Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 1 of 12
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`George A. Zelcs *
`gzelcs@koreintillery.com
`Randall P. Ewing, Jr. *
`rewing@koreintillery.com
`Ryan Z. Cortazar *
`rcortazar@koreintillery.com
`KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
`205 North Michigan, Suite 1950
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Tel: (312) 641-9750/ Fax: (312) 641-9751
`
`Stephen M. Tillery *
`stillery@koreintillery.com
`Steven M. Berezney, CA Bar #329923
`sberezney@koreintillery.com
`Carol O’Keefe *
`cokeefe@koreintillery.com
`KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
`505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
`St. Louis, MO 63101
`Tel: (314) 241-4844/ Fax: (314) 241-3525
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`*Admitted pro hac vice
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`Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
`Defendants
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`
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`Joshua Irwin Schiller, CA Bar #330653
`jischiller@bsfllp.com
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`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`44 Montgomery St., 41st Floor
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`San Francisco, CA 94104
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`Tel: (415) 293-6800/ Fax: (415) 293-6899
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`
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`Philip C. Korologos *
`pkorologos@bsfllp.com
`Jeffrey Waldron*
`jwaldron@bsfllp.com
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor
`New York, NY 10001
`Tel: (212) 446-2300/ Fax: (212) 446-2350
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`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`MARIA SCHNEIDER, UNIGLOBE
`ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, and AST
`PUBLISHING, LTD., individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
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`Case No. 3:20-cv-04423-JD
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`PLAINTIFFS AND COUNTERCLAIM
`DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`YOUTUBE, LLC and GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendants.
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` Judge: Hon. James Donato
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`Date: June 12, 2023
`Time: 9:00 a.m
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`YOUTUBE, LLC and GOOGLE LLC,
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`Counterclaimants,
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`v.
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`PIRATE MONITOR LTD., et al.,
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`Counterclaim Defendants.
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 2 of 12
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`Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of this Court’s Standing Order for Civil Jury Trials, Plaintiffs
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`Maria Schneider, Uniglobe Entertainment, LLC (“Uniglobe”), and AST Publishing, Ltd. (“AST”)
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`hereby submit this Trial Brief “specifying each cause of action and defense remaining to be tried
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`along with a statement of the applicable legal standard.” Standing Order for Civil Jury Trials ¶ 4.
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`PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for violations of the Copyright Act, including
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`direct copyright infringement (Cause of Action I), contributory copyright infringement (Cause of
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`Action III), vicarious copyright infringement (Cause of Action IV), and violations of 17 U.S.C.
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`§ 1202, which prohibits the removal of copyright management information or the distribution of
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`copies of copyrighted works with knowledge that copyright management information had been
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`removed (Cause of Action V).
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`Plaintiffs bring their claims against Defendants on behalf of themselves and four proposed
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`classes: (1) the Registered Works Infringement Class; (2) the Foreign Unregistered Works
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`Infringement Class; (3) the ISRC Class; and (4) the CLFN Class. [See ECF 245 at 3–4.]
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`Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification remains pending before the Court.
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`Defendants assert that they cannot be held liable for Plaintiffs’ copyright infringement
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`claims because (1) they are eligible for the protections of the safe harbor provisions of the Digital
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`Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)1; (2) the alleged copyright violations were authorized by
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`express licenses of the works; (3) the alleged infringements constitute fair use; and (4) some of the
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`alleged infringements are outside of the applicable limitations period.
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`The Court issued a Summary Judgment Order on January 5, 2023 [ECF 222], granting
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`Defendants’ partial summary judgment motion against Ms. Schneider “with respect to (1) all
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`infringement claims based on the 27 works for which Schneider failed to identify an infringement;
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`1 On May 4, 2023, Defendants informed Plaintiffs that they will seek not to pursue a defense under
`the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA if neither of the putative infringement classes is certified.
`Plaintiffs oppose their attempt to unilaterally amend their pleadings to withdraw this defense
`which has been vigorously litigated for three years. Plaintiffs filed an administrative motion on
`May 5, 2023, bringing this issue to the Court’s attention and requesting further argument or
`briefing on its impact on class certification issues. [ECF 309.]
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 3 of 12
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`(2) direct infringement claims based on the 15 works that were uploaded to YouTube by Schneider
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`or with her permission; and (3) the 121 alleged infringements that Ms. Schneider had actual
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`knowledge of more than one year before filing suit.” [Id. at 22.] As a result, Ms. Schneider’s
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`claims are limited to infringements for which she did not have actual knowledge more than one
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`year before filing suit. Further, Ms. Schneider’s direct infringement claims are limited to those
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`works that were not licensed to YouTube through upload. Ms. Schneider’s indirect infringement
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`claims were not affected by the Summary Judgment Order. Uniglobe and AST eliminated claims
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`of direct infringement for their works that were uploaded to YouTube, and claims for any
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`instances of infringement of which they had actual knowledge more than one year before the
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`commencement of this action, consistent with that Order.
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`On March 3, 2023, Plaintiffs submitted a partial motion for summary judgment as to
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`whether Defendants are eligible for the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium
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`Copyright Act (“DMCA”). [ECF 265]. That motion set forth sufficient, but not comprehensive,
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`reasons why that issue should be resolved in favor of Plaintiffs—specifically because YouTube
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`prevents copyright holders from seeing search results for the huge number of videos that are
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`private or unlisted. Plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment remains pending before the
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`Court.
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`Defendants also bring a counterclaim against Pirate Monitor Ltd. (formerly a Plaintiff but
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`which voluntarily dismissed its claims [ECF 66]) and Gabor Csupo under 17 U.S.C. 512(f) for
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`allegedly submitting false takedown notices in 2019 that caused videos to be removed from
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`YouTube.2 Defendants cannot carry their burden of proof as to these counterclaims. Pirate
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`Monitor Ltd. was dormant at the time the alleged violations occurred, and the takedown notices in
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`question were submitted by agents or sub-agents of another company, Intellectual Property LLC,
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`for which Mr. Csupo is not liable. [See ECF 260 at 9–10, 16–18.] Mr. Csupo and Pirate Monitor
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`Ltd. assert affirmative defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto.
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`2 Defendants purport to bring counterclaims against Pirate Monitor, LLC, a non-existent entity.
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 4 of 12
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` I.
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`COPYRIGHT ACT VIOLATIONS
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`A. Direct Copyright Infringement
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`In the Ninth Circuit, a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement requires that the
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`plaintiff show (1) “ownership of the allegedly infringed material,” (2) that “the alleged infringers
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`violated at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106,” and (3)
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`“causation (also referred to as ‘volitional conduct’) by the defendant.” Perfect 10 v. Giganews,
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`847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).
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`A plaintiff bears the burden of proving copyright ownership, which is a threshold question
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`in copyright infringement actions. See Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 654 F.3d 958, 962 (9th
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`Cir. 2011) (citing Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984)). “To prove
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`ownership, Plaintiff must establish either that it authored the asserted work, or that there has been
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`a ‘transfer of rights or other relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as to constitute the
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`plaintiff as the valid copyright claimant.’” Art of Living Found. v. Does 1-10, 2012 WL 1565281,
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`at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2012) (quoting 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01). A copyright
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`registration certificate is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated
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`in the certificate.” United Fabrics Int'l. v. C&J Wear., 630 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011).
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`The following exclusive rights attach to the Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works:
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`“(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
`(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
`(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
`public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
`lending;
`(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
` pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
`perform the copyrighted work publicly;
`(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
` pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
` individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
`display the copyrighted work publicly; and
`(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
`publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C § 106.
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`Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501, a plaintiff has standing to sue if he or she has “a legal or
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`beneficial interest in at least one of the exclusive rights described in § 106.” Silvers v. Sony
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`Pictures Ent., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005).
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 5 of 12
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`“Direct liability must be premised on conduct that can reasonably be described as the
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`direct cause of the infringement ‘with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying
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`that one could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the
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`copyright owner.’” Perfect 10. v. Giganews, 2014 WL 8628034, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014)
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`(quoting Costar Group v. Loopnet, 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004). The issue of direct
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`infringement for an internet service provider like YouTube thus turns on whether the defendant:
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`(1) exercised control over the infringing act; (2) selected the infringing material; or (3) instigated
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`any copying, storage, or distribution. See Giganews, 847 F.3d at 670.
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`Plaintiffs bring claims for infringements of United States works and foreign works. A
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`“United States work” is a work that is “first published—(A) in the United States; (B)
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`simultaneously in the United States and another treaty party or parties, whose law grants a term of
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`copyright protection that is the same as or longer than the term provided in the United States.”
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`17 U.S.C. §101 (omitting subparts not relevant). Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) and (c), no action for
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`infringement may be brought for a “United States work” unless the work is registered prior to
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`infringement or within three months of its first transmission.
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`A “foreign work” is any work that is not a “United States work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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`Foreign works are exempt from the registration requirements of the Copyright Act. See TVB
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`Holdings USA. v. Enom., 2014 WL 12581778, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014) (“[R]egistration is
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`not a prerequisite to bringing suit over a copyrighted work originating outside the United States.”).
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`B. Contributory Copyright Infringement
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`“A party engages in contributory copyright infringement when it (1) has knowledge of
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`another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that
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`infringement.” Erickson Productions v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
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`“Contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer ‘know or have reason to know’ of
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`direct infringement.” A&M Recs. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). “There is no
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`dispute that a proper takedown notice under the DMCA would confer [the defendant] with actual
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`knowledge of the specific acts of infringement identified in the notice.” Perfect 10 v. Giganews,
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`2014 WL 8628031, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014). The element of material contribution is
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 6 of 12
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`satisfied when the alleged contributory infringer “can take simple measures to prevent further
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`damage to copyrighted works yet continues to provide access to infringing works.” Perfect 10 v.
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`Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
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`C. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
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`“To prevail on a vicarious liability claim, plaintiff must prove defendant has (1) the right
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`and ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringing
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`activity.” Erickson, 921 F.3d at 829 (cleaned up). “A vicarious infringer exercises control over a
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`direct infringer when he has both a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as
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`well as the practical ability to do so.” Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018)
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`(cleaned up). “The essential aspect of the ‘direct financial benefit’ inquiry is whether there is a
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`causal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps.”
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`Erickson, 921 F.3d at 829.
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`II.
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`VIOLATIONS OF 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)
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`Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendants for violations of 17 U.S.C § 1202(b), which
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`prohibits the knowing removal of copyright management information (“CMI”) or the distribution
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`of copyrighted works with the knowledge that copyright management information has been
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`removed. 17 U.S.C § 1202(b) provides in relevant part:
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`“No person shall, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law—
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`“(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright
`management information, [or] . . .
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`“(3) distribute, import for distribution, or publicly perform
`works, copies of works, or phonorecords, knowing that
`copyright management information has been removed or
`altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law,
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`“knowing, or, with respect to civil remedies under section 1203, having
`reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or
`conceal an infringement of any right under this title.”
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`To establish a claim under Section 1202(b)(1), Plaintiffs must show “(1) the existence of
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`CMI on the [infringed work]; (2) removal and/or alteration of that information; and (3) that the
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`removal and/or alteration was done intentionally.” Mango v. BuzzFeed, 356 F. Supp. 3d 368, 376
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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`To establish a claim under Section 1202(b)(3), Plaintiffs must similarly establish: “(1) the
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`existence of CMI on the infringed work; (2) distribution of the infringed work containing missing
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`and/or altered CMI; and (3) that the distribution was done knowing that the CMI was removed
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`and/or altered without permission.” Id.
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`“Both provisions . . . require the defendant to possess the mental state of knowing, or
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`having a reasonable basis to know, that his actions ‘will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal
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`infringement.’” Stevens v. Corelogic, 899 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2018).
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`III. DEFENSES
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`A. DMCA Safe Harbor
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`Defendants assert that they cannot be held liable for any direct or secondary copyright
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`infringements because they qualify for the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C
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`§§ 512(c) and (d). To be eligible for the safe harbor protections of the DMCA, Defendants must
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`demonstrate that they meet the two conditions set forth in § 512(i)(1). The failure to satisfy either
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`of these threshold conditions deprives Defendants of eligibility. Giganews, 993 F. Supp. at 1196
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`(C.D. Cal. 2014) (“To be eligible for any of the four safe harbors stated in § 512(a)-(d), a service
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`provider must first meet the threshold conditions set out in § 512(i).”).
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`“The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply
` to a service provider only if the service provider—
`(A)
`“has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs
`subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s
`system or network of, a policy that provides for the
`termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and
`account holders of the service provider’s system or network
`who are repeat infringers; and
`“accommodates and does not interfere with standard
`technical measures.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1).
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`(B)
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`The term “standard technical measures” is set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2):
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`“As used in § 512(i)(1)(B), the term “standard technical measures”
`means: technical measures that are used by copyright owners to
`identify to protect copyrighted works and—
`(A)
`“have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of
`copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair,
`voluntary, multi-industry standards process;
`“are available to any person on reasonable and
`nondiscriminatory terms; and
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`(B)
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`(C)
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`"do not impose substantial costs on service providers or
`substantial burdens on their systems or networks.”
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`In addition, in order to show that Defendants have adopted, reasonably implemented and
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`informed users of their policy to terminate repeat copyright infringers from using the platform,
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`Defendants must meet their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
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`YouTube “has a working notification system”; (2) YouTube has “a procedure for dealing with
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`DMCA-compliant notifications”; (3) YouTube “does not actively prevent copyright owners from
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`collecting information needed to issue such notifications”; and (4) YouTube’s implementation of
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`its policy did not allow a substantial number of repeat infringers to access the platform without
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`restriction. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007).
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`If an internet service provider can satisfy these threshold eligibility requirements, they may
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`then be eligible for the DMCA safe harbor provisions if for each alleged infringement the service
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`provider demonstrates that it:
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`(A)
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`(B)
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`“(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an
`activity using the material on the system or network is
`infringing;
`“(i) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware
`of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
`apparent; or
`“(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
`expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
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`“does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to
`the infringing activity, in a case in which the service
`provider has the right and ability to control such activity;
`and
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`“upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds
`expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material
`that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
`infringing activity.” 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1).
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` A
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` service provider must “expeditiously” remove infringing material if it has either actual
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`knowledge or “red flag knowledge” of the infringement. “Actual knowledge refers to whether the
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`service provider had subjective knowledge, while red flag knowledge turns on whether a
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 9 of 12
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`reasonable person would objectively know of the infringements. Both actual and red flag
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`knowledge refer to knowledge of the specific infringement alleged.” Mavrix Photographs v.
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`Livejournal, 873 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Failure “to remove, or
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`disable access to, the material” renders the service provider ineligible for the DMCA’s safe harbor
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`protections. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). General knowledge that the service is used for copyright
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`infringement is insufficient. UMG Recordings. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022
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`(9th Cir. 2013). The requirement that the service provider has not received a financial benefit
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`directly attributable to the infringement applies “in a case in which the service provider has the
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`right and ability to control such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(d). To have “the right and ability to
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`control,” the service provider must exert “substantial influence on the activities of users.” UMG
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`Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1030.
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`B. Express License
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`Defendants contend that they are not liable for direct copyright infringement because
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`Plaintiffs granted YouTube an express license in certain of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.
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`Defendants claim that Plaintiffs cannot assert direct copyright infringement against them where
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`Defendant was granted an express license to copy or distribute the work. The “existence of a
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`license creates an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.’” Oracle USA v.
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`Rimini St., 879 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church
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`of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “‘[w]hen a licensee exceeds the scope of
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`the license granted by the copyright holder, the licensee is liable for infringement.’” Oracle USA,
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`879 F.3d at 954 (quoting LGS Architects, v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th
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`Cir. 2006)).
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`C. Fair Use
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`Under the Copyright Act, “Courts are directed to determine fair use on the basis of the
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`following non-exclusive factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
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`use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
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`copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
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`3:20-cv-04423-JD
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 10 of 12
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`copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
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`the copyrighted work.” Monge v. Maya Mags., 688 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2012).
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`D. Statute of Limitations
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`Defendants assert that some of Plaintiffs’ alleged infringements are barred by the one-year
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`limitations period set forth in YouTube’s Terms of Service. The Court’s Summary Judgment
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`Order [ECF 222] found that the contractual limitations period, rather than the three-year
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`limitations period under the Copyright Act, applies. Plaintiffs have eliminated all infringement
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`claims of which they had actual knowledge more than one year before filing suit to streamline the
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`issues to be litigated at trial.3 Defendants claim that a portion of the remaining infringements are
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`barred by Plaintiffs’ constructive knowledge, which Plaintiffs dispute. See Fahmy v. Jay-Z, 835 F.
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`Supp. 2d 783, 787–88 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“A claim for copyright infringement accrues when one
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`has knowledge of a violation or is chargeable with such knowledge. Actual or constructive
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`knowledge of facts giving rise to the alleged infringement is sufficient” (citations omitted).).
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`IV. DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIM
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`Defendants’ counterclaims against Mr. Csupo and Pirate Monitor Ltd. assert that they
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`violated 17 U.S.C § 512(f) by submitting false takedown requests in 2019 that caused videos to be
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`removed from YouTube. To prevail on this claim, Defendants must demonstrate by a
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`preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Csupo and Pirate Monitor Ltd. submitted the takedown
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`notices, that they “knowingly and materially misrepresent[ed] that copyright infringement has
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`occurred,” that Defendants “relied on such misrepresentations,” and that Defendants “have been
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`“injured as a result.” See Automattic v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
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`(cleaned up). Defendants cannot meet this burden of proof for several reasons. First, Pirate
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`Monitor Ltd. did not submit to YouTube the takedown notices at issue; it was dormant in 2019
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`and was not acquired by Mr. Csupo until 2020. As to Mr. Csupo, he also did not submit the
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`takedown notices; they were submitted by agents or sub-agents of another company, Intellectual
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`Property LLC, for which Mr. Csupo is not liable as a matter of law. Alternatively or in addition,
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`3 Plaintiffs reserve their ability to challenge this finding on appeal.
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`PLAINTIFFS AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF
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`3:20-cv-04423-JD
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 11 of 12
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`the takedown notices were submitted by agents or sub-agents of a different company, MegaFilm
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`kft., for which Mr. Csupo is not liable as a matter of law, including as explained in the pending
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`motion for summary judgment filed by Pirate Monitor Ltd. and Mr. Csupo. [ECF 260.]
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`Mr. Csupo and Pirate Monitor Ltd. assert two affirmative defenses in response to
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`Defendants’ allegations: (1) unclean hands and (2) in pari delicto. These defenses are grounded in
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`Defendants’ inequitable conduct of encouraging copyright infringement via YouTube.
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`“‘To establish unclean hands, a defendant must demonstrate (1) inequitable conduct by the
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`plaintiff; (2) that the plaintiff's conduct directly relates to the claim which it has asserted against
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`the defendant; and (3) plaintiff's conduct injured the defendant.’” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
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`v. Grokster, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Survivor Productions v. Fox
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`Broadcasting Co., 2001 WL 35829270, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2001)). “The doctrine of in pari
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`delicto dictates that when a participant in illegal, fraudulent, or inequitable conduct seeks to
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`recover from another participant in that conduct, the parties are deemed in pari delicto, and the
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`law will aid neither, but rather, will leave them where it finds them.” Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat.
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`Assn., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1143 n.1 (2005).
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`Dated: May 11, 2023
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`/s/ Philip Korologos
`Philip C. Korologos*
`Jeffrey Waldron*
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor
`New York, NY 10001
`Phone: (212) 446-2300
`Fax: (212) 446-2350
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`Joshua Irwin Schiller, CA Bar #330653
`BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
`44 Montgomery St., 41st Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Phone: (415) 293-6800
`Fax: (415) 293-6899
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`3:20-cv-04423-JD
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`Case 3:20-cv-04423-JD Document 320 Filed 05/11/23 Page 12 of 12
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`George A. Zelcs*
`Randall P. Ewing, Jr.*
`Ryan Z. Cortazar*
`KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
`205 North Michigan, Suite 1950
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Telephone: (312) 641-9750
`Facsimile: (312) 641-9751
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`Stephen M. Tillery*
`Steven M. Berezney, CA Bar #329923
`Carol O’Keefe*
`KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
`505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
`St. Louis, MO 63101
`Telephone: (314) 241-4844
`Facsimile: (314) 241-3525
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`*Admitted pro hac vice
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`Attorneys for Plaintiffs Schneider, Uniglobe
`and AST and for Counterclaim Defendants
`Pirate Monitor Ltd. and Csupo
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`11
`PLAINTIFFS AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS’ TRIAL BRIEF
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`3:20-cv-04423-JD
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