Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3578 Page 1 of 15
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`Sean Pak (SBN 219032)
`seanpak@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN, LLP
`50 California Street, 22nd Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 875-6320
`Facsimile: (415) 875-6700
`
`Thomas D. Pease (pro hac vice)
`(N.Y. Bar No. 2671741)
`thomaspease@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN, LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, New York 10010
`Telephone: (212) 849-7000
`Facsimile: (212) 849-7100
`
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Taction Technology, Inc.
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`TACTION TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`
` Case No. 21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB
`____________________
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`TACTION’S RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`APPLE INC.,
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`vs.
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`Defendant
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`TACTION’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3579 Page 2 of 15
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1
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`Disputed Constructions ..................................................................................... 1
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`“wherein the ferrofluid reduces at least a mechanical resonance
`within the frequency range of 40-200 Hz” / “wherein the viscous
`ferrofluid reduces at least a resonance within a frequency range
`of 40-200 Hz” / “wherein the ferrofluid damps at least a
`resonance” ............................................................................................... 1
`
`“wherein the ferrofluid reduces the Q-Factor of the response of
`the apparatus over at least a portion of the frequency range of 40-
`200 Hz” / “wherein the ferrofluid reduces a Q-factor of a
`response of the apparatus over at least a portion of a frequency
`range of 40-200 Hz” ................................................................................ 4
`
`“magnet” .................................................................................................. 6
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`“wherein each of said flexures is thinner along a motion axis of
`the moving portion than it is in directions orthogonal to the
`motion axis of the moving portion” ........................................................ 7
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`“generally cuboid”................................................................................... 9
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`“wherein each of said plurality of flexures is relatively stiff in
`resistance to motion transverse to a plane of the moving portion,
`but relatively less resistant to linear motion in the plane of the
`moving portion” .................................................................................... 10
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`III. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 10
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`TACTION’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3580 Page 3 of 15
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Celgard, LLC, v. Shenzhen Senior Tech.,
`No. CV. 19-05784-JST (N. D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) .................................................. 8
`
`Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`915 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................. 3
`
`Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc’n Co. LP,
`838 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 5
`
`Dow Chem. Co. v. NOVA Chem. Corp.,
`803 F.3d 620 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................. 8
`
`Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`435 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................... 6
`
`Eon Corp. v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc.,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 2
`
`First Quality Tissue, LLC v. Irving Consumer Prod. Ltd.,
`No. CV 19-428-RGA, 2022 WL 958089 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2022) ......................... 8
`
`InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm’n,
`690 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 2
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc.,
`429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 4
`
`Kingspan Insulated Panels Inc. v. Centria GP,
`No. 1:15-CV-1023, 2018 WL 1256559 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2018) .................... 3
`
`On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH,
`386 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................... 9
`
`Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`808 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................. 3
`
`Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Device Co.,
`No. 2:17-CV-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) ............ 3
`
`Pelican Int’l Inc. v. Hobie Cat Co.,
`No. 20-CV-2390-BAS-MSB, 2022 WL 298959 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022) ............. 3
`
`Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc.,
`839 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................... 3
`
`Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp.,
`875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................... 8
`
`ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,
`346 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................... 4
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`TACTION’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3581 Page 4 of 15
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`SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ............................................................................... 2
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................... 9
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................... 8
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3582 Page 5 of 15
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Apple’s constructions are at odds with the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence and
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`should be rejected.1 Apple repeatedly violates the cardinal rule of claim construction
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`by indiscriminately seeking to write new limitations into the claims. For example,
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`Apple contends “wherein the ferrofluid reduces at least a mechanical resonance”
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`mandates a substantially uniform, non-peaked response when nothing in the claim
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`suggests that, and no evidence shows the required clear and unmistakable disclaimer
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`of scope Apple contends was made. No reason exists why the jury could not apply this
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`phrase, and other terms in dispute, as written without the surplus language Apple seeks
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`to inject. Apple’s contention that certain claim phrases are indefinite also lacks merit.
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`In contrast, Taction’s constructions flow directly from the intrinsic record and should
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`be adopted.
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`II. Disputed Constructions
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`A.
`“wherein the ferrofluid reduces at least a mechanical resonance
`within the frequency range of 40-200 Hz” / “wherein the viscous
`ferrofluid reduces at least a resonance within a frequency range of 40-200
`Hz” / “wherein the ferrofluid damps at least a resonance”
`
`Claims
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`Taction’s
`Construction
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`Apple’s Construction
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`’885 patent, cls. 1, 17
`’117 patent, cls. 1, 9, 16
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`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`“wherein the ferrofluid produces
`a substantially uniform, non-
`peaked response over the
`frequency range of 40-200 Hz”
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`Apple improperly rewrites a claim phrase that is clear on its face and can easily
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`be applied by the jury as written. This phrase merely requires a mechanical resonance
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`1 By abandoning its constructions for “plurality of flexures that are generally flat
`and generally rectangular” and “plurality of protrusions that He within a same plane
`as adjacent portions of the plurality of flexures,” after telling the Court it would brief
`them (Dkt. 58 (Joint Hearing Statement) at 2-5; Dkt. 58-1 (Joint Claim Construction
`Chart) at 25-29), Apple caused Taction to waste two pages in its opening brief
`unnecessarily addressing those terms. Dkt. 73 (“Taction Br.”) at 23-25.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3583 Page 6 of 15
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`to be reduced, just as the patent describes and the prosecution history and extrinsic
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`evidence support. Nothing warrants Apple’s reading in of a limitation requiring a
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`substantially uniform, non-peaked response over the claimed frequency range.
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`Tellingly, Apple itself continued to rely on Taction’s plain meaning construction at the
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`PTAB (to seek invalidity) even after filing its opening Markman brief and even after
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`the PTAB denied institution of all four of Apple’s IPR petitions. See, e.g., Ex. 1,2
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`IPR2022-00057, Petition for Rehearing at 3 n.1 (“This proceeding captures
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`independent claims 1 and 17, both of which include nearly identical language requiring
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`a reduction in resonance within the frequency range of 40-200 Hz.”);3 see also id. at
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`1 (“Ground 1 relied upon Kajiwara, which disclosed a reduction of the resonance
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`amplitude at ~150 Hz. Ground 2 relied upon Park728, which disclosed a reduction of
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`resonance amplitude from 80-180 Hz.”).4 Applying plain and ordinary meaning here
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`would not “invite[] legal error” or otherwise “leav[e] the question of claim scope
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`unanswered” since the plain meaning is indisputable: reduce means “reduce,” not
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`“eliminate” or “completely flatten.”5 Cf. Eon Corp. v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc.,
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`815 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`Apple commits the “cardinal sin” of importing limitations from embodiments
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`into the claim language. SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc.,
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`242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Pelican Int’l Inc. v. Hobie Cat Co., No. 20-CV-
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`2 All exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Gavin Snyder filed herewith.
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`3 All emphases are added unless otherwise noted.
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`4 All of Apple’s petitions for rehearing were also denied by the PTAB.
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`5 Apple also erroneously argues that claim 1 of the ’885 patent is representative
`and therefore claim 16 of the ’117 patent should be interpreted to include a 40-200
`Hz frequency limitation, which it does not have. Dkt. 72 at 8. Construing claim 16
`of the ’117 patent to have the same scope as the other claims is particularly
`inappropriate. InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318,
`1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the doctrine of claim differentiation prevents limitations from
`one claim being read into another claim that has different language).
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3584 Page 7 of 15
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`2390-BAS-MSB, 2022 WL 298959, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022) (stating the
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`“bedrock principle of patent law” that “particular embodiments appearing in a
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`specification will not be read into the claims when the claim language is broader than
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`such embodiments”). Apple does not dispute that “substantially uniform” and “non-
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`peaked” are not in the claims, and run directly contrary to the “reduce” language the
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`PTO approved. Compounding Apple’s error, none of the embodiments it relies on
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`(Dkt. 72 (“Apple Br.”) at 9-10, 11 (citing ’885 patent at Abstract, 2:25-36, 3:53-58,
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`5:49-52, 9:36-44)) contain all the limitations it seeks to read in. Optis Wireless Tech.,
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`LLC v. Huawei Device Co., No. 2:17-CV-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054, at *22-23
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`(E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) (rejecting proposed construction that “mixes features of
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`various embodiments”). And Poly-America, L.P. v. API Industries, Inc. is
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`distinguishable as the court found “[e]very embodiment described in the specification
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`has [the proposed limitation] and every section of the specification indicates the
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`importance of [the proposed limitation].” 839 F.3d 1131, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`Although Apple contends Taction disavowed the claim scope by disparaging
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`prior art, “disavowal of claim scope through disparagement of the prior art in the
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`specification” is a “high bar” and criticizing prior art does itself not automatically rise
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`to clear disavowal. See, e.g., Openwave Sys., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 808 F.3d 509, 517
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`(Fed. Cir. 2015); Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
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`Kingspan Insulated Panels Inc. v. Centria GP, No. 1:15-CV-1023, 2018 WL 1256559,
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`at *7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2018) (finding prior art criticisms insufficient to disavow
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`claim scope “in light of the lack of support in the claim language for [the] proposed
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`construction”). Further, the discussion of prior art in the specification Apple cites
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`(Apple Br. at 9-10) describes prior art transducers without added damping, not damped
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`transducers, and does not mention “reduction” of resonance at all. ’885 patent at 2:1-
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`10 (noting the “lack of mechanical damping” in prior art); 2:10-36 (mentioning “un-
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`damped linear resonant actuators”).
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`Apple’s argument that Taction disclaimed claim scope during prosecution of the
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3585 Page 8 of 15
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`parent application, Apple Br. at 10-11, also lacks merit as the claim language in that
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`application6 and the phrase here are different. See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech
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`Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he prosecution of one claim
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`term in a parent application will generally not limit different claim language in a
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`continuation application.”); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1383
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`(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Although a parent patent's prosecution history may inform the claim
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`construction of its descendant, the [parent] patent's prosecution history is irrelevant to
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`the meaning of this limitation because the two patents do not share the same claim
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`language.”). And the language Apple points to regarding “highly resonant” prior art
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`actuators being different from Taction’s “highly damped output” fully supports
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`Taction’s construction. Apple Br. at 10-11. Taction never contended that a reduction
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`of mechanical resonance was not encompassed by the claims or invention.
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`Nor does the extrinsic Taction marketing material Apple relies on include the
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`limitations Apple proposes. Apple Br. at 11-12. For example, the white paper states
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`that “for purposes of our tactile transducer, you can think of damping as a method for
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`. . . reducing resonances.” Dkt. 72-3 at 18. Further, the terms “flatter” and “flattest”
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`that Apple heavily relies on (Dkt. 72-4 at 2; Dkt. 72-3 at 6) are relative terms that are
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`not in the claim language or specification, and in no way suggest that only
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`“substantially uniform, non-peaked” responses are permitted.
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`B.
`“wherein the ferrofluid reduces the Q-Factor of the response of the
`apparatus over at least a portion of the frequency range of 40-200 Hz” /
`“wherein the ferrofluid reduces a Q-factor of a response of the apparatus
`over at least a portion of a frequency range of 40-200 Hz”
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`6 “[W]herein the motion of the moveable member is damped to reduce the Q-
`factor of the vibration module over the frequency range of 40-200 Hz.” Dkt 72-5 at
`76 (amended claim 15). What’s more, a different, dependent claim specified “wherein
`the damping member flattens the acceleration response of the module to a Q-factor of
`less than 1.5, over the frequency range of 40-200 Hz.” Id. at 72-73 (original language
`in claim 2). This demonstrates that when Taction intended to claim a “flattened”
`response, it knew how to do so, and claims that are directed to a reduced resonance
`should not be construed to flatten a response.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3586 Page 9 of 15
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`Claims
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`Taction’s
`Construction
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`Apple’s Construction
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`’885 patent,
`cl. 20
`’117 patent,
`cl. 17
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`Not indefinite
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`Plain and ordinary
`meaning
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`Indefinite OR
`“wherein the ferrofluid produces a
`substantially uniform, non-peaked response
`over the frequency range of 40-200 Hz”
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`Apple contends that only a device, rather than a haptic response of a device, can
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`have a Q-factor. Apple Br. at 14. But a POSITA would have no trouble understanding
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`with “reasonable certainty” the claims as written, because a device’s haptic properties
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`necessarily apply to haptic effects played on the device. Thus, it makes perfect sense
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`for the claims to refer to the Q-factor of a “response of the apparatus.” Taction Br. at
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`13; Dkt. 73-2 (“Oliver Decl.”) ¶¶ 50-58; see also Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sprint
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`Commc’n Co. LP, 838 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“As Nautilus instructs,
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`the dispositive question in an indefiniteness inquiry is whether the ‘claims,’ not
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`particular claim terms, ‘read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
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`prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
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`about the scope of the invention.’”) (citation omitted). Additionally, the patent
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`examiner—a POSITA—readily understood the scope of the invention in the ’885
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`patent application. Dkt. 73-7 at 9 (applying “reducing the Q factor over at least a
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`portion of the frequency range of 40-200Hz” to prior art); see also Taction Br. at 11.
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`Nothing in Apple’s brief suggests that there is any evidence, much less clear and
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`convincing evidence, that the term is indefinite. Other than Apple’s assertion that the
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`phrase is “nonsensical” (Apple Br. at 14), Apple does not identify any perceived
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`ambiguity that prevents a POSITA from being informed by the claim of the scope of
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`the invention with reasonable certainty. Conspicuously, Apple fails to address the
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`intrinsic and extrinsic evidence that Taction relies on in its brief to show why the phrase
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`is not indefinite. Id. at 11-12. And even if the drafting of the claim language were
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`“imperfect” or “somewhat problematic” (it is not), “the court should resolve any
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`ambiguity in favor of the patentee.” Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3587 Page 10 of 15
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`435 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, the phrase is not indefinite.7
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`Apple’s alternative construction fares no better.8 Apple relied upon Taction’s
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`plain meaning construction of “over at least a portion” in its IPR petitions when it was
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`beneficial to Apple, but now seeks a narrower construction in litigation. See, e.g., Ex.
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`2, IPR2022-00059 Petition at 47-48 (claiming that Miyazaki-Park494-Kajiwara
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`combination met this limitation “because the operating frequency is between at least
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`120-180Hz, which is within the range of 40-200Hz”) (emphasis added; see also id. at
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`61 (similar discussion for the 80-180Hz range in the Park728 reference). Apple also
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`conflates Q-factor with resonance, but they are distinct terms that describe overlapping
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`but different subject matter. Apple Br. at 15. Resonance is merely a numerator in the
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`11
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`Q-factor (with the resonance width being the denominator). Taction Br. at 11; Oliver
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`Decl. ¶ 51. While reducing the resonance will reduce the Q-factor, reducing the Q-
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`factor does not necessarily mean reducing the resonance. Apple’s alternative
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`construction should be denied for reading “Q-factor” out of the claims.
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`C.
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`“magnet”
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`Claims
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`Taction’s Construction Apple’s Construction
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`’885 patent, cls. 1,
`14, 17, 20
`’117 patent, cls. 1,
`7, 9, 16
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`“material that produces a
`dipolar magnetic field”
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`No construction required as the
`plain meaning controls.
`To the extent that a construction is
`required, “a ferromagnetic body
`that produces a magnetic field”
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`Apple’s chief argument for reading “ferromagnetic” into this term is that non-
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`ferromagnetic magnets are purportedly not strong enough to move the mass in haptic
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`actuators. Apple Br. at 16. But this supports Taction’s position, not Apple’s. Since
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`7 Although indefiniteness is not a basis for finding invalidity in an IPR, Apple
`had no difficulty in applying the plain meaning of the phrase under the Phillips
`standard. See, e.g., Ex. 2, IPR2022-00059 Petition at 6, 40-50, 53-61.
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`8 Apple does not address Taction’s argument that Apple is seeking to improperly
`replace “over at least a portion” with “over.” Taction Br. at 13.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3588 Page 11 of 15
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`the surrounding context of the asserted claims already requires that the magnets are
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`strong enough to move the mass, there is no need to add a “ferromagnetic” restriction
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`to this term in order to indirectly limit the magnets to a particular type of stronger
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`magnets. There are other types of magnetic material, as admitted by Dr. Hayward and
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`explained further by Dr. Henriksen. Dkt. 72-2 (Hayward Decl.) ¶ 90; Dkt. 73-4
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`(“Henriksen Decl.”) ¶¶ 41-42. If such materials are powerful enough to move the mass
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`and work in a device that otherwise practices the claims, they should not be arbitrarily
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`excluded from the claims. Apple also alleges that “the specification . . . does not
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`disclose any embodiment wherein the claimed magnets lose their magnetic properties
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`once an external field is removed,” Apple Br. at 16, but there is similarly no statement
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`excluding any such magnets. And, as Dr. Henriksen notes, ferrimagnetic and
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`antiferromagnetic magnets are also permanent magnets, like ferromagnets (but would
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`be excluded by Apple’s construction). Henriksen Decl. ¶ 41.
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`Apple also incorrectly asserts the term “dipolar” only makes sense applies to
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`magnets, not fields. But this is simply wrong. As Dr. Henriksen explained, it is
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`common to refer to magnetic fields produced by dipolar magnets as dipolar magnetic
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`fields. Henriksen Decl. ¶ 35. Apple also does not address the specification’s
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`description of the polarization of the magnets, which shows they produce a dipolar
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`magnetic field. E.g., ’885 patent at 3:5-6; 4:39-30; 7:32-33; 8:16-17.
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`20
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`Last, Apple offers no justification for its proposed restriction to a “body” rather
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`than a “material.” Taction’s construction of “magnet” thus better aligns with the
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`intrinsic evidence, as well as the relevant science of magnets.
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`D.
`“wherein each of said flexures is thinner along a motion axis of the
`moving portion than it is in directions orthogonal to the motion axis of
`the moving portion”
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`Claims Taction’s Construction
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`Apple’s
`Construction
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`’885
`patent,
`cl. 10
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`Not indefinite
`“wherein the local cross section of each of said flexures
`at any point is thinner in the direction of a motion axis
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`Indefinite
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3589 Page 12 of 15
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`of the moving portion than it is in directions orthogonal
`to the motion axis of the moving portion”
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`This claim language is clear on its face and can easily be applied by the jury.
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`Moreover, contrary to Apple’s argument, the Dow and Teva cases have no applicability
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`here. In Dow, the court found “neither the patent claims nor the specification . . .
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`provide[d] any guidance as to which method should be used.” Dow Chem. Co. v.
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`NOVA Chem. Corp., 803 F.3d 620, 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Similarly, in Teva, the court
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`found that the specification provided no guidance on which measurement method to
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`use, and the term did “not have a plain meaning to one of skill in the art.” Teva Pharm.
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`USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The specification
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`never . . . even mentions [the different measurement methods].”). Later Federal Circuit
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`cases confirm that “if a skilled person would choose an established method of
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`measurement, that may be sufficient to defeat a claim of indefiniteness, even if that
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`method is not set forth in haec verba in the patent itself.” Presidio Components, Inc.
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`v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In Presidio,
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`although multiple measurement methods existed, “the general approach was
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`sufficiently well established in the art and referenced in the patent to render the claims
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`not indefinite.” Id. at 1377. Here, the measurement scheme is well established for a
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`POSITA. Oliver Decl. ¶¶ 60-64; Presidio at 1377. It is also supported by the
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`specification.9 Taction Br. at 19-21. Thus, the term is definite. See Sonix Tech. Co.
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`9 Even if this Court were to find that no guidance is provided in the intrinsic
`evidence, and it should not, “whether a POSA would find there are competing existing
`methodologies on how to conduct the [measurement] is a disputed factual issue,” and
`inappropriate to resolve at claim construction. First Quality Tissue, LLC v. Irving
`Consumer Prod. Ltd., No. CV 19-428-RGA, 2022 WL 958089, at *4 (D. Del. Mar.
`30, 2022); see also Celgard, LLC, v. Shenzhen Senior Tech., No. CV. 19-05784-JST,
`at *15-16 (N. D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) (Ex. 3) (this fact issue cannot be resolved at claim
`construction).
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3590 Page 13 of 15
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`v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (A patent can provide
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`reasonable certainty by providing guidance, examples, and points of comparison).
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`E.
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`“generally cuboid”
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`Claims
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`Taction’s Construction
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`Apple’s Construction
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`’885 patent, cl. 2
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`Not indefinite
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`Indefinite
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`’117 patent, cls. 1, 9
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`Plain and ordinary meaning
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`Apple lists examples where terms of approximation can be indefinite. But these
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`examples analyze the terms “large” and “minimal,” which are terms reflecting relative
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`sizes, which require a point of comparison. Apple Br. at 21. In contrast, “generally”
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`has been held in a multitude of controlling cases to be definite. Taction Br. at 20-21
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`(citing four Federal Circuit cases finding “generally” to be definite).
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`Apple also applies a specific dictionary definition of “cuboid”: “a solid square
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`object with six equal sides.”10 However, Apple’s own dictionaries provide another
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`equally viable definition of cuboid that Apple completely ignores. See e.g., Dkt. 72-6
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`at 90 (defining cuboid: “a six-sided figure each face of which is a rectangle”); Dkt. 72-
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`7 at 93 (similar); Dkt. 72-8 at 96 (similar); Dkt. 72-9 at 99 (similar).
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`Markedly, and as Apple agrees, there are no examples in the intrinsic evidence
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`that fit Apple’s proposed construction of “shaped like a cube”—plainly because this
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`construction is at odds with all disclosed embodiments. On-Line Techs., Inc. v.
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`Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] claim
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`interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim is
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`rarely, if ever, correct.”). Instead, the patents depict a “six sided figure in which each
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`face is a rectangle,”11 including in Figure 4:
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`10 Taction maintains that such argument is improper and should be waived, as
`Apple told Taction at a meet and confer that the basis for its indefiniteness argument
`was “generally,” not “cuboid.” Taction Br. at 20 n.7; Dkt. 73-1 ¶ 33.
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`11 If the Court wishes to construe “cuboid,” Taction provides this definition,
`which is supported by the intrinsic evidence and Apple’s extrinsic evidence.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3591 Page 14 of 15
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`Instead of looking to the intrinsic evidence first to determine the meaning of the
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`claim, Apple starts and ends with extrinsic evidence—its cherry-picked dictionary
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`definition—to determine the definition of “cuboid.” This is an incorrect approach that
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`turns Phillips on its head. Apple’s method ignores the other definitions in its own
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`dictionary evidence and, more importantly, the intrinsic evidence of the patent.
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`F.
`“wherein each of said plurality of flexures is relatively stiff in
`resistance to motion transverse to a plane of the moving portion, but
`relatively less resistant to linear motion in the plane of the moving
`portion”
`
`Claims Taction’s Construction
`
`Apple’s Construction
`
`’117
`patent,
`cl. 9
`
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`Not indefinite
`“wherein each of said plurality of flexures is
`more resistant to motion transverse to the
`plane of the moving portion than to linear
`motion in the plane of the moving portion”
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`Indefinite
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`Apple again alleges the term is indefinite as a term of degree without providing
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`a standard or reference point for measuring that degree. But Apple overlooks the
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`language of the claim itself, which provides that reference point. Using the intrinsic
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`evidence as a guide, the term “relatively” in this limitation means the stiffness (or
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`resistance to motion) is greater in one direction relative to the other. Taction Br. at 22-
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`23. Accordingly, a reference point exists and the term is definite.
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`III. Conclusion
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`Taction respectfully requests that the Court adopt Taction’s proposed
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`constructions and reject Apple’s proposed constructions.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00812-TWR-JLB Document 111 Filed 07/21/22 PageID.3592 Page 15 of 15
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`
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`Dated: July 21, 2022
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`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN, LLP
`
`By: /s/ Sean Pak
`
`Sean Pak (SBN 219032)
`seanpak@quinneemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN, LLP
`50 California Street, 22nd Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 875-6320
`Facsimile: (415) 875-6700
`
`Thomas D. Pease (pro hac vice)
`(N.Y. Bar No. 2671741)
`thomaspease@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN, LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, New York 10010
`Telephone: (212) 849-7000
`Facsimile: (212) 849-7100
`
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff Taction Technology,
`Inc.
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