Case 3:18-cr-04683-GPC Document 353-1 Filed 03/24/22 PageID.4846 Page 1 of 14
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`MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
`GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.
`Randy K. Jones, SBN 141711
`3580 Carmel Mountain Road, Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Telephone: (858) 314-1510
`Email: rkjones@mintz.com
`
`Daniel Goodrich, BBO 692624 (Pro Hac)
`Ryan Dougherty, BBO 703380 (Pro Hac)
`1 Financial Center
`Boston, MA 02111
`djgoodrich@mintz.com
`rtdougherty@mintz.com
`
`BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER,
`WOLPERT, NESSIM, DROOKS
`LINCENBERG & RHOW P.C.
`Gary S. Lincenberg, SBN 123058
`Nicole R. Van Dyk, SBN 261646
`Darren L. Patrick, SBN 310727
`Alexis A. Wiseley, SBN 330100
`1875 Century Park East, Floor 23
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 201-2100
`Email: glincenberg@birdmarella.com
` nvandyk@birdmarella.com
` dpatrick@birdmarella.com
` awiseley@birdmarella.com
`
`Attorneys for Mark Manoogian
`
`BIENERT KATZMAN
`LITTRELL WILLIAMS LLP
`Thomas H. Bienert, Jr., SBN 135311
`James D. Riddet, SBN 39826
`Whitney Z. Bernstein, SBN 304917
`Carlos A. Nevarez, SBN 324407
`903 Calle Amanecer, Suite 350
`San Clemente, California 92673
`Telephone: (949) 369-3700
`Email: tbienert@bklwlaw.com
` jriddet@bklwlaw.com
` wbernstein@bklwlaw.com
` cnevarez@bklwlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Petr Pacas
`
`WIECHERT, MUNK &
`GOLDSTEIN, PC
`David W. Wiechert, SBN 94607
`Jessica C. Munk, SBN 238832
`27136 Paseo Espada, Suite B1123
`San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675
`Telephone: (949) 361-2822
`Email: dwiechert@aol.com
` jessica@wmgattorneys.com
`
`Attorneys for Jacob Bychak
`Attorneys for Mohammed Abdul Qayyum
`
`Case No. 18-CR-4683-GPC
`DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE (NOS. 1 & 2) TO EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO PREJUDICIAL AND
`HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY MATERIAL AT TRIAL
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`Case 3:18-cr-04683-GPC Document 353-1 Filed 03/24/22 PageID.4847 Page 2 of 14
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`JACOB BYCHAK, et al.,
`
` Defendants.
`
`Case No. 18-CR-4683-GPC
`Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF
`LAW AND AUTHORITIES IN
`SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
`MOTIONS IN LIMINE NOS. 1 & 2
`TO:
`1. PRECLUDE REFERENCE AT
`TRIAL TO “SPAM” AND/OR
`THAT DEFENDANTS WERE
`“SPAMMERS”
`2. PRECLUDE REFERENCE AT
`TRIAL TO MR. MANOOGIAN’S
`STATUS AS AN ATTORNEY
`
`Date: April 7, 2022
`Time: 1:00 p.m.
`Dept.: 2D
`
`I.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF LAW AND AUTHORITIES
`INTRODUCTION
`Defendants Jacob Bychak, Mark Manoogian, Mohammed Abdul Qayyum,
`and Petr Pacas (collectively, “Defendants”) move in limine pursuant to Federal
`Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 to respectfully request that the Court issue the
`following Orders to preclude reference at trial to the following irrelevant and
`unfairly prejudicial statements and topics:
`
`1.
`
`An Order precluding any reference to “spam” or that Company A sent
`“spam,” or that the Defendants were “spammers,” as those terms are
`highly inflammatory and mischaracterize Defendants’ actions in this
`case in a way that immediately invites the jury to conclude the
`Defendants committed criminal acts.
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`Case 3:18-cr-04683-GPC Document 353-1 Filed 03/24/22 PageID.4848 Page 3 of 14
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`2.
`
`An Order precluding all references at trial to the fact that Mark
`Manoogian is an attorney, that he attended law school, or that he
`represented Company A in any capacity as an attorney because Mr.
`Manoogian is not licensed to practice law in California, did not practice
`law during the time relevant to the Indictment, did not work for Company
`A as an attorney during the relevant time alleged in the Indictment, and
`his status as an attorney has no relevance to any issue of consequence at
`trial.
`Allowing any reference to the above-described issues or topics at trial serves no
`purpose other than to unfairly prejudice the jury and deprive the Defendants of their
`right to a fair trial.
`II.
`LEGAL STANDARD
` Only relevant evidence is admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and
`402, but even relevant evidence must be excluded “if its probative value is
`substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
`prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
`needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair prejudice”
`under Rule 403 “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure
`the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the
`offense charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). The Ninth
`Circuit has “warned repeatedly” against admitting evidence that makes a “conviction
`more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends
`to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its
`judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.” United States v. Bradley,
`5 F.3d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Hodges, 770 F.2d 1475,
`1480 (9th Cir. 1985)). Rule 403 is “designed principally to promote the twin policies
`of assuring ‘correct’ factual determinations in individual cases and actual and
`perceived fairness in the judicial process as a whole.” United States v. Robinson, 544
`F.2d 611, 616 (2d Cir. 1976).
`In evaluating the prejudicial nature of a specific piece of evidence, a district
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`court should consider whether the government could have made the same showing
`through less prejudicial means. United States v. Sine, 493 F.3d 1021, 1035 (9th Cir.
`2007). “The Supreme Court has held that ‘what counts as to the Rule 403 probative
`value of an item of evidence . . . may be calculated by comparing evidentiary
`alternatives.’” Id., quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182-183 (“If an alternative were
`found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of
`unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first
`offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed
`by unfairly prejudicial risk.”). Indeed, when potential evidence, characterizations of
`that evidence, or argument has the potential to inflame or mislead the jury, that
`evidence should be excluded where neutral evidence is available that will not suggest
`that the jury should make a decision on an improper basis. See id.
`Courts have frequently precluded the use of words that signal that an illegal or
`improper act has occurred before illegal conduct is proved because of the highly
`prejudicial effect of such a characterization. See, e.g., FreeLife Int’l., Inc. v. American
`Educ. Music Publ’ns Inc., No. CV07-2210-PHX-DGC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`38411, at *19 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2010) (granting motion in limine with regard to use
`of the word “pyramid” as it “carries the potential of prejudice”); William Hablinksi
`Arch. v. Amir Constr., Inc., No. CV 03-6365 CAS, 2006 WL 8442793, at *9 (C.D.
`Cal. December 8, 2006) (in copyright dispute over architectural work, precluding
`plaintiff from using term “copycat house” for being “unfairly prejudicial”). Words are
`also precluded from use when their use presupposes the factual establishment of a
`legal conclusion. See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Rehrig Pac. Co., No. 1:11-cv-1273
`LJO BAM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67957, at *21 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) (granting
`motion in limine to preclude use of the term “trade secret” at trial due to potential for
`prejudice).
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`There Is No Probative Value In Using The Inflammatory And
`Inaccurate Term “Spam” To Describe Company A Or Defendants’
`Activities And Use of The Term Poses Significant Danger Of Unfair
`Prejudice, Confusion Of The Issues, And Misleading The Jury.
`While “spam” does not have a precise definition, it is widely understood to
`constitute junk email messages that are “dubious in nature and origin, and a
`substantial proportion consists of pornographic images or links to pornographic
`websites. Spam may also contain child pornography or links to illegal websites
`containing child pornography.” United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1055-1056
`(9th Cir. 2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d
`1040, 1044-1045 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]gnored by most and reviled by some,
`spam is largely considered a nuisance and a source of frustration to e-mail users.”).
`The transmission of unwanted and illicit “bulk e-mail advertising, or spam, is a
`controversial and much maligned practice.” Seidl v. Greentree Mortg. Co., 30 F.
`Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D. Colo. 1998). Put simply, referring to email as “spam”
`evokes a feeling that the email is not only unwanted and intrusive, but that the
`messages contain offensive and potentially illegal content. See Adam Hamel, Will
`the Can-Spam Act of 2003 Finally Put A Lid on Unsolicited E-Mail?, 39 New Eng.
`L. Rev. 961 (2005) (spam is “associate[ed] with fraud, pornography, and computer
`viruses, spam presents real threats to American business, children, and the elderly,
`and jeopardizes the very future of the Internet”).
`The government has repeatedly demonstrated a conscious decision to
`mischaracterize Company A’s legitimate commercial email marketing business as
`involving sending spam, and by extension, seeks to portray the Defendants as
`nefarious “spammers.” See, e.g., Indictment, ¶ 8, ECF No. 1 (“[D]efendants
`concealed their use of the IP addresses to send ‘spam’ emails . . .”) (attached hereto
`as Exhibit A [“Ex”] to Declaration of Daniel J. Goodrich [“Goodrich Decl.”]);
`Transcript of February 14, 2019 Motion Hearing, at pp. 16:12-15, ECF No. 281
`Case No. 18-CR-4683-GPC
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`(Government comparing unsolicited commercial emailing to “a boiler-room
`scheme, where people were being called by phone and receiving phone calls that
`they did not want and potentially luring them into doing things they did not want to
`do.”) (attached hereto as Goodrich Decl. Ex. B). These mischaracterizations are not
`only highly inflammatory and factually incorrect, but they are also of zero probative
`value concerning any issue of consequence in this case and must be excluded.
`First, “spam” is a loaded term that reeks of criminality and is only valuable to
`the government because, contrary to the evidence, it immediately conveys to the jury
`that Defendants partook in a criminal enterprise to send unsolicited, and likely illegal,
`emails that contained pornographic or harmful content. But, in fact, sending spam is
`not illegal. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1045, 1047–1048 (Ninth Circuit recognizing that
`CAN-SPAM Act “does not ban spam outright, but rather provides a code of conduct
`to regulate commercial e-mail messaging practices”). Here, the facts demonstrate that
`Company A was in the business of sending and/or facilitating legitimate commercial
`marketing campaigns via email to willing customers who had opted in to receiving
`these emails. Clients such as USAA, Liberty Mutual, Geico, Disney, Fidelity,
`Subway, and Uber used Company A’s services to communicate with customers and
`potential customers. These legitimate advertising emails bear no resemblance to the
`intrusive content or phishing schemes that the term spam brings to mind. Indeed, it is
`undisputed that Company A never sent obscene, pornographic, or illicit emails.
`Similarly, the evidence at trial will further confirm that none of the Defendants
`were responsible for actually sending any commercial email, let alone unwanted
`spam. The undisputed facts reflect that the Defendants were members of Company
`A’s Operations team and were employed to acquire the IP addresses necessary to
`facilitate Company A’s commercial email marketing operations. Accordingly, to
`allow the government to mischaracterize the Defendants as spammers or to present
`Company A as being in the business or sending spam would be giving the government
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`a license to brand the Defendants as criminals without any supporting evidence. See,
`e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (Defendants
`convicted for sending spam emails including sexually explicit images). Because the
`terms “spam” and “spammers” are inherently prejudicial and lack any probative
`value, this Court must exclude those terms from this case if Defendants are to receive
`a fair trial.
`Second, to the extent that the government argues there is some slight probative
`value in referring to legitimate advertising emails as a type of spam – there is not –
`any perceived value is substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the Defendants of
`being depicted as criminal spammers. This is particularly true where, as here, there is
`a less prejudicial and more accurate term available: “commercial email.” The
`government is well aware of a neutral alternative and freely uses the neutral and
`accurate term “commercial email” when addressing the facts of this case. It is only
`when the government decides to ramp-up its rhetoric does it choose to deploy the term
`spam against the Defendants.
`For example, in the government’s response to the Defendants’ request for a
`Bill of Particulars, the government begins by dramatically framing the case as
`“charges related to the defendants’ fraudulent acquisition of Internet Protocol (IP)
`addresses and the use of the purloined IP addresses to send spam.” Government’s
`Response and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion For Bill of Particulars, at p. 2,
`ECF No. 51, (attached hereto as Goodrich Decl. Ex. C) (emphasis added). By
`contrast, in its “Statement of Facts,” the government refers to Company A’s
`operations more accurately as “digital advertising” and states that Company A
`“required numerous Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to send its commercial
`emails.” Id. at p. 2-3 (emphasis added). The government’s response proceeds to
`refer repeatedly to “commercial email” until the government shifts back to advocacy
`mode, at which point the government uses the term “spam” and conflates
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`commercials email with spam. See, e.g., id. at p. 9 (describing the “multiple
`commercial email messages” alleged to have been sent by Defendants under the
`heading “All Spam Emails and Multiple Commercial Email Messages”)
`(emphasis added). Tellingly, the Indictment uses similar sleight of hand by defining
`commercial email as “spam.” Indictment ¶ 2(c), ECF No. 1 (“Members of the
`conspiracy would use the fraudulently acquired IP addresses to send commercial
`email (‘spam’) messages”) (Ex. A).
`Requiring the government to use the neutral term “commercial email,” rather
`than the more inflammatory and highly prejudicial term “spam,” will alleviate the
`prejudice that would be inflicted on the defendants; “commercial email” also has the
`benefit of being an accurate description of Company A’s operations and the
`advertising communications that were transmitted. Moreover, the government has
`already proven that it will not be prejudiced by using the factually accurate term,
`“commercial email,” in lieu of “spam” in describing Company A’s advertising
`communications. See Gerawan Farming, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67957, at *21
`(granting motion in limine to preclude reference to prejudicial word where party “will
`not suffer any prejudice if it is required to use a phrase in lieu of” prejudicial term).
`As is the case here, “when the probative value of the evidence is substantially
`outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . or misleading the jury, the evidence
`must be kept out.” United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
`Finally, this Court should preclude the Government from using the term spam
`because it will confuse and mislead the jury. Indeed, the CAN-SPAM Act “does not
`ban spam outright, but rather provides a code of conduct to regulate commercial e-
`mail messaging practices.” Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1047–1048. Nor does the Act even
`use the term “spam.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7702(2)(A) & (B) & (17) (using the term
`“commercial electronic mail message”—instead of “spam”—to refer to “any
`electronic mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial
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`advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service”).
`Likewise, the charges against the Defendants here relate to registering and
`announcing IP addresses, which has nothing to do with sending spam messages. See
`18 U.S.C. § 1037(a)(5). In other words, although the government has charged the
`Defendants with violating a provision of the so-called CAN-SPAM Act, the activity
`charged does not relate to the Defendants actually sending any spam email. In fact,
`the Defendants are charged under section (a)(5) of the Act, which concerns falsely
`representing oneself as an IP registrant and has nothing to do with sending spam
`email. Allowing the government to refer to the Defendants as spammers, without any
`factual predicate for doing so, would invite the jury to prejudge the Defendants as
`guilty under the CAN-SPAM Act before hearing any of the evidence, or considering
`the provision under which Defendants are charged. In the context of a prosecution
`under the CAN-SPAM Act, allowing the government to refer to the Defendants as
`“spammers” is akin to allowing the government to refer to individuals charged with
`larceny as “thieves.” Cf. Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969)
`(condemning the government’s reference to the defendant as a “hoodlum” as a “type
`of shorthand characterization of an accused, not based on evidence, [that] is especially
`likely to stick in the minds of the jury and influence its deliberations”); Getchell v.
`United States, 282 F.2d 681, 690-691 (5th Cir. 1960) (reversing a conviction where
`the government repeatedly referred to the defendant as a con man).
`In sum, the mere mention of spam or that Defendants are spammers unfairly
`paints a picture for the jury that the Defendants partook in an intrusive email
`campaign, transmitting harmful content including viruses, pornography, or other
`illicit material to unwilling recipients. Because this characterization is factually
`unsupported and the government can easily use the term “commercial email” in lieu
`of “spam,” the government should be precluded from using the term “spam” or
`referring to the Defendants as “spammers” at trial.
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`B.
`
`Evidence That Mark Manoogian Is An Attorney Is Highly
`Prejudicial And Irrelevant To Any Issue Of Consequence In This
`Case
`The government has indicated that it intends to emphasize that Mr. Manoogian
`is an attorney. See, e.g., Government’s Response and Opposition to Defendants’
`Motions For Discovery, For Further Motions, and To Preserve Evidence, at p. 3, ECF
`No. 47 (“Defendant Mark Manoogian (who is an attorney) represented himself to be
`Business Development Manager”) (attached hereto as Goodrich Decl. Ex. D);
`Government’s Response and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion For Bill of
`Particulars, at pp. 2-3, ECF No. 51, (same) (attached hereto as Goodrich Decl. Ex C).
`But the fact that Mr. Manoogian is an attorney is irrelevant to the charges at issue and
`makes no fact in consequence more or less likely because Mr. Manoogian is not
`licensed to practice law in California, never practiced law before or during the time
`relevant to the Indictment, was not employed as an attorney at Company A during the
`relevant period in the Indictment, and he did not in fact provide any legal opinions
`concerning the events at issue in this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. The government
`simply wants to use this description to insinuate to the jury that Mr. Manoogian knew
`or should have known that what the government now characterizes as criminal activity
`was, at the time, criminal. Because of this inherent unfairness, the issue of Mr.
`Manoogian’s status as an attorney must be completely excluded from the trial.
`Mr. Manoogian was employed at Company A as a Business Development
`Manager on the Operations Team. The position of Business Development Manager
`was not within the legal department at Company A, and the position did not require a
`law degree or license to practice law. As a Business Development Manager, Mr.
`Manoogian was tasked with acquiring IP addresses to facilitate Company A’s
`commercial marketing operations – a role that required no legal analysis, experience,
`or skill. He was never responsible for conducting legal reviews of any documents or
`providing his legal opinion on any matters at Company A. Simply put, Mr.
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`Manoogian did not work as an attorney at Company A at the time relevant here.
`Though it is true that Mr. Manoogian graduated from New England Law School
`in Boston and became a member of the Massachusetts Bar in 2008, these facts are
`completely irrelevant to any issue in this case. Mr. Manoogian practiced law for a
`total of two months at his father’s law firm after becoming a licensed attorney in
`Massachusetts; he never sat for the California bar; he never worked at Company A in
`a legal capacity during the relevant timeframe. The only plausible reason the
`government would want to describe Mr. Manoogian as an attorney is to suggest to the
`jury that Mr. Manoogian was involved with Company A’s legal department, which
`did in fact review and affirm that transactions the government now contends are
`criminal. Similarly, the government will likely try to argue that because Mr.
`Manoogian is an attorney, he somehow had an elevated sense of awareness, or
`knowledge concerning the acts the government has reshaped as criminal. Put
`differently, the government is likely to argue that Mr. Manoogian should have known
`that the Defendants’ conduct was criminal because he is an attorney. But this would
`be an unfairly prejudicial and patently inaccurate characterization of Mr. Manoogian
`given that he had two months of land use and zoning law experience in a completely
`different jurisdiction, did no work for Company A as an attorney at any of the relevant
`times, and had no knowledge or expertise about any generally applicable areas of the
`law. In short, any reference to the fact that Mr. Manoogian is an attorney will
`improperly conjure up a level of knowledge and experience that simply did not exist.
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Defendants respectfully request that the Court preclude the government from
`making reference to the highly prejudicial, and minimally probative, topics as
`described above. Specifically, that the Court enter the following Orders in limine:
`1.
`An Order precluding any reference to “spam” or that Company A sent
`“spam,” or that the Defendants were “spammers,” as those terms are
`highly inflammatory and mischaracterize Defendants’ actions in this
`case in a way that immediately invites the jury to conclude the
`Case No. 18-CR-4683-GPC
`DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE (NOS. 1 & 2) TO EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO PREJUDICIAL AND
`HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY MATERIAL AT TRIAL
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`Case 3:18-cr-04683-GPC Document 353-1 Filed 03/24/22 PageID.4857 Page 12 of 14
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`Defendants committed criminal acts.
`
`2.
`
`An Order precluding all references at trial to the fact that Mark
`Manoogian is an attorney, that he attended law school, or that he
`represented Company A in any capacity as an attorney because Mr.
`Manoogian is not licensed to practice law in California, did not practice
`law during the time relevant to the Indictment, did not work for Company
`A as an attorney during the relevant time alleged in the Indictment, and
`his status as an attorney has no relevance to any issue of consequence at
`trial.
`
`Dated: March 24, 2022
`
`Dated: March 24, 2022
`
`Dated: March 24, 2022
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS,
`GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.
`By: s/ Randy K. Jones
` Randy K. Jones
` Daniel J. Goodrich (Pro Hac)
` Ryan Dougherty (Pro Hac)
` Attorneys for Mark Manoogian
`BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT,
`NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG &
`RHOW, P.C.
`By: s/ Gary S. Lincenberg
`Gary S. Lincenberg
`Nicole Rodriguez Van Dyk
`Darren L. Patrick
`Alexis A. Wiseley
`Attorneys for Petr Pacas
`
`WIECHERT, MUNK & GOLDSTEIN, PC
`By: s/ Jessica C. Munk
`Jessica C. Munk
`David W. Wiechert
`Attorneys for Jacob Bychak
`
`Dated: March 24, 2022
`
`BIENERT KATZMAN
`LITTRELL WILLIAMS LLP
`By: s/ Whitney Z. Bernstein
`Whitney Z. Bernstein
`Thomas H. Bienert, Jr.
`James D. Riddet
`Carlos A. Nevarez
`Attorneys for Mohammed Abdul Qayyum
`Case No. 18-CR-4683-GPC
`DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE (NOS. 1 & 2) TO EXCLUDE REFERENCES TO PREJUDICIAL AND
`HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY MATERIAL AT TRIAL
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`Case 3:18-cr-04683-GPC Document 353-1 Filed 03/24/22 PageID.4858 Page 13 of 14
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`CERTIFICATION OF AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN SIGNATURE
`The undersigned counsel of record for Defendant Mark Manoogian certifies
`that the content of this document is acceptable to each of the Defendants’ counsel
`whose electronic signature appears thereon, and that I have obtained their
`authorization to sign this document on their behalf.
`
`s/ Randy K. Jones
`Randy K. Jones
`
`1
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`Case 3:18-cr-04683-GPC Document 353-1 Filed 03/24/22 PageID.4859 Page 14 of 14
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`Counsel for Defendant certifies that the foregoing pleading has been
`electronically served on the following parties by virtue of their registration with the
`CM/ECF system:
`
`AUSA Melanie K. Pierson
`AUSA Sabrina L. Feve
`AUSA Ashley E. Goff
`U.S. Attorney’s Office
`880 Front Street, Rm 6293
`San Diego, CA 92101
`melanie.pierson@usdoj.gov
`sabrina.feve@usdoj.gov
`ashley.goff@usdoj.gov
`Candina S. Heath
`Department of Justice
`1301 New York Avenue NW, Suite 600
`Washington, DC 20530
`candina.heath2@usdoj.gov
`
`I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
`America that the foregoing is true and correct.
`Executed on March 24, 2022, at San Diego, California.
`
`/s/ Randy K. Jones
`Randy K. Jones
`
`123561770v.1
`
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