Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3656 Page 1 of 14
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`
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`Christopher S. Marchese (SBN 170239)
`marchese@fr.com
`Seth M. Sproul (SBN 217711)
`sproul@fr.com
`Ryan P. O’Connor (SBN 253596)
`oconnor@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`12860 El Camino Real, Suite 400
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Tel: (858) 678-5070
`Fax: (858) 678-5099
`
`Joy B. Kete (pro hac vice)
`kete@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`One Marina Park
`Boston, MA 02210
`Tel: 617-542-5070 / Fax: 617-542-8906
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Apple Inc.
`
`Additional Counsel Listed on Signature
`Page
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`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`
`
`TACTION TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`APPLE INC.
`
`
`
`
`
` Defendant.
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB
`
`DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S
`CORRECTED RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`District Judge: Hon. Todd W. Robinson
`Magistrate Judge: Jill L. Burkhardt
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3657 Page 2 of 14
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PAGE
`CLAIM TERM ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 1
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`I.
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`The Court must construe Term 1 ..................................................... 1
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`The Taction patents disavow claim scope ....................................... 2
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`Apple’s construction does not import limitations from the
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`specification, exclude a disclosed embodiment, or provide
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`definitions for individual words ...................................................... 4
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`4.
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`Apple’s IPR petitions do not support Taction’s construction ......... 5
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3658 Page 3 of 14
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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` Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Eon Corp. v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 640 (2017) .................. 1
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`O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 1, 5
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`Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................ 2, 4
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`Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Cellect, LLC,
`IPR2020-00476, 2020 ........................................................................................... 5
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`Target Corp. v. Proxicom Wireless, LLC,
`IPR2020-00904, Paper 11 (Nov. 10, 2020) ...................................................... 5, 6
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) ..................................................................................................... 6
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3659 Page 4 of 14
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`I.
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`CLAIM TERM ANALYSIS
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` Term 1: “wherein the ferrofluid reduces at least a mechanical
`resonance within the frequency range of 40-200 Hz” and variants
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`The dispute here centers on the clear and unambiguous disclaimer of claim
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`scope found both in the specification and file history of the Taction patents. Taction’s
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`proposal ignores this evidence and should be rejected for this reason alone. Taction’s
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`proposal, which urges “plain and ordinary meaning,” should also be rejected because
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`it invites legal error by leaving the question of claim scope unanswered. Elecx. v.
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`Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“By determining
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`only that the terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, the court left
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`this question of claim scope unanswered, leaving it for the jury to decide. This was
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`legal error.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 640 (2017); O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond
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`Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Because the parties
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`dispute the scope of Term 1 and Taction’s purported “plain and ordinary meaning”
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`construction does not resolve that dispute, the Court must construe Term 1 and should
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`adopt Apple’s proposed construction. Taction has not proved otherwise.
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`1.
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`The Court must construe Term 1
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`In this case, the parties dispute the scope of Term 1 and Taction’s purported
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`“plain and ordinary meaning” construction does not resolve that dispute. Term 1 is
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`not simple, easy to understand, or straightforward even to a POSITA and certainly
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`will not be viewed as such by a lay jury. Ex. EE (Visell Decl.) at ¶¶34-36. Thus,
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`Taction’s arguments that it “use[d] ordinary, easy to understand words when it drafted
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`the claims” and that it “would be error to substitute those terms with words that have
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`a significantly different meaning” are incorrect. Taction Br. at 5-6 (citing Sipnet); see
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`also id. at 4 (arguing that the disputed phrases are “simple and straightforward”).
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`Furthermore, Taction’s reliance on Sipnet is misplaced. In that case, the parties
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`disputed the meaning of the term “is,” which the court found “has a meaning that can
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`only be called plain.” Sipnet, 806 F.3d at 1360. And there was no disavowal. Here,
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3660 Page 5 of 14
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`however, the disputed term is objectively and comparatively complex, uncertain in
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`meaning, and not entitled to its purported “plain meaning” because of express
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`disclaimers. See id. at 1361 (acknowledging plain meaning does not apply when there
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`is a disclaimer). Thus, Taction’s construction cannot be adopted.
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`2.
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`The Taction patents disavow claim scope
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`As explained in Apple’s opening brief (at 7-13), the specification and file
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`history of Taction’s patents clearly and unequivocally disavow any claim scope other
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`than a substantially uniform, non-peaked response over the range of 40-200 Hz.
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`Tellingly, however, Taction’s opening brief (at 9) devotes only a single paragraph to
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`these disavowals. And that paragraph contains no analysis of the evidence cited in
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`Apple’s portion of the joint claim construction chart for this term.
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`Instead, Taction argues that the claims, specification, and file history do not
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`state verbatim that “the invention requires producing ‘a substantially uniform, non-
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`peaked response’ and that any other type of response, including a reduction of
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`resonance would not be covered by the scope of the invention.” Taction Br. at 9
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`(emphasis original). The law, however, requires no such statement. “While disavowal
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`must be clear and unequivocal, it need not be explicit.” Poly-America, L.P. v. API
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`Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “For example, an inventor may
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`disavow claims lacking a particular feature when the specification describes ‘the
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`present invention’ as having that feature.” Id. “Similarly, an inventor may disavow
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`claims lacking a particular feature when the specification distinguishes or disparages
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`prior art based on the absence of that feature.” Poly-America, 839 F.3d at 1136. As
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`explained in Apple’s opening brief (at 9-11), that is exactly what the applicant did in
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`the specification and file history of the Taction patents.
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`Taction next argues that the specification does not reflect a disavowal of claim
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`scope. Yet Taction does not address any of Apple’s evidence. Instead, Taction argues
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`the “the frequency distortion around a resonant frequency in the 40-200 Hz range is
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`reduced, but not necessarily eliminated.” Taction Br. at 6-7 (citing ’885 patent at 9:36-
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3661 Page 6 of 14
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`39). Remarkably, Taction omits with ellipses the remainder of the cited sentence and
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`paragraph, which further states: “to achieve the relatively uniform, non-peaked,
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`response evident in FIG. 5G between 40 and 200 Hz in range 503. The absence of
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`resonant peak [sic] in the response makes it possible to reproduce the tactile
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`component of a musical experience with previously unattainable high fidelity.” ’885
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`patent at 9:39-44. These omitted statements expressly confirm that the production of
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`a substantially uniform, non-peaked response over the range of 40-200 Hz—not any
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`unspecified reduction of resonance—overcomes the drawbacks of the prior art.
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`Similarly, Taction argues that the file history reflects no disavowal of claim
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`scope. Once again, however, Taction does not address any of Apple’s evidence.
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`Instead, Taction points to a rejection of claims during prosecution of the ’885 patent
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`and argues the Examiner determined that the prior art did not disclose or render
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`obvious a reduction in resonance, including in the 40-200 Hz frequency range,
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`without any mention of the ferrofluid producing a substantially uniform, non-peaked
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`response over the frequency range of 40-200 Hz. Taction Br. at 7. This argument is
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`both irrelevant and wrong. It is irrelevant because the applicant (not the examiner)
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`disavows claim scope and here, the disavowal of claim scope in the file history
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`occurred during prosecution of the ’885 patent’s parent application. Thus, the
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`examiner’s statement during prosecution of the ’885 patent says nothing about
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`whether Taction disavowed claim scope in the file history generally and does not
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`address the disavowal during prosecution of Taction’s earlier patent.
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`Taction’s argument is also wrong because the Examiner expressly determined
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`the prior art discloses that ferrofluid will reduce resonance. Ex. 6 at 8-9. Specifically,
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`the Examiner found that “the addition of the ferrofluid of King in an actuator of
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`Houston et al. and Isono et al. would lead to the reduction of a resonance.” Id. What
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`the prior art failed to disclose, according to the Examiner, was reduction of resonance
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`in the range of 40-200 Hz. Id. Thus, if anything, this evidence supports Apple’s
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`construction because it confirms every claim must include the range of 40-200 Hz.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3662 Page 7 of 14
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`3.
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`Apple’s construction does not import limitations, exclude an
`embodiment, or provide definitions for individual words
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`Every embodiment in the specification that describes the frequency response
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`has a substantially uniform, non-peaked response over the frequency range of 40-200
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`Hz and indicates the importance of that response. “These two facts provide together
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`a proper reason to limit the claims in this way.” Poly-America, 839 F.3d at 1137.
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`“Moreover, even if these indications were not themselves sufficient, they, when taken
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`together with the statements from [the Taction] patent’s specification and prosecution
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`history identified above, provide clear and unequivocal evidence that the inventor
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`intended to disavow any claim scope” other than a substantially uniform, non-peaked
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`response over the range of 40-200 Hz. Id. Thus, Taction’s argument that Apple’s
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`construction imports limitations from the specification is incorrect.
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`Furthermore, Apple’s proposed construction tracks the only embodiments in
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`the patent. Thus, contrary to Taction’s arguments, Apple’s proposed construction
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`does not exclude any disclosed embodiments. Not surprisingly, Taction failed to
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`identify a single embodiment that is excluded by Apple’s proposed construction.
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`Instead, Taction argues that “several embodiments discuss reducing or damping the
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`resonance generally without requiring a ‘substantially uniform response.’” Taction
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`Br. at 8-9. As support for this assertion, Taction notes that “the specification describes
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`damping resonance to ‘add[] tactile sensations to audio’ and ‘lower[] the user’s
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`preferred acoustic listening level.’” Id. However, neither of these “effects” are
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`precluded by Apple’s construction. Ex. EE (Visell Decl.) at ¶37.
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`Finally, Taction’s argument that Apple attempted to provide definitions for
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`individual words in Term 1 should be rejected. Taction Br. at 5-6. Apple’s proffered
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`construction does not rewrite “reduce a resonance” as “produce a uniform, non-
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`peaked response” or conflate “reduce” with “eliminate.” Instead, Apple’s
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`construction captures the actual scope of Term 1 in view of the clear and unambiguous
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`disavowal of claim scope in the specification and file history of Taction’s patents.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3663 Page 8 of 14
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`4.
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`Apple’s IPR petitions do not support Taction’s construction
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`In the IPR petitions, Apple, like Taction here, proposed giving the claims their
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`plain meaning, which is the proper approach when, as in the IPRs, there is no need
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`for claim construction. In this case, however, claim construction is required because
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`the parties dispute the scope of Term 1. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361-62; see also
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`Target Corp. v. Proxicom Wireless, LLC, IPR2020-00904, Paper 11, at 12 (Nov. 10,
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`2020) (“alternative pleading before a district court is common practice….”); see also
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`Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Cellect, LLC, IPR2020-00476, 2020, Paper 14 (July 31,
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`2020) (“[T]he proposed constructions in district court litigation need not be adopted
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`in the Petition for Petitioner to be in compliance with the rules.”).
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`Term 2: “wherein the ferrofluid reduces [a/the] Q-Factor of [a/the]
`response of the apparatus over at least a portion of [a/the] frequency
`range of 40-200 Hz”
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`Term 2, which describes the reduction of a Q-factor in a response (something
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`that does not have a Q-factor) is indefinite because it is nonsensical. Apple Br. at 13-
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`14. Notably, Taction does not dispute that: (1) a Q-factor is a dimensionless quantity
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`that describes how underdamped an oscillator or resonator is; and (2) the response of
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`the oscillator or resonator does not have a Q-factor. In fact, Taction’s own expert, Dr.
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`Oliver, expressly acknowledges that the Q-factor “describes the extent to which an
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`apparatus [not a response] is underdamped” and refers to a “low Q-factor system”
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`(not a low Q-factor response). Ex. 1 (Oliver Decl.) at ¶51; see also id. at ¶51 (arguing
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`that that the Q-factor is a “[s]ymbol of merit for an energy-storing device, resonant
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`system or turned circuit”). These admissions confirm that Term 2 is indefinite.
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`Nonetheless, Dr. Oliver and Taction argue that it somehow makes sense to
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`describe a reduction of the Q-Factor of a response because “the ‘response’ is referring
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`to the ‘movement of the moving portion’ in reaction to the ‘signals applied to the
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`coil.’” Id. at ¶53; Taction Br. at 12. This argument does not cure the defect in Term
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`2. Ex. EE (Visell Decl.) at ¶¶41-42. Like the claimed “response,” the “movement of
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3664 Page 9 of 14
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`the moving portion” does not have a Q-factor. Id. Thus, it is equally nonsensical to
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`describe a reduction of a Q-factor of the “movement of the moving portion.” Id.
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`Nor does it help for Taction to argue that a POSITA would understand that “the
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`apparatus is the energy storing system in which the ferrofluid acts to reduce the
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`resonant frequency of such system.” Taction Br. at 12. Indeed, this argument does not
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`address the indefiniteness issue. Furthermore, a POSITA would not have understood
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`that the claimed ferrofluid merely reduces the resonant frequency. As previously
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`explained, the claimed invention uses ferrofluid to eliminate the resonance peak and
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`produce a substantially uniform, non-peaked response over the range of 40-200 Hz.
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`Finally, the fact that Apple proposed a construction of Term 2 “in order to
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`facilitate IPR challenges … is not a concession that a skilled artisan would arrive at
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`those constructions with ‘reasonable certainty.’” Intellectual Ventures, 2016 WL
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`4363485, at *9; Avenue Innovations, 310 F.Supp.3d at 466. The PTAB does not
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`consider whether a claim is indefinite. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Thus, “alternative
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`pleading before a district court is common practice, especially where it concerns
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`issues [like indefiniteness] outside the scope of inter partes review.” Target,
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`IPR2020-00904, Paper 11 at 12. Furthermore, as written, Term 2 is indefinite. But
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`Apple is within its right to propose an “alternative construction” of Term 2, which it
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`does only if the Court finds Term 2 not indefinite. And, under that scenario, Taction’s
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`arguments are incorrect for the reasons explained above in the context of Term 1.
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`In addition, although Apple’s alternative construction includes the phrase “over
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`the frequency range of 40-200 Hz” instead of “over at least a portion of the frequency
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`range of 40-200 Hz,” that is the proper approach because it tracks the actual scope of
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`the claim. Taction’s argument that this “injects another limitation” is wrong. Apple’s
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`construction is consistent with a POSITA’s understanding that Term 2 is another way
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`of claiming the concept recited in Term 1 and should have the same scope.
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` Term 3: “magnet”
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`The most important part of Apple’s construction is whether “magnet” refers to
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3665 Page 10 of 14
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`a single body. Under the plain meaning, a magnet is a single physical body (or block)
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`of material, even if it has multiple magnetic regions or poles. Ex. EE (Visell Decl.) at
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`¶¶50-52; Ex. GG (Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary) (defining “magnet” as “a body
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`having the property of attracting iron and producing a magnetic field external to
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`itself); Ex. HH (dictionary.com) (similar). Accordingly, a plurality of magnets as
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`recited in the claims necessarily requires separate, physical bodies.
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`Taction wants to deconstruct the notion of a magnet and define it solely by its
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`ability to create a magnetic field to allow for a single physical body to be multiple
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`magnets.1 Elsewhere Taction has argued that it “chose to use ordinary, easy to
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`understand words” and that it therefore “would be error to substitute those terms with
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`words that have a significantly different meaning.” Taction Br. at 5. Yet here, Taction
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`veers from the plain meaning of a truly common word when neither the patent nor the
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`understanding of a POSITA supports such a construction.
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`The Taction patents do not refer to a single magnetic body as a plurality of
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`magnets. See, e.g., ’885 patent at 7:32, 8:17, 10:14, 10:30, 11:6, 11:47, 12:4, 12:14,
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`12:35, Figs. 1, 3B, 3C, 4B, 7, 8A, 9A, 9B, 10A, 11, 12, 13A, 15B. The exemplary
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`magnets in the preferred embodiment (e.g., magnets 302a, 302b, and 402) are clearly
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`separate bodies; rather that portions of the same body as Taction suggests. And there
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`is no indication in the specification of the Taction patents that portions of magnetic
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`material in the same body are considered separate magnets if they have separate
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`magnetic regions or poles.
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`1 Taction also takes issue with the word “ferromagnetic” in Apple’s construction and
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`continues to assert that a magnet produces a “dipolar magnetic field.” But none of the
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`other magnet types Taction identifies would have been used to implement the claimed
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`invention. Ex. A (Hayward Decl.) at ¶¶90-94; Ex. EE (Visell Decl.) at ¶¶53-54. And,
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`contrary to Taction’s arguments, “polarity” refers to the magnet; not the magnetic
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`field. Apple’s Br. at 15-16; Ex EE (Visell Decl.) at ¶¶43-48.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3666 Page 11 of 14
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`Taction offers a different interpretation of these disclosures, but it is
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`unsupported spin. First, Taction argues that the magnets of Figure 3B are “adjacent
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`portions of magnetic material” in a single body, but neither the description nor the
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`picture supports that. Taction Br. at 15. Taction also argues the related ’921 patent
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`discloses that “magnets can be composed of subsidiary magnets.” Id. Thus, according
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`to Taction, “a claimed ‘magnet’ is not restricted to a ‘body,’ but instead can comprise
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`subsidiary pieces of material on that ‘body.” Id. Like the Taction patents, however,
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`the ’921 patent provides no indication that adjacent portions of magnetic material are
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`considered separate magnets if they have separate magnetic regions or poles. Instead,
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`the cited claims of the ’921 patent merely confirm that a magnet may comprise two
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`oppositely polarized magnets. And, in each embodiment of the ’921 patent, each
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`“subsidiary” magnet is a separate body.
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`Taction also looks to extrinsic evidence (i.e., textbooks and two Apple patents),
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`but that evidence is unavailing. Taction Br. at 15-16. None of Taction’s extrinsic
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`evidence uses the term magnet to refer to a portion of a single body. In fact, one of
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`Apple’s patents expressly refers to a magnetic array as a single magnet and
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`distinguishes that magnet from an array of “separate magnets.” See, e.g., Ex. 24 (’861
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`patent) at 2:66-3:2 (“This paper describes … the ability to create a multi-pole magnet
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`that is both more compact and more cost effective than an array of separate
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`magnets.”). Nothing cited by Taction suggests that a magnet is a portion of a single
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`body or that a magnet is defined only by the magnetic field it produces.
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` Term 4: “wherein each of said flexures is thinner along a motion axis
`of the moving portion than it is in directions orthogonal to the
`motion axis of the moving portion”
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`Taction’s opening brief does not even attempt to address the various methods
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`of measuring the dimensions of a flexure and certainly does not identify anything in
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`the specification indicating that any particular method of measurement should be
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`used. In the absence of such evidence, the Court must find Term 4 indefinite.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3667 Page 12 of 14
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`Nonetheless, Taction asserts “[a]ny argument that a POSITA would be unable to
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`determine which part of the flexure is thinner is misguided.”2 Taction Br. at 20. The
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`issue, however, is not whether a POSITA would be able to determine which part of
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`the flexure is thinner using any method of measuring the dimensions. Instead, the
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`issue is whether Taction’s patents identify which of the various methods for
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`measuring the dimensions of a flexure should be used to determine whether a flexure
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`is “thinner along a motion axis of the moving portion than it is in directions orthogonal
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`to the motion axis of the moving portion.” As explained in Apple’s opening brief (at
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`17-21), they do not.
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`Term 5: “generally cuboid”
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`Taction’s position principally focuses on the understanding and usage of the
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`term “generally,” but fails to consider the context of how this term is recited in the
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`relevant asserted claims. The relevant asserted claims use “generally” to modify
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`“cuboid,” and thus, the term of approximation is “generally cuboid”—not merely
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`“generally” as Taction posits. Taction’s statements, cited case law, and purported
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`dictionary definitions referencing the common usage of “generally” do not address
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`how a person would have understood the scope of the disputed term—“generally
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`cuboid.” That is, even if the term “generally” alone is not indefinite, the term
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`“generally cuboid” is indefinite because the specification does not define “cuboid”
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`and also does not provide any example embodying the plain meaning of “cuboid.”3
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`Taction also appears to conflate the minimum specificity requirement for
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`2 Taction appears to incorrectly assume that all flexures used in linear actuators are
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`like the simple flexures shown in the exemplary embodiments of the Taction patents.
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`See, e.g., Ex. JJ at Figs. 3-5; Ex. KK at Fig. 1; Ex. LL at Fig. 5; Ex. MM at Fig. 11.
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`3 Taction incorrectly asserts that “‘cuboid’ [being] the basis for indefiniteness” is
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`“waived.” Taction Br. at 20, n. 7. As made clear in Apple’s opening brief and in
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`Apple’s Proposed Terms for Construction, the disputed term is “generally cuboid.”
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3668 Page 13 of 14
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`definiteness and the lack of objective boundaries that results in indefiniteness. While
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`each of the cases cited by Taction relate to the former, the analysis of “generally
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`cuboid” here relates to the later. Indeed, several of Taction’s cited cases involved
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`terms of approximation where “generally” modified an adjective with objective
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`boundaries. Here, however, “generally” modifies “cuboid” and the plain meaning of
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`“cuboid” is “shaped like a cube” or “more or less cubic,” which has no objective
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`boundaries and there are no examples of a “generally cuboid” housing in the
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`specification of the Taction patents. Exs. E-G. Instead, each example of the claimed
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`housing disclosed in the specification is “substantially planar (e.g., with a thickness
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`less than one-third the length or width)” and is not generally more or less cubic.
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`Term 6: “wherein each of said plurality of flexures is relatively stiff
`in resistance to motion transverse to a plane of the moving portion,
`but relatively less resistant to linear motion in the plane of the
`moving portion”
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`Each of Taction’s arguments regarding Term 6 is incorrect. First, Taction
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`rewrites claim 9 of the ’117 patent to preserve its validity. As explained in Allen
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`Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., however, it is not the court’s “function
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`to rewrite claims to preserve their validity.” 299 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Second, Taction incorrectly and baselessly asserts that the term “‘relatively’ is …
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`typically found to be definite.” Taction Br. at 22. The term “relatively,” however, is
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`not typically found to be definite. As shown in Apple’s opening brief (at 24-25), the
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`term “relatively” is often found indefinite. Third, Taction argues that “the claim itself
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`gives meaning to ‘relative’ as ‘relatively stiff’ is juxtaposed with ‘relatively less
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`resistant.” Taction Br. at 23. The claim, however, does not place the terms side-by-
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`side or contrast the two phrases. Finally, Taction argues that its proposed construction
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`is “in line with the specification.” Taction Br. at 23. Yet none of the statements
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`Taction cites provides a standard for determining the claimed degree of stiffness.
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`Thus, Term 6 is indefinite.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 112 Filed 07/22/22 PageID.3669 Page 14 of 14
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`Dated: July 22, 2022
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`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`
`By: /s/ Ryan P. O’Connor
`
`Christopher S. Marchese (SBN 170239)
`marchese@fr.com
`Seth M. Sproul (SBN 217711)
`sproul@fr.com
`Ryan P. O’Connor (SBN 253596)
`oconnor@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`12860 El Camino Real, Suite 400
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Tel: 858-678-5070 / Fax: 858-678-5099
`
`Joy B. Kete (pro hac vice)
`kete@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`One Marina Park
`Boston, MA 02210
`Tel: 617-542-5070 / Fax: 617-542-8906
`
`Jacqueline Tio (pro hac vice)
`tio@fr.com
`FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
`1180 Peachtree Street, N.E., 21st Floor
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`Tel: 404-892-5005/Fax 404-892-5005
`
`Counsel for Defendant Apple Inc.
`
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