Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 1 of 17
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`
`Matthias A. Kamber (SB # 232147)
`matthiaskamber@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`101 California Street, 48th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel: (415) 856-7000
`Fax: (415) 856-7100
`
`Robert W. Unikel (pro hac vice)
`robertunikel@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 S. Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`Tel: (312) 499-6000
`Fax: (312) 499-6100
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`Attorneys for Defendant Google LLC
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`[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED ON
`SIGNATURE PAGES]
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`
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`Ellisen S. Turner (SB #224842)
`ellisen.turner@kirkland.com
`Joshua Glucoft (SB #301249)
`josh.glucoft@kirkland.com
`Kevin X. Wang (SB #318024)
`kevin.wang@kirkland.com
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`2049 Century Park East, 37th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Tel:
`(310) 552-4200
`Fax:
`(310) 552-5900
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`Attorneys for Defendants
`Meta Platforms, Inc. and WhatsApp LLC
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`Sonal N. Mehta (SB# 222086)
`Sonal.Mehta@wilmerhale.com
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`2600 El Camino Real, Suite 400
`Palo Alto, California 94306
`Tel: (650) 858-6000
`Fax:
`(650) 858-6100
`
`Taylor Gooch (SB# 294282)
`Taylor.Gooch@wilmerhale.com
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1 Front Street, Suite 3500
`San Francisco, California 94111
`Tel:
`(628) 235-1000
`Fax:
`(628) 235-1001
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff Twitter, Inc.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`CASE NO.
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`3:22-cv-03199-JD
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 2 of 17
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`CASE NO.
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`3:22-cv-03202-JD
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`CASE NO.
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`3:21-cv-09773-JD
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`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`META PLATFORMS, INC, et al.,
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`TWITTER, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`JOINT REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 101 MOTION
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`Date: April 13, 2023
`Time: 10:00 a.m.
`Place: Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`Judge: The Hon. James Donato
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 3 of 17
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
`IV.
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`THE ASSERTED PATENTS ARE NOT PATENT-ELIGIBLE ....................................... 1
`A.
`Alice step one: Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a
`communication based on participants’ characteristics. ........................................... 1
`1.
`Claim 1 uses broad, functional terms. ......................................................... 1
`2.
`Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call routing practices. ......................... 3
`3.
`Claim 1 uses known technology to perform routine functions. .................. 5
`Alice step two: Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept. ............................................... 5
`B.
`CLAIM 1 OF THE ’234 PATENT IS REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL ASSERTED
`CLAIMS .............................................................................................................................. 8
`DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE IS APPROPRIATE .................................................... 10
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`CASE NO. 3:21-cv-09773-JD
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 4 of 17
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.,
`40 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022) .................................................................................................. 7
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`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 8
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`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
`773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 7
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`Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
`830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................. 2
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`Fast 101 PTY Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc.,
`424 F. Supp. 3d 385 (D. Del. 2020) .......................................................................................... 8
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`Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc.,
`879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................. 1
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`Hyper Search, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`No. 17-1387-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL 6617143 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 2018) ...................................... 9
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`iSentium, LLC v. Bloomberg Fin. L.P.,
`343 F. Supp. 3d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ....................................................................................... 9
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`Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH,
`942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................. 2, 3
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`Landmark Tech., LLC v. Assurant, Inc.,
`No. 6:15–CV–76–RWS–JDL, 2015 WL 4388311 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2015) ......................... 9
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`In re Morsa,
`809 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................... 9
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`MyMail, Ltd. v. OoVoo, LLC,
`No. 17-CV-04487-LHK, 2020 WL 2219036 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2020), aff’d,
`2021 WL 3671364 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) ........................................................................... 3
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`People.ai, Inc. v. SetSail Techs., Inc.,
`575 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .................................................................................... 9
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`Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc.,
`161 F. Supp. 3d 325 (D. Del. 2015) .......................................................................................... 3
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`CASE NO. 3:21-cv-09773-JD
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 5 of 17
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`Table of Authorities
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`Page(s)
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`PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc.,
`404 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .................................................................................... 8
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`Procter & Gamble Co. v. QuantifiCare Inc.,
`288 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2017) .............................................................................. 9, 10
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`Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,
`873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................... 6
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`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................... 6
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`Voip-Pal.Com, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`411 F. Supp. 3d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ............................................................................. passim
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`CASE NO. 3:21-cv-09773-JD
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 6 of 17
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`Because VoIP-Pal’s patent claims are, on their face, drawn to an abstract idea and there is
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`no inventive concept, no declarations or amended pleadings can or would save its claims from a
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`finding of patent-ineligibility and the Court should dismiss VoIP-Pal’s complaints with prejudice.
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`I. THE ASSERTED PATENTS ARE NOT PATENT-ELIGIBLE
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`A. Alice step one: Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of routing a
`communication based on participants’ characteristics.
`1. Claim 1 uses broad, functional terms.
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`Representative Claim 1 claims purely functional limitations that do not disclose how any of
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`its claimed functions (“receiving,” “transmitting,” and “initiating”) are actually achieved. As
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`discussed at length in the Motion (Dkt. 1001), the “purely functional nature of the claim[s] confirms
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`that it is directed to an abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea.” See Mot. at 6–8
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`(quoting Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
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`Apparently conceding the broad, functional nature of Claim 1, VoIP-Pal argues the “proper
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`inquiry is whether the claim sufficiently recites how to achieve a specific improvement over prior
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`art call routing systems.” Opp’n at 6–7. Claim 1 does not need to recite trivial processes, such as
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`how a call is initiated using a telephone number. However, to survive a 101 motion, Claim 1 must
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`recite “a sufficiently specific structure or act for achieving” a particular improvement over prior
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`art. See id.; e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
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`(claims not abstract where they “recite[d] specific steps . . . that accomplish the desired result.”).
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`Here, however, Claim 1 does not recite a sufficiently specific structure and instead claims an
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`abstract idea.
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`The closest thing to a purported improvement over the prior art that VoIP-Pal identifies is
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`the use of an “access code to enable a local call to be made based on the calling device’s location.”
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`Opp’n at 7. But neither Claim 1 itself, nor the specification, indicates that an “access code” provides
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`specific structure to overcome the claim’s broad, functional terms of call routing. Indeed, VoIP-Pal
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`offers no particularized meaning for what an “access code” is (see Dkt. 85-2 at 3–4), refusing to
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`1 All docket citations are to the Google action (No. 3:22-cv-03199-JD) unless otherwise indicated.
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 7 of 17
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`limit “access code” 2 to even a telephone number, IP address, username, or any other specific type
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`of identifier (see id. at 7–8). The result is that, although VoIP-Pal contends that an “access code” is
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`the structure that “enable[s] a local call to be made” (Opp’n at 7), that “access code” is not even
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`limited to use in a calling environment and purports to apply to all types of “communications” (e.g.,
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`text messaging). See ’721 patent at cl. 1.3 Claim 1’s functional language is thus not tethered to any
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`specific implementation, nor does it describe “how” to achieve the desired functionality across the
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`breadth of technology within its scope; therefore, it remains an abstract idea. Ultimately, VoIP-
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`Pal’s argument that Claim 1 is directed to “using an access code to enable a local call to be made
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`to the callee based on the calling device’s location” (Opp’n at 7) is no more than “a result or effect
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`that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke[s generic] processes and machinery.” Koninklijke
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`KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted)
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`(“KPN”). This “essentially result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a
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`frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101,” and warrants finding ineligibility here. Elec.
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`Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Voip-Pal.Com,
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`Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 926, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding the claim’s purported
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`“distinct manner of call routing” to recite “nothing more than result-focused steps and generic
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`technology”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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`Finally, VoIP-Pal’s reliance on KPN is misplaced. In KPN, the Federal Circuit reiterated
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`that claims being “arguably related to advances in computer technology” are insufficient for patent-
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`eligibility. “An improved result, without more stated in the claim, is not enough to confer eligibility
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`to an otherwise abstract idea.” KPN, 942 F.3d at 1150 (citation omitted). Rather, “[t]o be patent-
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`eligible, the claims must recite a specific means or method that solves a problem in an existing
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`technological process.” Id. But unlike the patent-eligible claims in KPN, which solved the problem
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`of defective check data via a specific, concrete method (that is completely dissimilar to the
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`technology at issue here), Claim 1 lacks “sufficient recitation of how the purported invention
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`2 Claim 1 uses the “access code to identify the callee,” but VoIP-Pal does not contend that “callee
`identifier” has any particular structure to it. See Dkt. 52 at 7–8.
`3 Movants do not admit that either patent contains sufficient written description support for or
`enables claims directed to “communications” beyond calls.
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-2-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 8 of 17
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`improve[s] the functionality of a computer”—i.e., how its “access code” solves the problems found
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`in prior art systems.4 Id. at 1152 (emphasis in original).
`2. Claim 1 is analogous to preexisting call routing practices.
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`As part of the Alice analysis, analogies serve as an analytical framework to aid in the Court’s
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`determination of whether the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea. See VoIP-Pal v.
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`Apple, 411. F. Supp. 3d at 955 (“Courts have often compared high technology claims to their
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`manual or ‘brick-and-mortar’ counterparts in determining whether the claims are directed to an
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`abstract idea.”). Like in VoIP-Pal’s case against Apple, Claim 1 “simply discloses the concept of
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`call routing, which can be—and has been, in the past—accomplished manually.” Id. VoIP-Pal
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`fundamentally misunderstands this when it highlights purported differences between the literal
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`elements of Claim 1 and preexisting call routing practices, such as (according to VoIP-Pal) that
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`there “is no access code in Movants’ switchboard operator analogy.” See Opp’n at 7–9. VoIP-Pal,
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`in effect, asks the Court to perform a novelty analysis at step one and determine whether preexisting
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`call routing practices fully anticipate Claim 1. See id. at 8 (faulting Movants’ analogy for not
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`providing “explanation of how specifically switchboard operators performed the limitations of
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`Claim 1”), 10 (faulting Movants for “present[ing] no evidence that what is claimed and what is
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`allegedly preexisting were carried out in the same manner”). But Claim 1’s purported novelty is
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`not relevant, and VoIP-Pal should not conflate the eligibility inquiry into an anticipation inquiry
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`under § 102. See Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Amazon.Com, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 3d 325,
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`331 (D. Del. 2015) (“That the method was a new means of transmitting information is not relevant
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`to the § 101 analysis.”). What is relevant is whether the preexisting call routing practices are
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`analogous to the idea that Claim 1 is “directed to.” They are.
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`4 VoIP-Pal is vague as to what problem the patents were purportedly attempting to solve, given that
`the patents admit that a calling card could be used to place a local call to a callee based on the
`calling device’s location. See ’234 patent at 1:22–26 (“A ‘calling card’ may permit the user of the
`mobile telephone to place a call to a local telephone numbers . . . instead of placing the call directly
`to the callee.”); MyMail, Ltd. v. OoVoo, LLC, No. 17-CV-04487-LHK, 2020 WL 2219036, at *16
`(N.D. Cal. May 7, 2020), aff’d, 2021 WL 3671364 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) (“In contrast to
`Koninklijke, the [asserted patents] fail to identify ‘a problem in an existing technological process’
`that is solved by the [claimed technology]. Thus, Koninklijke is inapplicable . . . .”) (citations
`omitted).
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-3-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 9 of 17
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`Like traditional call routing on a switchboard, Claim 1 analogously routes a communication
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`based on participant characteristics. VoIP-Pal argues that Movants “have no evidence that using
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`the caller’s location . . . was long-standing or well-known” in the switchboard analogy, Opp’n at 8,
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`but the complaint itself indicates this because the switchboard operator necessarily knows the
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`caller’s location because the caller is located in the area serviced by operator’s switchboard. See
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`Compl. ¶ 15. Even VoIP-Pal concedes that, in practice, “[t]he operator knows—by definition—that
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`this caller is already connected to the switchboard.” Opp’n at 7; see also id. at 8 (“The caller’s
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`identity and location were still known due to the caller’s fixed, physical connection . . . .”). This
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`knowledge of the caller’s location in turn allows the switchboard operator, like in Claim 1, to
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`determine how to route the call based on the caller’s location, either connecting that caller to a
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`callee in the same service area and thus on the same switchboard or to a callee in a different location
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`and thus on a different switchboard. See Compl. ¶ 15 (“If the callee was connected to the same
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`telephone switch board the operator would . . . plug the cable into a socket associated with the
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`callee’s telephone. If the callee was associated with a different switchboard . . . a second operator
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`would be involved to bridge the gap to the appropriate switchboard.”). Regardless, the eligibility
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`analysis does not concern itself with whether preexisting practices taught each and every element
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`of the claim; what matters is whether long-standing switchboard practices analogously routed
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`communication based on participant characteristics. As discussed above, they did.
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`Claim 1 is also analogous to the use of calling cards, which the patent specification states
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`are used to route communications based on the caller’s location in order to “permit the user of the
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`mobile telephone to place a call to a local telephone number . . . instead of placing the call directly
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`to the callee.” ’234 patent at 1:22–26; see Mot. at 8–9. VoIP-Pal’s laundry list of six minor
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`differences between the specific operation of calling cards and Claim 1 might indicate that calling
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`cards do not anticipate Claim 1, but not that they are not analogous to Claim 1. See Opp’n at 8–9.
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`Even VoIP-Pal does not contend that Claim 1 is “directed to,” for example, the idea of an “‘access
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`code’ [being] received by the caller’s phone in response to the caller entering information” (the
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`first enumerated difference in VoIP-Pal’s list), so it is irrelevant that a “calling card’s phone number
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`is known but not in response to caller information.” Id. at 8. The alleged difference shines no light
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-4-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 10 of 17
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`on whether Claim 1 and calling cards are analogous. Like the switchboard analogy, the calling-card
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`analogy further shows that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
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`Finally, VoIP-Pal and its declarant, Dr. Mangione-Smith,5 argue that Claim 1 “relates to
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`dynamically providing an optimal point-of-access connection to the communication network for a
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`mobile device based on its changing location.” However, Claim 1 does not claim, and the
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`specification does not describe, this concept. The terms “dynamically,” “optimal,” “point of
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`access,” and “changing location” do not even appear in the patents. (See generally ’234 and ’721
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`patents, Dkts. 1-2, 1-3.) To the contrary, Claim 1 itself explicitly contemplates an access code
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`“associated with a location pre-associated with the mobile telephone” rather than based on a
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`dynamically changing location. ’234 patent at 34:49–55. Accordingly, VoIP-Pal’s arguments are
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`untethered to the intrinsic evidence.
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`3. Claim 1 uses known technology to perform routine functions.
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`VoIP-Pal does not contest that it did not invent Claim 1’s hardware (a mobile device and an
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`access server). Though using generic computing components do not preclude eligibility per se, they
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`are a telltale sign of ineligibility when performing the same routine functions as in other settings
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`(here, routing communications between phones and servers).6 Overall, the Alice step one analysis
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`overwhelmingly points to Claim 1 as directed to an abstract idea.
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`B. Alice step two: Claim 1 lacks an inventive concept.
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`VoIP-Pal argues that (1) the Claim 1’s use of “access codes” is an “inventive alternative,”
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`(2) the prosecution history demonstrates that Claim 1 contains an “inventive alternative,” (3) DDR
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`is analogous and confirms patentability, (4) the ordering of steps is inventive, and (5) that Dr.
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`Mangione-Smith’s declaration saves the patents. Each argument fails.
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`First, VoIP-Pal incorrectly argues that “Claim 1 recites an inventive alternative to
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`5 The Mangione-Smith declaration is part of VoIP-Pal’s complaint in the Twitter case only, but
`Defendants jointly address it to obviate any claim by VoIP-Pal that it deserves a chance to add it
`to its complaints in the Google and Meta cases.
`6 Without any ability to point to new technology or even new functions performed by existing
`hardware, VoIP-Pal sets up a straw man argument that “Claim 1 does not merely automate calling
`card or switchboard processes.” Opp’n at 9. That is not Movants’ argument for this issue; rather,
`Movants contend that Claim 1 relies on known hardware to perform known functions that such
`known hardware routinely performs. Mot. at 11.
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-5-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 11 of 17
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`conventional mobile telephone roaming,” by “using an access code to provide an optimized point-
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`of-access to a network for calling a callee based on the calling device’s current location and not
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`based on conventional roaming.” Opp’n at 10–11 (emphasis in original). But VoIP-Pal concedes
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`that an “access code” is not inventive. Id. at 13 (“[N]either VoIP-Pal nor Dr. Mangione-Smith assert
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`that an ‘access code’ is inventive by itself.”). Nor could VoIP-Pal seriously contend otherwise:
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`access codes are nothing more than an ill-defined label for conventional call-routing identifiers that
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`are routinely used when routing via switchboard operators, trunk lines, or calling cards. See VoIP-
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`Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (finding a similar “gateway” to be “undefined” and “nothing
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`more than a placeholder for the structure ‘through which the call . . . will be carried.’”).
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`VoIP-Pal instead argues that “it is the claimed use of an access code to facilitate an
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`unconventional form of roaming that was not well-understood, routine, or conventional.” Opp’n at
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`13. But using an access code “to provide an optimized point-of-access to a network for calling a
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`callee based on the calling device’s current location,” id. at 10–11, amounts to nothing more than
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`implementing the abstract idea of routing communications based on participant characteristics and
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`with conventional technology and is not an inventive concept. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent
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`Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[H]ere, steps that generically spell out what it means
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`to ‘apply it on a telephone network’ [] cannot confer patent eligibility.”); see also Secured Mail
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`Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The fact that an identifier
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`can be used to make a process more efficient, however, does not necessarily render an abstract idea
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`less abstract.”). Moreover, using the “current location” is not even reflected in the claimed
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`invention, as Claim 1 explicitly contemplates using an access code “associated with a location pre-
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`associated with the mobile telephone . . . .” ’234 patent at 34:49–55 (emphasis added).
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`Second, VoIP-Pal argues that statements made by the applicant during the prosecution of
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`the patent shows that the claims include an inventive use of access codes. However, the quoted
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`passages confirm only that the purported invention is directed to the same basic concepts of
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`“avoidance of long distance or roaming charges” and avoiding “engaging other mobile telephone
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`service providers directly” already reflected in calling cards and basic call routing. See Opp’n at
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`11. They, like the claim itself, provide no indication of how the patents achieve those aims.
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-6-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 12 of 17
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`Third, DDR is readily distinguishable. See VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 972
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`(distinguishing DDR for comparable patent claim). The Federal Circuit in DDR determined that the
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`claims at issue “recite[d] an invention that is not merely the routine or conventional use of the
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`Internet” only after finding that the “claimed solution [was] necessarily rooted in computer
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`technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
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`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014). It also
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`cautioned “that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for
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`patent.” Id. at 1258. Here, unlike in DDR, the problem being addressed is not computer-centric. In
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`fact, the patent specification describes the problem and solution: automating the “complicated or
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`cumbersome steps in order to initiate a call to the callee” with calling cards, using conventional
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`technology. ’234 patent at 1:28–32.
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`Fourth, VoIP-Pal argues that requiring an access code “in response to caller information”
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`is unconventional and thus inventive. Opp’n at 12. It is not. Setting aside that VoIP-Pal’s view of
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`calling-card practices is too rigid and does not take into account the caller’s choice of which calling
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`card to use, any differences between the order of steps for Claim 1 versus that for calling cards is a
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`natural, but immaterial, result of implementing basic calling-card practices in a conventional
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`automated process rather than via manual user inputs. Fundamentally, VoIP-Pal confuses the proper
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`inquiry at this stage and again collapses the eligibility inquiry into merely assessing whether Claim
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`1 is in any way different from a preexisting practice.
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`Fifth, Dr. Mangione-Smith’s declaration fails alongside VoIP-Pal’s arguments. As
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`explained in Movants’ motion, the declaration is conclusory and unaligned with the claims and
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`specification. See Mot. at 12–13. VoIP-Pal again baldly claims that Claim 1 is inventive because
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`“it is the claimed use of an access code to facilitate an unconventional form of roaming,” without
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`any explanation of how that “unconventional” form of roaming works other than by implementing
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`long-known routing concepts in a conventional environment. See Opp’n at 13. The declaration
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`cannot overcome the plain, abstract nature of Claim 1 and its lack of inventive concept as shown
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`by the intrinsic evidence. See CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., 40 F.4th 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
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`(affirming finding of ineligibility and no genuine fact issue “due to the explicit contradiction
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-7-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 13 of 17
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`between CareDx’s extrinsic evidence and the numerous admissions of conventionality in the
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`intrinsic record”); VoIP-Pal v. Apple, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 968 (“[T]he fact that these claim elements
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`are conventional can be discerned from the patent itself—no outside evidence is needed.”). Here
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`too, “neither the claims nor the specification provide[] the critical ‘how,’” and “the validity of the
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`Patents-in-Suit does not turn on the factual issue of whether the alleged improvements are ‘well-
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`understood, routine, and conventional.’” Id. at 974 (quoting Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F. 3d 1360,
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`1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
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`II. CLAIM 1 OF THE ’234 PATENT IS REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL ASSERTED
`CLAIMS
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`Claim 1 of the ’234 patent is representative for patent-eligibility purposes because the
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`asserted claims “are substantially similar in that they recite little more than the same abstract idea
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`. . . .” Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343,
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`1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The fact that the ’234 and ’721 patents share a specification also “is some
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`additional indication of representativeness.” PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc., 404 F.
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`Supp. 3d 1021, 1035 (E.D. Tex. 2019). VoIP-Pal makes two overarching arguments: (1) that Claim
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`1 is not representative of the server side claims, and (2) that Claim 1 is not representative of claims
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`that include means-plus-function terms. VoIP-Pal is wrong on both fronts.
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`First, the server-side claims are not patently distinct—they merely provide the mirror-image
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`of Claim 1. VoIP-Pal essentially contends that the server-side claims disclose a meaningful
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`additional step of “producing an access code.” However, this step just reiterates the same basic
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`limitations as Claim 1: that an access code somehow exists that identifies a phone number or IP
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`address that enables a local call to be made via a communication channel, which is associated with
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`the caller’s location. Compare ’234 patent, Claims 1 and 30. Like Claim 1, the server-side claims
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`give no information on how an access code is generated or could represent an inventive concept.
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`At most, VoIP-Pal points to “minor, non-technical variations” among the asserted claims
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`that do not meaningfully affect the eligibility analysis. Fast 101 PTY Ltd. v. Citigroup Inc., 424 F.
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`Supp. 3d 385, 388 (D. Del. 2020) (finding representativeness where “all of the independent claims
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`of the remaining patents recite the same concept . . . and the dependent claims offer only minor,
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`REPLY ISO 101 MOTION
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`-8-
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`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-09773-JD
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`Case 3:21-cv-09773-JD Document 64 Filed 03/30/23 Page 14 of 17
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`non-technical variations”); see also People.ai, Inc. v. SetSail Techs., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 3d 1193,
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`1205–11 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (finding representativeness and ineligibility for “substantially similar”
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`claims that the patentee “does not meaningfully distinguish”). VoIP-Pal rattles off some of these
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`variations but never explains how they meaningfully affect the eligibility analysis.
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`Second, VoIP-Pal’s argument that means-plus-function claiming saves the patents from
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`being directed to ineligible subject matter is wrong. Where, as here, the specification discloses
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`nothing but generic technology as the structure for the means-plus-function limitation, the claims
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`are still ineligible. See Hyper Search, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 17-1387-CFC-SRF, 2018 WL
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`6617143, at *9 (D. Del. Dec. 17, 2018) (“Additionally, the means-plus-function limitations in the
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`asserted claims do not render them patent eligible because the specification describes generic, well-
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`known computer hardware and software components.”); iSentium, LLC v. Bloomberg Fin. L.P.,
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`343 F. Supp. 3d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding ineligibility for means-plus-function claim
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`where it “does not describe a structure that confers patent protection to an abstract idea”); Landmark
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`Tech., LLC v. Assurant,