Case 3:17-cv-00183-CAB-BGS Document 138 Filed 08/07/17 PageID.4100 Page 1 of 33
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`
`NICOLA A. PISANO, CA Bar No. 151282
`
`npisano@foley.com
`JOSE L. PATIÑO, CA Bar No. 149568
`
`jpatino@foley.com
`JUSTIN E. GRAY, CA Bar No. 282452
`
`jegray@foley.com
`SCOTT A. PENNER, CA Bar No. 253716
`
`spenner@foley.com
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`3579 VALLEY CENTRE DRIVE, SUITE 300
`SAN DIEGO, CA 92130
`TELEPHONE: 858.847.6700
`FACSIMILE: 858.792.6773
`Attorneys for Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs
`ESET, LLC and ESET SPOL. S.R.O.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No. 3:17-cv-00183-CAB-BGS
`ESET, LLC AND ESET SPOL. S.R.O’S
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`(’844 / ’780 / ’305 / ’086 / ’621 / ’755
`PATENTS)
`
`
`
`Courtroom 4C
`Place:
`Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
`
`FINJAN, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff and Counter-
`Defendant,
`
`v.
`ESET, LLC, et al.,
`Defendants and Counter-
`Plaintiffs.
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`4833-7729-4668.4
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
`I. 
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................... 1 
`II. 
`III.  LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART .................................................... 2 
`IV.  CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS .......................................... 2 
`A.
`  DOWNLOADABLE .................................................................................... 2 
`
`1. 
`
`’844, ’780, and ’086 patents ....................................................................... 3 
`
`a) 
`
`b) 
`
`c) 
`
`’844 patent ............................................................................... 3 
`
`’780 patent ............................................................................... 4 
`
`’086 patent ............................................................................... 5 
`
`2. 
`B.
`
` 
`
`’621 and ’755 patents .................................................................................. 6 
`OTHER TERMS IN THE ’086 PATENT ................................................... 6 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`appended Downloadable ............................................................................. 6 
`
`destination computer ................................................................................... 8 
`
`a file appender … for appending a representation of the Downloadable
`security profile data to the Downloadable to generate an appended
`Downloadable ............................................................................................. 9 
`
`4. 
`
`a transmitter…for transmitting the appended Downloadable to a destination
`computer .................................................................................................... 10 
`  OTHER TERMS IN THE ’844 PATENT ................................................. 11 
`
`C.
`
`1. 
`
`before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients ... 11
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
`
`
`
`D.
`
`  OTHER TERMS IN THE ’780 PATENT ................................................. 13 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`E.
`
` 
`
`1. 
`F.
`
` 
`
`software components required to be executed by the Downloadable ...... 13 
`
`ID generator…for performing a hashing function on the Downloadable and
`the fetched software components to generate a Downloadable ID........... 14 
`
`performing a hashing function on the Downloadable and the fetched
`software components to generate a Downloadable ID ............................. 16 
`THE ’305 PATENT.................................................................................... 17 
`
`network interface, housed within a computer ........................................... 17 
`OTHER TERMS IN THE ’621 PATENT ................................................. 18 
`
`1.  wherein information pertaining to the downloadable includes information
`pertaining to an operation of the downloadable and distinct from
`information pertaining to the request ........................................................ 18 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`response engine for performing a predetermined responsive action based on
`the comparison (claims 1 and 10) ............................................................. 20 
`
`response engine for performing a predetermined responsive action based on
`the comparison with the information pertaining to the predetermined
`suspicious downloadable (claim 5) ........................................................... 21 
`
`downloadable engine ................................................................................. 21 
`4. 
`G.
`  OTHER TERMS IN THE ’755 PATENT ................................................. 22 
`
`1. 
`
`downloadable engine for intercepting a request message being issued by a
`downloadable to an operating system ....................................................... 22
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
`
`2. 
`
`intercepting a request message being issued by a downloadable to an
`operating system ....................................................................................... 23 
`
`a response engine for…the predetermined security policy ....................... 25 
`3. 
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 25 
`
`
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`V. 
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 10
`
` Page(s)
`
`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
`783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................................. 19
`
`Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................... 2
`
`Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc.,
`673 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 10, 11
`
`Finjan Inc. v. McAfee, Inc. ................................................................................................ 2
`
`Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... passim
`
`Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
`355 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................... 1
`
`Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software,
`462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................. 22
`
`MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp.,
`672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................... 2
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ............................................................................................. 3, 5
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 1, 2
`
`SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc.,
`415 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................... 2
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ..................................................................................... 1
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)
`
`Cases
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) .......................................................... passim
`
`Page(s)
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ passim
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Pursuant
`to
`the Court’s Amended Case Management Order Re: Claim
`Construction Schedule (D.I. 116), Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs ESET, LLC and
`ESET SPOL. S.R.O. (collectively “ESET”) submit this opening claim construction brief
`for the disputed claim terms of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,154,844 (D.I. 1-1, “the ’844 patent”),
`6,804,780 (D.I. 1-2, “the ’780 patent”), 7,975,305 (D.I. 1-3, “the ’305 patent”),
`8,079,086 (D.I. 1-4, “the ’086 patent”), 9,189,621 (D.I. 1-5, “the ’621 patent”) and
`9,219,755 (D.I. 1-6, “the ’755 patent”).
`The technology in this case relates generally to protecting a computer from
`malware or viruses downloaded from the Internet. The constructions proposed by ESET
`are straightforward and supported by the intrinsic evidence and the understanding of
`persons of ordinary skill in the art. By contrast, for most terms Finjan relies on “plain
`and ordinary meaning” without any explanation as to how or why that meaning differs
`from ESET’s proposed construction. Finjan plainly intends to reveal its proposed
`constructions via expert testimony at trial, and not before. And the few constructions
`Finjan does propose ignore the intrinsic evidence.
`ESET respectfully requests adoption of its proposed constructions.
`II. LEGAL STANDARDS
`This Court is familiar with the basic tenets of claim construction: First, that the
`court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including
`the claims, the specification and prosecution history. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v.
`Vaughan Co., 355 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Second, that in most situations, an
`analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim
`term, making reliance on extrinsic evidence improper. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Third, that the specification is always highly
`relevant to the claim construction analysis, and usually is the single best guide to the
`meaning of a disputed term. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
`2005) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). Fourth, that “[a]n inventor is entitled to
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`claim in a patent what he has invented, but no more.” MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp.,
`672 F.3d 1250, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Fifth, where the specification clearly limits the
`invention to a particular form, the claims should be construed consistently with that
`limitation. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
`2009). And sixth, when the patentee makes clear and unmistakable prosecution
`arguments limiting the meaning of a claim term in order to overcome a rejection, the
`courts limit the relevant claim term to exclude the disclaimed matter. SanDisk Corp. v.
`Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`Claim construction is performed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in
`the art. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13; 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. Throughout the timeframe
`of 1997 through 2015, when the applications for the patents-in-suit were filed, one of
`ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor-level degree in computer
`science and two to three years of experience in the design and development of computer
`security/anti-virus software. Ex. A1 (“Spafford Decl.”) at ¶ 16.
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS
` Downloadable
`A.
`The term “Downloadable” is not a term of art, and thus has no special meaning to
`one of skill in the art. Spafford Decl. ¶ 20. Finjan proposes adoption of the claim
`construction in Finjan Inc. v. McAfee, Inc., where the court recognized that “the patent
`applicant intended to act as the lexicographer of this term [Downloadable].” See, Ex. B,
`at p.2, n.1 (construing the claim for U.S. Patent No. 6,092,194 (“the ’194 patent”, Ex.
`C)). In that case, the McAfee court adopted the sole definition of Downloadable
`provided in the ’194 patent specification at 1:44-46. The ’194 patent is incorporated into
`each of the Asserted Patents except the ’305 patent. As described below, the prior
`construction is inappropriate here.
`
`1 Unless otherwise stated, all Exhibits refer to those attached to the Declaration of Scott
`A. Penner in support of ESET’s Opening Claim Construction Brief.
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`1. ’844, ’780, and ’086 patents
`
`Finjan
`an executable
`application program,
`which is downloaded
`from a source computer
`and run on the
`destination computer
`
`ESET
`Indefinite
`In the Alternative: An executable application program,
`which is downloaded from a source computer and run on
`the destination computer, wherein executable application
`program means a program in machine language that is
`ready to run on a particular computer
`a) ’844 patent
`The term “Downloadable” as used in the ’844 patent is defined differently in
`earlier applications that are incorporated by reference, thus rendering the term indefinite.
`First, the ’844 patent uses the exact same language as the ’194 patent in defining a
`Downloadable. ’844 patent at 1:44-47. But immediately following that definition, the
`specification provide
`“examples” of
`a Downloadable
`and
`lists
`“Java™
`applets…JavaScript™ scripts…ActiveX™ controls…and Visual Basic.” 1:48-55.
`JavaScript scripts are not “executable application programs;” they are instead interpreted
`programs. Spafford Decl. ¶ 26. This contradiction becomes apparent when the entirety
`of the specification is reviewed, including the incorporated-by-reference specification of
`application 08/790,097 (see ’844 patent at 1:7-17), which matured into U.S. Patent No.
`6,167,520 (“the ’520 patent”, Ex. D). The ’520 patent defines a Downloadable
`differently: “a small executable or interpretable application program which is
`downloaded from a source computer and run on a destination computer.” ’520 patent at
`1:32-34 (emphasis added). The emphasized words in the definition above are omitted
`from the definition of a Downloadable in the text of the ’844 patent. Thus, the ’844
`patent, which incorporates the ’520 patent, presents two different definitions of
`Downloadable having different scopes; one of skill in the art would not have been able
`to tell with reasonable certainty what scope applies. Spafford Decl. ¶¶ 23, 27-28. As
`such, the term is indefinite. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,
`2129 (2014) (“[W]e read §112, ¶2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the
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`specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of
`the invention with reasonable certainty.” (emphasis added)).
`Second, the different meanings presented in the ’844 patent for “Downloadable”
`are mutually exclusive. One of ordinary skill would have understood that there is a
`substantial difference between “executable” application programs and “interpretable”
`application programs: an “executable application program” had to in fact be
`“executable” meaning “a program in machine language that is ready to run on a
`particular computer.” Spafford Decl. ¶¶ 24-25; see also Exs. E (defining an executable
`as “a program in machine language that is ready to run in a particular computer.”); F
`(defining executable program as “a program that is ready to run on a given computer.
`For a program to be executable, it first must be translated, usually by a compiler, into the
`machine language of a particular computer” where machine language is defined as “the
`native binary language recognized and executed by a computer’s central processing unit
`(CPU)”). Thus, at the time of the invention, an “executable application program”
`differed from an “interpretable” application program in that executables were programs
`that were already in machine language and were ready to be run on a particular
`computer. Interpreted programs, on the other hand, were programs that still had to be
`further processed after being downloaded before they could run on any particular
`machine. Spafford Decl. ¶ 26. A person of skill also would have known that JavaScript
`was an interpreted language and not an executable language, and thus could not be an
`example of a “Downloadable” as defined in the ’844 patent. Id.
`Alternatively, a person of skill could have ignored the erroneous example
`discussed above and concluded that the term is limited to “executable application
`programs,” see D.I. 136-2 at 1, with the understanding that executable application
`programs are “in machine language that is ready to run on a particular computer.”
`b) ’780 patent
`The term “Downloadable” as used in the ’780 patent is also indefinite. The ’780
`patent also incorporates the specification of the ’520 patent creating all the problems
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`already discussed above. See ’780 patent at 1:19-27. The ’780 patent adds a further
`ambiguity by reciting claim language that requires the fetched software reference “be
`executed by the Downloadable.” See id. at claims 1, 9, 18. As discussed in section I.A.1
`below, claim 1 requires that the Downloadable must itself be capable of executing the
`fetched “software components.” If that is true, then the Downloadable must be more
`like a virtual machine, e.g., a Java virtual machine, than an executable. Spafford Decl.
`¶ 29. It is not possible for a Java file, JavaScript file, ActiveX file, or Visual Basic file
`“to execute” fetched software components because only the processor or a virtual
`machine can actually execute code. Id. In view of the express requirement of the claim
`language, it would be impossible for a “Downloadable” to consist of any of the
`examples provided in the specification. Id. The term “Downloadable” as used in the
`claims of the ’780 patent is inherently contradictory, indecipherable and therefore
`indefinite. Id. at ¶ 30; Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
`Alternatively, a person of skill could choose to overlook the erroneous example
`and adopt the alternative construction proposed by ESET as set forth above for the ’844
`patent, wherein an “executable application program” is a program “in machine language
`that is ready to run on a particular computer.”
`c) ’086 patent
`The ’086 patent specification does not contain any definition for “Downloadable.”
`The ’086 patent incorporates by reference the specifications of the ’194 patent, the ’780
`patent, and U.S. Patent No. 6,480,962 (“the ’962 patent”, Ex. G). ’086 patent at 1:34-35.
`The ’962 patent includes the same definition of “Downloadable” as the ’520 patent as
`discussed above. ’962 patent at 1:38-40 (“a small executable or interpretable
`application program…” (emphasis added)). Because the term Downloadable in the ’086
`patent has multiple meanings with varying scopes, one of skill in the art again would not
`have been able to tell with reasonable certainty which applied, rendering the term
`indefinite. Spafford Decl. ¶¶ 27-28; Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
`Alternatively, a person of skill could choose to overlook the erroneous example
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`and adopt the alternative construction proposed by ESET as set forth above for the ’844
`patent, wherein an “executable application program” is a program “in machine language
`that is ready to run on a particular computer.”
`2. ’621 and ’755 patents
`
`Finjan
`ESET
`an executable application program,
`a small executable or interpretable
`which is downloaded from a source
`application program which is downloaded
`computer and run on the destination
`from a source computer and run on a
`computer
`destination computer
`Neither the ’621 nor ’755 patents defines the term “Downloadable”: both patents
`incorporate by reference all of the same applications discussed above, resulting in the
`same inherent contradiction between the definitions of Downloadable, thus rendering the
`term indefinite. However, the scope of the inventions disclosed in the ’621 and ’755
`patents is controlled by the disclosures in the ’962 patent family. The claims of both the
`’621 and ’755 patents require “probes,” but neither specification mentions this term.
`Instead, the only incorporated specification that provides support for “probes” is the
`’520 patent (and its continuation, the ’962 patent). During prosecution of the ’621 and
`’755 patents, to overcome the Examiner’s rejections that the claims lacked written
`description, the applicant relied solely on the ’962 patent as providing the support. Ex.
`H at 6-7; Ex. I at 6-9. Because the ’962 patent defines a Downloadable as “a small
`executable or interpretable application program which is downloaded from a source
`computer and run on a destination computer” that language controls here. See ’962
`patent at 1:38-40.
` Other Terms in the ’086 Patent
`B.
`1. appended Downloadable
`
`Finjan
`ESET
`plain and ordinary
`file that contains a representation of the downloadable security
`meaning
`profile data after the Downloadable
`The term “appended Downloadable” is not a term of art, and moreover, appears
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`only in the claims of the ’086 patent. Spafford Decl. ¶¶ 31-32. Claims 1 and 9 also
`require a downloadable security profile (“DSP”) but that term also does not appear in the
`’086 patent specification. In fact, the disclosure of the ’086 patent has nothing to do
`with the claims of the ’086 patent. Id. at ¶ 32. Nonetheless, a person of skill generally
`would have understood the term “appending” as meaning adding data to the end of an
`existing file. Id. at ¶ 36.
`A proper construction requires that the appended Downloadable be a single file.
`This is self-evident in light of the express language of the claims. In claim 1, an
`“appended Downloadable”
`is created by “appending a representation of
`the
`Downloadable security profile data to the Downloadable” and then the “appended
`Downloadable” is transmitted to a destination computer. Claim 24 further confirms this
`construction because it recites transmission of a “Downloadable and a representation of
`the Downloadable security profile data” as multiple pieces of information while claims 1
`and 9 each teach transmitting a singular appended Downloadable. One of skill in the art
`also would have understood that when two files or bit streams are appended, they result
`in a single resultant file or bit stream. Id. at ¶¶ 37-40.
`A proper construction also must include the security profile data after the
`Downloadable. Appending was well known in the art at the time of the application that
`led to the ’086 patent and meant to incorporate data at the end of the structure. Id. at
`¶¶ 37-39. This concept is confirmed by numerous dictionaries. Ex. E (defining append
`as “to add to the end of an existing structure” (emphasis added)); Ex. J (defining
`append as “to place or insert as an attachment by adding data to the end of a file or
`database or extending a character string.” (emphasis added)). These dictionary
`definitions confirm that when two items are appended the result is a single item.
`Finjan offers no construction for this term other than “plain and ordinary
`meaning.” Nothing Finjan purports to rely on for its construction mentions appending a
`DSP to a Downloadable D.I. 136-2 at 22. For example, nothing in Figures 1-7 of the
`’194 patent, id. at 23, or the ’194 specification (6:5-19, 9:65-10:1), D.I. 136-2 at 22,
`
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`show creation of an appended Downloadable or transmission of anything other than the
`original Downloadable or a substituted Downloadable. See ’194 Patent Fig. 6C at 666
`and 672, Fig. 3 at 333 (describing passing of a Nonsuspicious Downloadable but no
`appending); Spafford Decl. ¶ 41. Finjan’s citations to the ’780 patent are equally
`unavailing. See D.I. 136-2 at 22. And none of Finjan’s purported evidence provides any
`clue regarding Finjan’s “plain and ordinary” meaning. See id.
`Accordingly, an “appended Downloadable” must be a “file that contains the
`Downloadable followed by the representation of the Downloadable security profile.”
`2. destination computer
`
`Finjan
`ESET
`plain and ordinary
`the computer to be protected from suspicious operations in the
`meaning
`Downloadable
`The term “destination computer” is not a term of art, and has no support in the
`’086 patent other than in the claims. While discrete parts of the recited claims are
`mentioned in the priority applications, such as the ’780 patent, see also D.I. 136-2 at 24,
`there is no written description support for the complete inventions recited in the claims
`of the ’086 patent in the ’086 specification or any of the applications incorporated by
`reference therein. Spafford Decl. ¶¶ 32, 42.
`The term “destination computer” appears in the specification of the ’780 patent, as
`the computer that originally requests the Downloadable and on which the Downloadable
`is intended to run. 1:50-53 (“A Downloadable…is downloaded from a source computer
`and run on the destination computer.” (emphasis added)). See also, e.g., Figure 6C,
`9:24-25 (“step 666 passes the Downloadable to the intended recipient” (emphasis
`added)). Thus, per the ’780 patent, the “destination computer” is the computer that the
`alleged invention is intended to protect and not just any random computer to which the
`Downloadable may be forwarded.
`Taken as a whole, the ’780 patent specification makes plain that the destination
`computer is “the computer that originated the request for the Downloadable” which is
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`interchangeable with ESET’s proposed construction of “the computer to be protected
`from suspicious operations in the Downloadable.”
`3. a file appender … for appending a representation of the Downloadable
`security profile data to the Downloadable to generate an appended
`Downloadable
`
`Finjan
`plain and
`ordinary
`meaning
`
`ESET
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
`Function: appending a representation of the Downloadable security profile
`data to the Downloadable to generate an appended Downloadable
`Structure: None
`When a claim term fails to recite the word “means” the presumption against
`applying 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 can be overcome “if the challenger demonstrates that the
`claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function without
`reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Williamson v. Citrix Online,
`LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (reversing strong presumption
`against application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 and overruling “strict requirement of a
`showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything the can be construed as
`structure”) citing Watts v, XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`Here, the term “file appender” lacks structure and is claimed in entirely functional
`language. Under Williamson, either failure alone triggers the presumption that 35
`U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies. Id. Apart from the claims, the function of the “file appender”
`is not described anywhere in the ’086 specification or in any of the other citations Finjan
`purports to rely on in support of its unspecified construction of “plain and ordinary
`meaning.” See D.I. 136-2 at 27-29. As defined in the claims, however, the function of
`the “file appender” is “appending a representation of the Downloadable security profile
`data to the Downloadable to generate an appended Downloadable.”
`No structure is disclosed for performing the recited function. See also Spafford
`Decl. ¶¶ 43-44. None of the evidence Finjan purports to rely on for this term mentions
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`appending. Nor can Finjan rely on disclosure of a general purpose computer to save its
`claims. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed.
`Cir. 2008) (“[s]imply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a
`particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to ‘the corresponding structure,
`material, or acts’ that perform the function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6.”);
`Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
`(“If special programming is required for a general-purpose computer to perform the
`corresponding claimed function, then the default rule requiring disclosure of an
`algorithm applies.”). Here, appending is not something a general computer purpose
`computer does without special programming. Spafford Decl. ¶ 45. Thus, the
`specification must disclose the corresponding structure. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1241, 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Because no structure and no algorithm is
`disclosed, the term “file appender” is indefinite. See Ergo, 673 F.3d at 1365.
`4. a transmitter…for transmitting the appended Downloadable to a
`destination computer
`
`Finjan
`plain and
`ordinary
`meaning
`
`ESET
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
`Function: transmitting the appended Downloadable to a destination
`computer
`Structure: None
`The term “transmitter” also does not appear in the ’086 patent. No structure is
`disclosed for performing the function recited in the claim, which is written in entirely
`functional language. Section 112, ¶ 6 therefore applies. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
`The term “transmitter” likewise does not even appear in the ’780 patent or in any
`of the references Finjan purports to rely on. D.I. 136-2 at 30-31. Instead, the function of
`the “transmitter” is described only in the claims as “transmitting the appended
`Downloadable to the destination computer.”
`A transmitter for transmitting an appended Downloadable is not something that
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`can be done with a general purpose without specialized programming. Spafford Decl.
`¶¶ 46-47. While Fig. 6C of the ’780 patent teaches to “Pass Downloadable” (666) or to
`“Send Subs