Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.73 Page 1 of
`11
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
` Case No.: 24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
`OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
`
`[Dkt. No. 9.]
`
`SHEISGRACIELOU, LLC, a California
`limited liability corporation,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`MCBEE FARMS, L.C., a Missouri
`limited liability company,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
`
`pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 9.) Plaintiff filed an
`opposition on October 25, 2024 and Defendant filed a reply on November 1, 2024. (Dkt.
`Nos. 11, 13.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to
`dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
`Background
`On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff Sheisgracielou, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint
`
`against Defendant McBee Farms, L.C. (“Defendant”) for trademark infringement of its
`registered U.S. Trademark No. 7326145 (“’145 Mark”) for the wordmark “COWBOY
`PILLOWS” for use on “Underwear: Bottoms as clothing; Tops as clothing.” (Dkt. No. 1,
`
`1
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.74 Page 2 of
`11
`
`
`Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has sold clothing with the wordmark “COWBOY PILLOWS”
`since August 2022 and the U.S. Trademark Office registered the ‘145 Mark on March 12,
`2024. (Id.)
`Defendant is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of
`the State of Missouri with its principal place of business in Missouri. (Id. ¶ 5.)
`Defendant provides farming services and land cultivation services and sells farm-to-table
`products with an emphasis on meat. (Dkt. No. 9-1 McBee Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) Defendant
`operates a website, www.mcbeefarms.com, where it promotes its television show and
`podcast and also promotes various brands, including a meat processing brand, a protein
`snacks brand and a custom home building brand. (Dkt. No. 11-1, Suhr Decl. ¶ 9.)
`According to Defendant, it has evolved into a lifestyle brand and also sells apparel
`and merchandise to promote the main farming services including the COWBOY
`PILLOWS t-shirts. (Dkt. No. 9-1, McBee Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6; see also Dkt. No. 11-1, Suhr
`Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant’s website has a “Merch” hyperlink that sells logo clothing and
`hats, including the infringing products. (Dkt. No. 11-1, Suhr Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant’s
`Instagram and Facebook social media accounts also include a link to its “Link Tree”
`which contains hyperlinks to Defendant’s business with one of the hyperlinks to the
`“Merch” section of its website. (Id. ¶ 10.) Of the twenty-two (22) sales of the
`COWBOY PILLOWS t-shirts, five (5) sales were made to California addresses. (Dkt.
`No. 9-1, McBee Decl. ¶ 8.)
`
`According to the complaint, the sale of tank tops featuring the wordmark
`“COWBOY PILLOWS” with the same color schemes and fonts as the ‘145 Mark is
`causing a likelihood of consumer confusion. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 10.) The
`complaint alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant uses the same marketing channels and
`have significant overlap in their target audience. (Id. ¶ 11.)
`Plaintiff sent Defendant a demand letter informing Defendant that Plaintiff owns
`the ‘145 Mark and of Defendant’s infringing conduct providing it with actual notice of
`Plaintiff’s proprietary rights in the ‘145 Mark; therefore, its continued infringement is
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`2
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.75 Page 3 of
`11
`
`
`willful and wanton. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15.) The demand letter requested that Defendant cease
`selling the infringing products but it refused.1 (Id. ¶ 2.)
`
`On October 8, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
`jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 9.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 25, 2024, and
`Defendant replied on November 1, 2024. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 13.)
`Discussion
`Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
`A.
`“When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
`
`bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction.” In re Western States
`Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig. v. Oneok, Inc., 715 F.3d 716, 741 (9th Cir. 2013).
`If the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff
`need only make “a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to
`dismiss.” Bryton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 575 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir.
`2009). The court inquires “whether [the plaintiff]'s pleadings and affidavits make a
`prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, Inc., 303 F.3d
`1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). On a prima facie case, the court considers uncontroverted
`allegations in the complaint as true and the court resolves all contested facts in favor of
`the non-moving party. In re Western States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d
`at 741; AT & T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)
`(same).
`
`“Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the district
`court applies the law of the state in which the court sits.” Marvix Photo, Inc. v. Brand
`Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). California’s long-
`arm statute is “coextensive with the outer limits of due process under the state and federal
`constitutions, as those limits have been defined by the United States Supreme Court.”
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`1 In its motion, Defendant claims it immediately removed the infringing products from its website when
`contacted by Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4.)
`
`3
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.76 Page 4 of
`11
`
`
`Republic Int’l Corp. v. Amco Eng’rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting
`Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974)). As such, the Court need only
`consider the requirements of due process. Due process requires that nonresident
`defendants have “minimum contact” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of
`the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe
`Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Personal jurisdiction can be either
`“general” or “specific.” See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
`408, 415-16 (1984). The parties dispute whether the Court has specific jurisdiction over
`Defendant, a Missouri limited liability company. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 11 at
`102; Dkt. No. 13 at 2.)
`B.
`Specific Jurisdiction
`
`Specific jurisdiction exists when a case “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the
`defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466
`U.S. at 414 n. 8. The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over
`a nonresident defendant “focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
`and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). Specific jurisdiction is
`limited to ruling on “issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
`establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S,
`915, 919 (2011) (citation omitted). “When there is no such connection, specific
`jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in
`the States.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal, 137 S. Ct. 1771, 1781
`(2017). A court must look “to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
`defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285.
`Therefore, “mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.”
`Id. at 290. Rather, “an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`
`2 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination.
`
`4
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.77 Page 5 of
`11
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`
`defendant has formed a contact with the forum State.” Id. Specifically, a court may
`exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant only where “the defendant's suit-related
`conduct” “create a substantial connection with the forum [s]tate.” Williams v. Yamaha
`Motor Co. Ltd., 851 F.3d 1015, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at
`284-85).
`
`The Ninth Circuit conducts a three-prong test to determine whether a non-resident
`defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction,
`(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
`consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
`some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
`conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
`protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or
`relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of
`jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must
`be reasonable.
`
`
`Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
`Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of
`satisfying the first two prongs of the test.” Id. If the plaintiff meets that burden, “the
`burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of
`jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
`U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)).
`On the first prong, the Court applies the purposeful direction analysis for a
`trademark infringement claim. See Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th
`1085, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2023) (applying purposeful direction for trademark
`infringement).
`1.
`Purposeful Direction
`Under the first prong, the Ninth Circuit applies the purposeful direction test
`
`enunciated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802-
`03; Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017).
`
`5
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.78 Page 6 of
`11
`
`
`Under the three-part Calder “effects” test to evaluate purposeful direction, Plaintiff must
`establish that the defendant allegedly “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly
`aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be
`suffered in the forum state.” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
`2002) (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 783).
`Defendant does not dispute the first and third elements but argues that the second
`element, that it expressly aimed conduct at California, has not been satisfied because it
`did not expressly aim any conduct in this forum simply by operating an interactive
`website. (Dkt. No. 9 at 6-8.) It further claims it is engaged primarily in agricultural and
`farming services, not sales of clothing, and a few sales on its website that was only
`briefly active does not amount to expressly aiming conduct in this forum. (Id.) Further,
`of the total 22 sales nationwide, only five sales occurred in California but none in this
`district. (Dkt. No. 13 at 2-3.) Plaintiff responds that the number of sales does not impact
`whether Defendant expressly aimed its conduct at this forum, and selling clothing is its
`“means of conducting regular business.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 12-13.)
`In Herbal Brands, the Ninth Circuit explained that an interactive website, by itself,
`cannot establish expressly aiming. Herbal Brands, Inc., 72 F.4th at 1091. “Otherwise,
`every time a seller offered a product for sale through an interactive website, the seller
`would be subjecting itself to specific jurisdiction in every forum in which the website was
`visible, whether or not the seller actually consummated a sale. That result would be too
`broad to comport with due process.” Id. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that operating a
`website along with “something more” demonstrating “conduct directly targeting the
`forum” satisfies the expressly aiming prong. Id. at 1092.
`In Herbal Brands, the plaintiff, a manufacturer and distributor of health and
`wellness products sued the defendant for trademark infringement for making
`unauthorized sales of the plaintiff’s products on Amazon. Id. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit
`held that “that if a defendant, in its regular course of business, sells a physical product via
`an interactive website and causes that product to be delivered to the forum, the defendant
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`6
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.79 Page 7 of
`11
`
`
`‘expressly aimed’ its conduct at that forum.” Id. at 1093. From this, it delineated two
`key elements that must be satisfied on the “expressly aimed” prong. “First the sales
`must occur as part of the defendant’s regular course of business instead of being ‘random
`isolated, or fortuitous.’” Id. at 1094 (emphasis in original). “Second, the defendant must
`exercise some level of control over the ultimate distribution of its products beyond
`simply placing its products into the stream of commerce.” Id. (emphasis in original).
`Here, by operating an interactive website targeting California and admittedly
`selling the infringing products and generating revenue from five online sales in
`California, Defendant has “expressly aimed” conduct at this forum. (Dkt. No. 11-1, Suhr
`Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 9; Dkt. No. 11-2, Sandidge Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendant used its website as a
`means of conducting regular business of selling t-shirts with the infringing product
`through the “Merch” section of its website to California residents and caused the product
`to be delivered to California. See Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1095 (“we hold that
`Defendants expressly aimed their conduct at Arizona because they allegedly sold
`products to Arizona residents via an interactive website in their regular course of business
`and caused those products to be delivered to the forum.”); Leszcaynski v. Kitchen Cube
`LLC, Case No.: 8-23-cv-01698-MEMF-ADS, 2024 WL 1829620, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
`17, 2024) (purposeful availment met where the defendant used its website of conducting
`regular business of making product sales to California residents and caused the product to
`be delivered to the forum); Shuffle Master, Inc. v. Kardwell Int’l, Inc., Case No.
`2:12cv8271-SVW-RQ, 2013 WL 12126745, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (expressly
`aimed factor met by operating a website where 1 percent of its overall revenue comes
`from online sales to California). These five sales were not “random, isolated, or
`fortuitous.” See Herbal Brands, Inc., 72 F.4th at 1094.
`Defendant misunderstands the legal analysis required for personal jurisdiction by
`repeatedly arguing that no sales were made in this district. (Dkt. No. 9 at 7; Dkt. No. 13
`at 2.) In an analysis of personal jurisdiction, the Court looks at whether the nonresident
`defendant has minimum contacts “within the territory of the forum”, see Int’l Shoe Co.,
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`7
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.80 Page 8 of
`11
`
`
`326 U.S. at 316, and must look “to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself”,
`Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. The absence of sales in this district is not the relevant question
`but whether the products were advertised in California and whether sales were made in
`California, the forum State. In this case, it is not disputed that Defendant operated an
`interactive website targeting California and sold the infringing products to addresses in
`California.
`Further, Defendant contends that it only made five sales out of the total of twenty-
`two sales of the COWBOY PILLOW t-shirts which is only a miniscule amount and does
`not demonstrate it expressly aimed conduct at California. District courts have noted that
`“the critical inquiry in determining whether there was a purposeful availment of the
`forum state is the quality, not merely the quantity.” Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, LLC, 61 F.
`Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that a Connecticut corporation had
`purposefully availed itself of California's forums where the defendant maintained a
`website and had made two sales to California customers); see also Vanity.com, Inc. v.
`Vanity Shop of Grand Forks, Inc., No. C 12–02912 SI, 2012 WL 4755041, at *3 (N.D.
`Cal. Oct. 4, 2012) (finding personal jurisdiction where total online sales to customers in
`California were 0.02% of infringing defendant's total sales, noting that “while these sales
`may be small, it cannot be said they are not purposefully directed at California”); Tech
`Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Service Center, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (D. Or. July 11,
`2000) (plaintiff “has presented evidence of a highly interactive Web site and one actual
`transaction involving an Oregon resident.”) Here, Defendant has expressly aimed
`conduct at California by consummating the sale of five COWBOY PILLOWS t-shirts via
`an interactive website advertising and offering the infringing products for sale to
`California consumers.
`The Court concludes Plaintiff has shown that Defendant has purposefully directed
`its activities at California.
`/ / /
`/ / /
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`8
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.81 Page 9 of
`11
`
`
`
`2.
`
`Claim Arises Out of or Relates to the Defendant’s Forum-Related
`Activities
`Defendant argues that this factor is not met because it has not sold any products to
`
`consumers in this district. (Dkt. No. 9 at 8.) Plaintiff responds that Defendant
`misunderstands forum to be limited to a district rather than the state of California. (Dkt.
`No. 11 at 14.)
`
`The second prong requires that the “claim arise out of or relate to the defendant’s
`contacts with the forum.” As discussed above, Defendant’s conduct must arise out of its
`conduct in California, and not specifically conduct in this district. As such, the claim for
`trademark infringement arises out of Defendant’s marketing and sale of infringing
`products to California. See Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1096 (“Plaintiff’s claims – which
`allege harmed caused by Defendant’s sale of products – clearly arise out of and relate to
`Defendants’ conduct of selling those same products to [forum] residents.”).
`3.
`Exercise of Jurisdiction Must be Reasonable
`
`
`On the third prong for purposeful direction, the burden shifts to Defendant “to
`‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.”
`See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The Court looks to the following seven factors to
`determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants is reasonable.
`(1) the extent of the defendants' purposeful interjection into the forum state's
`affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the
`extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants' state; (4) the forum
`state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial
`resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the
`plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of
`an alternative forum.
`
`
`Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting CE Distrib., LLC v. New
`Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004)). Once a defendant has purposefully
`directed its activities at the forum, it must demonstrate a “compelling case” that
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`9
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.82 Page 10
`of 11
`
`
`
`jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
`(1985).
`
`First, Defendant argues that it only made a miniscule number of sales with most
`occurring outside of California and none in this district. (Dkt. No. 9 at 9.) Plaintiff
`disagrees arguing that 23% of sales of the infringing products were made to California.
`(Dkt. No. 11 at 15.) On this first factor assessing the “extent of the defendants’
`purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs”, the Ninth Circuit has noted that
`when a defendant has purposefully directed its activities in this forum causing injury
`here, it has also injected itself into this forum. See Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav.
`Co., Inc., 1 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1993) (this first factor “parallels the question of
`minimum contacts” in determining the reasonableness of exercising specific
`jurisdiction); Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991) (“In light of the
`first prong of purposeful availment, analysis of this first factor [extent of purposeful
`interjection] would be redundant”)). Because Plaintiff has shown that Defendant
`purposefully directed its activities at this forum, this factor favors Plaintiff.
`On the second factor looking at the burden on the defendant of defending in this
`forum, Defendant argues that litigating in this forum would be highly burdensome
`claiming that it had to retain two law firms in California. Plaintiff responds that it would
`similarly be faced with the burden of litigation in Missouri. The second factor must be
`examined “in the light of the corresponding burden on the Plaintiff.” Sinatra v. Nat'l
`Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's burden of litigating in
`Missouri is just as great as Defendant’s burden of litigating in California. Thus, this
`factor is neutral.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`10
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`

`

`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Case 3:24-cv-01479-GPC-AHG Document 14 Filed 11/19/24 PageID.83 Page 11
`of 11
`
`
`
`Weighing the two factors raised by Defendant, the Court concludes that Defendant
`has failed to a demonstrate compelling case that jurisdiction over it would be
`unreasonable.3
`
`Conclusion
`Based on the reasoning above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss
`
`for lack of personal jurisdiction. The hearing set on November 22, 2024 shall be
`vacated.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`Dated: November 19, 2024
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3 In reply, Defendant argues jurisdiction would be unreasonable as the remaining factors. (Dkt. No. 13
`at 6.) However, a party may not raise new arguments in a reply. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,
`997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
`brief.”). Because Defendant raised the remaining factors in its reply, Plaintiff has not had an
`opportunity to address Defendant’s new arguments. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider
`Defendant’s argument raised for the first time in the reply.
`
`
`11
`
`24cv1479-GPC(AHG)
`
`