collateral estoppel.
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`15
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`SEVENTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Upon information and belief, some or all of the causes of action may not be maintained
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`because of res judicata.
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`SEVENTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant reserves the right to move for a severance of the various
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`allegations in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
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`EIGHTIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Admiralty law may apply to this action.
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`EIGHTY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant’s liability has been extinguished to the extent the Plaintiffs
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`have executed any releases relieving the answering Defendant from liability.
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`EIGHTY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are attributable to conditions, pre-existing or otherwise,
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`and said damages are reasonably capable of being apportioned amongst the various conditions
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`and the damages allegedly caused by the answering Defendant pursuant to the Restatement
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`(Second) of Torts § 433A, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572o, and/or any other applicable statute or law.
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`The Plaintiff’s recovery against the answering Defendant for these other conditions, pre-existing
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`or otherwise, must be denied.
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`EIGHTY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff's damages, if any, are attributable to causes other than the acts or omissions
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`of the answering Defendant and are capable of being apportioned amongst the causes pursuant to
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`the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572o, and/or any other
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`16
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`applicable statute or law. Recovery must be denied for injuries not attributable to the answering
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`Defendant.
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`EIGHTY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant pleads comment k. of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
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`EIGHTY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff used the answering Defendant’s product when he knew or should have
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`known of its dangerous condition and, therefore, his actions are deemed to be the sole proximate
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`cause of injury.
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`EIGHTY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiffs’ claims are barred due to failure to provide adequate notice and the
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`answering Defendant is prejudiced thereby, including but not limited to the loss of useful
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`evidence.
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`EIGHTY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s claims are barred as too remote under any applicable statute of repose,
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`including but not limited to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577a.
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`EIGHTY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`There is no warranty extended by the answering Defendant for asbestos-containing
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`products because the answering Defendant is not a merchant in goods of the kind.
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`EIGHTY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s claim for breach of warranty upon which relief may be granted is barred
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`because the Plaintiff was not a person reasonably expected to be affected by the product.
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`17
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`NINETIETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s unreasonable acts were the proximate cause of his injury and, therefore,
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`there can be no recovery.
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`NINETY-FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of release and accord and satisfaction.
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`NINETY-SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any asbestos containing products supplied by
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`the answering Defendant were
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`encapsulated, non-friable and contained only chrysotile asbestos, which does not cause asbestos
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`related diseases at low doses. Any alleged exposure of the Plaintiff to an asbestos-containing
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`product supplied by the answering Defendant was not of the type and/or was insufficient to be a
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`proximate cause to the Plaintiff’s alleged asbestos disease, if any.
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`NINETY-THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`At all times and places mentioned in the Complaint, if the Plaintiff and/or other persons
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`used products sold by the answering Defendant, which allegations the answering Defendant
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`denies, they did so in an unreasonable manner, not reasonably foreseeable to the answering
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`Defendant, and for the purpose for which the products were not intended, manufactured, or
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`designed. The Plaintiffs’ injuries and damages, if any, were directly and proximately caused by
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`said misuse and abuse, and the Plaintiffs’ recovery herein, if any, is barred or must be diminished
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`in proportion to the fault attributable to the Plaintiffs and/or such other parties and persons.
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`NINETY-FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`If the Plaintiff was injured or harmed, which the answering Defendant denies, the
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`negligence of the Plaintiff’s employer proximately caused such injuries or harm, and the Plaintiff
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`received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. Therefore, if the Plaintiff is
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`18
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`entitled to damages, which the answering Defendant denies, the answering Defendant is entitled
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`to a setoff in the amount of said workers’ compensation benefits.
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`NINETY-FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent that the exclusive remedy falls under either
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`the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905, or the
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`Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-275 et seq.
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`NINETY-SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s claims are barred based upon the learned intermediary doctrine.
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`NINETY-SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`If the Plaintiff is barred from recovery, any action filed by or on behalf of the Plaintiff's
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`spouse is also barred because it is a derivative action.
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`NINETY-EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant is not liable because the asbestos fibers used in its product, if
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`any, were encapsulated and non-friable.
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`NINETY-NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`If the Plaintiff proves that the Plaintiff became exposed to chrysotile asbestos, then that
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`asbestos did not cause an asbestos-related disease, due to its physical nature, the low dose, and/or
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`its transition to fosterite.
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`ONE-HUNDRETH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The injuries alleged were caused in whole or in part by the Plaintiff's violation, or his
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`servants’ or agents’ violation, of the various statues, ordinances and regulations governing the
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`conduct of the parties at the time said injuries were sustained.
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`19
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`ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`This answering Defendant did not mine, process, manufacture, design, test, fashion,
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`package, distribute, deliver or sell any products which were the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s
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`claimed injuries.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND SECOND SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`If the Plaintiff was injured by exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products,
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`which the answering Defendant denies, then such injuries were or may have resulted from
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`exposure to products of one or more other manufacturers not parties to this action, including
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`Johns-Manville Corporation, Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. a/k/a UNARCO Industries, Inc., and
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`Amatex Corporation, and other such manufacturers who have filed bankruptcy.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any claims asserted in the Complaint alleging fraud should be stricken because they have
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`not been pled with the requisite particularity.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant breached no warranties, either express or implied, in
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`connection with the sale or distribution of any products which allegedly harmed the Plaintiff.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`Any claims against the answering Defendant for breach of warranty are barred in whole
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`or in part by Plaintiffs’ failure to give timely notice to the answering Defendant of the alleged
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`breach of warranty.
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`20
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`ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`There was no negligence, gross negligence, willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct,
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`reckless indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff, or malice (actual, legal, or
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`otherwise) on the part of the answering Defendant as to the Plaintiff.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The Plaintiff’s claims are governed in whole or in part by The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant pleads §5 of the Restatement [Third] of Torts and states that
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`under the circumstances, it had no duty to warn as a component part manufacturer.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant is not liable for any component parts which may have been
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`subsequently incorporated into its products, which were not manufactured, sold, or supplied by
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`the answering Defendant.
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`ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant hereby gives notice that it will seek to apply the law of another
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`state at the time of trial, pursuant to Practice Book section 10-3(b)
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`ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH SEPARATE DEFENSE
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`The answering Defendant incorporates and adopts by reference any and all other and/or
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`additional defenses, raised or to be raised by any other party, and expressly reserves the right to
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`amend and supplement its defenses herein to assert additional defenses and to make further
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`admission upon completion of further investigation and discovery.
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`WHEREFORE, Defendant Eaton Corporation, as successor-in-interest to Cutler-
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`Hammer, Inc. (improperly pled as “Eaton Corporation, individually and as successor to Cutler
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`21
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`Hammer and Vickers Pump”) requests judgment in its favor dismissing the Complaint and for
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`such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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`CROSSCLAIMS
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`Defendant Eaton Corporation, as successor-in-interest
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`to Cutler-Hammer,
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`Inc.
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`(improperly pled as “Eaton Corporation, individually and as successor to Cutler Hammer and
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`Vickers Pump”) (“Defendant”), by way of crossclaim against each named co-defendant says:
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`FIRST COUNT
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`Without admitting any liability therein, the answering Defendant asserts that should
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`liability be found against said Defendant, it is entitled to and hereby claims contribution from all
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`co-defendants.
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`SECOND COUNT
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`While the answering Defendant denies that it is negligent or liable in any regard, it is
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`certain that its negligence or liability, if any, was passive, vicarious and imputed, whereas the
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`negligence or liability of the co-defendants was active and primary.
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`THIRD COUNT
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`While denying any negligence or liability in this action, the answering Defendant says
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`that if there was any negligence or liability, then the negligence or liability of the answering
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`Defendant was secondary only and the negligence or liability of the co-defendants herein was
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`primary.
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`Accordingly, the co-defendants are obligated by operation of law, contract and otherwise,
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`to indemnify the answering Defendant and hold the answering Defendant harmless from any and
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`all claims which are the subject of the Complaint.
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`22
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`WHEREFORE, the answering Defendant demands judgment by way of contribution
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`and indemnity against the co-defendants for any judgment which may be entered in favor of
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`Plaintiffs against the answe