throbber
Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 15
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
` REALTIME ADAPTIVE STREAMING, L.L.C.
`
`
`
`v.
`
`SLING TV L.L.C.,
`SLING MEDIA L.L.C.,
`DISH TECHNOLOGIES L.L.C.,
`DISH NETWORK L.L.C., and
`ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-02097-RBJ
`
`LEAD CASE
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendants seek constructions supported by the intrinsic record. In most cases,
`
`the disputed terms have specific meanings dictated by the specification of the Asserted
`
`Patents1. For other terms, the Asserted Patents do not support a clear meaning at all,
`
`rendering the asserted claims indefinite and therefore invalid.
`
`Realtime maintains that virtually no terms require construction so that it remains
`
`free to interpret those words to suit its infringement arguments. This approach
`
`perpetuates ambiguities in the claims, which the Court should resolve at the claim
`
`construction stage. Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1318
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the
`
`‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one
`
`
`
`1 The “Asserted Patents” refers to U.S. Patent No. 8,867,610 (“the ’610 Patent”) and U.S.
`Patent No. 8,934,535 (“the ’535 Patent”) (attached as Exhibits A and B, respectively).
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 15
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`‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the
`
`parties’ dispute.”) (internal quotations omitted).
`
`II.
`
`THE ASSERTED PATENTS
`
`The Asserted Patents share a common specification and are directed to selecting
`
`a compression scheme based on characteristics of the data being compressed. They
`
`claim specific methods of data compression based upon “the determined parameter or
`
`attribute and a throughput of the communication channel” (the ’610 Patent) or “information
`
`from the selected access profile” (the ’535 Patent). The claims require selecting a
`
`compression algorithm based on these criteria. ’610 Pat. at 20:1-22:53; ’535 Pat. at 20:29-
`
`23:30. The Asserted Claims2 are all directed to variations on this same theme.
`
`III.
`
`DISPUTED TERMS
`
`1.
`
`“access profile” (’535 Pat., Cl. 1 and 14)
`
`Realtime’s Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`“profile containing information about the number or
`frequency of reads and writes”3
`
`The intrinsic evidence shows that “access profile” means “profile containing
`
`
`
`information about the number or frequency of reads and writes.” The plain language of
`
`the term requires that the claimed profile includes information about access. And the ’535
`
`Patent repeatedly and consistently describes different “access profiles” for data based on
`
`information about the frequency of access, i.e., the number or frequency (annotated in
`
`blue in the tables below) of reads and writes (annotated in red):
`
`
`
`2 See Dkt. No. 121 (Joint Chart) at 1.
`3 The DISH and Sling entities do not seek a construction for this term.
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 15
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`’535 Pat. at 11:41-48, 12:50-67; see also id. at 8:4-13, 11:38-39, 12:1-50 (describing
`
`“Access Profile 3” as one in which “data is accessed with a similar number of reads and
`
`
`
`writes”).
`
`According to the claims, information from the selected access profile is used to
`
`select the appropriate compression algorithm for the data to be compressed. Id. at cols.
`
`11-12, claims 1, 14. The specification explains that the access profile contains information
`
`about the number or frequency of reads and writes of the data to be compressed. The
`
`specification provides that where data is written to a storage medium once or a few times
`
`but is read from the storage medium many times (i.e., Access Profile 1, corresponding to
`
`“Operating systems, Programs, Web sites”), “it is preferable to utilize an asymmetrical
`
`algorithm that provides a slow compression routine and a fast decompression routine.”
`3
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 15
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`Id. at 12:14-20, 11:41-48, 12:50-67. Conversely, where data is written to the storage
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`medium often but read few times (i.e., Access Profile 2, corresponding to “User generated
`
`documents”), “an asymmetric algorithm that provides a fast compression routine and a
`
`slow decompression routine” would be desirable. Id. at 12:26-35, 11:41-48, 12:50-67.
`
`Realtime cannot depart from the specification by advocating for no construction.
`
`There is no evidence that “access profile” is a term of art—as such, its only meaning
`
`derives from the specification. Realtime has not identified any extrinsic evidence that
`
`shows otherwise. And jurors will not know what an “access profile” is, leaving Realtime
`
`free to mold this term to suit its infringement needs and improperly broaden this term
`
`beyond the scope of the specification. See Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless
`
`Sol’ns., LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`
`2.
`
`“throughput of a communication channel” (’610 Pat., Cl. 1, 9, 12-14)
`
`Realtime’s Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`“number of pending transmission requests over a
`communication channel”
`
`The issue for the “throughput of a communication channel” term is whether the
`
`term must be construed to reflect what the inventors possessed and disclosed to the
`
`public or whether the term should be left as “plain meaning.” Just like the previous term,
`
`“throughput of a communication channel” is not something a typical juror will have
`
`knowledge of. “Plain meaning” will allow Realtime to improperly recapture subject matter
`
`that Realtime surrendered at the patent office.
`
`Although the term “throughput” appears in the specification in various contexts, it
`
`only appears once in the context of a communication channel. There, the specification
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 15
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`states that “for controlling the compression and transmission of compressed data . . .
`
`received over a communication channel . . . throughput tracked by the controller
`
`comprises a number of pending transmission requests over the communication
`
`channel.” ’535 Pat. at 8:22-27.4 Thus, in the context of the claimed communication
`
`channel, nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that “throughput” is anything other than
`
`the “number of pending transmission requests over a communication channel.” See
`
`Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding “nothing in the
`
`intrinsic record to support the conclusion that a skilled artisan would have construed the
`
`term ‘board’ more broadly than a piece of construction material made from wood cut from
`
`a log”).
`
`Moreover,
`
`the claimed
`
`“throughput” cannot
`
`include
`
`“bandwidth.” During
`
`prosecution, Realtime amended the ’610 Patent claims by replacing “bandwidth” with
`
`“throughput” to overcome a written description rejection. Ex. C, 02/27/14 Office Action at
`
`4; Ex. D, 05/27/14 Amendment and Response at 5-12, 15-18. Realtime should not be
`
`permitted to recapture the very claim scope that it sacrificed to gain allowance under the
`
`guise of “plain meaning.” Sterisil, Inc. v. ProEdge Dental Prods. No. 13-cv-01210-REB,
`
`2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189885, at *22-28 (D. Colo. Aug. 7, 2015) (finding that claim term
`
`added during prosecution was essential to the asserted patent and that defendant could
`
`not “recapture claim scope surrendered during prosecution” through claim construction).
`
`3.
`
`“asymmetric compressor(s)” (’535 Pat., Cl. 12, 15, 16, 24) /
`“asymmetric data compression” (’535 Pat., Cl. 1, 10) / “asymmetric
`compression algorithm” / “compression algorithms being
`asymmetric” (’610 Pat., Cl. 1, 9) / “asymmetric” (’610 Pat., Cl. 6, 16)
`
`
`
`4 Text that is bolded and italicized indicates emphasis added unless otherwise noted.
`5
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 6 of 15
`
`Realtime’s
`Construction
`No construction
`necessary.
`
`Not indefinite.
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`
`“a compression algorithm in which the execution time for
`compression and decompression differ significantly,” which renders
`the claims indefinite under Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I
`LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`
`
`
`The specification defines an “[a]n asymmetrical data compression algorithm” as
`
`“one in which the execution time for the compression and decompression routines differ
`
`significantly.” ’535 Pat. at 9:63-66. The specification thus defines asymmetry as a function
`
`of compression time versus decompression time. This express definition, however,
`
`cannot be translated into meaningfully precise claim scope because the claims are
`
`directed to compression devices. Decompression, however, can be performed on third-
`
`party decompression devices that can be located miles apart from the compression
`
`device.
`
`Thus, the express definition—which requires knowing both the compression time
`
`and the decompression time and making a comparison between the two—renders the
`
`claims indefinite because it requires a separate infringement determination for every
`
`possible use or corresponding implementation of a device—a determination that would
`
`result in different infringement outcomes for the same product, as described below.
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When
`
`a proposed construction requires that an artisan make a separate infringement
`
`determination for every set of circumstances in which the composition may be used, and
`
`when such determinations are likely to result in differing outcomes (sometimes infringing
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 7 of 15
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`and sometimes not), that construction is likely to be indefinite.”).5
`
`Whether a given compression algorithm is “asymmetric” varies based on how and
`
`where compression is applied and on decompression performance results that are not
`
`known by the claimed compressing device, rendering the term indefinite. Cf. id. at 1252
`
`(affirming the district court’s finding that the term “fragile gel” was indefinite because “an
`
`artisan would not know from one well to the next whether a certain drilling fluid was within
`
`the scope of the claims”). Compression and decompression can be performed on different
`
`devices (e.g., on a server and a smartphone, respectively) and may involve actions
`
`separated in time (e.g., where material is archived to a server and downloaded or viewed
`
`weeks or months later). Thus, a skilled artisan cannot look only at a compression device
`
`(e.g., the server) to determine if that device is infringing by performing “asymmetrical data
`
`compression” because the decompression execution time (e.g., from the smartphone)—
`
`that must be used as a benchmark—is unknown by the compression device. One would
`
`have to examine each separate client decompression device to ascertain whether the
`
`data compression algorithm used at the server was asymmetrical as compared to the
`
`decompression that was later performed.6 Moreover, the decompression execution time
`
`depends on the client device’s (e.g., a smartphone) computing power. Thus, the
`
`
`
`5 See Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Alzheimer’s Inst. of Am., Inc., No. 8:05-cv-639-T-
`23TBM, 2011 WL 13176243, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2011) (“Even when a patent
`expressly defines a claim term in its specification, the term is nonetheless indefinite ‘if a
`person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the definition into meaningfully precise
`claim scope.’”).
`6 Different client devices may be used to decompress the same originally compressed
`data. For example, a content provider can upload a single compressed video that is later
`decompressed and viewed by multiple users across different platforms (e.g., cell phones,
`tablets, desktop computers, etc.).
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 8 of 15
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`infringement result would be different if the client device decompressing the data was a
`
`powerful desktop computer versus a low-end smartphone, which is again a difference
`
`that may not be known by the compressing device.
`
`Any device employing a compression algorithm “would simultaneously infringe and
`
`not infringe the claims” depending on the capabilities of another device eventually used
`
`to perform decompression. The claims thus fail to inform a skilled artisan as to the bounds
`
`of the invention and are indefinite. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
`
`2120, 2124 (2014); Halliburton, 514 F.3d at 1250.
`
`4.
`
`“compressor” (’535 Pat., Cl. 1, 8, 10, 12, 14-16)
`
`Realtime’s
`Construction
`No
`construction
`necessary
`
`Not means-
`plus-function.
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`
`Means-plus-function element to be construed in accordance with pre-
`AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6.
`
`Function: compressing the at least the portion of the data block
`
`Structure: Controller 11 in Fig. 1 or DSP or Processor 121 in Fig. 3
`running any one of the following compression algorithms: arithmetic
`coding, dictionary compression, table-based compression, Huffman
`coding, and run-length coding
`
`Although the term “compressor” does not include the word “means,” the Federal
`
`Circuit held en banc that § 112, ¶ 6 nonetheless applies where a limitation (1) fails to
`
`“recite sufficiently definite structure” or (2) recites “function without reciting sufficient
`
`structure for performing that function.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,
`
`1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted). Here, both rationales apply to the term
`
`“compressor.”
`
`Like the “distributed learning control module” term in Williamson, the “compressor”
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 9 of 15
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`term “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure.” Id. at 1351; see also Sterisil, Inc., No.
`
`13-cv-01210-REB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189885, at *59 (holding that “the lack of any
`
`structure associated with the term ‘activator’ and the definition of activator in the claim
`
`solely in terms of functional language overcomes any presumption that this term does not
`
`fall within §112 para. 6.”). The term “compressor” has no structure—it is simply defined
`
`by its function (compressing) and would include anything that compresses. The
`
`specification does not provide any guidance as to what structure would be included in the
`
`term “compressor,” as the term does not appear in the specification at all. Realtime has
`
`not identified extrinsic evidence that would shed light on specific, associated structure.
`
`Thus, there is no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence that the term “compressor” is “understood
`
`by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name
`
`for structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349. Thus, 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶ 6 must apply.
`
`Under 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶ 6, the functional term must be limited to the structure in
`
`the specification that performs the identified function. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. Claim
`
`15 of the ’535 Patent requires that the function performed by the “compressor” is
`
`“compressing the at least the portion of the data block.” Because the specification only
`
`discloses general purpose processors that perform such compression (Controller 11 in
`
`Fig. 1 or DSP or Processor 121 in Fig. 37), the appropriate structure must take the form
`
`of an algorithm. See EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616,
`
`623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient
`
`structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented
`
`
`
`7 ’535 Pat. at 11:6-8, 11:25-29, 15:5-8.
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 10 of 15
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`functions require disclosure of an algorithm.”). The specification enumerates specific
`
`types of algorithms that perform the claimed function of compression—arithmetic coding,
`
`dictionary compression, table-based compression, Huffman coding, and run-length
`
`coding. ’535 Pat. at 5:1-10, 9:60-10:14. Thus, the claim term must be limited to this
`
`corresponding structure.
`
`5.
`
`“compressing / compressed / compression” (’610 Pat., Cl. 1, 2, 6, 8-
`14, 16, 18; ’535 Pat., Cl. 1, 2, 4-6, 8, 10-12, 14-17, 19, 21, 22)
`
`Realtime’s Construction
`[representing / represented /
`representation] of data with
`fewer bits
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`Alternatively “[reduction of / reducing / reduce] the
`amount of data required to process, transmit, or store a
`given quantity of information”
`
`
`The parties’ dispute concerns whether Realtime’s attempt to limit “compressing” to
`
`digital data vis-à-vis the word “bits” is appropriate. The intrinsic record does not support
`
`importing a limitation from the specification to further limit “compression” to only digital
`
`data. Further, the word “bits” (i.e., binary digits) adds ambiguity and is not a term easily
`
`understood by a layperson.
`
`Should the Court determine that this term requires construction, it should adopt
`
`“[reduction of / reducing / reduce] the amount of data required to process, transmit, or
`
`store a given quantity of information,” which Realtime previously proposed as an
`
`alternative construction and which closely tracks the specification. ’535 Pat. at 2:44-46;
`
`Realtime Data, LLC v. Rackspace US, Inc., No. 6:16-cv-00961 RWS-JDL, 2017 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 92131, at *17 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2017).
`
`6.
`
`“algorithm” (’610 Pat., Cl. 1, 6, 9, 12-14, 16)
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 15
`
`Realtime’s Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`“a set of rules that defines one or more parameters that
`can be varied”
`
`
`
`The Court should construe “algorithm” consistent with the specification, which is “a
`
`set of rules that define one or more parameters that can be varied.” The definition in the
`
`specification explicitly contemplates varying the parameters of algorithms to change their
`
`performance characteristics. ’535 Pat. at 1:30-35 (“Many compression algorithms define
`
`one or more parameters that can be varied, either dynamically or a-priori, to change
`
`the performance characteristics of the algorithm.”). In other words, adjusting an
`
`algorithm’s parameters results in a change in degree without a change in kind just like
`
`varying the settings of a mechanical tool (e.g., changing the speed of a variable speed
`
`drill) does not result in a selection of a different tool.
`
`The extrinsic evidence also supports Defendants’ construction. Two dictionaries
`
`cited on the face of the patent define an “algorithm” as a “set of well-defined rules” or a
`
`“set of rules” that lay out the steps to be taken to solve a problem. See, e.g., ’535 Pat. at
`
`pg. 19; EX. E, IEEE 100 The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms (7th ed.,
`
`2000) at 25 (““A prescribed set of well-defined rules or processes for the solution of a
`
`problem in a finite number of steps…”); EX. F, Larousse Dictionary of Science and
`
`Technology (1st ed., 1995) at 26 (“A set of rules which specify a sequence of actions to
`
`be taken to solve a problem.”). Consistent with the specification, the extrinsic evidence
`
`shows that adjusting parameters (e.g., speed or accuracy) within a “set of rules” does not
`
`result in a new algorithm.
`
`7.
`
` “the determined parameter or attribute” (’535 Pat., Cl. 15)
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 12 of 15
`
`Realtime’s Construction
`No construction necessary; Not indefinite.
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`Indefinite; lacks antecedent basis
`
`
`
`Claim 15 of the ’535 Patent is indefinite for lack of antecedent basis because it
`
`claims “the determined . . . attribute” without any prior recitation of a corresponding
`
`antecedent limitation. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2; see also Halliburton, 514 F.3d at 1249
`
`(“a claim could be indefinite if a term does not have proper antecedent basis where such
`
`basis is not otherwise present by implication or the meaning is not reasonably
`
`ascertainable”). A skilled artisan is left guessing as to the origin of “the determined
`
`attribute,” how or when it is “determined,” and what does the determining. See, e.g.,
`
`Cellular Commc'ns Equip. LLC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-576-RWS-RSP, 2016 WL
`
`7364266, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2016) (“[T]he disputed term lacks explicit antecedent
`
`basis, and Plaintiff has not shown any implicit antecedent basis. The disputed term is
`
`therefore indefinite.”); Illinois Computer Research LLC v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.,
`
`No. 10 CIV. 9124 KBF, 2012 WL 163801, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (finding term
`
`indefinite for lack of antecedent basis because the critical question of “who the actors are
`
`within the claims” was unanswered). The specification never mentions the word “attribute”
`
`and does not provide further guidance.
`
`8.
`
`“file” (’535 Pat., Cl. 3, 4, and 11)
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`Realtime’s Construction
`No construction necessary. “collection of executable programs and/or various data
`objects that occur in a variety of lengths and that are
`stored within a data storage device”
`
`The patentee acted as its own lexicographer and defined “file” in the specification.
`
`
`
`“Files are collections of executable programs and/or various data objects. Files occur in
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 13 of 15
`
`a wide variety of lengths and must be stored within a data storage device.” ’535 Pat. at
`
`5:60-63. Defendants’ proposed construction tracks the specification’s definition of “file.”
`
`9.
`
`“data block” (’610 Pat., Cl. 1, 2, 8-14, 18; ’535 Pat., Cl. 1, 2-6, 8-12, 14-
`17, 19, 21, 22, 24)
`
`Realtime’s Construction
`A single unit of data, which may range in size from
`individual bits through complete files or collection of
`multiple files
`
`Defendants’ Construction
`No construction necessary.
`
`“Data block” has a commonly understood meaning in the art as a block of data.
`
`
`
`Realtime’s construction adds no clarity to the claim language itself. The “single unit of
`
`data” requirement is unhelpful because the claim term is already written in the singular
`
`and the word “unit” adds no clarity to the term “block.” Realtime’s construction specifies
`
`the size of a “data block,” but the plain meaning does not limit “data block” to a particular
`
`size. It also adds confusion: a “data block” (whatever its size) must remain consistent
`
`throughout a claim. But Realtime’s proposal risks that a single “unit of data” may itself
`
`change in size and still satisfy different limitations of the same claim.
`
`Combined with Realtime’s proposal for “compression,” its construction is improper.
`
`Under Realtime’s proposal, an “individual bit” qualifies as a “data block.” But an “individual
`
`bit” cannot be represented with “fewer bits” as required by Realtime’s construction for
`
`“compression.” “Data block” does not become clearer upon construction, particularly
`
`under Realtime’s approach. “Data block” should be construed in accordance with its plain
`
`meaning.
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`Defendants respectfully request that the Court adopt its proposed constructions.
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 15
`
`Dated: October 3, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`s/ Ruffin B. Cordell
`
`Ruffin B. Cordell
`Adam R. Shartzer
`Brian J. Livedalen
`
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`1000 Maine Ave SW, Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20024
`PH: 202-783-5070
`FX: 202-783-2331
`cordell@fr.com
`shartzer@fr.com
`livedalen@fr.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Sling TV, L.L.C.,
`Sling Media L.L.C., DISH Technologies
`L.L.C., and DISH Network L.L.C.
`
`s/ Jennifer Librach Nall
`David B. Weaver
`Jennifer Librach Nall
`Aashish G. Kapadia
`Baker Botts L.L.P.
`98 San Jacinto Boulevard
`Suite 1500
`Austin, TX 78701-4078
`Phone: (512) 322-2587
`Fax: (512) 322-3687
`david.weaver@bakerbotts.com
`jennifer.nall@bakerbotts.com
`aashish.kapadia@bakerbotts.com
`
`
`Michelle J. Eber
`Baker Botts L.L.P.
`One Shell Plaza
`910 Louisiana Street
`Houston, TX 77002
`Phone: (713) 229-1223
`Fax: (713) 229-7732
`michelle.eber@bakerbotts.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant ARRIS Solutions,
`Inc.
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:17-cv-02097-RBJ Document 127 Filed 10/03/18 USDC Colorado Page 15 of 15
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`
`
`Counsel for Defendants certify that this brief is 3300 words in length as measured
`
`by Microsoft Word, and is in Arial 12 point font as required D.C.COLO.LPtR 17. Margins
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`are 1.5 inches at the top and 1 inch at the left, right, and bottom of each page per
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`D.C.COLO.LCivR 10.1.
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`s/ Jennifer Librach Nall
`Jennifer Librach Nall
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on October 3, 2018, counsel for ARRIS electronically filed a
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`copy of the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the Court’s CM/ECF System, which
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`will send electronic notification of such filing to counsel of record.
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`Dated: October 3, 2018
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`s/ Jennifer Librach Nall
`Jennifer Librach Nall
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